










Innovation and Transition in Law:
Experiences and Theoretical Settings
The Figuerola Institute
Programme: Legal History
The Programme “Legal History” of the Figuerola Institute of Social Science History –a part of
the Carlos III University of Madrid– is devoted to improve the overall knowledge on the history of law
from different points of view –academically, culturally, socially, and institutionally– covering both 
ancient and modern eras. A number of experts from several countries have participated in
the Programme, bringing in their specialized knowledge and dedication to the subject of their expertise.
To give a better visibility of its activities, the Programme has published in its Book Series
a number of monographs on the different aspects of its academic discipline.
Publisher:




Manuel Ángel Bermejo Castrillo, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Catherine Fillon, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3
Manuel Martínez Neira, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Carlos Petit, Universidad de Huelva
Cristina Vano, Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II
More information at www.uc3m.es/legal_history
Innovation and Transition in Law:











c/ Meléndez Valdés, 61 – 28015 Madrid






Versión electrónica disponible en e-Archivo
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/31394
Licencia Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
7
Massimo Meccarelli, Cristiano Paixão, Claudia Roesler, Innovation and 
transition in law: some introductory remarks on the heuristic value of 
a conceptual pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Setting Concepts
Massimo Meccarelli, Time of innovation and time of transition shaping 
the legal dimension: a methodological approach from legal history . . . .
Maria Pia Guerra, What is a legal transition? Thoughts on legal change 
amidst a political transition (Brazil, 1980-2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Flavia Stara, New philosophical paradigms and demand for law: 
space for innovation. Reflections on the time of transition as a practi-
cal structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Douglas Antônio Rocha Pinheiro, Melancholy as a permanent transi-
tion in law and democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cristiano Paixão, Uses of silence in political and legal transitions: a 
methodological approach to constitutional history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Considering Semantics
Claudia Roesler, Legal concepts from the standpoint of innovation and 
preservation of meaning: a rhetorical perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Francesco Gambino, Latent innovations in a legal system and civil law 
categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Antonella Meniconi, The words of Justice and the long italian transi-
tion (1943-1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Isaac Costa Reis, Rhetoric, technological innovation and legal audi-















Raphael Peixoto de Paula Marques, Constituent power and constitu-
tional change in Brazil’s transition to democracy (1945-1946) . . . . . . . .
Claudia Paiva Carvalho, Transition to democracy and the Brazilian 
presidential system post-1946: the relationship between institutional 
design and political instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elisabetta Fusar Poli, The physical body through the juridical lens: an 
issue of law of innovation and of innovation in law (XIX-XX cent.) . . . .
Francesca Martello, From telegraph to telephone: an exemplary tran-
sitional space in the legal discipline of technical innovations (1877-
1903) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alessio Bartolacelli, In the middle of nowhere. The never-ending tran-
sition of Italian private companies (società a responsabilità limitata 
- SRL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Giovanni Di Cosimo, The evolution of the form of government in Italy . . . .








Innovation and transition in law:
some introductory remarks on the heuristic value of a conceptual pair
Massimo Meccarelli, Cristiano Paixão, Claudia Roesler
1. Innovation-transition as a conceptual pair: correlation and juxtaposition; 2. 
The definition problem; 3. The issue of legal actors; 4. Areas of incidence of inno-
vation-transition; 5. Conclusions
The contributions collected in this volume1 are intended to offer a space for 
discussion on the major issues of the modernisation of law and legal change. 
Their object is principally represented by two key concepts – those of “inno-
vation” and “transition” – which appear to be as relevant to these phenomena 
as they are little defined in the taxonomy of contemporary legal science.
Nevertheless, a critical reflection on the heuristic value of these categories 
in legal history seems to be useful2. The problem of the modernisation of law 
in recent times, especially under the pressure of technological development 
and globalization, is to be considered as increasingly addressed using the in-
terpretative key of “innovation”. Whereas it is rather in terms of “transition” 
that it seems possible to consider the effect of legal change. 
The group of Italian and Brazilian scholars who participate in this volume, 
in continuing the common research itinerary undertaken in recent years,3 
aimed to investigate these problems using an interdisciplinary prism. It in-
cludes points of view from inside the legal sciences – such as legal history, 
philosophy of law, constitutional law, private and business law – and from 
outside them, such as philosophy and the history of political institutions.
1  This book is the result of two workshops held respectively at the Department of Law 
of the University of Macerata on 17 and 18 June 2019 and at the Faculty of law at the Uni-
versity of Brasilia on 4 and 5 November 2019. 
We would like to thank Prof. Manuel Martinez Neira for including this publication 
in the series Legal History of the Figuerola Institute - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Many thanks also to Gabriel Faustino Santos for the editing of the manuscript. 
2  In this perspective see Costa (2019).
3  See the volumes: Meccarelli (ed.) (2016); Martins/Roesler/Paixão (eds.) (2020); 
Paixão/Meccarelli (eds.) (2021).
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1. Innovation-transition as a conceptual pair: correlation and juxtaposition
Against this background, and in the light of the legal facts examined, the 
book investigates the theoretical possibility of conceiving innovation-transi-
tion as a conceptual pair and questions its possible applications. It seems that 
innovation, in fact, can occur precisely in processes of transition; while tran-
sition can be the consequence of innovation.
The framework of legal experience provides various confirmations in this 
respect. For example, to stay with the cases studied in the volume, let us look 
at the problem of the construction of a democracy in Italy or Brazil: here the 
projects, certainly oriented towards innovation, gained ground by crossing 
the space of a transition. This emerges from the analysis of the discursive 
strategies of the Judiciary in Italy after the collapse of Fascism (Meniconi), 
and from the study of the dynamics of constituent power in Brazil after the 
crisis of the Estado Novo in 1945 (Peixoto), as well as in the aftermath of the 
Dictatorship in 1988 (Paixão).
Other analyses clearly show how legal innovation finds its place in a tran-
sitional space. Alessio Bartolacelli reaches a similar conclusion by recon-
structing the choices made by the Italian lawmakers in the last twenty years 
in private companies issues. It also emerges from the study of doctrinal and 
case law responses to unprecedented problems, such as the legal qualification 
of the body (Fusar Poli) and the legal regulation of the machines of the new 
technologies (Martello) in the early twentieth century, as well as regarding 
the new implications of the good faith clause in the current time (Gambino).
Moreover, philosophy indicates how transition is fully suited to act as a 
practical structure of innovation processes (Stara) and also from a strictly 
legal theoretical point of view, it can be seen that legal innovations are main-
ly expressed in new ways of using existing concepts (Gambino, Roesler). As 
pointed out by Massimo Meccarelli, innovation and transition share a com-
mon trait, as their performativity seems to consist in attributing a situational 
value to the law; moreover, they appear as complementary concepts that in-
sist on different aspects of the phenomenology of legal change (respectively a 
way of seeing the law in the case of innovation and a way of being of the law 
in the case of transition).
The volume also takes into consideration a different value of the dyad in-
novation-transition: that in which the link between the two concepts is ex-
pressed as juxtaposition. In fact, if on the one hand, transition presupposes 
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the need for innovation, it also leads to opposing tensions. This is because by 
representing a place of time management (Paixão) and therefore by allowing 
different regimes of historicity4 to coexist, the construction of the “space of 
loss” as a foundation generated by the past (Paixão, Pinheiro) depends on it. 
In contrast to innovation, then, transition is a process that does not always 
provide directions on “where we are going to” (Bartolacelli). It can trigger 
resistance to a project for innovation, as, for example, emerges from certain 
attitudes of the Judiciary and its case law, in different historical phases (Fu-
sar Poli; Meniconi). Transition may also be the consequence of a crisis in an 
innovation programme. In this book, two experiences are analysed: Giovanni 
Di Cosimo evaluates the parable of parliamentarianism in Italy and Claudia 
Carvalho studies the crisis scenarios in which the presidential regime took 
place in the Brazilian Republic between 1945 and 1964.
These axes constitute the underlying plot of the volume while structur-
ally it is organized in three parts. In the first part, the book faces both the 
theoretical and methodological challenges posed by the two key concepts. In 
the second part, the book focuses on the relationships between the language 
and content of law. In its concluding part, the volume concentrates on some 
meaningful experiences, with different results concerning research in cases 
of innovation and transition. This lay-out, developed through the interdisci-
plinary prism of the research group, has increased the possibilities of investi-
gation of the theme. Of the multiple results that have emerged, we highlight 
below those on which the different analyses seem to converge.
2. The definition problem
The first area is related to the definition problem. In many ways it is in-
superable. We are not reflecting, in fact, on a strictly formal concept that can 
therefore be captured within an exclusively legal dimension. On the contrary, 
innovation and transition, even when observed for their importance in legal 
matters, are concepts that necessarily refer to different contexts, at the same 
time social, political, economic, cultural and anthropological; the problem of 
their definition, therefore, implies a necessarily transdisciplinary approach.
A further aspect that makes the definition problem more complicated is 
the importance of the point of view (Meccarelli, Guerra, Roesler); the act of 
4  Hartog (2012).
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reflecting on them implies its own «referential dimension»,5 since transition 
and innovation, seen from the legal point of view, do not have a transcenden-
tal character (Meccarelli). On the contrary, they are phenomenalistic and, 
if on the one hand, this explains the difficulty of defining them as legal cat-
egories, on the other, it highlights their value as a tool for uncovering the 
historicity of legal forms (which traces their correspondence to social facts).6 
This peculiarity, as will also be highlighted below, opens up an analytical per-
spective on levels of legal phenomenology, to which legal theory, inspired by 
a dogmatic understanding of law, has become insensitive.
The problem of innovation and transition, however, is not only the fact 
that it is irreducible to a purely legal format, but also offers a heuristic advan-
tage for its impact. First of all, we should consider the problem of the function 
of the concepts that we use in order to talk about law. In the case of “transi-
tion” and “innovation” it is twofold: theoretical and methodological. Transi-
tion and innovation, in fact, are proposed as possible forms of legal change 
(identifying, therefore, a theoretical problem) and at the same time as analyt-
ical tools for studying legal change (identifying, therefore, a methodological 
problem). For example, it is possible, with transition and/or innovation, to 
perceive a way of being of legal phenomena such as democracy (Pinheiro), 
or constituent power (Peixoto), or even a temporal legal regime (Meccarelli, 
Paixão). At the same time transition and innovation serve as analytical tools 
when they allow us to differentiate between legal problems, to read them in 
their autonomy, with respect to social-political dynamics (Guerra, Paixão).
By emphasizing the functional dimensions of the concepts, the reader will 
find in the chapters of this volume an weighting of how their permanence and 
their replacement by other (new) concepts can be thought of. It is in concep-
tual innovation that, according to Roesler, the permanent and tense dialectics 
between the preservation of semantic meanings and innovation is harvested, 
which accompanies the also permanent process of interaction between the 
objectified law in different modes and the social reality that it seeks to reg-
ulate. Gambino makes us see, in turn, how conceptual innovations can be 
latent or explicit/radical and, according to this new conceptual pair, shows 
how they can bring about new and different hermeneutic demands. Mar-
tello’s analysis illustrates these dynamics and their internal dialectics well, 
when she examines the path of telephone regulation in Italy and analyses 
5  Ginzburg (2019) 256.
6  Grossi (2006) 97-124; Grossi (2020) 78-99.
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the intersection between technological innovation and transition. Exploring 
several historical examples, Fusar Poli also links the terms innovation and 
transition in a particularly fruitful way - which is also full of potentialities for 
future studies - by conceiving innovation as a form of transition that contains 
its apparent contrary, persistence and tradition.
From these analytical dyads mobilized above, an important theme of ju-
ridical reflection still emerges: the limits and possibilities of legal dogmatics. 
Understood as a way of thinking about legal problems in their applicational 
dimension, dogmatics emerges in Roesler’s reflection as a way of fixing some 
starting points for legal reasoning that must, however, be permanently ques-
tioned by an investigative or zetetic approach. Dogmatic is always dangerous-
ly close to succumbing to a demand for conservation and, consequently, the 
freezing of concepts, the dogmatic needs to be “oxygenated” and learn to look 
at other fields of knowledge so that its function can be fulfilled in an increas-
ingly complex world, as Meccarelli makes us see. With Gambino, on the other 
hand, we grasp the hermeneutic challenges posed by a series of resources that 
enable an open and fluid interpretation and, with this, hinder or modify the 
ways in which the dogmatic construction of legal solutions is perceived, espe-
cially in the case of what the author qualifies as latent innovation.
In connection with the above observations on dogmatics, we can say that 
the defining challenge of transition and innovation opens a perspective of 
meaning on dynamics that, precisely the formal constructions of general the-
ory, have ‘hidden’ or ‘removed’ from the field of possible objects of the exer-
cise of legal science. This applies in particular to the possibility of rediscov-
ering a dimension of legal change that the book identifies in the processes of 
objectivation of law.
The process of transformation of social facts into normative facts that in-
volves the performative role of jurisprudence (Meccarelli); the exercise of re-
thinking of concepts in a zetetic sense (Roesler); the re-signification of the 
etymological value of concepts (Gambino); the transformative dimension of 
legal problems, as a constitutive moment of such problems (Fusar Poli, Mar-
tello): these are all dynamics, expression of the phenomenon of objectivation 
of the law, which the issue of innovation and transition bring to the fore-
ground.
What we are observing refocuses attention on the question of the impor-
tance of the different theoretical dimensions relevant for understanding legal 
problems. 
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Several of the chapters, in order to gain a legal point of view on the prob-
lem of transition and innovation, discuss the possibility of importing concep-
tual categories developed outside the legal sciences, in the field of theoretical 
and political philosophy or in the field of social and political sciences. For 
example, in order to understand the problems of legal change, the practical 
structure of discursive plans (Stara), the performative effect of the politics 
of silence (Paixão) or of melancholy (Pinheiro), as well as fields of knowl-
edge such as transitology (Guerra), lexicography (Fusar Poli) and rhetoric 
(Roesler, Reis) all assume importance.
One of the many modes of interdisciplinary relationship which are rele-
vant to legal knowledge and which can be clearly perceived from the inno-
vation-transition dyad is that of the relationship between law and language. 
It is in the perception of this intrinsic relationship and in its importance for 
the fulfilment of the functions performed by law that reflections on the func-
tions of language appear. Following a clue from Koselleck,7 Roesler stresses 
that expressing innovation always depends on the constitution of an acquired 
lexicon, that may not be completely new from the semantic point of view, but 
rather a gradual sliding of the meaning already present in the uses of lan-
guage. Exploring the semantic dimensions that appear in the emergence of 
the word “innovation” itself and its uses, Fusar Poli contributes to a sharper 
and more subtle perception of the relationship between transition and inno-
vation. The focus on the constitutive function of language and its many ways 
of shaping reality, its nuances and its interdictions also appear in the way 
Meniconi investigates judicial discourses, be they sentences or those aimed at 
a broader public, seeking to understand how the Italian judiciary expressed 
its values and attitudes in the Italian democratic transition. Another interest-
ing aspect of these uses in judicial sentences is, finally, explored by Gambino 
when observing the hermeneutical nuances of the use of good faith as an in-
terpretative clause capable of constituting a latent innovation.
It is worth pointing out an interesting aspect that emerges from the texts 
that make up this volume: one of the points of intersection between the cat-
egories of innovation and transition involves an important dimension in the 
history of law: space. As already stated in this introduction, it is evident that 
innovation and transition are placed as categories that allow for many tem-
poral structures; this does not, however, rule out that space is an important 
component for some historical reconstructions proposed here, such as the 
7  Koselleck (2010). 
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discussion of the Atlantic context at the time of the Haitian, American and 
French revolutions (Paixão) and the transformation that technological inno-
vations promote in the relationship between society and space (Reis, Martel-
lo).
3. The issue of legal actors
A promising way to think about the innovation-transition pair that ap-
pears in the texts of this volume is from the perspective of the different play-
ers: jurists in general, magistrates, legislators, political actors in a strict sense 
such as political parties, collective social actors who mobilize around certain 
agendas and, last but not least, the historical contribution of certain individ-
uals.
It is quite reasonable to suppose that certain players among those listed 
above can operate in such a way as to produce innovations or allow more 
or less clear and delimited transitions, especially since their mode of inter-
vention in reality implies it. This is the case, for example, of the legislator 
and of political and social actors, as the texts of Paixão, Carvalho, Martello, 
Di Cosimo, Bartolacelli, and Gambino make us see. More subtle and latent, 
though no less efficient, is the way in which jurists and magistrates act in this 
scenario and the texts of Meniconi, Reis, Fusar Poli, Roesler and Gambino are 
excellent ways to approach the phenomenon.
Less easy to situate, perhaps because they require a specific look at the 
small details of a historical time, are the contributions made by individuals 
and their idiosyncrasies when we think of innovative dynamics and the con-
struction of transitions. The reader will find stimulating clues in the texts of 
Meniconi, Reis and Peixoto. 
In addition to these trajectories, one can also point out the actions of social 
movements that assume a prominent role in the dimension of constitutional 
history, as highlighted, for example, in the text of Paixão, which identifies a 
series of entities and groups that, in the struggle for democracy, constituted 
the unified black movement in Brazil.
4. Areas of incidence of innovation-transition
There is a third aspect which deserves highlighting in these introductory 
pages. It has already been noted that our volume aims to provide a contribu-
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tion for a reflection on the significance of innovation and transition intended 
as analytical categories for understanding legal change.
This requires us to consider their impact on different areas of the legal 
dimension. Although it was not one of the goals of this project to carry out 
a comprehensive survey on this issue, the multidisciplinary approach of the 
book has opened up some perspectives on the subject. By referring back to 
each of the essays for further study, it may be useful, here, to consider some 
aspects. The first area of incidence of our analytical categories is undoubt-
edly represented by legal theory. Considering innovation and transition in 
order to reflect on legal change, leads, in fact, to a reflection on how legal 
thought proceeds, with which methods and with which instruments (Mecca-
relli, Roesler, Gambino, Fusar Poli). It also offers the opportunity to think of 
legal theory – rather than as the place of construction of a system – as the fo-
rum where various theoretical disciplines meet; as already mentioned above, 
in order to explain the legal importance of innovation and transition we must 
draw on keys of interpretation and categories elaborated by other knowledge 
(Pinheiro, Paixão, Reis, Stara) or even weave a dialogue with them in order to 
grasp the element of differentiation of the legal issue (Guerra).
Besides, legal history is another area to be considered. In this case it is a 
question of recovering, through the dimension of experience, indications for a 
phenomenology of the transition and innovation problem. This seems all the 
more relevant if we consider that, as observed above, only in their emergence 
in the real dynamics that trigger social aggregations, can innovation and tran-
sition express their relevance for the law. This volume, in particular, proposes 
itineraries on innovation and transition in modern and contemporary times 
in Italy and Brazil, with reference to legal thought (Meccarelli, Fusar Poli, 
Carvalho, Martello), case-law and the activities of judicial institutions (Fusar 
Poli, Meniconi), development of legislation (Martello, Bartolacelli) and the 
constitution making process (Paixão, Peixoto, Carvalho).
The latter, on the other hand, represents a thematic area that is also ad-
dressed with reference to the current phase. In fact, the dynamics of inno-
vation and transition are considered not only in relation to the constituent 
processes (Paixão, Peixoto), but also with reference to the constitutive pro-
cesses.8 In this way, the institutional dynamics that, outside the constituent 
moment, take on importance in structuring the constitutional dimension are 
8  On the distinction between constituent and constitutive dynamics in the constitu-
tional dimension please see Paixão/Meccarelli (2020).
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also considered. In particular, it is the de-constituent dynamics (Di Cosimo, 
Carvalho)9 that become the object of analysis. More in general the problem of 
democracy, assumed as the terrain in which constitutional law, institutional 
and political dynamics intertwine, is the object of study in several chapters of 
the book (Pinheiro, Paixão, Guerra, Di Cosimo).
Another important point of the innovation-transition pair involves the re-
lationship between law and emotions. Some texts discuss issues such as mel-
ancholy analysed as a power device, the identity between representatives and 
those represented, democracy and its relationship with memory policies and, 
finally, the role of silences in the construction of constitutional history (Pin-
heiro, Paixão). In fact, it may be interesting to question the role and function 
of emotions in historical processes related to law. New studies in this field are 
undoubtedly welcome.10
It is interesting to remark in this respect, how the space of relevance of 
the dynamics of innovation-transition is represented, not only by issues re-
lated to public law, but also to private law. The essays by Francesco Gambi-
no and Alessio Bartolacelli effectively highlight the problematic nature of the 
phenomena of innovation-transition, when they occur in a normative space, 
which focuses on the values of stability and certainty in inter-individual rela-
tions. In addition to corporate law (Bartolacelli) and contract law (Gambino), 
the problem emerges in the investigations carried out on the early twentieth 
century by Elisabetta Fusar Poli and Francesca Martello with regard to the 
regulation of personality rights, copyright, patents and technological inven-
tions.
5. Conclusions
The conceptual pair innovation-transition has multiple potentialities for 
further research, as we seek to highlight in these introductory lines. The range 
of research topics contained in the work, as well as the numerous other dis-
ciplines involved (beyond/outside legal history), suggest that discussions on 
innovation and transition are far from exhausted. New possibilities have ac-
tually been opened up by the contributions included in this volume.
Based on these perspectives, we should consider: what are the possible 
9  For a reflection on the current Brazilian scenario, please see Paixão/Zaiden Ben-
vindo (2020).
10  On the different configurations of emotions see Didi-Huberman (2013).
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connections between innovation and transition? As shown in the texts of 
Meccarelli and Stara, it could be argued that innovation in law, in order to 
be autonomous, seems to presuppose the existence of a transition (or sev-
eral of them). Transition, in turn, has greater autonomy as an explanatory 
key, as can be seen even by the existence of the fields of knowledge linked to 
it - “transitology” (dealt with in the Guerra paper), “transitional justice” (in 
the contributions of Meniconi and Paixão) and the extensive research, books 
and articles related to political transitions, especially in the second half of the 
twentieth century (a feature found in the articles by Peixoto, Carvalho and Di 
Cosimo).
Innovation and transition thus have a common aspect: both are actually 
temporal players, that is, they operate in the organization of the interaction 
between past, present and future. The studies performed based on this con-
ceptual pair enable the articulation of the temporal dimensions in several 
ways, with emphasis on historical processes of continuity, rupture, transfor-
mation, restoration, permanence of past structures, invention of traditions 
and other attitudes focused on the tension between past, present and future.
Throughout the analyses proposed in this volume, we note the creative 
use of these concepts by actors, institutions, and organizations, emphasizing 
the aspects of quality, incisiveness, and distinctiveness of the conceptual pair 
innovation-transition.
All of the contributions in this volume are complex, rigorous, and open 
to various fields of knowledge. In the closing words of this introduction, we 
cannot fail to mention that we expect new research to be carried out - in legal 
history and in legal theory as in other fields of legal studies - relying on the 
conceptual pair innovation-transition, so that the capacity to think about the 
future may be renewed, like the character in the Divine Comedy who warns us 
that, despite all the obstacles, the stages of a life that “far longer will extend” 
must be completed.11 
11  Alighieri (1921), Paradiso, XVII, 98 199.
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Time of innovation and time of transition shaping the legal dimension:
a methodological approach from legal history
Massimo Meccarelli 
1. Innovation and transition in law: a tentative conceptual setting; 1.1. Innovation 
and legal change; 1.2. Ascriptive time and transition in law; 1.3. An example in 
history: the transition to democracy and the aftermath of fascism in Italy; 1.4 
Legal transition as a legal regime; 2. Innovation and transition shaping legal di-
mension: the objectivation of law; 2.1. The dyad “innovation-transition” and the 
objectivation of law; 2.2. The transition from the ordo to the systema and the 
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1. Innovation and transition in law: a tentative conceptual setting
Legal change constantly draws the attention of jurists. Its relevance lies 
in the fact that it offers the possibility of multiplying the levels of analysis of 
legal issues, by bringing its relationship with its social, political, economic 
and cultural dimensions to the forefront. For a jurist, however, this is always 
a challenge, since considering legal change - precisely because of its openness 
to the pre-legal basis of legal forms - requires a continuous updating of the 
instruments used to carry out an observation of law and its dynamics. The 
purpose of these pages is to consider, from a historical perspective, the possi-
ble heuristic advantage that two analytical categories such as innovation and 
transition can offer in this regard.
First of all, I would like to attempt some conceptual delimitations in order 
to grasp the juxtaposition, such as the relationship between “innovation” and 
“transition”; then I would like to reflect on their situational value with re-
spect to the legal discourse; moreover, I would like to consider the dynamics 
of the objectivation of law which can be observed in this light (i.e. dynamics 
that help to identify law as a special form of normativity with its own “objec-
tive” value). This will also allow me to reflect, in conclusion, on the impact 




challenge, that contemporary legal problems pose to legal science as well as 
to the humanities and social sciences.
1.1. Innovation and legal change
If “innovation” designates a radical way of transformations occurring 
in the social, political, economic, technological, cultural fields, is it possible 
to identify the dynamics of innovation in legal change? What makes a legal 
change “innovative”? Could we speak of a time of innovation in legal experi-
ence? We can assess these questions tentatively, but the exercise may serve 
to better define the contours of our theme. In this regard we can consider two 
different perspectives.
In a first perspective, from the point of view of the object of the analy-
sis, legal innovation represents a change perceived (in the context in which 
it occurs) as progress. Thus understood, “innovation” indicates an explicitly 
stated (self-asserted) dynamic, which qualifies itself as oriented towards pro-
ducing a novelty, an unprecedented configuration, in law.
Let us focus our attention on some examples that we can find in the history 
of legal thought: when the purpose of a theory is to promote a radical propos-
al, the contrast between new and old is a typical argument. An example is the 
well-known pamphlet by Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene.1 Despite the 
descriptive character of the title, this essay aims to promote a radical change 
in the penal system in line with “a society organized in a different way, to be 
built on new political principles”.2 The book is related to a project for inno-
vation; to this end the rhetorical constructions of its pages often insist on the 
contrast between new and old, where the new is just and correct and the old 
is unjust and wrong.3
Self-assertive innovation can also be found in works that are not charac-
terized by an express purpose to mark a discontinuity, but which, at the same 
time, aim to explore new legal fields. Think of jurists like Hugo Grotius and 
his famous treatise De iure belli ac pacis. It is a work that intends to contrib-
ute to the establishment of a new legal framework for the new geopolitical 
dimension, that has emerged since the discovery of the Americas. The author 
1  See Porret (ed.) (1997); Porret/Salvi (eds.) (2015); Chiodi/Garlati (eds.) (2014).
2  Sbriccoli (1997) 177.
3  Among the many examples see the opening page of the book “A chi legge”, Beccaria 
(1764).
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expressly underlines this aspect in the introductory pages (the Prolegomena), 
where he states that he intends to impart his discourse sicut mathematici...; 
it is a matter of considering a different interpretative paradigm of social facts, 
which relies on a logical-abstract rationality (introduced by the new method-
ological approach of Descartes)4 rather than on a practical-evaluative one, as 
was common in the legal hermeneutics referable to the Aristotelian-scholas-
tic tradition. A similar consideration can be made about many other authors 
that in this historic turn aim to develop this insight. Think for example, of 
works such as the Nova methodus discendae docendaeque iurisprudentiae 
by Gottfried W. Leibniz, which, highlighting this intent already in the title, 
aims to promote a radical change in legal hermeneutics.5
From a historiographical point of view, the fact that an “innovative” inten-
tion is explicitly expressed in the legal discourse, is a useful element of evalu-
ation in the effort to historicize the experience. It may be relevant to consider, 
for example, that Leibniz and Grotius wanted to “label” their theory as inno-
vative in order to understand the more general debate on legal change in early 
modern time. We know, in fact, that in this period there are other theoretical 
approaches, no less pertinent and effective in shaping a new legal landscape, 
which follow a different argumentative strategy, based on the demonstration 
of apparent continuity with tradition. I am thinking of figures such as Fran-
cisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis Molina6 and, more in general, of the 
Iberian scholasticism of the early modern age.7
The fact of an explicitly innovative intent is significant; at the same time 
it is not self-sufficient with respect to the historical analysis to be carried out. 
As historians, in order to weigh a project of legal innovation explicitly stated 
in the sources, we question and verify the importance of this project, in terms 
of its impact (on scholarly debate or on regulatory regimes, etc.). A major 
aspect of the historical evaluation of ideas on legal innovation is, therefore, 
the examination of its links with (its effectiveness in relation to) the needs 
4  Grotius (1625), Prolegomena, post medium, ante finem: “Primum mihi cura haec 
fuit, ut eorum quae ad ius naturae pertinen probationes referrem ad notiones quasdam 
tam certas ut eas nemo negare possit, nisi sibi vim inferat [...] “Vere enim profiteor, sicut 
mathematici figuras a corporibus semotas considerant, ita me in iure tractando ab omni 
singulari facto abduxisse animum”. 
5  Leibniz (1667); De Iuliis (2010); Hespanha (2012) 311-332. 
6  Think of works such as those by Francisco De Vitoria (1538); Bartolomè de Las Ca-
sas (1997); Luis De Molina (1613); Domingo De Soto (1559). 
7  Costa (2001); Costa (2014).
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for change expressed by the social fabric or claimed by society. These brief 
considerations lead to the conclusion that the self-affirmation of the innova-
tive intent of a theory, while it is a determining factor in understanding the 
occurrence of a legal change, is not sufficient, as such, to explain legal change 
in the historical experience.
This calls us to consider a second possible perspective on legal innovation: 
recognised innovation. Here we refer to phenomena of legal change that we 
– as observers, from outside – identify as innovative. Innovation we can con-
sider from this point of view, as describing a certain way of being, a certain 
form, of change in law.
For this type of approach, the historical perspective is a privileged field. 
In fact, the historical point of view is always constituted as a sequence of ex-
periences of change, that we qualify as such, based on evidence to which we 
attribute a certain degree of “objectivity”. Law in history always appears to be 
in motion, but in a sequence of discontinuities like this some of them present 
themselves as “innovative”, in the sense that they are outstanding for being 
bearers of a paradigm shift.
Francisco de Vitoria’s theory on ius peregrinandi and ius communicatio-
nis8 is innovative because it introduces a different way of conceiving legal 
protection and permits the employment of European law in a new context, 
like the possible space of the new world. In other words, the invention of 
individual rights in the case of Vitoria, seeks to derive a position for Euro-
pean legal tradition in the unprecedented scenario of the new world, where 
it would otherwise have had no chance of being implemented (since the new 
world lacks the cultural, historical and spiritual assumptions, which formed 
the pre-legal foundation of that tradition). This result, to our eyes, is not af-
fected by the fact that this theory is conceived as part of a discursive strategy 
aimed at establishing continuity with tradition. In other words: there is no 
self-asserted innovation in the case of Vitoria, but, from the outside, we can 
easily recognise the innovative nature of his theory.
Now let us take a second and different example. The theory of the social 
contract in Thomas Hobbes is also innovative; as historians we can see that it 
provides an unprecedented solution to the problem of the foundation of po-
litical power and social cohesion; it also offers a different solution to the issue 
of legal protection through protection of rights, even compared with the inno-
vative theories of Vitoria. It is different because it is founded on the unprece-
8  Costa (2014); Neuenschwander (2013); Meccarelli (2014).
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
27
dented juxtaposition between ius (whose meaning is reduced to that of “right”) 
and lex (whose meaning is generalised in that of “law”), with the consequence 
that individual rights are the result of the will of the legislator, who, through its 
legal norm, provides rights; on the contrary, in the theoretical construction of 
Vitoria, individual rights are still the result of a legal dimensioning of justice.9
In the case of Hobbes, the recognized innovation also corresponds to a 
self-affirmed innovative intention: we are, in fact, dealing with a concept 
for modernization that is juxtaposed to tradition. Let us remember the well-
known page in which Hobbes talks about “some foolish opinions of Lawyers 
concerning the making of Lawes” where he directly criticizes the attitude of 
“that juris prudentia” to the production of law; in fact, for him it is essential 
to dissociate the ratio legis from the juris prudentia, in order to place at the 
centre the will of the legislator.10 The innovative nature that we recognize in 
Hobbes’ theory, in addition to its outstanding position with respect to the 
context in which it is inserted, is also due to the fact that it is capable of ex-
plaining legal order without the need for tradition. Here innovation is unde-
niably associated with discontinuity.
Rousseau’s theory of the social contract is also innovative and even though 
it fits into Hobbes’s path, develops it in a novel perspective, which focuses on 
the citizen and the sovereign people, identifying new key problems, such as 
that of constituent power or of representation.11 Rousseau is not the first to 
focus on the idea of the social contract in order to explain the genesis of a legal 
order, yet we agree in recognizing in his thinking a radical originality that in-
troduces a discontinuity. His reflections, in fact, open up a novel scenario also 
from the point of view of the theories produced up to that moment, through 
the paradigm of the social contract; I am referring not only to the develop-
ments of thought that derive from Rousseau, but also to some institutional 
implementations inspired by it (think of the Déclaration de droit de l’homme 
e du citoyen of 1789).
I have mentioned three examples taken from different chronological 
phases; historiography often highlights their mutual relations as part of a 
unitary path of legal thought which, through the centuries of the modern 
age, produces the traits of legal modernity. However, the issue of recognizing 
the innovative nature of these developments of thought, allows us to identify 
9  Please see Meccarelli (2014); Meccarelli (2017).
10  Hobbes (1651), part II, chapter 26, 189-193.
11  Costa (2001); Fioravanti (1998).
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variations, in order to better articulate the way in which we can historicize 
this trajectory. 
To come back to our main problem: with recognized innovation we intend 
to grasp an intrinsic character, an added value, which presents different fea-
tures in each single original theory; at the same time this added value is al-
ways relative, since it depends, necessarily, on an a priori placed by us as the 
observer. Seen from this more “objective” side, innovation, even if it confirms 
its analytical value, reveals a limit.
Let us, therefore, reflect in synthesis on the two kinds of innovation we 
have considered, the “self-asserted” and the “recognized”, in relation to le-
gal change. In both cases, methodologically speaking, innovation in law does 
not offer itself as a category of transcendental character, in the sense that, it 
can never constitute a concept independent of the dimension of experience, it 
cannot represent an a priori with which to order or consider empirical data. 
On the contrary, its analytical value lies in its situational attitude, i.e. in the 
way it explains the link between the circumstantial framework and the phe-
nomenon of legal change. “Innovation”, in so far as it lets us grasp a certain 
way of thinking about law in the circumstantial framework, also allows us to 
understand levels of complexity and structures of that framework. 
These were mainly methodological observations. And what can we say 
from a theoretical point of view? Can we speak of a time of legal innovation? 
If innovation in law, as we seem to have pointed out, does not have a tran-
scendental nature but consists, above all, in a way of considering the law in 
society, which is necessarily affected by the relativity of the point of view, it 
can hardly be conceived as a regime of law. However, given its situational 
character, it seems plausible to speak of innovation as a time of law, if we 
understand it as an indicator of a perceived regime of historicity, in the sense 
specified by François Hartog: a certain “way of linking together past, present 
and future”, an “experience of time” to which the “categories of past, present 
and future give order and meaning”.12 In this perspective we can consider the 
idea of a time of innovation that gives shape to legal dimension.
1.2. Ascriptive time and transition in law
Let us now consider the other pillar of our reflection: transition in law. 
Transition, like innovation, does not belong to the general categories of the 
12  Hartog (2015) XV-XVII and 11-16; Paixão (2013); Ricouer (2000) 480-498; Benja-
min (1940) 75-86; Scuccimarra (2016).
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theory of law either; from a methodological point of view, it too presents itself 
as a category with different analytical values. 
Usually we tend to consider “transition” in a descriptive key, that is, as a 
historical phase between a point of departure and a point of arrival. In this 
perspective transition seems to indicate a chronology of law rather than a 
legal regime. If one speaks either in specific terms of a transitional regime, 
or if one speaks in more abstract terms to refer to some kind of change in 
legislation, in case law and jurisprudence, in theoretical categories, the tran-
sition constitutes the time frame in which a phenomenon of change in law 
is observed. The importance of the transition thus understood, for the jurist 
and for the historian, lies in the fact that it represents a temporal segment in 
which a legal change occurs13; it is a historical time, qualified by the complex 
interweaving of old and new, which it is possible to observe in the interplay of 
forces between continuity, discontinuity, and also the emergence of the inno-
vation in the transition. Nevertheless, thus understood, the transition does 
not describe a regime of law.
Besides acting as a descriptive category of historical phenomena, “tran-
sition” can also be considered in a different light as an ascriptive time, i.e. 
a time with its own attributive force. With this term, in fact, I would like to 
suggest the idea of a temporal condition capable of attributing to law specific 
regimes and contents. If descriptive time contains the occurrence of the law, 
ascriptive time, on the contrary, represents a regime of the law. There are 
many possible examples and they seem to be of two different types. We can, 
in fact, distinguish the attributive times that rule the permanence of the law14 
and those that bind it to a condition of impermanence.
If we think about customary law, repeal, constituent power, etc., they are 
all concepts that gain their own autonomy in legal terminology, making time 
an element of their content (in the sense that it is time that marks the produc-
tion of legal effects). In the customary norm it is the recurrence in time that 
turns a social fact into a normative fact15. Repeal consists in a specific tem-
poral turning point that defines the life of a norm from which precise effects 
derive; the constituent power is also a specific temporal turning point that 
takes on the founding value of a legal order.16
13  Costa (2019) 29-33.
14  See Bretone (2004) 33-58.
15  See Paolo Grossi’s introduction to the re-edition of Bobbio (1942).
16  Ackerman (1991). 
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However, as we mentioned above, there are also examples of attributive 
time that affect the law in different ways, determining and justifying the law 
to the extent that it links it to a condition of impermanence. Transition is an 
example of this type of temporality. Transitional space, as such, is productive 
of circumstantial legal configurations, that act for the present; at the same 
time, with respect to the future, these legal configurations are reflected as 
constraints and preconditions17. In other words, the effects of the decisions, 
taken by political, social and also institutional actors during the transition 
processes, inevitably project themselves onto the post-transitional phase. 
This ultra-activity of transitional time results precisely from the special con-
dition of impermanence that characterizes it; for this reason, we argue that 
transition, understood in the attributive sense, represents a regime of law.
1.3. An example in history: the transition to democracy and the after-
math of fascism in Italy
We can search for examples in history. For the contemporary age, I am 
thinking above all of the major theme of the transition to democracy. It is 
a time in which the project of the future applies to a reality in turmoil, “un 
monde perpétuellement glissant”, as the historian Lucien Febvre observes 
in opening the first issue of the new series of the review Annales in 1946.18 
However, it is also a reality that is forced to deal with a dramatic demand for 
justice in order to build a new order.19 This is the time in which the “angel of 
history”, to recall the plastic image of Walter Benjamin, is pushed with open 
wings towards the future, while still looking at the past, contemplating the 
frightening scenario of the rubble, which can no longer be restored.20
We consider, in particular, the significant experience of the transition in 
Italy between 1943 and 1948, preparatory to the political and legal turning 
point for the Republic and democracy.21 In this temporal frame (of transition 
understood in a descriptive sense) that goes approximately from the fall of 
Fascism to the enactment of the new Republican Constitution, we are im-
17  See also Costa (2019), in partic. 40-41, on the possibility of considering the transi-
tion as a “structuring totality” that gives shape to systems and structures.
18  Febvre (1946) 3.
19  Sands (2016); Stonebridge (2011); Sebald (2004).
20  Benjamin (1940) 80.
21  Pombeni (ed.) (2016); Bernardini et al. (eds.) (2017); Focardi/Nubola (eds.) (2015).
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pressed by the richness of the questions that trigger the reflection of the ju-
rists. A look at the indexes of the legal journals of those years already shows 
the variety of structural problems which are discussed to address the situa-
tion. They often concern problems of the moment, but they call into question 
the general principles, or rather, they impose a choice as to which are the gen-
eral principles of reference for the solutions to be taken. In this impermanent 
space, in which the transition foregrounds its attributive nature, tentative as-
sessments of new legal theories are experienced, and legal debates are held 
on relevant issues like, for example, the replacement of legal norms over time, 
such as those on ius superveniens, the retroactivity of the statutory law, the 
nature and limits of the normative power of the Executive, the relationship 
between law and constitution, the relationship between justice and law, etc. 
Without making a list of the problems on the agenda, what is important to 
highlight here, is that the debate, on legal issues related to the circumstanti-
ality, is immediately linked to that, de jure condendo, regarding the “regular” 
time that will follow the transitional time; this laboratory of transition offers 
itself as a place of identification and empowerment of new principles and fun-
damental categories, to be employed also for the new legal system.
Let us try to consider a more specific example, still with reference to this 
period of post-war and post-dictatorship which was a transition to democ-
racy. Among the urgent issues to be addressed, that of the accountability of 
fascism and that of collaboration with German troops, during the last years of 
the war, assume a key importance. In this regard, between 1943 and 1946, we 
see a sudden change of approach.
The first is inspired by the aim to achieve restorative justice. The Minister 
of Justice Palmiro Togliatti, in submitting bills to the Parliament, explained 
that an act of clemency towards any criminal act should be granted for “any 
immediate and direct motive in the anti-fascist action”. The amnesty would 
be “an act of restorative justice to which society is indebted” in favour of those 
who broke the law “to contrast the fascist tyranny”.22 Indeed, an amnesty of 
this kind was issued first with a Royal Decree no. 96 7th April 1944, and then 
with Decree no. 719, 17th November, 1945. At the same time, other measures 
enacted between 1944 and 1945 established severe sanctions and special 
courts against the fascist leaders for the acts committed during the dictator-
ship; also collaboration with the German enemy, as well as any support for 
the re-establishment of a Fascist regime, were considered criminal offences. 
22  Togliatti (1945) 472-473.
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This set of norms was implemented23 in exemption of some fundamental 
principles of liberal criminal law (as was also happening at international level 
in order to make crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime accountable), such 
as the prohibition of the retroactive effect of legal norms, the exhaustiveness 
and precision in the normative description of a criminal offence, and the prin-
ciple that requires the courts to be pre-constituted to the facts they have to 
judge (the so-called principle of the juge naturel).
What is interesting is that, in a couple of years, the approach changed rad-
ically. Rather than “restoring justice” to the anti-fascists, the aim became to 
promote a broad pacification between winners and losers; as a consequence, 
the problem arose of mitigating the effects of the exceptional measures tak-
en in order to make fascism and collaborationism accountable. In 1946, an 
amnesty was issued,24 on the initiative of Minister Togliatti himself, the Min-
ister that had supported and implemented the strategy of restorative justice. 
This time the amnesty was mainly for crimes perpetrated by fascists. Fascism 
would remain illegal with reference to future events25, but for the past, with 
the new amnesty, the goal now became to promote a “new climate of unity 
and concord”.26 
It is the change in the political and institutional framework that inspires 
23  This is a series of measures taken through different Acts. The most relevant is the 
Decree no. 159 27th July 1944, “Sanzioni contro il fascismo”, that provided epuration from 
the administrative bodies of those who had held specific leading positions in the Fascist 
party; it established criminal sanctions for acts carried out by members of the Fascist party 
during the years of the regime; for the immediate future it provided for sanctions against 
those who collaborated with the German troops and supported the reconstitution of the 
Fascist regime; it created a special court, the High Court of Justice. For a more detailed 
analysis of this case, see most recently Caroli (2020); Franzinelli (2018).
24  Amnesty of 22th June 1946 no. 4. See Franzinelli (2006); Nubola (2016); Colao 
(2011); Caroli (2020).
25  See Act 3rd December 1947 no. 1546 “Norme per la repressione dell’attività fasci-
sta e dell’attività diretta alla restaurazione dell’istituto monarchico”; XII Transitional and 
final provision in the Italian Repubblican Constitution of 1948; Act 20th June 1952 no. 
645 “Norme di attuazione della XII disposizione transitoria e finale (comma primo) della 
Costituzione”.
26  Togliatti (1946) 711: “Tale è l’atto di clemenza che, approvato in un grave momento 
della nostra vita nazionale, certamente contribuirà a creare nel Paese quel nuovo clima di 
unità e di concordia che è il più favorevole alla ricostruzione politica ed economica, e nel 
quale dovrà continuare, entro i limiti stabiliti, la necessaria opera di giustizia per il defini-
tivo nostro risanamento politico e morale”. 
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this new approach. In fact with the Referendum of 2nd July 1946 the decision 
to proclaim the Republic was taken and a Constituent Assembly of clearly 
anti-fascist character was elected and called on to write the text of the new 
Constitution. Starting from the premise that “with the passage from the mon-
archy to the Republic a new period in the life of the unitary Italian State had 
opened up” Togliatti explained that, now, it was necessary to give a sign of 
“pacification and reconciliation of all good Italians”, which was also meant to 
include former supporters of the dictatorship.27
1.4 Legal transition as a legal regime
Let us go back to our path for some evaluation. In the case I have just 
mentioned, the regimes that the law takes on are explained and justified in re-
lation to the political situation. What is interesting for our analysis, however, 
is that this experience of transition is intended also to produce effects on the 
next scenario (thus highlighting, if you like, a double attributive effect: one on 
the present time, one on the future). 
In fact, if we consider how the two approaches (reparation Vs pacifica-
tion) were combined, or which prevailed, we can ponder to what extent the 
transitional time represented a constraint on future democratic life. Evidence 
of this can be seen in the activity of the institutions and in particular in the 
attitude of the judiciary in the first decades of democracy.28 Then there is the 
other aspect I mentioned, that of the importance of the transition as a mo-
ment of emergence of issues and problems relevant to the legal debate. We 
must not forget, in fact, that the regulatory regimes that have been activated 
as a consequence of the problem of bringing the past to justice, have not been 
in line with the principle expressed by Italian liberal legal culture on criminal 
law. At the same time, it is precisely the legal culture of the liberal age that the 
project for democratization was looking at in order to identify the fundamen-
tal principles and to build the new constitutional order. That experience of 
transition was axiologically linked to the democratic project, but to close the 
accounts with the past it was employing instruments not completely in line 
with that project. This gap between the project and the instruments contrib-
27  Togliatti (1946) 708. See also Berlinguer (1946) 484; Pilotti (1947) 21; Funaro 
(1947) 62.
28  On this point see the chapter by Antonella Meniconi in this same volume, precisely 
in reference to the Italian case.
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uted to a debate on the situation that, actually, was able to identify issues and 
problems, important for considering features of the new criminal system for 
democratic Italy. The issue of retroactivity, of the constitutionality (or consti-
tutional basis) of criminal law, the issue of standards of precision in drafting 
norms concerning criminal offences, the issue of the presumption in criminal 
trial, the issue of causality in criminal law, the regimes of mitigating circum-
stances, and many other key issues of the criminal system in the democratic 
age, were identified and discussed, starting from the problems arising from 
the transitional criminal law we are talking about.29 
Let us leave the examples aside and now return to our methodological itin-
erary. Transition, like innovation, comes to our attention as a category that 
helps us to understand the situational nature of the legal dimension. Both 
indicate a time of law (i.e. they refer to a certain regime of historicity that 
characterizes the phenomenon of legal change). However, the two concepts 
are significantly different.
We have, in fact, already considered that the category “innovation”, ap-
plied to the legal dimension, does not have a transcendental character; on 
the contrary, it allows us, above all, to grasp a certain way of thinking of the 
law in the circumstantial framework. If, on the other hand, we consider the 
concept of “transition”, understood as attributive time, it seems to reveal a 
certain way of being of the law; it is not only a time of the law, but also a legal 
regime.
2. Innovation and transition shaping legal dimension: the objectivation of law
2.1. The dyad “innovation-transition” and the objectivation of law
After the two concepts have been defined, we can now evaluate their pos-
sible relations. The aspects that distinguish them, as seen from our analysis, 
lead us to think of the two concepts as complementary. On a closer look, in 
fact, “innovation” and “transition” share a common element, that of situating 
our problem - i.e. understanding legal change and understanding the change 
of categories and concepts that describe it - in a context. They take this an-
alytical value because, as we have just observed, they manage to take into 
29  For more details on this point please see M. Meccarelli, Time and Legal Change. 
Some Methodological Remarks on Italy’s Transition to Democracy; and A. Meniconi, The 
Failed Reconciliation: The role of the Judiciary in Post-Fascist Italy and the Togliatti Am-
nesty, both in Paixão/Meccarelli (eds.) (2021).
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account respectively a way of seeing the law (innovation) and a way of being 
of the law (transition). Hence their complementarity. We might be able to go 
deeper into the analysis if we consider the horizon of possibility of “innova-
tion-transition” as a dyad.
The last example I gave, which showed, in the attributive time of the tran-
sition, a moment of mise en forme and development of new legal configura-
tions, suggests that the study of the transition allows us to acquire an analyti-
cal point of view on innovation processes. One could, in this respect, consider 
transition as innovation, and look at the time of transition as a preferential 
framework for studying the phenomenon of legal change. 
It is “preferential” because it allows us to rediscover an aspect of this phe-
nomenon that legal modernity has overshadowed. I refer to the dynamics 
of the objectivation of law (i.e. the dynamics of the transformation of social 
facts into normative facts, of the development of a jurisprudence capable of 
recognizing its legal importance,30 of the construction of a legal knowledge 
based on a cognitive diagnosis of the social facts). Historiography31 has iden-
tified “legal modernity” as the cultural and scientific turning point in the idea 
of law, which in Europe marks the detachment from forms and structures es-
tablished during the medieval legal experience (based on the jurisprudential 
dynamics of production and construction of the legal order), to give space to a 
concept of law, based on the idea of the primacy of political power and, there-
fore, on the relevance of statute law as the main source of law. This transfor-
mation of the legal systems of continental Europe took shape, starting from 
the new approaches to natural law in the modern age and finding complete 
configuration in the Nineteenth century with the establishment of codified 
legal systems.
2.2. The transition from the ordo to the systema and the disconnection of 
jurisprudence from the dynamics of objectivation of law
It might be useful to dwell briefly on the paradigm shift from the ordo to 
the systema, which marks the entry into legal modernity between the 16th 
30  In this same volume, Francesco Gambino also dwells on this problem, considered, 
however, from the point of view of the current legal system.
31  Grossi (2003); Grossi (2005); Hespanha (2012). For a philosophical perspective 
on the problem recently Cacciari/Irti (2019).
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and 19th centuries.32 With this I would like to draw more attention to the 
implications that this process had on legal hermeneutics, leading to its dis-
connection from the dynamics of the objectivation of law.
It is a process of re-signification of the concept of jurisprudence, which has 
been designed to relativize and with this to update the existing law, to an in-
strument conceived to promote the hypostatization (and then dogmatization) 
of legal concepts. As I have already had the opportunity to highlight in previ-
ous studies,33 this change in the method of interpretation of law, contributes 
to redefining the nature of jurisprudence, and to reorienting the function of 
jurists; as a consequence, the process of production of law would cease to be a 
phenomenon to be made objective through a hermeneutic activity.
In fact, “jurisprudential law”, developed according to the paradigm of the 
ordo, which for brevity we could also refer to the ius commune tradition, con-
sisted precisely in a hermeneutical activity, based on an Aristotelian-tomist 
conception of ratio and, therefore, capable of shaping the legal dimension, 
by objectifying it. Following this approach, the order had to be recognized 
through an observation of social facts and, consequently, hermeneutic activ-
ity was that exercise that allowed jurists to produce a probable awareness of 
law; namely the jurists’ interpretation represented a moment of approach to 
the truth, an intelligere that had to be verified and updated over time. The 
exercise of producing jurisprudence consisted, therefore, in an assessment of 
possible variations in the content of the law over time; it was a nomo-poietic 
process. Hence this understanding of legal hermeneutics served to ensure a 
permanent capacity to update the legal system, independently of the options 
of political power and its legislative activity.
The new paradigm of Cartesian rationality, which some orientations of 
legal thought have adopted,34 was to change the method of interpretation; 
the jurists, proceeding from axiomatic assumptions, would carry out a her-
meneutical activity which would no longer be practical-evaluative; on the 
contrary, it would be a logical-deductive activity, capable of producing firm 
results. Here lies the change: the legal hermeneutics of Modernity no longer 
look at the reality of social facts to reconstruct and justify the legal order; on 
the contrary, it is now based on an ahistorical and predefined a priori (for 
example, to stay with the doctrines of natural law: individuals as the main ob-
32  Cappellini (2010) 243-246.
33  Meccarelli (2016) 140-142.
34  See Hespanha (2012) 307-314; Tarello (1976) 133-190; Villey (2013) 493ff. 
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ject of the problem of the protection of rights, features of the state of nature, 
classification of natural rights, etc.).
As I have mentioned, this trend has taken on more and more prominence 
during the Modern Age. The real culmination was to be seen in the conti-
nental success of the jurisprudence of concepts in the 19th century. Here the 
activity of the jurist aimed definitively at “rationally” identifying the rules, 
institutions and ordering categories, so as to be able to describe the legal di-
mension as a legal system. This jurisprudence aspired to establishing and 
generalizing legal institutions by describing them as dogmas, so as to make 
them capable of subsuming social facts in themselves. As can be seen, with 
the jurisprudence of the System, an inversion with respect to the jurispru-
dence of the ordo was achieved, since only by starting from social facts could 
the jurisprudence of the ordo arrive at conceptualizations.
It should also be mentioned that this itinerary is also followed by the Ju-
diciary. This is particularly evident in the invention of the procedural device 
of “cassation” in France, promoted as a model of judgement at the Supreme 
Courts, which has become widely established on the Continent.35 Here too, 
the parable of the metamorphosis of jurisprudence closes, whose distinctive 
feature becomes that of its nomo-phylactic activity.
From the historical point of view, it is a process in which, while this jur-
isprudential law has been reduced to the format of the Cartesian cogito, the 
law imposed by the political power (statutory law) occupies the space left free, 
ruling the updateing of the law.
2.3. Innovation-transition as an analytical tool for understanding the 
constraints of theoretical sustainability of legal concept
I have lingered on this historical transition, because it highlights a change 
that directly affects our issue. The modern concept of law, in fact, has led to 
considering the emergence of legal normativity as a problem of identification 
of the sources of law and systematization of their mutual relationship. 
That is, the categories that describe the emergence of legal normativity 
have been defined starting from the result in order to regulate an activity 
of production of law. Its value as a process and, therefore, the possibility of 
framing it as a phenomenon of objectivation of the law, have been left in the 
background. 
35  Calamandrei (1921); Calogero (1937); Meccarelli (2011); Halpérin (1987).
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Our hypothesis is that, through to the innovation-transition dyad (i.e. 
thanks to their situational value) we can recover this level of understanding 
of legal phenomenology. This possibility is evident from legal history; think 
of the example we have just given with regard to transitional criminal law and 
its ultra-activity.36 A potential field of application for this kind of approach 
aimed at considering the innovation-transition as a dyad, is that of constitu-
tional history. I am thinking in particular of the study of constitution-making 
processes which could benefit from an analysis that, in addition to the usual 
constituent factors, would also consider the constitutive ones, that emerge 
in ascriptive times (such as the transition, the exception, the crisis). In fact, 
through the first, the constituent factors, we focus on social, political and le-
gal facts that aim to contribute to the production of a constitution (think of 
constituent conventions, or political rallies). These are bottom-up dynamics, 
bearers of a programmatic projection. With the second (the constitutive fac-
tors) we can include in the analysis of a constitution making process, also oth-
er dynamics that, as normative facts, have effectively contributed to produc-
ing the constitutional order, without being part of its design. These dynamics 
are both top-down or bottom-up, they can be multiple, simultaneous, asyn-
chronous and competitive, and above all express circumstantial potential. 
Think, for example, of the granting of a Constitutional Charter, the enactment 
of a law of constitutional importance, a decision of a Constitutional Court that 
changes a constitutional rule, a transitional regulation, a revolutionary event 
or a coup d’état, that de facto establish a new constitutional order.37 These are 
relevant factors that especially transitional time can contain, due to its special 
attributive force.
A possibility of re-gaining an understanding of the dynamics of objecti-
vation of the law seems useful also in relation to the current time; the prob-
lems we are called to reflect on today, increasingly require us to consider a 
multi-normative space, which does not seem to be ascribable to the monistic 
format of state legal systems (set up from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth 
century) and the categories connected to it.
36  Moreover,this would also help, perhaps, to provide new elements of understand-
ing of some connected events such as the permanence in force, over the decades of the 
Republican experience, of the criminal code and criminal procedure code, issued during 
Fascism. See Sbriccoli (2009) 695-700.
37  For a more detailed reflection on the historiographical implications of the distinc-
tion between constituent and constituent dynamics see Paixão/Meccarelli (2020).
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What we have observed above, concerning the opportunities that the situ-
ational value of innovation and transition opens up, urges us to consider one 
last issue. The use of these as analytical categories, in fact, in so far as it gives 
us a perspective on the processes of the objectivation of the law, allows us to 
gain a different point of view on legal concepts and their use. This is because 
it leads us to remove from the abstract (dogmatic) frame in which they are 
conventionally located.
The innovation-transition dyad - that serves as an analytical key for un-
derstanding the configurations of law in their situational value - allows us to 
observe legal categories and concepts in their original functions and there-
fore, to grasp the constraints of their theoretical sustainability,38 that is, the 
assumptions that justify their original raison d’être and, consequently, the 
viability of legal concept. Highlighting the constitutive limits of the categories 
and legal configurations can help us to verify the adequacy of the use of our 
conventional conceptual tools in relation to current problems.
Innovation-transition helps us, in other words, to recover a perspective of 
meaning for those foundations of legal structures that their enhancement in 
the dogmatic field prevents us from considering.
3. Innovation and transition in law: rethinking borders of legal disciplines
The possible de-dogmatisation effect, of a study of legal change addressed 
through the dyad innovation-transition, allows us to conclude our itinerary 
with a reflection on the issue of the interdisciplinary dialogue and the oppor-
tunity to reconsider the boundaries between different legal disciplines.
Let us start from the observation that, if we look at the last two centu-
ries, legal sciences have taken shape based on the aggregative force of the 
dogmatic method.39 It was a matter of developing a knowledge composed of 
concepts and categories, hypostatizing the doctrinal configurations and thus 
the normative forms of legal problems. The axiological foundation, like the 
38  See in this volume the chapter by Claudia Roesler which refers to this issue, con-
sidering the problem of repetitive structure in legal language. Roesler highlights how dog-
matic thought, despite its operative and stabilizing function, necessarily interacts with 
zetetic thought, which due to its cognitive function, provides the premises that are dogma-
tizable. That confirms the attitude of legal hermeneutics to make legal concepts question-
able, when considering the normative relevance of social facts.
39  Cappellini (2010) 155-162 and 239-248; Hespanha (2012) 410-451; Hespanha 
(2013); Haferkamp (2004). 
MASSIMO MECCARELLI
40
assumed social model, inserted in this path, which referred to the liberal val-
ues of the monistic state and individual freedom, soon became an implicit 
one, which, from the perspective of legal hermeneutics, did not need to be 
questioned.
It is on the basis of this formalistic attitude, that a differentiation between 
the fields of law was produced; the premise for their study consisted in a spe-
cialization of methods, categories and themes, marking boundaries and 
disciplinary partitions. Achieving self-referentiality and thematic and meth-
odological self-sufficiency, have also been ways of affirming the very essence 
and autonomy of each legal discipline. This means that the legal sciences have 
defined their specific identity by emancipating themselves from the problem 
of making a cognitive diagnosis of social issues. Over the last two centuries, 
making a diagnosis of the social has increasingly become a duty of other sci-
ences, the social and human sciences and, above all, a duty of political actors.
All this has operated over the last two centuries, and in fact it is still op-
erating, like a tacit pre-understanding horizon. This is an important problem 
today, when competence in grasping the social issues and an interdisciplin-
ary openness is required in legal discourse. Considering this background, it 
seems to me that the study of innovation and transition, thanks to its situa-
tional implications, offers the opportunity to rethink disciplinary boundar-
ies in the sense of breaking the self-referential closures. It is a question of 
starting a methodological practice that would encourage the experience of a 
dialogue between disciplines, by converging on three points:
– to include in the discourse on law the premises of a legal problem and, 
therefore, to verify the tools and categories with which we address it. In this, 
the opening to the social sciences and humanities, could be an added value; 
they can offer us inputs, suggest concepts and directions in order to carry out 
a cognitive diagnosis of the social issues from the legal point of view (think of 
the notions of otherness and of human and social interactions, the notions of 
social cohesion, or of normativity, just to mention a few examples that may 
concern our theme).
– to consider (also in the sense of questioning) the role that the single legal 
discipline can play in this context; which is a way to reconsider what kind of 
pre-understanding of the law in relation to society our disciplinary knowl-
edge bears and what kind of pre-understanding could or should be bearer.
– to accept the challenge of a circulation of ideas, reflecting on the limits 
of the self-sufficiency of a specific disciplinary point of view and - in a sort of 
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reversed actio finium regundorum, made from (or according to) otherness - 
on the spaces of autonomy to be recognized by other legal disciplines.
Without seeking here to attempt a theoretical setting of such a challeng-
ing topic, we can, maybe, more simply observe that, today, while the need 
for an interdisciplinary dialogue seems to be accepted by most scholars, the 
question of its methodological implications remains to be investigated. An 
enhancement of the pragmatic attitude of legal hermeneutics, and a greater 
exploration of its dialogical potential, seem to represent grounds on which it 
could be possible to gain a margin of advancement. Furthermore dealing with 
time of innovation and time of transition could also represent an opportunity.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, social scientists from all over the world have sought to 
understand a new role carried out by the judiciary. A significant body of re-
search has addressed global phenomena such as the judicialization of politics, 
the politicization of the law, the empowerment of constitutional courts, and 
the effects of these rearrangements of power on contemporary democracies. 
As far as Latin America is concerned, local studies have been in line with 
global research trends. However, they have also, albeit less explicitly, estab-
lished roots in another theoretical tradition—the tradition of transitology—
embracing both its weaknesses and its qualities. They have done so by assum-
ing that Latin American countries must be distinctly “recent democracies,” 
perhaps poorly consolidated ones, against which there may be a threat of re-
turning to the formerly authoritarian state. 
This paradigmatic link to transitology has led to two consequences. On 
the one hand, some of these studies of the Latin American context maintain 
substantive commitments to political elites and liberal institutions, with lit-
tle transparency about those commitments. On the other hand, because the 
studies have been based in neo-institutionalist theories of political science, 
they have recognized the relative autonomy of institutions—a concept that 
has its advantages for understanding the complexity of the contemporary 
world— but they do not extend its potential benefits to the analysis of organi-
zations in the legal system. The law, here, has continued to be subordinated 




This article aims to contribute to the debate by analyzing the concept of 
“legal transition,” broadly understood as the major changes to the legal sys-
tem in a context of intense political and social transformation. This concept, 
employed by authors working on courts in Latin America, encompasses both 
transitology’s weaknesses and merits. A methodological clarity about its uses 
may help the researcher to better direct her lens of analysis, both by revealing 
the substantive commitments that may be included in the theoretical frame-
work and by detailing the conditions under which it is possible to refer to 
institutional autonomy or to legal autonomy.
As we will argue, not all political or social pressure results in legal change. 
The system of law translates, or processes, in its own terms and times what 
we call external pressure. This means, first, that an instrumental idea of law 
is inadequate, or at least insufficient. It also means that the concept of the 
relative autonomy of political organisations, albeit interesting, should not 
be employed without mediation to research on legal organisations, as some 
scholarship has done.
The article has three parts. The first describes the underanalyzed influence 
of transitology in recent studies of law and courts in Latin America. The sec-
ond follows the twists and turns related to the limits and possibilities of this 
theoretical framework to develop a concept of autonomy that is functional 
for legal studies. The third builds on the thinking from the previous topics to 
carry out a survey of the state of the scholarship on legal transitions in Brazil.
2. How the literature on transitions still shapes legal studies 
During the last decades of the twentieth century, social scientists pro-
duced extensive scholarship on transition processes. The field of study be-
came known as transitology and had among its central figures Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Phillip Schmitter and Juan Linz. Their aim was to analyze the 
more than thirty countries that have changed their political regimes since 
1974, moving from authoritarianism to democracy. Thus, the researchers in-
tended to develop conceptual tools for comparative studies of the third wave 
of democratization.1
The field of transitology has downsized in recent years, at least as a form 
of studying the conditions for overcoming authoritarianism. However, we see 
its main theoretical concepts still being employed by transitional justice and 
1  See O’Donnell (ed.) (1986); Huntington (1993); Linz/Stepan (1996).
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by studies of courts in recent democracies, with major implications for the 
current understanding of law and democracy.
To begin with transitional justice, recent studies are closer to this intel-
lectual tradition than it might seem at first glance, as Gabriel Rezende points 
out.2 In its mainstream usage, transitional justice presumes an analogous link 
between democracy, liberal institutions, and an instrumental use of law, even 
though it has come to imply less a democratic consolidation than some ver-
sion of a national reconciliation.3 These studies even point to “a set of tools 
designed to address the legacies of a troubled past” that are capable of being 
replicated in many places.4 Of the four pillars established by Ruti Teitel—
memory and truth, justice, reparation, and institutional reforms— instru-
mental use of the law is evident in the latter, that is, in institutional design 
practices.5 However, the paradigm of transitional justice often presents itself 
as a “how-to” manual, setting out the tools, and even their order of implemen-
tation, to be as effective as possible. In that sense, it is not very far from the 
approach of international bodies, such as the World Bank, which developed 
models for rule of law in the 1990s that were inspired by neo-institutional-
ist theories and suited to development—and therefore resulted in programs 
for financing institutional reforms in Latin American countries.6 While we 
will not go any further here in terms of criticizing the commitment to liberal 
institutions, we just want to highlight, for the time being, the specific liberal 
understanding of law as a political tool. 
A similar finding applies to current studies of courts and democracies. 
2  Pinto (2013).
3  This argument mostly concerns mainstream transitional justice. For another point 
of view, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Rosemary Nagy, Lundy and McGovern. According to 
Lundy and McGovern: “‘Transition,’ as normally conceived within transitional justice 
theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of democratisation based on 
liberal and essentially Western formulations of democracy. Moreover, the assumption 
that ‘transition’ implies a move away from dictatorship and toward democracy ignores 
the problem that human rights abuses may continue to take place in circumstances where, 
in theory at least, the norms of liberal democratic accountability prevail. Challenging 
this permits a radical critique of implicit liberal versions of transition that may otherwise 
struggle to deal with the subversion of the rule of law, under the guise of law itself, in os-
tensibly liberal democratic states.” Lundy/McGovern (2008).
4  Gready (2011).
5  Teitel (2000).
6  Dakolias (1996); Carothers (1998); Guerra (2019).
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Take, for instance, the work of the political scientist Diana Kapiszewski. Ac-
cording to her classification, Latin American countries from the late 1970s 
experienced a triple transition: political, economic and legal.7 In the political 
sense, which she calls “regime transition,” dictatorial governments have be-
come liberal democracies. In the economic sense, most of the countries im-
plemented reform policies that changed the state’s role in the national econ-
omy, moving away from interventionist models and toward liberal economic 
models. 
In the legal sense, these countries have also undergone changes. Kapisze-
wski argues that there has been a complex, multifaceted, and nonlinear legal 
transition, which, above all, has intensified the role played by constitutions in 
legal systems. Even though not all countries have drafted new constitutions 
during or after democratization, all of them—or at least a significant num-
ber—have discussed the constitutionalization of law and have reformulated 
the way their societies grant rights and solve controversial issues.
The constitutionalization of law and a new understanding of constitu-
tional supremacy, Kapiszewski continues, drove the judiciary, and especially 
the higher courts, to a new and more relevant position on the political scene. 
Hence the new wave of studies that ask, for example, who the judges are and 
how they decide—a question that until a few years ago, according to Andrei 
Koerner, would be considered irrelevant in the field of social sciences.8 Thus, 
while, on the one hand, social scientists do recognize that the judicialization 
of politics is a global phenomenon, on the other hand, they associate it with 
a project of major social and institutional reforms connected to that of the 
transitions to democracy in Latin America.
Kapiszewski’s study shows the connections political scientists have been 
drawing among political regime changes, institutional changes to the orga-
nization of the judiciary, and legal changes. Following the set of theoretical 
tools developed in transitology and neo-institutionalism, political scientists 
trace state reforms and changes in the legal systems from an understanding of 
the democratization process as a social phenomenon.9 One finds similar con-
nections in Ginzburg, Helmke, and Ríos-Figueroa, among others.10 In Brazil, 
one also finds those connections in research concerning the process of the 
7  Kapiszewski (2012).
8  Koerner (2017).
9  Hall/Taylor (2003).
10  Helmke/Ríos-Figueroa (2011); Ginsburg (2012).
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empowerment of the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court). 
See, for example, the work of Diego Arguelhes and Leandro Molhano, as well 
as that of Fabiana Luci de Oliveira and Fabiano Engelmann, who associate 
the institutional transformations of the judiciary with the changes in the way 
that judges come to a decision.11
The point here is not to deny the theoretical merits of transitology and 
neo-institutionalism. Those theoretical frameworks are useful for research-
ers who investigate how institutions affect the behavior of individuals. In 
some respects, the historical explanations based on the model of dependent 
causality—that is, on a model of rational action that explains current trans-
formations through past circumstances—give solid insights into the effect of 
organizational rules on day-to-day institutional practices.
Models of neo-institutionalism, however, may have analytical limitations 
when transferred to the legal world. If such models are employed with insuf-
ficient methodological thought, they may mix the political criteria of institu-
tional organization with the legal criteria of judicial interpretation. In that 
regard, it is necessary to explain, for example, why a change in the rules for 
how courts are organized—e.g., rules on the appointment of judges—should 
entail a change in their case law. The problem is certainly exacerbated by a 
less-than-rigorous use of neo-institutional theory, which does not specify the 
autonomy of the organizations that the theoretical model itself established. 
Thus, some of the Brazilian studies that followed the democratization process 
and the enactment of the Constitution of 1988, for example, unequivocally 
related changes in the institutional dynamics of the Brazilian courts to the 
global societal transformations, sometimes generically referred to as the en-
largement of citizenship. Although a less common view today, some of those 
studies justified the empowerment of the courts by attaching them to the mo-
bilization of civil society for its rights.
On the contrary, however, in order to understand the effects of democ-
ratization on the legal system, one must take into account the difference be-
tween the time of politics, the time of institutions, and the time of law, that 
is, the specific operational logic of each one of these fields of knowledge.12 
Connecting these logics requires an additional methodological effort from the 
researcher.
11  Oliveira (2011); Arguelhes/Ribeiro (2016); Engelmann/Bandeira (2017).
12  Ost (2005).
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3. The autonomy of the political, legal, and institutional spheres in current 
studies
The main argument proceeds as follows: studies of transitology and 
neo-institutionalism have emphasized the relative autonomy of the political 
sphere and its organizations in relation to economic or structural constraints. 
Nevertheless, transitology has substantive values that were controversial at 
the very least. In addition, neither field of study has adequately extended this 
relative autonomy to the legal sphere. Yet although the legal transition cer-
tainly takes place in view of external pressures, it does so only to the extent 
that the legal system perceives them as pressures and only in accordance with 
its understanding of them, in its own time and based on its own categories. 
Legal change is that which occurs within the law. Therefore, the study of any 
legal transition must consider and differentiate the times of politics, organi-
zations, and law.
The first step is to recognize that institutionalist studies, including transi-
tology, have identified an autonomy for politics and institutions. These stud-
ies began to emerge in reaction to structural and functionalist studies that 
had been predominant up to that point. The institutionalist studies argued 
that social changes could not be observed through long-lasting economic and 
social patterns. The transition, in particular, would be an unpredictable event, 
unrelated by its own definition to the long-term patterns of structural analy-
sis, which called for new categories of analysis. 13 These studies thus opted for 
a theory centered on the contingency of interactions and on the constitutive 
uncertainty that marks the choices of agents. This theory of action highlight-
ed agents, practices, and expectations, as well as ideas and purposes, always 
having as the action as the basic unit.
That choice, however, meant a voluntarist approach to processes of 
change. On the one hand, this view has led to an emphasis on the choices 
of political elites. As Leonardo Avritzer has correctly pointed out, although 
classical studies of transitology have recognized that social participation was 
a component of the processes of democratization, thus breaking with the 
previous tradition of elitism in studies of democracy, they have never con-
sidered it as a sufficient factor.14 Within this framework, political elites, or all 
groups and individuals with the power of agency, negotiate the political pact 
13  See O´Donnell (1986); Linz/Stepan (1996).
14  Avritzer/Costa (2004).
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in a more or less private space, a pact of sovereignty that will pave the way 
to democracy.15 
On the other hand, the focus on institutions over-emphasized changes in 
the formal-institutional framework. To this point, this focus even had a sub-
stantive aspect: institutions constituted the objectively identifiable attributes 
of the success or failure of the transition to democracy and represented the 
settlement of political disputes in compliance with the rules of the game. In 
Adam Przeworski’s synthesis, “democracy is consolidated when under given 
political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes 
the only game in town.”16 Thus, institutionalist theory produced an inversion 
of temporalities in comparison to previous studies: if, for structuralist theo-
ries, modernization and economic development would lead to democracy, for 
transitology, it was, on the contrary, the consolidation of liberal institutions 
that would lead to development.17 That understanding is why Nicolas Guilhot 
goes a step further to say that the dictatorships themselves were the transi-
tions to liberal democracy and a liberal economy. 
Research centered on agents and institutions assigned a certain autonomy 
to the political field and to institutions. The following obstacles, however, did 
not arise from the recognition of this relative autonomy, but, first, from an 
excess, from the substantive charge that linked transitology, political elites, 
and institutional democratic consolidation; and, second, paradoxically, from 
an absence, from a non-extension of the analytical categories developed for 
the political field to the legal field. It is possible, we argue, to maintain the an-
alytical advantages of institutionalist theory, especially in its understanding 
of the complex world we live in, without falling into some of its missteps.
Studies of historical neo-institutionalism, which have also been critical 
for structural and functionalist theories, have given transitology the tools 
for understanding dynamics of change within institutions. In recent years, 
historical neo-institutionalist studies have also advanced to overcome some 
of its biases. In general, they have embraced a broad and loose concept: in-
stitutions comprise procedures, protocols, norms, and official and unofficial 
conventions inherent in the organizational structure of the political commu-
nity or the political economy. This concept includes the rules of constitutional 
15  Pinto (2013).
16  Przeworski (1991).
17  See Vitullo (2001); Guilhot (2002).
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order, as well as the usual procedures and conventions.18 In some respects, 
institutions also have a dual nature: they are both the set of rules that sustain 
and constrain organizations, and the organization itself as a social actor, in 
cases where those rules acquire a coherent body of practice.19 
In their “strategic” strand, institutionalist studies claim that institutions es-
tablish frameworks for expectations about the results of one’s own actions, as 
well as information about the foreseeable behaviour of other individuals; insti-
tutions do this through formal or informal rules of reward, incentive, and pun-
ishment for conduct. Thus, each agent can seek to maximize her preferences for 
strategic behaviour. In their culturalist strand, institutionalist studies have nar-
rowed the amplitude of strategic action, stating that behaviour is also affected by 
general worldviews. Even in this strand, however, institutions channel individual 
behaviours through moral and cognitive models, repertories of symbols, etc.20
As institutionalist studies have further asserted, the formal and informal 
rules that an institution produces may create their own temporality. Despite 
disagreement over the best model for explaining change, scholars do agree on 
distinguishing path dependent developments, points of abrupt change, and 
processes of gradual change.21 For those who follow the idea of path depen-
dence, institutional rules, once modified, guide agents to the next steps, en-
couraging social forces to organize themselves based on the returns expected 
by these rules, thus increasing the risk of uncoordinated action. Professional 
career rules, for example, guide agents to seek certain types of training and 
to expect positive results from this engagement. For those scholars who em-
phasize abrupt change, external factors can halt the previous predictions and 
force institutions and agents to adopt new directions.
In any case, institutions make internal decisions, which in turn affect the 
external world, especially to the extent that they distribute decision-making 
power in an asymmetrical way among social groups. They give unequal ac-
cess to the decision-making processes that will allow for change and the for-
mation of new dependent paths. This ability to influence decisions certainly 
does not mean that institutions are the only factor or that they exist in social 
isolation. But it does mean that, amid other factors, they create their own 
decision-making mechanisms.
18  Hall/Taylor (2003).
19  See March/Olsen (1989). 
20  See Evans/Rueschemeyer/Skocpol (eds.) (1985); Immergut (1992); Hall/Taylor (2003).
21  See Mahoney/Thelen (2010); Murillo/Levitsky (2013).
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From this brief overview of historical neo-institutionalism, it is possible to 
think about the significance of this relative autonomy of institutions for the 
legal system, or, in other words, to think about the changes that may have 
happened to the law and legal organizations, such as the courts, in parallel 
with social and political changes during the processes of democratization. 
Criticism in relation to the excess, to the substantive commitment that links 
democratic transitions, political elites and liberal institutions, does not re-
quire the abandonment of analytical categories suitable for describing the 
complex reality of the contemporary world, such as those which suggest the 
existence of relative autonomies for organizations. The alternative seems to 
rely on an increased attention to methodological strategies and, in particu-
lar, to historical studies—a commitment to be faithful to historical sources.22 
That is, precisely, to inquire, from social dynamics, about the frontiers one is 
looking at—legal, political and institutional—rather than assuming a specific 
ordering of the decision-making asymmetries.
4. Legal transitions—rethinking the autonomy of the political, legal, and 
institutional spheres 
Perhaps institutions might be better understood not as a set of standards, 
practices and expectations, but as a decision-making system. Indeed, concep-
tualizing institutions as a set of formal or informal rules, with a determined 
substantive content, makes it difficult to perceive that those rules are change-
able and, therefore, do not constitute a permanent identifiable identity. More-
over, the rules concept hinders perception of the institution’s boundaries and 
of how environmental factors determine its daily operation.
Using the concept of a decision-making system, on the other hand, allows 
the researcher to highlight the operationally closed communication process-
es. Organizations, here, lose the ambivalence of being at the same time a set 
of rules and an agent to form a system that generates itself, its interior, and 
its environment. They produce decisions that result from decisions and are 
22  Historical studies, in this sense, have something of an impossible task. They start 
with concepts from the present in order to discover their past, distinct, and unattainable 
meaning, as, for example, using a present-day concept of constitution to elaborate a con-
stitutional history. The idea of an autonomy of law, therefore, is also an operational con-
cept, which might guide historical questions, provided, however, that the researcher does 
not read, in the sources, what they do not say. Hespanha (2011); Costa (2013).
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occasions for future decisions. They understand external pressure in its own 
terms, since it is up to the system itself to define how it will make use of it.23
Certainly, there is no middle ground between the two concepts and the 
two theories. Aside from the distinct basic unit—in one case, the action; in 
another, the communication—opting for one or the other also leads to differ-
ent paths. Choosing historical neo-institutionalism seems to lead to an em-
phasis on change resulting from shocks external to the institutions. In con-
trast, choosing the theory of systems seems to stress the distinct use, among 
organizations, of the stock of semantics produced by society. In other words, 
organizations within the legal system operate differently than organizations 
within the political system. It is with this point in mind, therefore, that the 
choice of theory matters for the purposes of this article.
Following this rationale, systems of decision-making make use of a seman-
tic framework developed by functional systems such as politics, law, and eco-
nomics. The decision is an update among many possibilities and should pres-
ent itself as something that has meaning. Like any communication, therefore, 
a decision would be unfeasible without the condensed, prearranged semantic 
forms of meaning, such as those that different functional systems have previ-
ously made accessible. Semantics serves as memory, by its ability to preselect 
the problems to be solved. Therefore, organizations decide based on the se-
mantics produced by different functional systems.24
As far as the organizations that integrate the legal system, such as the 
courts, are concerned, this focus on decision-making means recognising that 
the organizations operate as a subsystem within this functional system. The 
courts decide about themselves, supported by legal semantic forms. Although 
historical research should investigate these uses and, in fact, may demon-
strate that the courts also use semantic forms others than the ones from this 
functional system, the idea of operational closure reminds us that not all po-
litical pressure or democratic pressure, no matter how much regime change it 
implies, reverts or should revert to legal change or change in case law.25
Courts, as organizations of the legal system, produce two types of decision. 
Firstly, they decide about the nature of the organization, such as the inclusion 
or exclusion of their members, “special ties” for judges, when and how the 
courts should decide, the relationship between courts, and the responsibil-
23  Luhmann (2018).
24  See Hasse (2005); La Cour/Højlund (2013); Luhmann (2018).
25  Luhmann (2004). 
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ities of their members when they judge. With regard to this point, research 
should identify the operations and timing of the organization. 
Secondly, courts also produce decisions about what belongs to law, what 
is legal, or what is illegal. Moreover, because of their central position in the 
legal system, they produce distinctions not only about the actual problem, 
but also about the criteria for identifying a legal problem and a legal decision. 
They thus oversee the consistency of legal decisions.26 These are second-or-
der observations that produce a closure of the legal system itself. These de-
cisions, it is worth noting once again, do not always correspond to or stand 
concomitant with distinctions about what is legitimate, economic, or dem-
ocratic and therefore do not always accompany processes of political tran-
sition. The courts translate, in their own language and in their own time of 
decision, what could generally be seen as external pressure. That is, in reality, 
something that the research needs to investigate and answer: if that transla-
tion occurs and, especially, in what terms and at what times.
Finally, making a distinction between central court communications and 
peripheral communications from the rest of the legal system also leads to 
another methodological concern. If it is not enough to identify political pres-
sures in order to attest to a legal change, it is also not enough to look only 
at the courts. It is essential to perceive changes in general legal communi-
cations, both those traditionally understood as legal, such as case law and 
theory of law, made by and for jurists, and those perhaps found in other social 
groups, that the research might possibly reveal.
5. The Brazilian studies on legal transitions
Brazilian scholars have written extensively about the transition to democ-
racy, across diverse fields and perspectives in the social sciences and perspec-
tives, which only confirms the varied and multifaceted nature of this process. 
This section aims to introduce an up-to-date overview of the scholarship with 
regard to concerns related to the idea of a legal transition, as stated above. 
We classify the studies that relate to legal changes according to three topics: 
social studies, institutional studies, and traditional legal history studies. 
Social studies analyze the production of law and of the constitution by di-
verse social groups. Usually such studies begin with theories of social move-
ments, following the academic tradition of law and society. These studies 
26  Luhmann (2004). 
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focus on legal production that happens outside the courts and other organi-
zations in the legal system—or, in other words, at the peripheries of the legal 
system. Institutional studies, on the other hand, analyze transformations in 
legal organizations and other state bodies. They encompass studies on the 
interactions between political and legal institutions, such as those concerning 
the phenomenon of the judicialization of politics and, in Brazil, of the em-
powerment of Supremo Tribunal Federal. Finally, studies of legal history in 
the more traditional sense dedicate themselves to understanding the histor-
ical formation of discourses and concepts produced by jurists and for jurists. 
There are fewer studies here in comparison with the other fields, but they 
show, in particular, some legal changes and features that other fields have 
taken for granted. Certainly, the classification into these three topics leaves 
aside a wide range of studies. However, it serves the purposes of this article, 
in the sense of underlining legal changes that have not been well understood 
in literature influenced by theoretical frameworks based in political science. 
5.1. Social studies 
Brazilian democratization had as a central milestone the promulgation of 
a new constitution. Thus, in the most literal sense, Brazil’s democratic transi-
tion was a constitutional transition. Moreover, the National Constituent As-
sembly (ANC) of 1987-1988 galvanized Brazilian society in an unprecedented 
way. A multiplicity of social groups organized themselves to participate, forg-
ing new legal and constitutional discourses. These groups—grassroots social 
movements, professional associations, trade unions—constituted themselves 
in this process by constituting new constitutional languages. 
Since then, an extensive scholarship has sought to identify the actors and 
pressure groups engaged directly and indirectly in the National Constituent 
Assembly. One area of investigation has focused on the constituent process. 
Published in the heat of the moment, Carlos Micheli’s book recounted the 
saga of popular amendments, describing the social use of this formal mecha-
nism for social participation.27 In a similar vein, though writing more recent-
ly, Maria Helena Versiani investigated social engagement through the use 
of formal mechanisms, such as popular amendments and sending letters, as 
well as its consequences for the forging of new political discourses on the idea 
of a republic.28 
27  Michelis (1989).
28  Versiani (2010); Versiani (2013).
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Over the years, collections of studies, often produced around commem-
orative dates of the promulgation of the new constitution, have detailed the 
role of specific groups in the ANC and in the constitutional debates that fol-
lowed its convening. Combined with gender and race studies, this research 
has demonstrated the role of women, black movements, and indigenous peo-
ple.29 With regard to the use of formal mechanisms, it is also possible to point 
out a continuity with Leonardo Avritzer’s investigations of sectorial councils, 
public hearings, and other constitutional mechanisms for social participa-
tion.30 
Some of these studies employed a social movement analysis methodology. 
In fact, the use of this methodology stems from a widely recognized coinci-
dence between democratization and the formation of new movements in the 
early 1980s. Initially, the authors, also members of these movements, empha-
sized the arrival of new social actors into the public arena.31 They published 
legal studies on the social production of law, as well as ethnographic studies 
(also from the 1980s) on new social conceptions of bearing rights.32 Subse-
quently, they joined a line of investigation into law and society that stressed 
the non-state production of law, in which the law was understood to be only 
indirectly based in courts. In this sense, these studies distance themselves 
from the neo-institutionalist framework this article has previously shown. 
Finally, with regard to studies of the Brazilian courts, the connection be-
tween social mobilization, institutional empowerment, and changes in case 
law seems to be more fragile, with the exception, among others, of Fabiana 
Luci’s investigation of representations of the court in newspapers during the 
1980s and 1990s.33
5.2. Institutional studies
Taking the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 as a point of refer-
ence once again, if some of the research on the constituent process highlight-
ed the involvement of social movements, as described above, another group 
of investigations focused on the role of organizations and institutions. The 
differences between these two groups of scholarship are blurred and possibly 
29  See Santos (2009); Magalhães (2015); Santana/Cardoso (2020).
30  Avritzer (2012).
31  See Sader (1988).
32  See Souza Júnior (2002).
33  Oliveira (2011).
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relate more to theoretical and methodological disagreements than to the de 
facto organization of these groups, whether or not they adopted formal rules 
or had a coherent set of practice. Take, for instance, religious groups, which 
would easily fit into both frameworks. 
Adriano Pillati developed well-known research on politicians and political 
parties in the National Constituent Assembly, relating them to the economic 
agendas of the country. He thus approached some of the ideas in transitolo-
gy about political elites, albeit with different conclusions.34 Within the field 
of constitutional history, the research group Percursos, Narrativas e Frag-
mentos (Trajectories, Narratives and Fragments) at the University of Brasilia 
developed studies on the National Constituent Assembly that also gave prom-
inence to political agents, among other social actors, in their examination of 
the debates on terrorism, religious identity, labor and union autonomy, and 
freedom of communications.35 
Making explicit use of institutionalist methodologies, other studies have 
focused on the role of the Ministério Público (Public Prosecutor),36 the Su-
premo Tribunal Federal37, the judiciary38, the police forces and the army,39 
and the Brazilian Bar Association.40 Such institutional histories best repre-
sent the research on the Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal, which is to say 
again that transitology and current studies of Latin American courts share the 
same sources. Scholars have analyzed the connection between the justices’ 
performances and the rules established by the Constitution of 1988, such as 
procedures for nomination, legal standing to sue, and the redefinition of legal 
competences.41 More recently, others have been seeking to map the affiliation 
and origin of the court’s nominees.42 
The problem is that using this lens for the political universe tells only part 
of the story, the part that most clearly blurs the boundaries between poli-
tics and law. It leaves out the challenges regarding the understanding of legal 
traditions. One could even argue that, in Brazil, these traditions developed 
34  Pilatti (2016).
35  Bigliazzi (2007); Pinheiro (2008); Lourenço Filho (2008); Couto (2020).
36  See Maciel/Koerner (2014); Rogério Arantes (1999).
37  See Koerner/Freitas (2013); Arguelhes/Ribeiro (2016). 
38  See Arantes (1997); Carvalho (2017).
39  Zaverucha (1998); Guerra/Machado Filho (2018). 
40  Couto/Guerra (2018).
41  See Koerner/Freitas (2013); Arguelhes/Ribeiro (2016). 
42  Fontainha/Santos/Oliveira (2017).
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through a long process of negotiation between constitutionalism and authori-
tarianism, which would point, in a different sense, to a deep-rooted confusion 
of politics and law. However, even in this sense, legal traditions have oper-
ated within the legal system, rearranging legal reasoning itself. The blurred 
lines are something legal history must address, not assume. 
5.3. Legal history of doctrine and legal theory
Along the lines discussed above, the idea of a legal transition cannot do 
without historical studies of changes in legal concepts. This area of more tra-
ditional studies of legal history identifies changes in doctrine, case law, and 
legal theories. 
Again, a good example of this approach is the research on the Brazilian 
and other Latin American courts. Employing institutionalist methodologies, 
these studies detect changes in organizational rules and practices, such as 
composition and appointment, hierarchy among judicial bodies, procedural 
design, as well as changes in the balance between groups with decision-mak-
ing power and the effect on the political role of the courts and on democracy 
as a whole. But given that courts produce two distinct types of decisions, on 
organization and on law, these studies only indirectly access changes in deci-
sions about what is legal and illegal, on one level, as well as, at a second level, 
decisions about what constitutes a legal issue or, in other words, about the 
consistency of legal decisions. Although such connections may exist, it is up 
to the research to demonstrate them. 
Recent Brazilian scholarship points to other interesting paths. In the past 
few decades, theories of legal reasoning have undergone significant changes. 
A wave of scholarship on the globalization of law spread throughout the world 
via neo-constitutional theories from authors such as Robert Alexy. Notwith-
standing that development, Brazilian society may have had a particular na-
tional receptiveness to this framework following the promulgation of the 
Constitution of 1988. José Mendonça and Christian Lynch, for example, have 
compared Justice Luís Roberto Barroso’s neo-constitutionalism to theoreti-
cal models adopted in other countries.43 In the Brazilian version, the theory 
would have the function of rejecting the pre-constitutional past, dictatorial 
or not, and legitimizing an illuminist role of the judiciary and the Federal 
Court. In a similar vein, José Rodrigo Rodrigues has analyzed the practice of 
43  Lynch/Mendonça (2017).
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the Brazilian courts and the theories they have used to support judges’ deci-
sion-making power.44 
Christian Lynch and José Mendonças’ explanation fits in interestingly 
with the hypothesis Andrei Koerner has developed in his studies. According 
to Koerner, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Federal Court justices updated 
the theory of limited effectiveness of constitutional norms, a theory originally 
devised in the 1960s, to restrict the reach of constitutional norms with which 
they disagreed.45 These ideas also fit in with the hypothesis of Diego Arguel-
hes and Leandro Molhano, for whom the justices have alternated restrictive 
and expansive legal reasoning techniques to guarantee their personal prefer-
ences.46
However, the process of changing legal theories with regard to both pro-
duction and diffusion—which have the potential to explain changes in law 
and jurisprudence—is still awaiting an in-depth treatment, with appropriate 
methodologies and historical sources. Research of this kind would need to 
encompass an analysis of academia, universities, the publishing market, and, 
as far as Brazil is concerned, possibly an analysis of the market and of the 
organizations that have been involved in preparing public tenders and bar 
exams, which have served as large-scale diffusers of conceptual and theoret-
ical legal schemes.47
6. Final remarks
Returning to the question posed at the opening of this article, which asked 
about what a legal transition is, a legal transition is a multifaceted phenome-
non, used to refer to the possible transformations in law resulting from major 
political and social changes. Any answer to the opening question must consid-
er the ways in which law and legal organizations translate or process, in their 
own terms and according to their own times, the pressures and interferences 
of their external world. That does not mean that interferences or changes do 
not occur, but that any interferences or changes must be demonstrated in the 
course of the research. 
44  Rodrigues (2013).
45  Koerner/Freitas (2013).
46  Arguelhes/Ribeiro (2016).
47  On the matter, see the publications of the Observatory on Legal Education of the 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Brazil.
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This question is certainly not new, although the term legal transition be-
gan to be used after the emergence of transitology. In 1894, in a book that 
would become a classic of Brazilian constitutional history, Felisbello Freire 
disclosed his discomfort with the newly created Supremo Tribunal Federal. 
Despite the proclamation of a republic in Brazil, the court retained traces and 
members of the monarchical regime. From the Supreme Court of the Empire, 
the new court had just changed its name: “They have all passed with their 
weapons and backgrounds from one court to another. The spirit of the two 
institutions, the profound differences of their attributions; the differences in 
education and special knowledge they claim; all this was of the utmost impor-
tance to transport a staff of old magistrates.” How would they perform their 
duties when they were unaware of this legal system they came to know only 
after they were “so old that they could no longer comprehend and feel the 
beauties of it”?
The excerpt is revealing of the differences among social time, political 
time, and legal time. Not every political change leads to a legal change, at 
least not concomitantly. Not every political transition, therefore, is a legal 
transition. It is up to the historical research to demonstrate the forms and 
elements that make up this special form of legal change.
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New philosophical paradigms and demand for law: space for innovation.
Reflections on the time of transition as a practical structure
Flavia Stara
1. Innovation to accommodate social changes; 1.1. The epistemological nature of 
innovation; 1.2. Social innovation and social transformation; 2. Processes of tran-
sition; 2.1.Transition as a practical-conceptual space-time phase
1. Innovation to accommodate social changes
In order to accommodate social change, it is essential to innovate, introduce 
new conceptual systems, new regulations, new procedures for production and 
new spaces for action and interaction. This requires to develop new theories 
and translating them into practical structures, into adaptive strategies in the 
awareness of the challenges and performance that the environment-world re-
quires. No innovation can have a lasting effect and impact in case it does not 
respond to needs already present within the context in which it occurs.
Creativity and innovation, as significant moments within the development 
process, belong to different logical levels. Creativity is an individual resource: 
it asks for flexibility, skills, talent, in many ways it is uncontrollable, it can be 
promoted but not planned. Innovation is a cultural and socio-economic phe-
nomenon. It involves the community, presents a risk factor and is the result 
of strategic actions. It calls for investments, infrastructure, dedicated policies. 
To innovate means to modify the structures of meaning of a given community 
that are rooted in the biologically oriented ways of interaction, in the ways in 
which the community foresees a horizon of socio-cultural expectations.
The drive for creativity is dominant in our society as it underpins the desire 
for innovation. But the call to innovate, and the creative imperative in particu-
lar, has proliferated beyond significant shifts in the economic cycle to incorpo-
rate the comparatively unremarkable micro-level creative acts that may – ul-
timately – have very little effect on society. The meaning of creation is, on the 
one hand, loosely defined (almost anything can be described as creative) and 
on the other it is ever more tied to the paradigm of production. We measure 
the success of creativity and the imperative for innovation in capitalist terms: 




value. In short, there is nothing creative in the discourse of creativity. The 
‘change-making’ in management discourse is what Jilles Deleuze describes as 
a product of a thought limited to what is its grounding (the economics) and 
which operates with perceived legitimacy: it is the established way of thinking. 
In contrast, to be truly creative and open to possibilities, we require an ‘unti-
mely’ modality of thinking.1 Deleuze terms it as ‘nomadic’ thought.
1.1. The epistemological nature of innovation
The issue opens up vast spaces for reflection that are linked to the episte-
mological nature of innovation which is generation of knowledge and, there-
fore, has an implicit or explicit epistemology. While investigating the concept 
of innovation cannot but refer to the philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, 
whose conceptions surpass both any monistic model of scientific knowledge 
and the notion of progress as a simple incremental accumulation of experien-
ce. Kuhn addresses the issue of innovation of paradigms and theoretical mo-
dels, trying to understand the relationships existing between normally evolu-
tionary periods of science and the ones defined as revolutionary. In his work: 
The Structure of Scientific Revolution2 he argues that for every science it is 
possible to speak of a “pre-paradigmatic” period in which random facts and 
ideas accumulate. According to Kuhn, in the pre-paradigmatic period, diffe-
rent schools of thought can arise and clash, at times they may be in competi-
tion with each other but not destined to take over one another. It may happen 
that a theoretical system begins to be accepted and shared by everyone, thus 
becoming a paradigm. Once the paradigm is fully established, then a period of 
“normal science” begins, in which research is conducted in accordance with 
the reference model provided by previous studies that have recorded favorable 
results. What in this period does not work or does not adapt to the paradigm 
is ignored or considered as anomalous. If, however, what is not working is 
recurrent then the paradigm goes into crisis: it reaches the stage defined as 
the revolution which leads to the emergence of a new paradigm and a subse-
quent period of “normal science”. Hence according to this theory we arrive at 
two conclusions, firstly that every cognitive discipline is punctuated and in-
tercalated by important discontinuities. Secondly, one’s own Weltanschauung 
depends upon the commitment toward the paradigm one refers to. According 
1  Deleuze (1997).
2  Kuhn (2012).
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
69
to Kuhn, innovation fully exists in a “revolutionary” context. There can be no 
grounding in innovation, since it exists in a purely binary logic or because 
knowledge has a break in its progress – and then everything changes or does 
not exist – nor can one talk about innovation by accumulation since the very 
concept of accumulation refers to a simply incremental phase, typical of a pe-
riod of “normal science”. Innovation can therefore be generated by unexpec-
ted dialectical logics and can appear even if it is not intentionally produced. 
In short, innovation is not produced and is not rooted, is not imposed or mat-
ched, it originates and produces itself and can’t be systematized because it is 
already a system. The question is to understand if the new paradigms present 
appreciable advantages in facing problems – compared to the old ones – or are 
even less useful in solving those very problems. An assessment in this regard 
would be scientifically appreciable, and in any case would not justify renou-
ncing to forge more adequate instruments than traditional ones. The history 
of science confirms the possibility of a long coexistence between old and new 
paradigms, which perform differently yet can continue to be usefully manipu-
lated along with the usual tools (in the same way that the theory of Newtonian 
gravitation is still effective in calculating the orbits of celestial bodies, even 
though it has been superseded by the theory of relativity, which in turn waits 
to be absorbed into a more advanced Unified Theory).
The socio-cultural scope of paradigm shifts producing structural changes 
and transitions is vast and can’t be grasped in its complexity. Therefore, we 
are going to outline only some of the many possible related phenomena, pre-
senting them as landmarks within a transdisciplinary reflection. 
The paradigms introduced by postmodernity feature remarkable transi-
tions transversal to all sectors of human thinking and acting. Every cultural 
action today moves within the space of a real antinomy between practical and 
theoretical reason, since it aggregates positions that are often ideologically 
distant from each other, within a globalized economy and a multi-ethnic so-
ciety, which mirrors various experiences of public ethics and political partici-
pation. The space of subjectivity emphasizes the need for individual freedom 
along with new claims of rights, producing socio-political phases of legitimate 
redefinition of personal dignity.
The Twenty-first century is no longer the century of the Ego, but of the We 
– not of a symbiotic and totalizing We, of a We constituted by the I/You, by 
an alter-egoic reality. Evidence of this is the phenomenon of multiculturalism, 
which moves from being a static space of pure and simple coexistence of diver-
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sity toward the process of inter-cultural reality which envisages a strong – albeit 
hard – interaction of identities. This osmosis among cultures and civilizations 
takes place through stages of transition by facing the syncretism or polytheism 
of values that cracks the canons of identity and the same personal ethical codes. 
We do experience the harsh reactions to this process of osmosis in the forms of 
fundamentalisms, nationalisms, sovereignties, populisms, localisms or glocali-
zation which is undermining the still dominant globalization.
1.2. Social innovation and social transformation
Reflecting on innovative social dynamic we can comprehend how transition 
toward global integration is proceeding alongside sociocultural disintegration, 
the resurgence of various separatism and international terrorism. The cons-
truction of the identity as socio-cultural belonging and relational expression is 
significantly problematized for the defense and promotion of new freedoms, 
against the traditional political-regulatory stratifications. Most democratic 
theorists welcome and support struggles for recognition and identity move-
ments to the degree to which they are movements for democratic inclusion, 
greater social and political justice, and cultural fluidity.3 Other theorists un-
derline how democratic equality and deliberative practices are quite compa-
tible with new legal and institutional designs that accommodate cultural plu-
ralism. The philosopher Seyla Benhabib4 suggests a comparative perspective 
on multicultural justice to appreciate how demands of the same kind may bear 
different meanings and yield different results. She observes that vibrant deli-
berative democratic societies may succeed in realizing opportunities for maxi-
mum cultural self-ascription and collective intergroup justice. Other scholarly 
voices transversally recognize the phenomena of social innovation as cultu-
ral contestation within the public sphere. For Richard Sennett5 the profound 
awareness grounded in the notion of collaboration creating community and 
responsible views of the future is innovative. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya 
Sen6 indicate a possible action trajectory by introducing the concept of social 
generativity and capacity approach. The transformation of social relations can 
be qualified as “capacitive”, that is, able to empower, directly or indirectly, the 
most disadvantaged sections of the population through the capacity of action.
3  Taylor (1994); Fraser/Honneth (2003).
4  Benhabib (2002; 2004).
5  Sennett (2012).
6  Nussbaum/Sen (1993).
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Since cultures are not homogeneous wholes, they are constituted through 
the narratives and symbolizations of their members, who articulate them as 
normative expectations expressed by particular social groups or by political 
or cultural minorities. Over the last few decades the claim for subjective and 
collective rights obtained, in different forms, public recognition in the con-
text of Western political and juridical structures. (However, we acknowledge 
that some new rights are by now widely accepted as regulatory instruments 
even beyond the borders of the Western world). Some new rights – it is the 
case of gender rights or those aimed at protecting the new configurations 
of family institutions – are still in the process of full approval and adequate 
effectiveness. These innovative resolutions, which are still in the process of 
implementation, confirm how human rights cannot be traced back to a com-
plete, static and universal regulatory complex. Sometimes, they tend to pre-
vail over customary conventions and laws, as is the case of feminine claims 
from cultures where millennial patriarchal traditions are in force, or for the 
new instances relating to sexual, marital and reproductive relations that have 
dismantled structures deemed to be “sacred”. The basic pattern of the tra-
ditional family, the heterosexual couple, historically cocooned in a family 
network both broad and binding in its parental and patrimonial obligations, 
had already undergone a change, between 19th and twentieth centuries, as a 
mononuclear family. In the process it emancipated itself and eased from the 
traditional parental networks to become functional for labor mobility. The 
crisis of this mononuclear family during the post-industrial era has brought 
out its basic weaknesses and is progressively frayed by virtue of a theory of 
gender, that is most advanced “bio-political manifesto” of the re-engineering 
of “natural socio-genesis”, attested by the reproductive monogram of the he-
terosexual procreative couple. The demand for emancipation from traditional 
and natural constraints can be enacted and transcribed in social and juridical 
institutions. The natural bonds are no longer recognized as such because they 
can be manipulated by techniques, which ar presumed to artificially redesign 
the socio-genetic relationship between sexuality and natural affiliation (see 
structural anthropology / Levi-Strauss). 
Norberto Bobbio7 identifies the category of new rights by calling them 
rights of the third generation, thus distinguishing them from the rights of the 
first generation (political rights, freedom, private property) and the rights of 
the second generation, or social rights, including right to work, right to edu-
7  Bobbio (1990).
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cation, right to health, as well as various public assistance and social security 
benefits, guaranteed in particular by the welfare state. According to Bobbio 
all human rights have historical and conflictual origins and are closely in-
tertwined with the standards of rationality of Western culture. And yet, he 
observes that precisely because the doctrine of human rights presents anti-
nomies within itself, it cannot have an absolute foundation: this foundation 
would entail the claim to make a right and its opposite both binding, irrever-
sible and universal. The analysis conducted by Bobbio is perfectly in line with 
the reflections of contemporary anthropology (A. Gehlen) that underline how 
“productive” operational knowledge coincides with the confirmation of man’s 
capacity to transcend the given situation.
2. Processes of transition
This disposition to the manipulation of reality – that once was described 
as “ontologically founded”– reaches its highest expression within an episte-
mological scenario no more centered on totalizing notions of truth. The as-
sertion that there is no absolute point of view to look at phenomena, is not 
an implicit admission of ethical relativism, but an admission of onto-ethic 
relativity, as well as of intellectual honesty, since knowledge always presup-
poses a somatic-chronologic-topologic situation. As H.G. Gadamer observes 
in “Truth and Method”, no one is without prejudice, since we all require some 
kind of prejudices to represent the horizon of our views.8 The recognition of 
the notion of truth as practicability of ideas (Pragmatism), generates a cons-
tant socio-political process of fluctuations, acceptability from levels of tolera-
tion toward actions and reciprocity. These processes are also challenged by 
the application of techno-sciences to the vital areas, that bring out the diffi-
cult transition of traditional ethical paradigms to the new processing of social 
justification: Bioethics, Biomedicine, Biolaw. The combination of computer 
science and genetics allowed technology to creep into the deepest folds of our 
lives, rewriting codes, superimposing biology and biography. Technology by 
transcending even the inconceivable, is becoming a human inner tool: high-
performance computers that think on behalf of people, are the evidence.
In the face of the technique that seems to neutralize every sense of limit, 
or natural or moral boundary, there are hypotheses of revision or overco-
8  Gadamer (1975).
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ming of traditional ethical paradigms.9 The foundation of a possible revision 
/ ethical revolution lies in the need to bring the person back to the center of 
an otherwise dystopian and despotic technological development, to measure 
innovation according to critical parameters of social sustainability and ethical 
admissibility, as well as to legal and logical justifiability. In order to rebalan-
ce confidence in technology, it is necessary to think beyond technology itself 
and evaluate its historical impact through the experimentation of new grids 
of meaning that are intertwined with ethical threads, and also useful for the 
management of economic-productive cycles.
Internet which is the largest and most visited public space, is the new di-
mension in which the human dialectic of knowing and doing is articulated – 
or, to cite Article 2 of the Italian Constitution – is the reality in which rights 
are exercised or can be denied, and the freedoms can be deployed or viola-
ted. The digital transformation process invests huge value in the interactions 
that unfold and intertwine in social productions. The interconnection with 
objects, sensors, devices of daily use, feeds the treatment of large volumes of 
data and favors increasingly astonishing applications of artificial intelligen-
ce, destined to profoundly change economic processes and social structures. 
Data protection is, therefore, the necessary condition for freedom and demo-
cracy, because the data constitute the digital projection of our “persona” and 
manifest its vulnerability. The relationship between market and rights is also 
played on this terrain. The processes of work automation are almost deter-
mining a kind of dehumanization. The progressive replacement of workers 
– even those involved in more complex functions – with machines, is desti-
ned to have remarkable social consequences. New categories of technologies, 
which use natural language processing and self-learning, will escalate people 
and machines interactions, increasing the skills of artificial intelligences. The 
obscure side of digital innovation is cybercrime. Data protection is, therefore, 
the research target for regulations, as any private or public activity is mostly 
based on technologies powered by personal data. In the age of disinterme-
diation and post-truth, new transitions often challenge the spaces of demo-
cracy. If the resolutions of justice are not available, or their application is not 
feasible, there emerges the extraordinary politics in which toleration plays a 
relevant role. Yet toleration presupposes and reserves not only the power of 
interference, but the discretion to define the threshold of interference. 
We are entertaining a reflection on issues that, to a certain extent, pertain 
9  Reichlin (2008).
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to the “canon” of Philosophy of Law. The reflection on social change raises the 
central question of what American legal philosophers define as the “call to con-
text”, or the need to bring law back to its historical context – also linguistic and 
symbolic context – from which derives the indication to observe the legal text 
as a cultural product involved in the construction of sense in a shared horizon. 
Martha Nussbaum points out that law when it is re-contextualized and desa-
cralized – in relation to the human sciences – reveals its hidden, ambiguous, 
incoherent and paradoxical face, but at the same time it reveals its possibilities, 
its authentic function as a necessary tool to preserve human interactions. As 
Nussbaum points out, the greatest crisis that hit the globalized world in the 
last decade is not the one that occurred in 2008: the famous financial bubbles, 
but the progressive loss of the humanistic culture.10 It is ironic that we have 
also lost the sight of the reasons that hinted to its importance in public life. In 
her opinion law also is subject to the same process of distancing itself from the 
humanistic ethos and moral and ethical considerations. The social and moral 
concerns are the threads of the whole complex of social fabric to which law 
should remain destined: an area that claims conscious and critical actions.
2.1.Transition as a practical-conceptual space-time phase
Taking into account the relationship between conceptual transformations 
and their translations into social transformations, the central element is the 
time-space factor within transitions among juridical cultures, customs, per-
ceptions and configurations of human dignity, amongst regulatory structures 
of freedom. The French thinker François Jullien refers to the concept of “en-
tre”, “in-between” within human and social transitions, as the recognition 
of a specific time-space of dialogue in which awareness offers elements to 
formulate a solution which is a non-solution.11 Paul Ricoeur, in his philoso-
phical hermeneutics, had already referred to the ontological position of un-
derstanding as “the long way”, because only a long path allows to collect the 
analytical contributions necessary for understanding experience in its whole-
ness.12 In other words, it implies to open up to a pluralism of views and partial 
solutions, or ad hoc solutions, by accepting how to manage the consequent, 
non-eliminable conflict of interpretations.13
10  Nussbaum (2012).
11  Jullien (2012).
12  Ricoeur (2010).
13  Ricoeur’s hermeneutics starts from the vision of the human condition presented 
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In the spirit of interpretation as a “long way”, it is necessary to recogni-
ze that we are always immersed in a phase of implementation, of transfor-
mation, and that meanings are constructed in perspective. It is precisely the 
possibility of genuinely different outcomes that allows us to recognize that 
transition is the practical-conceptual space-time phase to enact the potential 
of even inadequate solutions. As the historian Fernand Braudel pointed out, 
innovation is not the mere generation of novelties, but the creation of the 
conditions for a change destined to have long-lasting consequences that shift 
the limits of the possible.14
The “in-between” Jullien talks about, within transition, is the condition for 
promoting otherness: new criteria, categories and languages. Social practice 
is nourished by self-correction and free shared public debate and, therefore, 
it is able to develop an immune system against its own “deviations”. In view 
of an essential ethical-political, or more generally hermeneutical, component 
within the alleged scientific objectivity, Paolo Benanti, Italian political con-
sultant on the ethics of technology, proposes to develop an ethics of algo-
rithms to support the development of a national control strategy of artificial 
intelligences.15 By analyzing the debate that arose around the hypothesis rai-
sed by the European Parliament to attribute “electronic personality” to the 
robots, Benanti invites to distinguish three levels: technological, ethical and 
juridical. At present, the debate has been limited only to the last, that is how 
to regulate the use of these machines in society, but, according to Benanti, 
“traditional categories are no longer sufficient, new solutions must be found”. 
And he warns: “We cannot talk about ethics without knowing the technical 
by Heidegger in Being and Time. For Heidegger the human condition is that of beings 
who try to understand the world in which they are thrown without wanting or choosing 
it. Every living, therefore, corresponds to an interpretation, and the resulting human con-
dition is completely determined by the concrete possibilities available to each individual. 
Ricoeur accepts the Heideggerian approach and agrees with the principle that living is 
interpreting. However, he does not accept the conclusion that the human condition can be 
understood directly through the analysis of one’s own possibilities. Only in language can 
the human condition be discovered as a way of being. According to Ricoeur, therefore, the 
human condition discovers its meaning only with a long hermeneutical journey through 
the linguistic mediations of signs and symbols, of stories and ideologies, of metaphors and 
myths that determine it and in a certain sense constitute it, to end up enriched by devia-
tions through the language of others.
14  Braudel (2009).
15  Benanti (2018).
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aspects, we cannot give legal regulation without ethical principles and the 
competence of the technological substrate”. “These machines – he continues 
– work with algorithms” that today are “black boxes” protected by copyright. 
Hence the question: “Is it possible to maintain these black boxes or do we 
need to make them crystal boxes, that is transparent?”. To ensure that this 
innovation is truly at the service of mankind, it is necessary to “link progress 
to development through ethical values. A particularly demanding challenge 
in the case of artificial intelligence because the values  on which the machine 
decides are numerical values  and then it is necessary to create new paradigms 
to transform ethical values  into something that the machine can decode”. For 
this reason, it is necessary to “formulate the new modality of the algorithm” 
which “must contain tables of values, principles and norms to be translated 
into machine language”. “A model – he explains – can be to” insinuate “a kind 
of uncertainty inside the machine”. Thus “in the face of a doubt the machine 
will call upon the person who is the bearer to validate his decisions. This leads 
us to create a “Human Centered Artificial Intelligence” “and to develop ma-
chines “that are integrated with human beings and together with them they 
seek the best solution”.
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Melancholy as a permanent transition in law and democracy
Douglas Antônio Rocha Pinheiro
1. Introduction; 2. Melancholy as the permanence of loss; 3. Legal-political mel-
ancholy; 4. Final thoughts
1. Introduction
After an unfavorable first court session, Joseph K., the main character of 
the novel The Trial, by Franz Kafka, returns to his judging court and, with 
difficulty, gets to access the books lying on the judge’s desk. Surprisingly, flip-
ping through the pages of one of them, he finds the vulgar, obscene drawing 
of a naked couple over a couch, instead of legal doctrines. This frightens the 
man: after all, was that the kind of education given to the person who is to 
judge his life? Vladimir Safatle1 revisits this excerpt of the novel by Kafka in 
order to imply that the character, even if unaware of it, had found the true 
and only foundation of social relations: a circuit of feelings. In order to under-
stand power, thus, it is necessary to perceive how the political body affects the 
subjects in their individualization processes, and how it is affected by them 
in return. In early modern times, according to Thomas Hobbes, fear was the 
main feeling that shaped the political bodies and the individuals – which is a 
valid way of understanding the social reality even nowadays. The State, poli-
tics and the law are not but complex forms of managing fear, within a bigger 
circle that moves social relations according to the same feeling. Thus, new 
political-juridical reforms are only feasible as long as there are conditions to 
“come up with a society that does not have fear as the foundation of its circuit 
of feelings”.2
Under this point of view, it is believable that a political-legal crisis of any 
order may have suffered in its origins from the influxes of a new feeling that 
interfered with more intensity onto the current ruling circuit of feelings con-
nected to the processes of power organization and subject individualization. 
To understand that crisis, then, it would be necessary to identify the feeling 
1  See Safatle (2015).
2  Safatle (2015) 20.
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that stirs the consolidated circuit and how it proposes to reorder it. Consid-
ering all crises are equally marked by the asynchrony between the time of the 
consolidated power and the new vector of insurgent social temporalities,3 the 
destabilizing feeling should be the one that is capable of creating new affec-
tions, as well as synchronizing divergent social rhythms, either of the present, 
or from a spectral, unsolved past. That is why the thesis raised in this chapter 
is that melancholy, marked by a historizing attitude in which the present is 
confronted by the loss of real and ideal objects of its own temporality or from 
the past,4 is the key to understand the crises democracy has been facing in the 
world, especially in Brazil.
The proposal hereby presented has a previous counter-argument. Pieran-
gelo Schiera openly stated that “jurists must not be melancholic”.5 The advice 
is fruit of his studies on the history of the term melancholia. This conceptual 
path was first traced by medicine with humoral theory, sometimes attributed 
to Hippocrates, sometimes to Polybius, his son-in-law (fifth century B.C.). 
According to it, every organism has four humors – blood, phlegm, yellow bile, 
black bile – which keep one healthy if balanced.  However, if one of them 
prevails over the others, thus the temperaments manifest, respectively: the 
sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and the melancholic temperaments. The lat-
ter was seen as pathological and able to create mental alterations, misanthro-
py, and depression.6 Later, Aristotle, in his philosophical reflections, saw that 
melancholy had a paradoxical nature, as it was simultaneously able to gener-
ate apathy, depression and torpor, as well as the creative ability of extraordi-
nary people, such as philosophy, art, and politics geniuses.7 These concepts 
even gained strength in medieval times via Arabian-Islamic culture, on the 
medical aspect (with the Salerno school in the thirteenth century), as well as 
on the religious aspect – with the condemnation of acedia and its heretical 
classification –, and on the philosophical aspect – with the positive aspects of 
melancholia and Neoplatonism for Marsilio Ficino in the fifteenth century.8 
Finally, during the birth of the Modern State, melancholy was linked to asso-
ciability, whence comes the reprimand by Schiera.
3  See Koselleck (2006).
4  See Tindemans (2016) 137.
5  Schiera (2011) 155.
6  See Schiera (2016) 43-44; Klibansky et al. (1979) 8-10.
7  See Klibansky et al. (1979) 29-35.
8  See Schiera (2011; 2016).
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Political science and practice, in order to establish social cohesion and 
using sometimes the concepts of civilization/illustration, and sometimes the 
ideas of vigilance/punishment, has been in constant opposition to melan-
choly. This is because that feeling is seen as an innate anthropological trait 
that tends to social aversion and is refractory to order and discipline. In the 
pre-state phase (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), the overcoming of 
melancholy was accomplished by compromises and obligation contracts be-
tween the classes, of the first statutes, and of the legal-theological doctrines. 
In the founding phase of Modern State (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), 
emerging political doctrines with legal foundations, including the notions of 
sovereignty and the social contract, introduced the pretentious natural and 
rational thought to the social life in general. In the phase of consolidation 
of the State (eighteenth century), social life was justified, so the concert was 
to perfect instruments of civil and criminal organization, as a means to po-
tentialize the disciplinary processes; to finish, in the nineteenth century, law 
had its legislative production, and a prescriptive pretentiousness started to 
command the social regulation of behaviors and the pacification of deviating 
melancholic bodies. The legal field, thus, accomplishes its victory against the 
anti-social resistance of melancholy.9
Schiera himself,10 however, admits melancholy gains new meanings when-
ever there is a new anthropology, that is, a new conception of men and their 
place in the world. Thus, the “brief twentieth century” started with the Era 
of Catastrophe – the period of the two world wars, with long-term conflicts, 
military technology of farther reach, and high mortality rates, in which the 
greatest potencies faced each other11 – established a breach on the idea of 
constant, utopian, idealized progress. Obviously, the feelings of ruin, defeat, 
loss, mourning, melancholy, all existed before; however, in late modernity, 
these feelings come to put order to chaos, to the political narrative, to the 
meaning of existence and the place of men. Together with moments of eu-
phoric mania, as in the golden years of economic recovery in the middle of the 
twentieth century, contemporaneity has re-signified melancholia, making it a 
latent feeling that, according to the proposal hereby developed, stirs a circuit 
of crisis.
To develop on this argument, this chapter goes over what Freud and Benja-
9  See Schiera (2011) 141-145.
10  See Schiera (2011) 131.
11  See Hobsbawm (1995).
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min thought about melancholy, as an individualizing process, and as a meth-
odological instrument to understand modernity. Following to that, come the 
manifestations of melancholy in power, in political ideologies, and in the law. 
To finish, a conclusive section establishes a dialogue with the studies of Law 
and Emotion and presents the final thoughts.
2. Melancholy as the permanence of loss
In Mourning and Melancholia, written in 1915 and published in 1917, 
Freud reflected on a double temporality of losses: the social one, marked by 
the breach of the First World War and the consequent impossibility of main-
taining the “conventional treatment of death”,12 which so far was typically 
concerned with separating death from the daily life and restricting it to a dis-
tant moment of life closure; and the individual temporality of loss, based on 
three circumstances of Freud’s personal life: the separation from Carl Jung 
due to their disagreement on the importance of sexuality for the beginning of 
neurosis, the participation of one of his children in the war, and the death of 
his brother Emmanuel after a train accident.13 The congruence of these events 
made Freud think to what extent the different reactions to losses might influ-
ence the constitution of the I.14
Mourning is the expected reaction to the loss of a dear person or of some 
abstraction form, such as one’s homeland, freedom, people or ideals. This 
first loss usually leads to other losses: loss of interest to the outside world, 
since it now has the absence of the loved one, inducing itself more to oblivion 
than to remembrance; the loss of a position one held toward the lost object, 
since the death of a father, for example, also makes one lose the position of a 
child; moreover, the loss of the ability to choose a new object to direct one’s 
love investment in substitution for the deceased one, opposed to the reality 
world in a form of psychic lingering of the lost object’s existence. However, 
little by little, through a thorough struggle with time and energy investment 
12  Freud (2010 [1915]) 173.
13  See Peres (2011) 108-109.
14  This chapter avoids using the Latin-based terminology Ego, Super-ego and Id as 
adopted by the classic translation of the Standard Edition, by Ernest Jones, which desig-
nate the concepts of Ich, Überich, and Es – cf. Bazzo (2013) 160. Although popular, these 
words are far from the original intention of Freud to make his writings closer to current 
language, so that his patients could understand what he wrote – cf. Freud (1992 [1926]). 
Thus, we adopt the literal, modern translation, the I, the Super-I, and the It.
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and that focuses more on memories and the expectations that used to connect 
the libido of the I to the loved object, the order of reality ends up prevailing. 
After this painful process, the I finally detaches from the lost object and be-
comes free to accomplish a new objectal investment.15 
Melancholy is a pathological reaction to that same experience, defined by 
extracting the object’s loss from consciousness. For a griever, everything re-
lated to their loss is conscious. For a melancholic person, otherwise, either 
the recognition that the object has been lost is lacking, or, being aware of the 
lost object, the person does not differ what effectively is gone together with 
the loss. Also, the loss is sometimes only on the ideal world, that is, the object 
is still alive, but is not able to be the recipient of love investments, such as the 
ending of relationships. For that reason, the events that involve melanchol-
ic experiences can be considering numerous. In these situations, the melan-
cholic person blocks the libido directed to the loved object, and redirects it to 
the I itself. In the I, melancholy operates in the ambiguity of love to the object 
ant hate to its going away. On the one hand, the I identifies with the loved ob-
ject, replacing it, in denial to admit the loss of love for the object despite the 
loss of the loved object itself. On the other hand, the ideal of the I, in a critical 
instance split from the I itself, takes the I as its new object and insults it vig-
orously. Hence, self-recrimination of melancholic beings is the manifestation 
of the hatred against the object that is no longer present – which justifies why 
complaining about oneself is actually a way of complaining about another 
one.16 
Later, in the book The Ego and the Id (or The I and the It), of 1923, Freud 
reaches the conclusion that the substitution of objectal investment by iden-
tification is native to every process of constitution of the I, which makes 
melancholia an individually necessary event, rather than a pathological one. 
The I, when becoming aware of the objectal investments that produce the It, 
either approves them, or, through repression, sets them apart. However, in 
order to control the It, tolerating its erotic impulses and, at the same time, 
establishing deeper connections, the I identifies itself to the lost object, which 
compensated the It of the loss by offering itself as a new loved object. Such 
identification may facilitate the abandonment of the object, although it might 
be the very condition for such abandonment. The I, thus, corresponds to a set 
of abandoned objectal investments, a residuum of all identified choices that 
15  See Freud (1992 [1917]) 131-132; Kehl (2011) 18.
16  See Freud (1992 [1917]) 131-136.
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were taken away, a history of its own losses. And though this conflict is stron-
ger in the first years of life, due to the Oedipal objectal investment towards 
mother or father, whose necessary renouncement creates ambivalent identi-
fications to one or the other, it continues to operate throughout the whole life 
of the I, which makes its individualization a constant experience of losses.17  
Freud’s psychoanalytical studies ended up granting new meanings for 
melancholia. However, other intellectuals also revisited the term. For Walter 
Benjamin, melancholia is a transversal matter that is present since his the-
sis on German tragical drama util his last writings on the concept of history. 
Although revisiting, many times, the interpretative tradition of melancholic 
acedia and the four humors, especially when analyzing the classic picture by 
Dürer, Benjamin detaches from that same tradition by seeing in loss an in-
strument for understanding modernity. For him, criticism, as opposed to its 
role in romanticism, is no longer responsible for the survival of a work of art; 
rather, it needed to understand that the work’s ruin, death, decay, and loss are 
conditions for reading it. Then, Trauerspiel, as stillborn writings that readers 
have access, in their rawness and impossibility of completeness, promoted 
a rupture by articulating themselves as spatial simultaneity and admitting 
the collapse of the linear and sequential narrative. The impossibility of this 
traditional teleological narrative reflects the meaning loss of human actions, 
according to the Lutheran biblical reading that good deeds are not sources of 
saving grace, and the cause of the meaning emptying in the world itself. Loss, 
for Benjamin, does not happen within the I, but in the outside world, reduced 
to a residuum of the redeemer promise from the past.18
Although Benjamin does not differ mourning from melancholy, and uses 
them as interchangeable concepts, in his analysis there is a role given to loss 
as constitutive of the new position the I occupies in this modern, empty world. 
This makes it possible to see Freud and Benjamin in a similar hermeneutical 
constellation.19 Such connection, however, is not a necessary convergence of 
analysis, which is visible due to the way each of them sees the compromise of 
the I towards the lost object, the relation of non-intentionality and loss, and 
the productive aspect of melancholia. Firstly, melancholy for Freud does not 
17  See Freud (2011 [1923]) 13-74.
18  See Ferber (2013) 25-32.
19  Although Benjamin had read Freud, which is evident in the theory of shock and of 
the optical unconscious, it is not possible to clearly trace how much of the psychoanalytic 
studies on melancholy may have impacted his own reflection.   
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give in to reality calls, as it prefers to identify with the lost object to displacing 
its libido towards a new object. This reveals loyalty to loss and a certain ethic 
dimension via stubborn responsibility, non-negotiable, and present, toward 
the absent object. For Benjamin, on the other hand, a melancholic person is 
identified with the archetype of the courtier, an ambiguous figure that some-
times is the faithful servant of the monarch, sometimes is guilty of treason. 
And such treason is directed not to the human figure of the monarch, but to 
the things that represent power, such as the scepter and the crown. These 
identification to royal things makes this person abandon the ruler in crisis 
times, changing support to a new suitor to the crown, and this does not feel 
like infidelity. Treason to the monarch implicates fidelity to a greater value, 
monarchy itself. Melancholy here exchanges the ethical interpersonal com-
promise for the loyalty to stuff, which, in a nutshell, represents the loyalty of 
the courtier to him/herself.20
Secondly, melancholic loss for Freud has a non-intentional structure, 
which is not identifiable, and makes it impossible to develop any form of 
overcoming, which casts the shadow of the object over the I.21 For Benjamin, 
such non-intentionality has a philosophical asset as well. If the intentional 
structure of consciousness, as exposed by Husserl, is based on the separation 
between subject and object, as well as between object and the intentional act 
that becomes aware of it, such a structure can only generate knowledge, not 
the truth – as it would depend on the immersion of the subject into the object. 
In the senseless, mournful, empty modern world, whose diffuse loss induces 
melancholy, the subject cannot find a target to which to direct his/her inten-
tions. It only remains to immerse oneself in this world, instead of reacting to 
it – thus, philosophically, access to the truth can take place, in a very melan-
cholic experience.22
Finally, Freud and Benjamin, moving away from the traditional paralysis 
of acedia, point out the productive nature of melancholy: if for the former, 
melancholic work constitutes the I as a product of abandoned object invest-
ments, for the latter, the experience of loss is a condition for the possibility of 
20  See Ferber (2013) 32-41.
21  For Agamben (1993), melancholy has intentionality, since the melancholic person, 
on purpose, simulates the loss of something he/she never owned. Such an imaginative 
solution, by transforming the unattainable object into loss, creates a safe space for the mel-
ancholic person to relate to the allegedly lost object since, as an idealized and internalized 
object, it can never be taken away.
22  See Ferber (2013) 45-50.
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philosophical work. Mosaic-making could be, for Benjamin, a good allegory 
of such condition, since the aesthetic value of the work remains, despite the 
fact that it is marked by breaches and ruins, fragmented into small pieces. 
Likewise, philosophical criticism, should highlight the breaches of the mod-
ern world and indicate the gaps that cannot be explained, considering the 
history of these losses as the only possible redemption.23 Melancholy, hence, 
is not only a destabilizer possibility for the hegemonic circuit of feelings of 
our time, nor just a concept with integration capacity between the crisis and 
simultaneous temporalities. It is also a methodological instrument capable 
of supporting reflections on the processes of absence, loss, concealment, 
which are so common in the modern world. In that sake, this chapter now 
has the intention of mapping and highlighting these breaches in democracy 
and law.
3. Legal-political melancholy
The contemporary experience of democracy is melancholic, since it has 
been continuously crossed through by experiences, representations, and 
discourses of loss and absence, whose effects are not completely conscious-
ly trackable. This generates a continuous temporality of suspension, the in-
capacity of closuring the past, and the condition of potential transition due 
to the constant possibility of emergence of lost objects or the call of reality 
– which is noticeable in many aspects of the public life. In politics, for exam-
ple, melancholy hunts both the aspects of ideology, besides being a device for 
controlling the bodies of citizens.
The political movements on the left-wing are the most commonly relat-
ed ones to the concept of melancholy, Benjamin24 being the first to establish 
such a link. In a 1930 text, when criticizing a book of poems by Erich Kästner 
and the school of New Objectivity to which he belonged, the German phi-
losopher accuses the poet of a certain tortured stupidity, a melancholic atti-
tude of those who give up the prophetic and utopian role of literature through 
which future things are anticipated. With this, Kästner supposedly restricted 
himself to describing the present state of affairs, transforming the political 
struggle into commoditized hollow forms, consumer goods that, unable to 
awaken the revolution, reinforce the apathy and fatalism of bourgeois oppres-
23  See Ferber (2013) 59-66.
24  See Benjamin (1987 [1930]) 73-77.
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sion. After Benjamin, the relation between melancholy and the left came to be 
invoked when movements, parties and institutions with such an ideological 
profile lose the ability to incite the proletarian forces.
Thus, in the late 1990s, Wendy Brown identified a certain melancholy on 
the left-wing that, marked by several losses – such as the fall of real socialism, 
the end of a unified movement, the absence of a sense of local or international 
community and a consistent political-moral teleology to sustain proletarian 
mobilization – it was no longer able to create concrete possibilities for change 
in the present. This same left, narcissistically identified with historically mo-
bilizing categories and ideals, but unable to attract libidinal investment in the 
present, supposedly became a conservative force, which defends the welfare 
state instead of building non-state emancipatory possibilities, while attacking 
identity policies and postmodernism as the alleged culprits for proletarian 
dispersion and apathy25.
For Jodi Dean, the diagnosis is different: the communist utopia had been 
lost as an object of desire, causing the left to extract its pleasure from repeat-
ed experiences of failure. This drive for the inability to win supposedly caused 
the left to maintain repetitive patterns of behavior, such as political practices 
of not forming alliances, obstructing legislative votes or formulating unwork-
able bills, which may even generate small victories, but long term, result in 
constant defeats. However, it is from this continued impotence that the mel-
ancholic left derived its pleasure26. More recently, Enzo Traverso returned to 
the topic. The continuous defeats suffered by the left used to serve as fuel for 
the communist utopia. From the combination of fight experience, even if they 
failed, with the horizon of utopian expectation, a notion of historical time was 
continually reframed. The fall of real socialism, however, clouded the alter-
natives for the future, generating a presentism, at the same time, anchored 
in what had already been achieved, in the name of the principle of responsi-
bility, and fearful of the opening for the future, which could show itself even 
more overwhelming. The melancholy of the left was thus due to the fidelity 
to the promises of revolutionary emancipation alive in memory as a way of 
refusing to admit neoliberalism as a call of reality – at least, while new eman-
cipatory utopias do not present themselves as an alternative27.
Although more occasional, there are also melancholy readings about the 
25  See Brown (2003) 458-465.
26  See Dean (2013) 81-87.
27  See Traverso (2018) 36-48, 130-131.
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right-wing. Sanford Schram28, for example, when analyzing the Tea Party’s 
performance in the United States, identifies an ambiguity in the constitution 
of the middle class, marked both by an ideal identification to a self-sufficient, 
responsible subject and, as well as for an indebted subject, to whom some 
kind of state support would be given. It is not uncommon for supporters of 
the Tea Party, a movement that proposes tax cuts, to be elderly, white, mid-
dle-class men and beneficiaries of Social Security – but who see reducing the 
waste of public money as the solution for reducing taxes without commitment 
to their own welfare benefits. The melancholy of the American middle class is 
thus supposedly derived from the impossibility of continuing to practice Prot-
estant ethics, from maintaining the ideal of the entrepreneurial subject, from 
the increasing indebtedness rates and from the constant demands to reduce 
taxes, seen as the reason for personal indebtedness itself. This same melan-
choly prevents the middle class from seeing the call of precarious reality in 
the world of work, which, when reducing the standard of living, would make 
it impossible to maintain a lost ideal with which it identifies.
In addition to the left-right spectrum, there are those who argue that mel-
ancholy is an inherent device of power. First, because the loss of the object 
does not operate detached from the environment in which such loss occurs; 
thus, the withdrawal of the object in the psyche is accompanied by a with-
drawal also of the social world, transforming the I into a political order. Sec-
ondly, because it is social power that establishes which losses may or may 
not be mourned, exercising control over melancholic identifications due to 
the intentional impossibility of mourning. Thirdly, the State cultivates mel-
ancholy, by manipulating these losses, as a way of concealing and displacing 
its own ideal authority, reducing its ostentatiousness from the outside world 
through the internalization of its terrifying power as an ideal of conscience. 
When successful, even if fits of mania allow revolutionary moments when the 
tyrant is removed from the government, tyranny remains structurally hidden 
in the psyche, allowing for new accommodations of authoritarian power29. 
As for constitutional history, melancholy can also be perceived. Especially 
in Brazil, there are those who claim the properly constitutional experience 
started only with the 1988 Constitution, since previous attempts were sup-
posedly marked either by the lack of popular legitimacy or by the ineffective-
28  See Schram (2015) 38-47.
29  See Butler (2017) 189-199.
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ness of constitutional norms30. This resentful constitutionalism is properly a 
melancholic constitutionalism marked by the excess of failure memories and 
an evident amnesia of the struggles for rights31, as well as by an abstract con-
stitutional ideal forged from experiences which, impossible to be implement-
ed mimetically, was identified as a loss in the identity of the constitutional 
subject.
However, it is possible to think of the constituent experience itself as mel-
ancholy. In the face of social pluralism, it is impossible for the constituents 
to correspond to a perfect mirroring of the citizens they represent, along the 
lines of a Schmittian national identity. There will always be a gap created by 
the insurmountable distance between the constituents’ self-perception and 
the image of the pluralist constitutional community. The elaboration of the 
Constitution would thus be the attempt to fill this void by transcending the 
limits of the constituents’ subjectivity, which occurs through an identifica-
tion with the other whose representation was lost in the electoral process of 
choosing representatives. A Constitution will only be able to obtain increased 
legitimacy if its formulators build, through the elaboration of the text, a com-
bined identity between the I of the constituents themselves and the otherness 
lost in representation, to which they have to melancholically identify. For this 
reason, the constitutional language is not only of representatives, nor only of 
those represented32.
Constitutional discourse, borrowing common terms when doing politics, 
can be similar to the process of alienation in the identity construction of sub-
jects, through which individuals perceive themselves by a name they did not 
choose. It happens similarly when acquiring the dialogic processes of com-
munication, in which the words used by the subject are only partly possessed 
by him/her, since they were actually taken from a web of meaning previously 
given by society. The constitutional discourse inevitably brings with it the 
pre-constitutional experiences that were lost, just as it needs to identify, as 
much as possible, with the pluralities that were lost in the process of pop-
ular representation33. Obviously, this melancholic moment of constitutional 
elaboration fails to account for all the losses that operate in the very constitu-
ent process. For this reason, the identity of the constitutional subject, appre-
30  See Barroso/Barcellos (2003) 327.
31  See Moreira/Paula (2017) 98-101.
32  See Rosenfeld (1998).
33  See Pinheiro (2019).
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hended only by this constitutional discourse rooted in a common language 
that unites and links the multiple others, will always be an incomplete work, 
subject to constitutional construction and reconstruction, which operates 
from the continuous interpretive process of constitutional statements by the 
Judiciary up to the factual normativity that results from the experience of 
constitutional contents by society. 
Thus, the melancholy nature of law is not restricted to public law, but also 
extends to private relations. According to Gilmore34, the contract and its re-
spective civil liability have always managed to remain within the theory of 
crime. However, more and more, legal doctrine and practice have naturalized 
such responsibility, replacing the theory of bargaining and consensus with a 
certain modern communitarianism, making the contract no longer appreciat-
ed under the specific factual conditions of its agreement in favor mechanical 
application of general and objective laws. In this sense, the famous thesis on 
the death of the contract would properly deal with a melancholy loss. 
After all, using the concept of melancholy ecstasy by Rose35, it should be 
questioned whether such a thesis by Gilmore, in stating the death of the con-
tract, far from indicating mourning, does characterize, in fact, a melancholy 
statement by those who identify a loss of the classic characteristics of the con-
tract and, attached to them, deny recognizing in its new elements the latent 
presence of the lost concept, maintaining melancholic fidelity to the object 
that was lost36. Such melancholy of a legal institute, in fact, can remain strong 
in the magistrates’ performance, when they resist applying, for example, in 
private relations, a new understanding of the autonomy of will, remaining 
faithful to the private will not tempered by limits of constitutionalism. In Bra-
zil, this discussion could also be extended to the civil concept of family, tradi-
tionally linked to double and binary organization. This is often still used as a 
parameter in the face of multiple affective, homo-affective or non-binary or-
ganizations – which was evident in the prohibition of notarizing polyaffective 
unions, even with merely declaratory effects, as determined by the National 
Council of Justice.
34  See Gilmore (1995).
35  See Rose (1996).
36  See Barnard (2006) 391-393.
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4. Final thoughts
If melancholy apparently installs a new circuit of affections, perhaps the 
jurists should consider what investigative potentialities the questions posed 
by this new feeling in times of new crises, temporalities and structures of the 
political-legal power can provide, especially to the study of past times. In this 
regard, the dialogue with the emerging field of research entitled Law and 
emotion, which began to be developed more consistently in the mid-1990s, 
could be quite fruitful. One might question the extent to which melancholy is 
properly an emotion. However, when Law and emotion research emerged in 
the 1990s, there was little scientific production that accurately distinguished 
the concepts of feeling, emotion, humor and affections37, which is why such 
studies tend to cover the whole vast field of human reactions, conscious or 
unconscious, which interfere in the way the body places itself in the world 
and, consequently, in the way knowledge is processed and actions are taken.
There are at least six research possibilities linked to that scientific field38: 
(I) emotion-centered approach: it analyzes how a specific emotion, includ-
ing aspects about its origin, its purpose and its manifestations, influence or, 
at least, should influence the law, such as, for example, aversion39, shame40, 
and fear41; (II) emotional phenomenon approach: area which seeks to ana-
lyze how decisions with judicial consequences, produced socially or by the 
judiciary itself, are made based on the prospective emotional response42; (III) 
emotion-theory approach: it considers the different theories about emotions 
and demonstrates how each can affect in particular the production and ap-
plication of legal rules43; (IV) legal doctrine approach: instead of focusing 
on an emotion, the analysis is restricted to a certain legal subarea, such as 
civil liability, and the way emotions manifest in it; (V) theoretical approach 
to law: instead of focusing on the different theories of emotion, it highlights 
the different legal theories and how each one of them makes room for the 
incorporation of emotions and the way it happens – as, for example, has been 
37  See Ekkekakis (2013).
38  See Maroney (2006).
39  See Kahan (1999).
40  See Nussbaum (2004).
41  See Sunstein (2002).
42  See Blumenthal (2005).
43  See Kahan/Nussbaum (1996).
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observed in the economic analysis of law44; (VI) legal-actor approach: it ex-
plores how emotions influence and guide – or, at least, how they should guide 
– the various legal professionals (judges, lawyers, among others), as well as 
those who interfere in the respective jurisdictional provision (members of the 
jury, for example)45.
The possibility of this dialogue seems fundamental to think about the ex-
tent of the influence melancholy has on law and democracy, since both cor-
respond to a permanent transition because they can never assert themselves 
as finished projects. After all, the political-legal process is marked by several 
identifications with objects that were lost due to impositions, failures or im-
possibilities. The continuous alternative of emergence for the silenced loss, 
together with the call of reality, can always trigger new identification process-
es. On the other hand, the normalization of such losses can generate exclud-
ing vigilance processes within democracy and the judiciary, so that the lost 
objects never return. In this scenario, the legal historian needs to remember 
a certain fire alert. Benjamin says that acedia and sadness are characteristic 
of the historian who focuses only on the winning side, which makes them 
melancholic. However, in the ambiguity that is proper to this feeling, the his-
torian who throws him/herself into invisible, absent and spectral narratives, 
lost objects of the constitutional discourse, can also be melancholic. When 
analyzing history, if historians are able highlight these breaches in the le-
gal-constitutional discourse, they will contribute to the mosaic constructed 
by historiographical criticism.
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Uses of silence in political and legal transitions:
a methodological approach to constitutional history
Cristiano Paixão
1. The presence of the past: transitions, trauma, silence; 2. Understanding the 
uses of silence; 3. Silencing a Revolution: Nineteenth Century Brazil and the Hai-
tian experience; 4. Concluding remarks
At the beginning of my research program, I sought to analyze the historical 
factors related to the presence of silence in Brazilian constitutional history. 
My goal was to highlight the persecution suffered by the Black population 
(including the Black Movement) during the military regime.1 This is an on-
going research project, which continued in the workshops held in Macerata 
and Brasília in June and November 2019 and in June 2020.2 I will seek to the 
analyze the social construction of silence in relation to social groups, as in the 
case of the survivors of the Korean War. After that, I proceed to understand 
the social construction of silence more generally. For this purpose, I will ob-
serve the role of silencing in nineteenth-century Brazil, particularly with re-
gard to the social meanings of the Haitian Revolution. 
1. The presence of the past: transitions, trauma, silence
When the word “transition” comes to mind, especially in the field of legal 
history or political science, it is normally related to a specific time period that 
connects past and future. We can, for example, discuss the “Brazilian transi-
tion to democracy” or the political transition that took place in South Africa 
after the end of its apartheid regime. In these circumstances, transition fo-
cuses on the two poles of organized time: it is possible to emphasize the past 
regime, understanding its central features, its ways of oppression, and so on. 
It is also possible to highlight the future and to discuss the possibilities for a 
1  See Paixão (2021).
2  I thank José Otávio Guimarães, Massimo Meccarelli, Renato Bigliazzi, Hilary Levin-
son, Antonella Meniconi, Douglas Pinheiro and Ana Carolina Couto for suggestions and 
discussion. I am also thankful to all participants in the workshops for their contributions 




new regime, taking into consideration the democratic agenda of its political 
actors (when the case in question is one of a transition to democracy), the 
connections between the state and civil society, and other topics about the 
nature of the future regime.
But the analysis of political transitions can be useful for legal history, and 
not only for the “transitional” relevance of this lapse in time. Is it possible to 
identify different temporal dimensions of political transitions? Can the tran-
sition process create an asymmetry in time, breaking the balance between 
past and future—or even invalidating that balance? To what extent can tran-
sition time be influential on the future of the regime? 
This paper is the product of an ongoing research project between the Uni-
versity of Macerata and the University of Brasília on the diversity and com-
plexity of transition processes and their impact on legal history. In his essay 
in a forthcoming volume on transitions (2021), Massimo Meccarelli investi-
gates the “ascriptive time” that can be found in transition processes, by which 
he means the effects on the future of the political and legal measures adopt-
ed during transitions. Observing the legal uses of amnesty in post-war Italy, 
Meccarelli points out the persistent effect of concepts and practices typical of 
the transition on legal practices in democratic Italy.3 
In this paper, we will highlight the silencing of certain groups and actors 
during transition processes, especially when catastrophic events and unrec-
onciled trauma were experienced before the transition. As we know, the total-
itarian and authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century were responsible 
for countless human rights violations: disappearances, executions, torture, 
and other abuses took place during many political struggles around the globe. 
In different ways, most of these regimes were ultimately replaced by demo-
cratic rule. That doesn’t mean, however, that the trauma experienced by var-
ious actors, families, groups, and generations was discussed or treated. Many 
of the violations were protected by amnesty laws, by political pacts made 
during the transitions, and even by the enduring presence, in the new regime, 
of political actors who took part in the human rights violations.
Thus, in our discussion, we will try to highlight the role of the silences pro-
duced by political transitions. Our intention is not only to demonstrate the 
production and persistence of these silences, but also to propose an analysis 
of the uses of these silences by the silenced communities themselves. In other 
words, from the perspective of legal history, these silences can be important 
3  See Meccarelli (2021).
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instruments for reading the narratives produced during and after political 
transitions, whether by subjects of the law or by judicial bodies and truth 
commissions.
Our appropriation of the past, in all its forms, is established through am-
bivalence and difference. Ambivalence involves the tenuous but essential 
relationship between the act of remembering and the act of forgetting.4 For 
every social, political, and institutional act of remembrance, there are many 
silences that result from forgetfulness. In addition, memory is always pre-
carious, fragile, and conflicting. When they confront the past in their present 
operations, governments and parliaments are placed between different—and 
often directly contradictory—claims.5
The silences, however, stem from acts of writing. In the context of the 
varied forms of trauma and human rights violations in contemporary histo-
ry, there are experiences to be recovered, understood, known, and reconsti-
tuted through various narratives. These points make the need for historical 
research on the subject even more important: Why are there such silences? 
What are the subtle ways in which these silencing operations are enforced 
and allowed to persist?
In sum, there are practices, languages, and political experiences that re-
main silenced, that are neither discussed nor addressed via the institutional 
and legal forms of recognition. Silence occurs in time and constitutes time.
When we discuss the temporal dimension in modern society, we take into 
account the multiple aspects of the connections among individuals, social 
groups, and the presence of the past. Societies can react to the past in many 
ways, including the selection of certain events in history for commemoration 
(as with holidays, for instance), the construction of memorials for remember-
ing particular events or groups, and the exclusion of some facts from public 
debate (which can, in turn, stimulate people to forget parts of national or 
local history), among others. Politics of memory is always selective. For every 
act of remembrance, there is also an act of forgetting. As happens in the usu-
al manner of all political communication, the recollection of the past is also 
the object of a struggle. There is no such thing as a “neutral” commitment to 
memory.6 
In a provocative analysis, Jacques Rancière emphasizes the relationship 
4  See Weinrich (2004).
5  See Connerton (2009).
6  On this subject, see Gensburger/Lefranc (2017); Huyssen (2003).
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between time, politics, and narration. The concept of time should not be lim-
ited to the moment or to the dividing line between past and future; rather, the 
act of narrating involves a presence, or not, in time. Being “part of time,”—
that is, participating in history—is directly connected with the narrative of 
things past.7 Silence, in the way we use the word here, means exactly that: 
a denial of participation in history, a denial of other possibilities for writing 
history—both at the same time.
Historical sources come as layers of the past. It is always a challenge for 
the historian to organize and classify this material. That search for the past, 
that task of understanding the sources, can be compared to the work of orga-
nizing an archive.
We refer here to the work of Jacques Derrida in Archive fever. For Der-
rida, an archive is a sign that concentrates several constructions of mean-
ing. On the one hand, an archive is a commencement. As Derrida tells us, it 
would be something like “the principle according to nature or history, there 
where things commence—physical, historical, or ontological principle.” It is, 
then, a topography and a genealogy. It’s a place of origin. But on the other 
hand—and at the same time—an archive is also the manifestation of a com-
mandment, of an order. For Derrida, the archive is also “the principle ac-
cording to law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, 
social order is exercised, in this place from which order is given—nomolog-
ical principle.”8
We must point out an important aspect of this argument: the updating of 
the archive. This is because, as Derrida says, the archons, those responsible 
for the organization and construction of the archive, were not only responsi-
ble for the physical security and storage of the archive: “The archons are first 
of all the documents’ guardians. They do not only ensure the physical security 
of what is deposited and of the substrate. They are also accorded the herme-
neutic right and competence. They have the power to interpret the archives. 
Entrusted to such archons, these documents in effect state the law: they recall 
the law and call on or impose the law.”9 Therefore, in addition to guarding, 
organizing, and distributing its elements, there is a task—which the archive 
calls for—that directly summons the law: for Derrida, it is a question of the 
need for a “jurisdiction,” an activity of “stating the law.” 
7  See Rancière (2018) 13-47.
8  Derrida (1995) 9.
9  Derrida (1995) 10.
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This activity of stating the law involves, above all, being in time. Authori-
ty, that is, the power that emanates from the authority that constitutes, pre-
serves and reproduces the archive, must respond to a demand for legitimacy. 
And this does not happen only because of a democratic construction - it also 
happens because, since modernity, the questioning of the archive is being 
carried out, the questioning of its elements, of its disposition and, mainly, of 
its own authority. So, from the archive arises the law.
Thus, together with the construction of an archive, the idea of knowledge 
projected on it seems to be inherent. The institutionalization of the archive 
and the discourses it contains and disseminates seem to be also fundamental. 
As Derrida says, “A science of the archive must include the theory of this in-
stitutionalization, that is to say, at once of the law which begins by inscribing 
itself there and of the right which authorizes it.”10
And here we have a condition of opening the archive for the future. Yet 
for Derrida: “The archivist produces more archive, and that is why the ar-
chive is never closed. It opens out of the future.”11 Archiving is dialogue with 
the future. If we take the metaphor proposed here seriously—the past as an 
archive—then we must understand the Derridian reflection as a call to legal 
history: the history of the construction of this archive, the history of its uses, 
its risks, its possibilities.
Rodney Carter, borrowing from Derrida’s work, presents an interesting 
connection between the archive and the silences we can find in it: 
Archival power is, in part, the power to allow voices to be heard. It consists of high-
lighting certain narratives and of including certain types of records created by certain 
groups. The power of the archive is witnessed in the act of inclusion, but this is only one of 
its components. The power to exclude is a fundamental aspect of the archive.12 
Silence, however, should not be equated with the complete absence of 
noise, of rumour, of any manifestation of presence, action, or interference. As 
Carter points out, 
Silence implies voice. It does not equal muteness, that is, it is not a negative phenom-
enon, simply the absence of sound, speech, text, or other sign. Silence can be actively en-
tered into or, as occurs where the power is exerted over an individual or group, it is enacted 
10  Derrida (1995) 10.
11  Derrida (1995) 45.
12  Carter (2006) 216.
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upon that individual or group. In the archives, silences can occur as marginal groups are 
actively denied entry.13 
The reflections proposed by Carter open new possibilities for the reading 
of the past through the metaphor of the archive. Minority and marginalized 
groups, obscured in official narratives or dominant political groups, especial-
ly in authoritarian regimes, are therefore inserted in the past. It is up to the 
reader—in our case, the legal historian—to understand the various forms of 
manifestation for these actors and groups.
An example is enlightening. Thus, using research by Ramsay Liem, we 
now analyze the multiple meanings of a traumatic event for the Korean-origin 
community living in the United States of America: the Korean War.
There is one aspect of the Korean War that draws attention: the conflict, 
which—accounting for soldiers, volunteers, and the civilian population—left 
more than one million dead, is not legally closed. There was only an armistice, 
which established a demilitarized zone, but there was no peace agreement 
or surrender by any of the belligerent parties. Efforts at reconciliation or at-
tempts to overcome the trauma have not been initiated.
This situation somewhat resembles the cases of “disappeared persons” 
that arose in the context of the South American dictatorships in the second 
decade of the twentieth century. There is something permanently unfinished 
about the fate of the disappeared: without information about the bodies and 
the circumstances of death, relatives remain in the constant postponement 
of mourning. In legal terms, these are permanent crimes, which continue to 
produce effects in the contemporary era.
The case of the Korean War brings a succession of traumas. In addition 
to enduring the trauma of the conflict itself, many Koreans had to emigrate. 
According to the careful work conducted by Ramsay Liem, who interviewed 
several members of the Korean community in the United States, many Kore-
ans in the United States seem to have associated the success of migration with 
a ban on remembering (and discussing) war events:
Over a half a century has passed since the end of active fighting in the Korean War and 
Korean American survivors have established new lives in the United States. One might 
reasonably expect that these conditions, in combination with the national narrative of the 
Korean War as forgotten, might have eroded Korean American memories of this conflict. 
Lisa Lowe (1996) suggests that enfranchisement in the United States for Asian immigrants 
13  Carter (2006) 219.
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requires “forgetting the history of war in Asia and adopting the national historical narra-
tive that disavows the existence of the American imperial project…(and) acceding to a po-
litical fiction of equal rights that is generated through the denial of history…” (p. 27). The 
pressure to acquiesce to the nation’s dominant self-image is experienced by all citizens, 
especially during periods of national crisis, as evident in the United States following the 
tragedies of September 11, 2001. But for immigrants, especially racial, ethnic minorities 
whose political and social statuses are tenuous, the ideological authority of the state can be 
particularly insidious. For Korean American survivors of the war, it means added pressure 
to suspend talk about the Korean conflict and to forget.14
However, silence did not lead to forgetfulness. In fact, an inverse effect seems 
to have been produced. The more that public remembrance was discouraged, 
the stronger it became the remembrance of individuals or groups. Liem’s exam-
ples also include survivors of other traumas generated by authoritarian regimes:
some psychological research suggests that external cues that instruct the individual 
to avoid focusing on a past experience may actually enhance rather than lessen memory 
rehearsal. “Institutional forgetting…and collective silence as a whole end up by reinforcing 
the strength of both individual and collective level informal memories” (Marques, Paez, 
& Serra, 1997, p. 257). Findings from a recent Danish study (Bernsten & Thomsen, 2005) 
also indicate that historical events invested with strong personal identity and emotion can 
be retained in memory for considerably longer periods of time and with remarkable accu-
racy for contextual features than previously assumed. In this work, survivors of the Danish 
occupation and liberation during World War II not only recalled factual information asso-
ciated with the onset of these events with unexpected veracity, but those with reported ties 
to the resistance offered the most vivid and accurate memories.15
The marks of trauma, and their impacts on individuals, groups, and gen-
erations are complex, vary in each case and can never be generalized. Thera-
peutic strategies, individual and collective, may be used for healing, but they 
are not enough for a more comprehensive and public treatment of the theme. 
With that point in mind, Ramsay Lien then conceived a traveling exhibition 
containing works, installations, and videos that call into question some as-
pects of the official accounts of the trauma and, above all, the silencing im-
posed on survivors and their descendants. The exhibition was named Still 
Present Pasts: Korean Americans and the “Forgotten War.” He also directed 
a documentary entitled Memory of Forgotten War. It is interesting to point 
out the effects of the exhibition on viewers from other national affiliations:
14  Liem (2007) 159.
15  Liem (2007) 159.
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More than anything else, Still Present Pasts is about claiming voice, breaking six de-
cades of silence about how ordinary people experienced the Korean War in Korea and the 
United States. The people whose oral histories inspired our exhibit challenged the culture 
of silence in the U.S. that shrouds the Korean War, risked becoming targets of political and 
ideological conflict in their own communities, and were willing to relive personal traumas 
and expose them to other family members as well as strangers. For many of these people 
the interview was the first time they spoke openly about their war pasts and the ghosts that 
continue to haunt them. By permitting us to include some of their memories in a dialogue 
with the exhibit artists, they stepped further into the public arena. They also joined others 
whose public testimony has been a force for resisting and redressing social and political 
injustices, for example, Holocaust survivors, Japanese American internees, Argentinean 
mothers of the disappeared, victims of Cambodia’s Killing Fields, and the thousands of hu-
man rights survivors worldwide who have testified before national and international truth 
and reconciliation commissions. Without their contributions, Still Present Pasts could not 
have begun a process of lifting the silence about a tragic, unresolved chapter in American 
history that continues to reverberate in the present.16 
This case of silencing the traumas, experiences, and narratives of the Kore-
an War is yet another example of the situation contained in a famous phrase 
coined by Henry Rousso and Eric Conan: “the past that does not pass.”17 This 
presence of the past, marked by acts of silence, oppression, resistance, and 
the articulation of narratives, deserves to be investigated closely by legal his-
tory, especially in contemporary times.
2. Understanding the uses of silence
It is worth noting that the reflection proposed here is part of a perspective 
that incorporates the choices made by certain societies, in their given political 
circumstances—such as operations that take place in the present and involve 
the selection of a recomposed, rewritten, reworked past. These operations 
are associated with the double dimension of memory. They are located be-
tween remembrance and forgetfulness. They presuppose particular forms of 
remembering and forms of forgetting.
Our aim is to identify these choices and understand the role of silence in 
their affirmation and, especially, in their persistence. We must not directly con-
nect silence to oblivion, just as we cannot understand silence as absence. On 
many occasions silence is active; it plays a role. It marks a political position 
16  Liem (2009) 11.
17  See Rousso/Conan (1998).
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or blocks a spoken or written demonstration. Silence, therefore, is a source of 
communication that circulates in society. Thus, we better understand expres-
sions such as “eloquent silence,” “cries of silence,” or, in English, “silence that 
speaks so much louder than words” or “silence that speaks volumes.”
It is clear, however, that an imposed silence denotes an attitude of forgetful-
ness, which is often quite selective. It is worth mentioning, to this point, that an 
expressive part of memory studies today seems to focus on the analysis of obliv-
ion and its various functions and forms. It is understandable that the first theo-
retical approaches to the memorial phenomenon, which became widespread in 
the postwar period and from the 1980s onwards, had remembrance as a central 
concern. The catastrophes experienced in the Second World War—the extreme 
experience of the Shoah, the Lager, the mass destruction planned and carried 
out with modern technologies, using science and rationality —all this marks the 
necessity of affirming the act of remembering as a demonstration of the human 
capacity for resistance, survival, and the power of witnessing. 
Another factor, widely discussed in the field of history, was the emergence 
of a relevant social and political mobilization around memory, particularly 
since the 1980s and 1990s, with the establishment of memorial laws, the elab-
oration of a museological framework for memory, the multiplication of cele-
brations on symbolic dates, and the construction of places of memory. 
The dimension of forgetfulness, however, was never absent in these mani-
festations, and it is natural that it should be so. After all, the act of forgetting 
is linked to the field of memory. It is one of its constitutive poles. The capacity 
of modern society to construct artifacts of memory depends on the capacity of 
this same society to establish spheres of oblivion. 
Two important books, written by Paul Ricœur and Harald Weinrich, are 
directly connected to this discovery of oblivion as an essential element of hu-
man, social, and political choices. Situated in the field of history and literary 
theory, Ricœur and Weinrich have drawn attention to the various strategies 
of oblivion that unfold in the course of human experience. Amnesty, forgive-
ness, witness, judgment, and responsibility are key words in the postwar ex-
perience. And they belong to the domain of forgetfulness and remembrance.18
In the unfolding of these forms of forgetfulness, we perceive the role of 
silence as a strategy for concealment and for the suppression of social prac-
tices and experiences. Regarding the field of legal history, we observe how the 
demands, claims, and protests of social groups are often relegated to oblivion. 
18  Weinrich (2004); Ricœur (2004). 
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They are silenced in an active way; that is, the silence is imposed. As Eviatar 
Zerubavel said, the relegation to oblivion is the expression of a “conspiracy of 
silence.”19
Continuing in this vein, Zerubavel also takes up the idea that silence is not 
the absence of speech.  In the social sphere, silence involves the act of silenc-
ing, that is, an action aimed at preventing the emission of a communication 
that, if it were not silenced, would have happened in society:
In his short story “Silence,” Leonid Andreyev explicitly contrasts stillness, or “the mere 
absence of noise,” with silence, which actually implies “that those who kept silent could 
… have spoken if they had pleased.” Being silent, in other words, involves more than just 
absence of action, since the things we are silent about are in fact actively avoided […] Ig-
noring an “elephant” is not a result of simply failing to notice it but of some actual pressure 
to disregard it. Such pressure is for the most part a product of unmistakably social tradi-
tions, conventions, and norms of attending which we internalize as part of our socializa-
tion [...] What we are socially expected to ignore is often articulated in the form of various 
taboos against looking, listening, as well as speaking. Those who defy or even simply 
ignore such prohibitions are considered social deviants.20
It is essential to emphasize that silences, in the perspective adopted here, 
are social products, related to certain political attitudes that select what 
should and should not be said. As pointed out by Zerubavel, “the bounds of 
acceptable discourse are socially delineated by normative as well as political 
constraints, and what we look at, listen to, and talk about is therefore actually 
affected by both normative and political pressures.”21 The dimension of si-
lence is therefore a social dimension: “silence is a collective endeavor. While 
it takes only one person to produce speech . . . it requires the cooperation of 
all to produce silence.”22
As already noted, the more recent studies in the domain of memory (and 
its relationship with history and the social sciences) have devoted attention 
to the dimension of oblivion. In the words of Anne Whitehead, there has been 
a kind of “discursive shift.”23 According to Whitehead, this new attitude in-
volves discussion of the collective aspect of forgetfulness: can we talk about 
collective forgetfulness, in a way analogous to collective memory?
19  Zerubavel (2010) 32.
20  Zerubavel (2010) 33-34.
21  Zerubavel (2010) 35.
22  Zerubavel (2010) 36.
23  Whitehead (2009) 154.
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This question is central to our discussion. The reason is that, as we know, 
the present is the locus of disputes about the past. Memories are constructed 
and socially reiterated in a discursive dispute. What’s more, as if it were the 
other side of the same coin, this same phenomenon also occurs with regard to 
forgetfulness. As Jay Winter says:
When the victims of violence have the sanction to speak out, as in a court of law or 
truth commission, then they become the authors not only of their stories, but also of their 
lives. Not speaking can entail accepting someone else’s story about what happened to you 
[...] The central point is that the entitlement to speak about war and violence is in no sense 
universal. Some have the right; others do not. The difference between the two categories is 
a matter of social and cultural codes, which can and do change over time.24 
The connection between modern wars and memory disputes is evident. 
From competing narratives about the Algerian War to the symbolic heritage 
of the American Civil War (which triggered violent conflicts in 2017, such as 
those in the city of Charlottesville when an attempt was made to remove a 
statue of a general who fought for the Confederates),25 the disputes over the 
meanings of these conflicts are unrelenting.
The possibilities for speaking, however, are not the same for all contend-
ers. Some may speak out publicly about the conflict: others may not. As noted 
by Jay Winter:
Commemoration is the collective representation of a shared view of a past worth recall-
ing. As such, it is performative; it selects elements of a narrative and necessarily suppress-
es other sides of the story [...] The question arose as to how to glorify those who die in war 
without glorifying war itself? 
One way to do so is to ensure that the names of everyone – and not only the gener-
als – are listed and honoured. And yet even this format does not solve all the problems 
of remembering war in the modern age. In French, a war memorial is a memorial to the 
dead – monument aux morts; in English, it is the more equivocal ‘war memorial’. Which 
part of war does it commemorate? The justice of its outbreak? The justice of its outcome? 
The honourable treatment given to enemy prisoners or the wounded? No one knows the 
answer to these questions, and all commemorators start with the same puzzle: what do we 
leave out?26 
24  Winter (2010) 8.
25  See <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/aug/11/charlottes-
ville-on-edge-on-anniversary-of-deadly-white-nationalist-rallies>.
26  Winter (2010) 20.
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What’s left out? What voices are silenced? How do these forms of silencing 
operate, and how do they reproduce themselves in time? 
With these questions in mind, we will look at the role of silence in political 
and social disputes in nineteenth-century Brazil.
3. Silencing a Revolution: Nineteenth Century Brazil and the Haitian ex-
perience
The delayed abolition of slavery in Brazil has never been followed by any 
policy about the inclusion of the Afro-Brazilian population in the labor mar-
ket. The abolition of slavery took place at the same time that the Brazilian 
government was encouraging European immigration to Brazil at the end of 
the nineteenth century, which was a clear attempt at whitening society. Vio-
lence and exclusion continued to affect the Black population, in the cities and 
in the countryside.27 
The vast inequality between whites and Blacks, which still persists in broad 
terms in Brazilian society today, was a subject of discussion at a particularly 
important moment in Brazilian constitutional history: the proceedings of the 
1987-1988 National Constituent Assembly. On that occasion, militants in the 
Black Movement, especially those on the Subcommittee on Blacks, Indige-
nous Populations, People with Disabilities and Minorities, took an intense 
action to ensure that, during public hearings, the issue of Brazilian racism 
was openly discussed.
In an illuminating, deep, and meaningful statement made at the time, 
the writer and journalist Joel Rufino dos Santos stressed one point: Brazil’s 
constant tendency to see itself as a white country has ultimately denied and 
concealed a vital element of its own history. In his view, this incapacity to per-
ceive the diversity of Brazilian society “represses, conceals its black dimen-
sion, because what this country is -- it is a country of blacks, whites, Indians 
and other ethnicities.”28
Joel Rufino called for Brazil to “re-constitutionalize” itself, to rethink its 
own trajectory, because “one of the aspects of the Brazilian crisis is this very 
vision that we have of the country,” which historically has silenced the cul-
ture, social practices, and the autonomy of the Afro-Brazilian population. 
27  See Alonso (2018) 358-364; Schwarcz (2012) 61-65; and Loner (2012) 417-442.
28  Brasil, Diário da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Suplemento ao nº 63, 
21.5.1987, 136.
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It is evident that racial issues in Brazil are multiple and complex and leave 
room for many different approaches, which are not exclusive but complemen-
tary. At this point in our research, our focus turns to the reception, inter-
pretation, and attempts at silencing that occurred throughout the nineteenth 
century in a landmark historical event in the context of the Americas: the 
Haitian Revolution. 
An initial remark that we have already underscored is that silence does 
not imply absence, emptiness, or denial of meaning. Silences are also socially 
produced. These constructs indicate, before anything else, a political element 
that is almost agonistic: social actors occupy different positions in the debates 
over the principles and norms that flow in each political community when 
discourse concerning a regime or a specific constitutional document is pro-
duced. Debate does not occur only through speeches, discourse, and writings. 
Indeed, a political dispute may be a struggle to speak, to describe, to pro-
duce meaning in discursive form. One of the tools that can be used in such 
debates is the silencing of the opponent, either at the place from which his 
speech originates or by means of language suppression and other prohibi-
tions. Therefore, the silence produced in these circumstances is not absence. 
It is interdiction, blockage of the issuing of another discourse. In this context, 
silence is a political construction. As mentioned by Eni Orlandi:
There comes the whole question of “take” the word, “remove” the word, make it say, 
make it shut up, silence, etc. Because of its political dimension, silence can be consid-
ered both part of the rhetoric of domination (that of oppression) and its counterpart, the 
rhetoric of the oppressed (that of resistance). And there is a fertile field to be observed: in 
the relationship between Indians and whites, in the discussion of agrarian reform, in the 
speeches on women.29
Here we have two dimensions that intersect. Silence is at once a social con-
struction and a mode of dispute over meaning. It is constructed to the extent 
that the act of interdicting speech is imposed, enforced by certain political ac-
tors at the expense of other discourses. And, precisely for this reason, silence 
is also a tool activated by some actors in order to resist, to offer alternative 
accounts, and, in the final degree, to even exist.
In the realm of legal principles and norms, which have been defined by the 
production of text since the beginning of modernity, silences are generated 
and are also used to oppose specific discourses. Therefore, the legal historian 
29  Orlandi (2018) 29.
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should search for traces, clues, and fragments of political and legal practices 
that enable a more broadly inclusive understanding of the task of drafting 
legal texts—in particular the constituent processes, one of the most fertile 
fields in constitutional history—but also, and more importantly, of their uses 
by various social and institutional agents.
At this point in our discussion, we shift our focus to observe a dilemma of 
modern constitutionalism. In a constitutional order that appeals to equality, 
freedom and fraternity, how can we justify the institution of slavery? This is a 
question common to many countries that adopted the constitutional form in 
the nineteenth century, and it is very often brought up in social and political 
history. It is also critical to the history of constitutionalism.
Well known is the episode, narrated by Kenneth Maxwell, of a secret meet-
ing held between Thomas Jefferson, the American ambassador to France, 
and José Joaquim Maia e Barbalho, who was a medical student in Coimbra. 
Born in Rio de Janeiro, Barbalho had written letters to Jefferson; they met in 
Nîmes, France, in May 1787. During the meeting, Barbalho (who presented 
himself with the alias Vendek) claimed that a revolution was being brought 
about in Brazil, which would result in its independence from Portugal. The 
United States would be the model, and Brazil would become a republic. Jef-
ferson reported the meeting to John Jay, then the foreign secretary of the 
American confederation, but he would have been reticent about possible 
support to Brazil, since the United States had a good rapport with Portugal. 
Through devious means, the account of the meeting reached the insurgents 
in the province of Minas Gerais.30 Furthermore, it is known that Tiradentes 
“carried in his pocket a copy of French translations of the state constitutions 
of the United States,” as mentioned by Bernard Bailyn in the preface to the 
Brazilian edition of his classic work on the history of the American constitu-
tion.31
The expected endorsement for revolutionary and republican actions, how-
ever, never materialized. It was important to the United States to have a good 
relationship with Portugal, and thus, nothing was done for or about the Bra-
zilian insurgents. Furthermore, there was the question of slavery, which was 
central to Portuguese colonial rule. And as is well known, Jefferson, a land-
owner in Virginia, owned many slaves.
The quandary around the connection between revolution, freedom, and 
30  See Maxwell (2016) 75-87.
31  See Bailyn (2003) 7.
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slavery would become even more evident through the effects of the French 
Revolution. The former French colony of Santo Domingo experienced a pow-
erful slave-led revolution that resulted in political regimes commanded by 
leaders such as Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Alexandre 
Pétion, and Henri Christophe. However, France refused to give up and came 
back to dominate parts of the island, even relying on the support of some rev-
olutionaries, until new conflicts broke out. Haitian independence was finally 
consolidated only in the first few years of the nineteenth century. The Haitian 
Revolution was, therefore, a lengthy process, extending from 1791 to 1804. In 
the background of the conflict was the institution of slavery—which had been 
abolished by France in 1794. Haiti’s independence, however, would not be 
recognized by France until 1825, with a heavy cost imposed on the young Hai-
tian republic, which had to pay financial compensation to its former colonizer 
for many years.32 We can thus see the ambiguity in the attitudes of the United 
States and France in relation to slavery, which persisted in America and in 
French colonies, even after the revolutionary movements in both countries. 
However, the content of the slogans of the French Revolution could be 
interpreted differently by various political actors. In the case of the Haitian 
Revolution, that is precisely what happened. As observed by Carolyn Fick, 
the Haitian context saw a resignification of property rights. In the language 
of the revolution in France and in the United States, property—and the right 
to use it—was associated with freedom. On the other hand, in the then colo-
ny of Santo Domingo, whose population lived under a regime of slavery, the 
exercise of freedom required that the right to property be destroyed. That 
requirement was because the regime considered slaves to be property of their 
masters.33
In this context, an important task for the colonial elite of the early nine-
teenth century in Brazil was filtering the historical narratives related to the 
Haitian Revolution. According to research sources, the political elite, press, 
and those giving official speeches deliberately avoided using the term “revo-
lution” to describe the Haitian independence movement. Instead, they used 
terms such as “insurrection” or “revolt” and always associated them with ad-
jectives carrying a negative connotation, such as “horror” or “disorder.” 
As outlined by Ada Ferrer:
32  For an account of the different stages of the Haitian Revolution, see Trouillot 
(2015) 31-107.
33  Fick (2007) 394-414.
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Two approaches to the Haitian Revolution, apparently contradictory, have prevailed 
since the beginning of the slave uprising in August 1791. The first tendency is to neglect, 
underestimate, or let pass in silence this revolution and its impact. They mirror the first 
reactions to the violent events of that August and the interpretations that took place there. 
When faced with a revolution led by men and women slaves who came to destroy the main 
institutions of society, the contemporaries were incapable of seeing the possibility of a rev-
olution led by slaves and, even more, a successful revolution, leading to the creation of an 
independent state. They watched and learned the facts through pre-conceived categories, 
explained the events and gave an interpretation, denying that enslaved people could make 
a revolution. Their accounts have blamed the external agitators, the detrimental effects of 
the French Revolution’s ideology, the slave owners’ miscalculations, but almost never the 
slaves’ own will, ability, or consciousness. 
This lack of understanding by contemporaries has marked even the way historians 
have dealt with the issue or remained silent. As stated by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, the early 
inability of thinking within appropriate categories challenged the historical narrative by 
referring it to the vision of contemporaries, thus turning the Haitian Revolution into a 
relative absence in history [...]
Due to the fact that incomprehension and silence have accompanied and followed this 
revolution, the reference to Haiti from 1791 to the 19th century was constant in all slavery 
societies in the New World. That being said, people talked about it, wrote about it, all those 
who were able or not to recognize a slave revolution in it expressed their opinion. At the 
time, news circulated among the slaves and their owners, while colonial authorities tried 
to keep “contaminated” slaves and seditious ideas out of their territories. Many decades 
later, the mere mention of Haiti still retained evocative power.34
In the case of Brazil, an expression was created: “Haitianism.” This was 
a word used to signify the risk of insurrection, of breaking the slave struc-
ture that was at the base of nineteenth-century Brazilian society. Some cases, 
which will be analyzed in greater depth in the course of this investigation, are 
quite emblematic of this attitude toward the Haitian Revolution. Diplomat-
ic documentation, newspapers, historical texts, and several other historical 
sources reveal episodes that occurred in the period ranging from 1804 to the 
1870s, in which the example of Haiti is, to some extent, disputed among social 
actors. While slave owners and the imperial political elite would invariably de-
scribe the Haitian case as a negative example, to be avoided at all costs, groups 
of slaves would, in situations of conflict, mention the Haitian Revolution as a 
model worth pursuing, celebrating the deeds of revolutionary heroes.
It is clear, however, that those who controlled the discourse in the public 
sphere sought to avoid any mention of the Haitian Revolution. When that was 
34  Ferrer (2012) 38.
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not possible—given a specific set of circumstances, such as, for example, the 
presence of any Haitian among Brazilian slaves or the concrete invocation, 
in cases of insurrection, of the Santo Domingo Revolution—the discourse in-
stead qualified “Haitianism” as a negative, fearful, frightening experience.
Such attitudes were summarized by Marco Morel:
At first, it was preferable not to talk about it, at least openly or in public: to silence, 
hide, suffocate and ignore, so as not to draw attention to that which should not be remem-
bered. When such a posture was not feasible, when the demonstrations became visible, 
then it was the case of warning and alarming against the excesses, the violence, the dan-
gers and the horrors of such an experience.35
This connection between silence and disapproval, between the prohibi-
tion of speech and the blatant repression of political action, was the stance 
of a broad sector of the political and economic elite of the Empire of Brazil 
(a stance that had already begun in colonial times). However, some sources 
demonstrate attempts by groups of slaves, republican leaders, and abolition-
ists to take over the characters and symbols of the Haitian Revolution.
One of the main reasons that the Brazilian political and economic elite 
sought to avoid the Haitian example at all costs was the desire to control the 
process of abolishing slavery. As we know, Brazil was one of the last countries 
to end slavery, finally doing so in 1888. This strategy of control over the pro-
cess was effectively successful, since abolition occurred in a gradual way and 
without any public policies designed to include the then slaves in the labor 
market. Abolition marked the beginning of the segregation of the newly freed 
Black population.
This issue, which still underlies the many forms of structural racism in 
contemporary Brazil, is thus linked to a transition process—that is, from 
monarchy to republic, which occurred one year after abolition. And that pro-
cess was affected by the attempts at imposing silence over the narrative of a 
revolution led by slaves, who took advantage of their autonomy to defeat a 
colonial power, to build a political community, and to enact a constitution. To 
grasp the echoes of this attempt at silencing, as well as the ephemeral ways of 
recovering the Haitian experience by those who resisted the slave regime, is a 
duty that deserves to be achieved in constitutional history.36
35  Morel (2017) 38.
36  An important contribution in the field of constitutional history is the extensive 




Up to this point, our itinerary has indicated some different levels of si-
lence.
The first level results from the reception of the Haitian Revolution itself, 
classified by Michel-Rolph Trouillot as an “unthinkable” event, that is, as one 
marked by a transformational power that exceeded, by far, the other revolu-
tionary experiences of its time. Because of this, it received less attention, was 
subject to greater incomprehension, and is still, in a way, a less investigated 
event in modern history.37
When we consider the impact of the long Haitian Revolution on eigh-
teenth-century Brazil, more perceptions of silence arise. As stated by histori-
an Marco Morel, such silence has two different meanings: the first is oriented 
to the forbidding of speech, to the blocking of the theme. It is focused on 
the interdiction of speech, on the prohibition of the subject. Noblemen, slave 
owners, and political leaders constantly attempted to avoid mentioning the 
events that had taken place in Haiti. When that was not possible, given the 
significance of the Haitian Revolution as an example of resistance and re-
publican revolt (as in the case of the Pernambuco Revolution), the strategy 
involved silencing its revolutionary heritage. Haitian exemplarity was seen 
as dangerous and harmful and should not be adopted as a reference. Thus, as 
already stated, the widespread use of the term “Haitianism” in the nineteenth 
century.38
In twentieth-century historical experience, silence took on new forms. Af-
ter the abolition of slavery, with no public policies for the integration of Af-
ro-Brazilian into the labor force, the social segregation of the Black population 
began.39 That period was also when the first Brazilian republican governments 
encouraged European immigration. As a result, social and cultural practices 
associated with the Black population did not—and have not—become visible, 
even if they were reproduced in various spheres of society, just silently.
When some organizations dedicated to Black people’s rights became ac-
tive, especially in the 1930s and 1940s, another form of silencing took place: 
Revolution during the 1823 Constituent Assembly. Please see Queiroz (2018); Duarte/
Queiroz (2019). 
37  See Trouillot (2015) 27, 70-107; Ferrer (2014) 31, 150, 157.
38  See Morel (2017) 99-303.
39  See Chalhoub (2017); and Sevcenko (2010).
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clouded under a veil of conceptualizations linked to a certain “harmony” be-
tween races, and other similar formulations, the struggle for the recognition 
of Afro-Brazilians citizens continued to be neglected—and, as Flavio Gomes 
and Petrônio Domingues have stated, they are still waiting for greater atten-
tion from historians and researchers in general. Certain experiences, such as 
the Black Front and the Black Experimental Theater, played an interesting 
role in Brazilian social and political issues and are still awaiting a better un-
derstanding of their significance in the light of the changes Brazil has under-
gone since the 1930s.40
These struggles for recognition also unfolded in subsequent periods of 
Brazilian republican history and assumed centrality in the 1970s, when there 
were new forms of mobilization among Brazil’s Black population, which were 
then closely followed by the security forces of the military regime. It was in 
the context of accelerating the political transition and the redemocratization 
process that the Unified Black Movement emerged on the national landscape 
(it was founded in June 1978 in São Paulo).41
The Black population’s demands for recognition have comprised, first and 
foremost, a request for listening, for the possibility of dialogue in Brazilian 
society—an urgent demand that extends even to the present day. As this arti-
cle was being written, protests and demonstrations directed against police vi-
olence toward the Black population erupted in Brazil.42 Therefore, the contin-
ued existence of structural racism and the recurrent occurrence of demands 
for recognition permeate the entirety of Brazilian history.
As far as the field of constitutional history is concerned, there are two po-
tential approaches to future research on this subject. The first approach in-
volves what Pietro Costa once termed the “spatial turn” in legal history.43 The 
Haitian Revolution was a very complex historical experience. It was carried 
out in an Atlantic context in which the meanings of many revolutions were 
defined and redefined—beyond that which took place in Santo Domingo, the 
American and French experiences also were felt by the Atlantic world. One 
40  See Gomes/Domingues (2013) 255-267; and Domingues (2018) 237-243.
41  See Pires (2018) and the final report of the Rio de Janeiro State Truth Commission 
(Brasil, Comissão Estadual da Verdade do Rio de Janeiro, Relatório Final, dezembro de 2015, 
avaliable at: <http://www.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/administrator/components/com_
simplefilemanager/uploads/Rio/CEV-Rio-Relatorio-Final.pdf>). See also Paixão (2021).
42  See <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2020/06/e-no-brasil-vidas-negras-
importam.shtml>.
43  See Costa (2016); Meccarelli/Sastre (2016).
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can also refer to a Black Atlantic space, where enslaving practices and strug-
gles for freedom coexisted.44 This phenomenon is particularly interesting in 
Brazilian history, due not only to the evident influences of the American and 
French Revolutions, but also, and primarily, for the repercussions of the Hai-
tian Revolution. There was a visible space of communication between Brazil 
and Haiti, which included the northern provinces of Brazil (especially that of 
the Grand Pará), passed through French Guyana, and then reached the Hai-
tian context.45 Slaves, freedmen, military men, politicians, and priests took 
this route, leaving behind sources, testimonies, and narratives. So a research 
program that includes the influence of this spatial background on Brazilian 
history in the early nineteenth century looks to yield promising findings.
That brings us to a second area of interest: how do we connect constituent 
processes with struggles for the freedom and recognition of the Black pop-
ulation? Such a question can be posed at certain crucial times in Brazilian 
constitutional history.
The first Constituent Assembly in Brazilian history was disbanded by Em-
peror Pedro I in 1823. The constituent proceedings, however, featured discus-
sions around the fundamental issues to be settled by the newly independent 
nation. The records of the meetings are available and are a major source for 
histories of that period. The Haitian issue was discussed at the Assembly be-
cause one of the most influential constituents, João Severiano Maciel da Cos-
ta, had been governor of French Guiana (then under Portuguese occupation) 
between 1809 and 1819. As already stated, Guiana was a strategic stopover 
on the route connecting Brazil and Haiti. And João Severiano dealt with an 
intriguing situation during his time in Guiana: he was in charge of the inter-
rogation of a Brazilian-born priest who had spent two years in Haiti. Charged 
with Haitianism, he was imprisoned and deported at Maciel da Costa’s com-
mand.46 Thus, at the 1823 Constituent Assembly, the Haitian Revolution 
was discussed, with the full involvement of Maciel da Costa.47 As pointed out 
44  See Gilroy (1993).
45  See Gomes/Morel (2003) 37-63.
46  See Gomes/Morel (2003) 47.
47  See Brasil, Segunda Sessão Preparatória, 18 de abril de 1823, Diário da Assembleia 
Geral, Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil – 1823, Ed. Fac-similar, V, Brasí-
lia, Senado Federal, Conselho Editorial, 2003, 207; and Honorato (2014). I would like to 
thank the researcher Fernando Henrique Lopes Honorato, PhD Candidate at UnB Law 
School, for this important reference. For a substantiated account of the 1823 Constituent 
Assembly—and the role of the Haitian Revolution in it—see Queiroz (2018).
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above, the experience of Haiti was present throughout the nineteenth century 
in Brazil, often marked with silencing practices by the political and economic 
elite, but sometimes referred to in rebellions or abolitionist protests.
After the Assembly was disbanded, the Emperor decided in 1824 to enact 
a constitution, which remained in force up to 1889 (throughout the whole 
monarchical era). And, as is widely known, the Constitution of 1824 has no 
reference to the subject of slavery, which was the basis of economic and social 
relations at the time. That is another silencing process, which discloses more 
than it conceals, since it draws a line between what can and cannot be said. 
This silence was still being imposed, but it has been challenged by political 
and social actors. Silences leave their imprint, denote choices, and enable us 
to grasp the challenges of articulating concepts and ideas. As highlighted by 
Eni Puccinelli Orlandi, silence is not only “among words. It crosses them. An 
essential event of meaning, it is significant matter par excellence.”48
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Legal concepts from the standpoint of innovation and
preservation of meaning: a rhetorical perspective
Claudia Roesler 
1. Introducing the topic; 2. Thinking along with Koselleck; 3. Introducing 
Theodor Viehweg: dogmatics, zetetics and base theory; 4. Viehweg’s historical 
examples and what they can teach us; 5. Connecting the dots
1. Introducing the topic
The current article has the cultural innovation in legal discourse as its 
theme and intends to investigate it as a persistent phenomenon, explored by 
looking at the rhetorical and argumentative practices of jurists. It represents 
an initial approach to the subject and will certainly need to be further devel-
oped in later research. Therefore, we offer the reader an introduction to the 
topic and to its possible unfolding.1
Its starting point is to think about the way jurists proceed with their tasks 
with a peculiar combination of innovation and conservation, easily noticeable 
if we look at legal concepts in a long-term perspective or if we compare sever-
al contemporary legal systems, preferably while representative of diverse cul-
tures. In other words, our starting point implies showing how this particular 
combination is naturalized in the linguistic and operational practices of ju-
rists and only appears when we identify a socio-legal problem, contrast it with 
its normative and jurisprudential regulation and denaturalize the text or, as 
in this paper, when we think of law in connection with language and history.
One of the transversal topics that appear in our observation of Brazilian 
argumentative practice is that of the legal culture that highlights the bound-
aries of arguments. For the purposes of this investigation, this culture is un-
derstood as the set of shared beliefs, institutions, and knowledge, which make 
up for a background in which arguments of legal theory and practice of a giv-
1  This article is a revised and expanded version of the one presented at the Workshop 
Innovazione e transizione nel diritto: esperienze e configurazione teoriche, held at the 
Università degli Studi di Macerata, on June 17 and 18, 2019. I thank the colleagues who 
contributed to it and made it possible to improve the text, especially Cristiano Paixão, 




en historical time become possible. When new social problems arise, jurists 
start working with them implying in treating the new properly and fitting it 
into existing mechanisms, which are the shared and eventually disputed lex-
icon. A cultural innovation appears when the lexicon changes, encompassing 
phenomena not previously covered and it does so by the corresponding pure 
and simple conceptual innovation or by the evolution of the semantic content 
of terms. 
In order to carry out the discussion, we will start from the idea by Reinhart 
Koselleck, presented in a text entitled “Repetitive structures in language and 
history”2 in which the author debates the dialectic relationship between inno-
vation and the keeping of structures. From the insight offered by Koselleck, 
we will be able to look at this process in a more practical way, following the 
suggestions from Theodor Viehweg3 about how legal knowledge is built and 
its different “layers”. The distinctions between dogmatics, zetetics and the 
common substrate that Viehweg describes as a “base theory” will be explored 
further in the article. 
The paper is divided into three parts, the first dedicated to Koselleck; the 
second and the third to Viehweg, presenting his main theoretical categories 
and then exploring the author’s thoughts, with historical examples. Finally, it 
ends with closing remarks connecting the dots addressed throughout the text.
2. Thinking along with Koselleck
Taking advantage of a beautiful image about love – the unrepeatability of 
each story that involves lovers as if it was unique, and its repetition over time, 
if considered humankind as a whole – Koselleck proposes his investigation 
on the topic of repetitive structures as a generalization of a fact that started 
from two observations: in a timeline, people and their life events, their con-
flicts and solutions are and remain unique and unrepeatable. Even so, they 
occur within pre-conditions that are repeatable and, at the same time, never 
remain exactly as they were before. In other words: if everything was repeat-
ed endlessly, there would be boredom. If, on the contrary, everything was 
in constant innovation, humanity would fall into some kind of “black hole” 
without having a clue to where it was heading.4 
2  Koselleck (2010); the text, with minimal changes, also appears in Koselleck ( 2018).
3  Viehweg (1974); also Viehweg (1995).
4  Koselleck (2010).
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This frame, which bets on the combination of repetition and innovation in 
different ways, would allow, according to the author, to consider if historical 
events are accelerating or being delayed. Acceleration corresponds to faster 
innovation and fewer repetitions while delay would occur when repetition is 
more present and makes change slower or virtually impossible. The theoret-
ical isolation of this interchange between innovation and repetition in unre-
peatable historical situations would enable us to understand which would be 
the most recurring preconditions and, consequently, repetitive structures. 
It would be possible, then, to differ what is “really new”, that is, what does 
not repeat anything that already existed, from what already existed and pres-
ents itself in a new form. Such a theoretical solution would allow us to review 
the traditional distinctions between different eras and their categorization as 
“ancient history”, “middle ages” and “modern age”, would remove the eth-
nocentric constraints present in the way in which academic institutions or-
ganize their discourse and would make it possible for intercontinental and 
intracontinental comparisons, organizing temporalities beyond pre-estab-
lished conventions.
Koselleck is concerned with making two important clarifications in order 
to avoid misunderstandings or insights that are out of touch with his model 
intents. The first is that we must not misunderstand the idea of repetitive 
structures with that of recurrent cycles, present in several formulations in 
Western thought. The second is aimed at preventing the misinterpreting of 
repetitive structures with causality in historical events. Repetitive structures 
do not indicate a simple return-cycle of the same and, although they predict 
the uniqueness of events, they do not lead to causal explanations.
The next step is to show some of the preconditions at different aspects of 
human life. The author divides them into five categories: a) extra-human con-
ditions of our experience, which concern the natural cycles of the earth and 
the universe; b) biological pre-conditions that we share with other animals; c) 
institutions; d) repetition structures embedded in sequences of unique or di-
verse events; e) linguistic repetition structures, within which repetitions and 
innovations are generated and recognized. In this paper, we are particularly 
interested in the institutional and linguistic categories.
According to Koselleck, we can think of institutions as artifacts created 
only by human beings and, although modern inventions evoke new experi-
ences, the tension between innovation and repetition is nevertheless present. 
The role of institutions, therefore, is to deal with this tension in the course of 
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history based on mechanisms of repetition. Examples of these mechanisms 
can be found while working – whose circumstances do change but are based 
on the human capacity of learning and repeating tasks – and at the field of 
law, which interests us particularly.
In this case, the author points out, the very existence of the law presuppos-
es its ability to be repeatedly applied to similar cases, that is, its ability to be 
steadily invoked as a standard option for solving social problems. This does 
not imply that new circumstances do not require new legal solutions and, 
consequently, the law does not require innovation. In those lines, modernity 
appears as an era of accelerating legislative innovation in opposition to a long 
time of regulations and customs based on traditional regulatory mechanisms, 
and on a successive exchange of regulation that is not only new but is en-
forced only for short periods of time, later followed by another innovation. 
The paradox is that stability, coming from a rule that is enforced regularly, 
requires new cases to be judged according to parameters appropriate to them. 
The peculiar combination of innovation and stabilization that we mentioned 
previously appears then in all its intensity.
Koselleck’s main interest in his writings is not an analysis of law as an insti-
tutional stabilization mechanism and, consequently, the paragraphs devoted 
to the topic are few and basically illustrative. Law appears as one of the main 
examples of relevant institutions and its peculiarities are not addressed. We 
will return to this issue later, based on the conclusions we can make after re-
constructing Viehweg’s views about legal reasoning, as previously mentioned.
To end this part of our journey, we need to see how Koselleck deals with 
the last of the repetition categories, the language. The main point here is to 
show how the new always appears with the possibility of already presenting 
it in the language of the present, even if new terms are created or new forms 
of expressing it are required. Of the three linguistic planes, the syntactic one 
seems to be the least affected by innovation or is the most imperceptible in 
the short term. Semantics, on the other hand, is what allows us to see inno-
vation happening and to see it within existing structures, that is, from shifts 
of meaning, often metaphorical. The author points out that many of the ex-
pressions we use to describe significant historical events are geological met-
aphors that appeal to our condition as beings who share their physical space 
on Earth – ruptures, eruptions, breaks, and revolutions are good examples 
of this – and we only understand them because we already have a common 
background given by language.
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Invoking Gadamer, the term “pre-understanding” is used and the point 
that most interests us is the statement that this dynamic of change, which is 
apparently purely semantic, requires an ability to explain innovations analog-
ically. In those lines, innovating means finding a way to project new content 
into semantic vehicles that, created for the sake of newness or not, can be 
adequately mirrored in common knowledge already shared by the commu-
nity. It is not by chance that Koselleck cites Heinrich Lausberg5 classic work 
on literary rhetoric and invoke the definition of topos. He warns the reader 
that the functioning of topoi is not properly understood if one does not notice 
that they are not simply empty formulas that repeat themselves over time, 
but that they are also relatively stable repetitions, intertwining semantics and 
pragmatics.
The relationship between innovation and the keeping of older structures 
thus becomes more delicate due to the dynamics of language, we are now on 
the intersection between linguistic change and history. In other words, it’s 
about the language’s capacity to absorb and express historical events. Using 
political changes as an example, Koselleck points out the distance between 
these two planes and the relative distance between change, always induced by 
language before its occurrence and registered afterward, and its expression.
The relative separation between the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic 
planes can also be seen from the perspective of political change. Innovation 
happens more quickly and clearly in semantics and is less noticeable – if it 
does – syntactically and pragmatically in the strict sense. The same syntactic 
structure and the same form of rhetorical expression may be used over a rel-
atively long time and still mean successive political content, whose semantic 
meaning has been reinvented.
Claiming that it is in semantics that conceptual innovations appear more 
quickly does not mean that the pragmatic plane is unimportant. The tension 
between innovation and conservation is more evident in the pragmatic one, 
as it is from it that we are able to observe how the argument was imposed 
or a single discourse was persuasive and it depends on a peculiar, tense and 
unstable combination between the ability to be familiar to the audience of its 
time using accepted and recognized linguistic elements and, at the same time, 
presenting of what is unique or new.
As we have seen, Koselleck places law among social institutions capable of 
stabilizing structures. Although the author does not directly make this claim 
5  Lausberg (2011).
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in the text, as the law is linguistically articulated, its forms appear with the 
same characteristics of language and the constant internal semantic displace-
ment also operates in it. The institutional capacity of the law is articulated in 
an unstable balance between innovation and the repetition of the enforce-
ment of rules that are socially recognized as legal and that implies the keeping 
of the semantic envelope with the displacement of its content. For this dis-
placement to work, it cannot be so abrupt or so visible as to disrespect shared 
parameters, especially by jurists, even if not only by them.
The main goal of this article is to better understand this process and, con-
sequently, to clarify how innovations are produced and introduced in the le-
gal lexicon. Now the research depends on a more detailed look at the inter-
nal aspects of the legal discourse. This research will be conducted by taking 
advantage of some of Theodor Viehweg’s suggestions in writings after Topik 
und Jurisprudenz, in which the author drew a circular path between dog-
matics, zetetics and base theory that are useful to show how this process of 
conceptual innovation appears in the field of law. Our project moves, there-
fore, in the delineation of law as a social artifact articulated intrinsically by 
history and language and how the former is affected by the issues that affect 
the latter two. Resorting to an interdisciplinary perspective that unites this 
knowledge across the board may be an effective way of highlighting aspects 
that are not very obvious in the legal practice of jurists. This is the object of 
our research in the next topics, starting with the presentation of the main 
concepts of Viehweg and then introducing some initial observations about 
the semantic changes in history, observed by Viehweg himself in his research.
3. Introducing Theodor Viehweg: dogmatics, zetetics and base theory
The distinction between a dogmatic way of thinking and a zetetic way of 
thinking is used by Viehweg in texts published throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, a few years after his Topik und Jurisprudenz and, due to the peculiar 
characteristics of these texts – book chapters, conferences at events, academ-
ic papers – the definitions that interest us return several times, with different 
nuances and details that can vary from one text to another. We intend to re-
construct the main aspects of the distinction, throughout the different texts.6
6  Viehweg (1995). The articles are referred by the title and by the page range: System-
probleme in Rechtsdogmatik und Rechtsforschung 97-106; Ideologie und Rechtsdogmatik 
86-96; Some Considerations concerning Legal Reasoning 107-114; Notizen zu einer Rhe-
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First, it is important to note that the author proposes the distinction as 
a way of understanding the complexity generated by the wide range of legal 
phenomena and, therefore, the multiplicity of tasks it supposes, ranging from 
an analysis of a certain legal system, to scientific or philosophical investiga-
tions. Viehweg proposes to consider these areas as a question and answer 
scheme, in his research of how areas of knowledge may emerge as specific 
thematic fields. Thus, a field of problems that is sufficiently describable is 
constructed and answers are offered that, according to the proof procedures 
to be specified, are finally accepted or rejected.
In the question and answer schemes, it is possible to emphasize the ques-
tions or the answers. When we emphasize the questions, the structure points 
to the investigation or zetetics. When we emphasize the answers, dogmatics. 
In the first scenario, the continuous pondering, which can make us rethink all 
the answers offered in the investigation (and that is why it is understood that 
the relevance is given to the question aspect) points to an infinite course, or at 
least without a specific ending. In research or zetetics, the answers are always 
taken as temporary, provisional, and questionable at any time. Your task is 
to label the range of questions in the chosen field. In the second case, when 
the answer is highlighted, the arguing starts from some points that cannot be 
questioned and its pondering is limited by the impossibility of questioning 
the dogmas, which “dominate” the other answers.
Explaining the distinction from a rhetorical discourse model, understood as 
a game between parties that propose and defend their statements, Viehweg pro-
vides us with another description of the distinction that can help clarify its scope. 
Assertions are treated as dogmata when, in theory, they are excluded from get-
ting attacked in the long term, and therefore, they are not subject to any duty of 
defense, that is, to any duty of reasoning, if not simply a duty of explanation. The 
opposite occurs with the assertions that in all investigations are used simply as 
zetemata. In theory, they are free to be subject to any kind of attack and need to fill 
both duties: defense/reasoning and explanation. They are always questionable.
However, how can one explain the existence of dogmatic and zetetic 
thoughts? Why do both of them exist? Dogmatic thought is linked, says Vie-
hweg, to opinion and the formation of opinion, while the zetetic thought is 
linked to the dissolution of opinions through investigation and its basic as-
sumption is doubt.
torischen Rechtstheorie 191-199; Über den Zusammenhang zwischen Rechtsphilosophie, 
Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik 35-44.
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It should be noted, says Viehweg, that in the everyday action and decision, 
dogmatic thought seems to be indispensable, because it is part of the action, 
forced to establish, rethink and keep a closed system of thought, a dogma. A 
thought that places itself as a task for continuous rethinking, as an investiga-
tion, fails to fulfill this function because actions require questions to stop and 
the answers provided, which are, in this sense, dogmatized. In order to act, 
the exercise of doubt must be carefully considered, because the urgency of 
decisions requires having an opinion based on data or information provided 
by context. Thus, the dogmatic thought is the daily thought itself as well as 
the formation of opinion.
Although dogmatic thought fixes the opinions, making them indisputable, 
it cannot abandon its inherent development. Thus, Viehweg points out, in 
order to maintain a cohesive and stable system of dogmatic opinions, inter-
pretation gains importance, whose role is to make the necessary flexibility of 
nondiscardable dogmas, enabling their internal review without denying or 
deleting them. If dogmatic thought puts those basic statements (dogmas) out 
of question and doubt, it also develops them continuously exactly because 
they cannot be abandoned.
Contrary to what the usual meaning of the word “dogmatic” indicates, dog-
matic thought does not work with norms as if they represented fixed, one-way 
conditions. Although their starting points are unquestionable, their linguis-
tic characteristic, with the inherent connotative and denotative uncertainty, 
offers a relatively wide range for manipulating dogmas so that they can be 
continuously adapted to changing social circumstances.7 
Dogmatic legal thinking is necessary and continually seeks to influence or 
provoke a set of behaviors in a more or less broad social group, with the least 
possible disturbance. This focus has an operative function and its cognitive 
aspect, although relevant, is not predominant. When referring to him, Vieh-
weg affirms his multiple social functions and puts it in the following terms: 
it influences others and makes confidence become a prescription of behavior. 
This type of thinking, adds the author, tries to grant an operative function to 
what is thought and expressed.
On the other hand, a zetetic thought remains within the boundaries of a 
cognitive function and this is its functional role in society. Zetetic thought is 
an attempt because its greatest interest is in increasing the reliability of its 
statements and beliefs, which are subject to constant review so that the the-
7  See Ferraz Jr. (1996) 49.
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ory can be built in solid ground. Its intent while using language is to inform 
and describe states of affairs. The dogmatic thought or approach, as it has an 
operative function, combines the informative and the directive (prevailing) 
characteristic of language.
Ahead of the need to legitimize the assumption of dogmatic starting points, 
it is necessary for them to be introduced in a rational way and this aspect is 
highlighted by Viehweg multiple times. Thus, the zetetic approach turns out 
to be essential as it provides, although this is not its primary function, prem-
ises that are immediately dogmatized and dogmatizable, especially in a soci-
ety that attaches great relevance to the scientific legitimation of knowledge.
Moreover, one of the possible relationships between the two approaches 
is legitimizing the directive system of behaviors, dogmatic, in the absence of 
grounding in religion or tradition. The dilemma is that the zetetic system can 
only offer a partial overview in terms of content, which makes it difficult to 
take its knowledge as good dogmatic starting points.
This perspective shows the importance of the relationship between the 
dogmatic and the zetetic thought. It is decisive for the science of law – since 
dogmatization is considered a sequel of legislation – and it is clear that both 
depend on having the correct information about our complicated social world. 
Zetetics has to intervene continuously as a corrective to dogmatics, introduc-
ing de-dogmatizations.
The role of zetetics is to critically examine the assumptions on which 
dogmatics is based, hence providing it with the means to review its dogmas, 
adapting and rationally grounding them. For full legal knowledge, it is not a 
matter of eliminating or absorbing one onto the other, but of understanding 
them as both necessary and complementary.
If, on the one hand, social dynamics itself requires dogmatic thinking, on 
the other hand, the setting of this approach would lead to its own bankruptcy 
as guidance for action, since it would not allow the renewal of the cognitive 
content of its premises. Thus, the zetetic approach makes a critical contribu-
tion granting continuous correction.
In an article entitled Über den Zusammenhang zwischen Rechtsphilo-
sophie, Rechtstheorie und Rechtsdogmatik, Viehweg discusses, as the title 
indicates, the link between legal dogmatics, the theory of law and the phi-
losophy of law.
Viehweg notes that a sociological consideration indicates that every social 
group needs to establish an opinion on what it considers fair. This legal opin-
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ion must be understood as a binding response to a social issue and fulfills a 
social function by allowing the coordination of the behavior of a diverse com-
munity of individuals.
This opinion might come from or be expressed in maxims passed from 
generation to generation, from an oracle, from judicial rulings or from laws. 
If, however, this opinion is submitted to the control of thought and, with that, 
rationalized, it will become a legal dogmatic.
Legal dogmatics is structurally formed by one or more fundamental dog-
mas, reconcilable with each other and considered as unstable, as they are tak-
en as starting points that are not subject to questioning, and put as basic prem-
ises. Everything that is suggested as a response to a problem within this dogma 
must be reconciled with the meaning of these dogmas, as this way of thinking 
is inherent, that is, it develops internally, based on its own assumptions.
Dogmatics may take on several structures, such as deductive or classical 
dialectics. Regardless, when the dogmas fail to guide praxis, due to them be-
coming confused or insecure, that dogmatics vanishes. The question posed 
here is that of practice, of man’s action as an indefinite being, and the struc-
ture is conditioned by the social function. Once social relevance is lost, the 
dogma might die, regardless of the structure with which it was built.
The references in the article we are examining suggest that there is an in-
trinsic link between the legitimacy of each legal dogma in its historical con-
text and the relationship between structure and function. In order to fulfill 
its function of guiding praxis, dogmatics must present itself according to a 
structure that is acceptable to the thinking of its time.
Viehweg states that dogmatic systems always have a structure attributed 
to them by their social roles and, at the same time, suggests that this struc-
ture has a dimension of legitimation that cannot be disregarded, otherwise 
we are not able to properly observe the legal phenomenon. This means that, 
for the sake of legitimizing dogmatic systems, two dimensions are necessary 
and complementary: the content that comes from a set of socially accepted 
cultural references and the discourse that is accepted as reliable at that his-
torical moment.
Regardless of whether we accept the opinion set out above, it is certain 
that, in order to fulfill its role of unifying and coordinating behavior in soci-
ety, fundamental dogmas must have explicitly or implicitly a theory of mate-
rial law that work as their ultimate foundation and this means they must have 
a solid answer about what is fair. In this sense, Viehweg mentions several his-
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torical examples, such as the base theory of Roman jurists, so hidden that it 
is difficult to reconstitute, or that of Thomas Aquinas, which is quite explicit. 
At the same time, we can consider the positivization of fundamental rights in 
written constitutions as the practice of a theory of material law.
Such practice, says Viehweg in another article from 1961,8 embodied in 
written norms, solves only part of the problem, indicating what should be 
understood as the base theory. Praxis also requires the establishment of a 
dogmatic theory of interpretation, whose role would be precisely to indicate 
how texts should be interpreted in order to find that base theory. The inter-
preter is referring to a constitutional order that contains a theory of law that 
is not only formal but also material. If in theory, this is clear and consistent, in 
practice it is not always so, as this theory arises from customs, habits, ethics.
Furthermore, the unity or uniformity of a material legal theory of this type 
is necessarily postulated, but in reality, it is so full of tensions that its har-
monization poses considerable difficulties for every jurist and, in particular, 
to a constitutional court. A theory of law built in those lines has the role of 
preventing the interpretation from becoming never-ending – although it is 
perfectly known that the constitution also needs to be interpreted – and indi-
cating what is considered a problem of justice, thereby putting it on the field 
of possible legal-dogmatic arguments.
However, if this is the task that belongs to dogmatics, it is different from 
that which belongs to the philosophy of law. This is put forth by Viehweg as 
having a double role. The first is linked to the fact that it participates essen-
tially in the arising of a theory of law. From the philosophy of law, a base 
theory is born that gives rise, in turn, to legal dogmatics. The second role is 
that after having generated a theory of law, it also makes the theory of law, 
now dogmatized, an object of investigation. What Viehweg means with this 
connection can be better understood by examining the historical examples 
that he recovers. This will be the subject of our next item.
4. Viehweg’s historical examples and what they can teach us
The link between the two approaches is best seen if we turn to an article 
that Viehweg published in 1970 on dogmatics and zetetics in Jhering9 and 
whose objective, according to the author, is to support the epistemological 
8  Viehweg (1995a).
9  Viehweg (1995h).
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thesis according to which Jhering took an important step from dogmatic to 
legal zetetics.
To this end, Viehweg develops a brief recovery of the social context in which 
Jhering lived, aiming to show that the most common problem explored by 
Jhering’s contemporary thinkers is the social problem, closely tied to the be-
ginning of the industrial era. The idea of development has great relevance and 
was put forward by a partly scientific-natural and partly historicist thought.
In the perspective that Viehweg proposes, Jhering tried to treat the great 
historical material at his disposal with a scientific-natural spirit, seeking to 
practice the history of law according to the methods of natural science. When 
publishing Der Zweck im Recht he said he believed he had reached the end 
of his investigation of the Law, as he was in a position to show his nature. 
The need for Jurisprudence to present itself as an investigation of the law 
increased considerably with its touch to the investigation of nature.
Viehweg then seeks to demonstrate, analyzing Jhering’s intellectual tra-
jectory, that this author initially had a dogmatic relationship with Roman 
Law and used it as a source of solutions for the legal-dogmatic building of 
arguments, having created relevant theories that do not have only a cognitive 
component, but also an operational role.
The step from a dogmatic to a zetetic is located by Viehweg in the second 
section of the second part of Geist des Römischen Rechts that ends, according 
to the author, the meaning presented in Der Zweck im Recht, which arose 
from the generalization of the particularly observed conceptions of purpose 
and from the elevation of this category to the position of central explanation 
of the legal phenomenon in its entirety.
Again, says Viehweg, efforts to more strongly ground the basic doctrine of 
dogmatics appeared promptly and Jhering’s work, Kampf ums Rechts, rep-
resents this point, enabling a form of dogmatic-teleological thinking.
Finally, as Viehweg concludes from his analysis, it can be understood that 
the industrial era was, on the one hand, facing a new and still confused reali-
ty, lacking in research. On the other hand, it sought adequate dogmatization. 
In this situation Jhering created in the German language, following the model 
of nature research, a new legal science that stimulated a new legal dogma. 
From that point on, within the framework of a science of law, both a sociol-
ogy of law, zetetical and investigative, and a dogmatic Jurisprudence -- also 
sociological -- have developed.
This example shows how the double-sided relationship between the dog-
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matic and the zetetic approaches can be seen in a given historical moment, 
inasmuch as it illustrates how a dogma was questioned by a reflexive and 
critical thought and how, shortly thereafter, this same critical thinking began 
a new dogmatic creation.
It is interesting to note that this concern with the way in which the models 
of arguing and the eventual contents of a base theory have been developed 
throughout history also appear as the main topics in the two papers by Vieh-
weg, in addition to sporadic mentions in many others. 
The article entitled Modelle juristischer Argumentation in der Neuzeit, in 
which recovers the models of arguing that were developed during the tran-
sition to modernity, emphasizing that the first major change in the way of 
Western jurists argued was precisely the adaptation of the traditional system 
to the axiomatic-deductive that dominated all arguments since the 17th cen-
tury. Viehweg recovers, showing in detail, the concern of 15th century human-
ist jurists with the belonging of jurisprudence to the field of ars or scientia.
In the 16th century, jurists continued to use existing expressions, but be-
gan to express criticism of scholastic jurisprudence and to propose analyses 
of legal systems. The term systema, however, will only appear in a title in 
1608 and should not be taken too seriously, since it designates, for the jurists 
of the time, an attempt to present the Corpus Iuris more properly. As Vieh-
weg shows, the way tradition was introduced is no longer utilized, but it is not 
completely discarded.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the model that inspires ju-
rists becomes the geometric and, consequently, there is a great rupture in the 
argumentation model. The philosophical investigation of the Enlightenment 
is capable of providing the first basic principles for making deductions and for 
grounding a system in solid foundations. Christian Wolff, recalls Viehweg, is 
a key author in this regard. 
The “deductivists” will decisively influence the construction of legal 
knowledge in the following centuries, even if their theoretical orientation is 
not unanimously accepted. A critical approach to the type of deduction based 
on fundamental principles will be offered by Montesquieu and will also have 
supporters in the following centuries, constituting the second major aspect 
of the models of argument that will confront and, in some way, still confront 
each other, says Viehweg.
The other article, entitled Einige Bemerkungen zu Gustav Hugos Recht-
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sphilosophie,10 explores more closely a specific conceptual change, showing 
how the expression “philosophy of law” became part of the lexicon of jurists 
in the mid-18th century and is used by Gustav Hugo to designate part of a 
tripod of knowledge that would allow the jurist to cover all the aspects of his 
field of expertise, articulated from three questions: What is the law? Is it rea-
sonable that it should be so? How did it become law?
The first question and the corresponding answers, according to Hugo, 
constitute the scope of legal dogmatics. The second, that of the philosophy 
of law. The third would be that of the history of law. A tripartite articulation 
that, according to Viehweg, had further developments that made it bipartite 
and, with that, coordinated legal dogmatics and the history of law among 
themselves, as if it were a sequence of studies, only delivered by different 
means. A division that separated philosophy from law and the history of law 
was very well received by the authors of the time, argues Viehweg, making 
possible both the tripartite version, as articulated by Hugo, and a bipartite 
version, which unified dogmatics and history, since that allowed to separate 
what was considered historically determined from what was understood as 
critical thought. Initially used in the longer-term, such as “philosophy of pos-
itive law”, then “philosophy of law” is incorporated into the lexicon of jurists 
and begins to describe a critical perspective on the law.
After going through the historical examples used by Viehweg to illustrate 
his concepts, let’s move on to the final phase of our research, bridging the 
gaps that were left behind.
5. Connecting the dots
Seen from this perspective, the connections between law and history that 
we try to rebuild from Koselleck’s text, albeit in a very approximate way at the 
moment, are now seen more clearly.
As we have seen, the German historian’s concern with innovation and 
the maintenance of structures, in the text we have explored, allows us to ap-
proach the role of law and language in these processes. Thus, the law, as one 
of the forms of social institution that allows a stabilization, by guiding be-
haviors, needs, at the same time, to incorporate the new and maintain what 
is usable from tradition. Language, in turn, is a mechanism for constructing 
meaning for historical events and its analysis - especially by observing how 
10  Viehweg (1995f).
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concepts are used in a given historical time - would allow us to see when the 
new emerges and how it is articulated, either by sliding the meaning of an 
existing term or by creating a new one.
The phenomenon pointed out by Viehweg when he distinguishes between 
a dogmatic and a zetetic way of thinking that generates sets of also dogmatic 
and zetetic statements, illustrates the dialectics pointed out by Koselleck be-
tween conservation and innovation, now in the legal debate. By taking some 
starting points as indisputable, they function as possible anchors for the in-
stitutionalization of law. Social changes, more or less accelerated depending 
on the historical time in which we are located, require that these dogmas 
have their meaning reviewed and semantically changed whenever necessary. 
Zetetic questioning enters, here, as a mechanism of cognitive renewal and 
supplier of cultural elements, categories and concepts that allow the substitu-
tion of what no longer makes sense, creating a new lexicon, or adapting what 
can still be used, sliding its meaning through the interpretation of premises 
that cannot be abandoned.
The circularity between dogmatic, zetetic and their meeting point, the ba-
sic theory, can be a way of seeing the phenomenon pointed out by Koselleck. 
The topical way of thinking of jurists, according to Viehweg’s conception, 
would provide a very appropriate tool, since each topos in its uniqueness and 
a set of topoi in its entirety can function as formulas of meaning shared by 
a community and at the same time give it a sufficiently solid content to be 
useful. Taken out of their context, which Viehweg calls situational, the topoi 
are, in fact, formulas too broad and apparently more disturbing to commu-
nication than good semantic tools. From a rhetorical perspective, however, 
their malleability may be precisely the key that explains why jurists use the 
same concepts over long historical times, without implying in the use exactly 
the same semantics.11
The processes of political legitimation of the content of the law, often men-
tioned by Viehweg, require a significant amount of attention and the invoking 
of the authority of tradition. As jurists are well aware, some concepts sound 
“eternal”. While explaining the concept of property or contract, it seems 
possible to use the Romans. When talking about contemporary concepts, it 
seems necessary to start by telling the “story” of how it was created, thus gen-
erating a feeling of continuity that plays a significant rhetorical role. Rather 
than assuming these concepts as human creations dated in time and guided 
11  For further examples, see Gambino in this volume. 
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by political, economic and cultural debates, the use of a concept created out 
of time, that is, of an origin as distant as mythical, means two things. First, it 
is possible that we are facing one of those concepts that express a permanent 
structure of human life, and as such, lasts long. Second, it is possible that 
the invoking of its long history in Western legal thought serves to avoid the 
debate about the determinations of the present – facilitating its legitimation 
– and to make a change in the meaning happen, as effective as it is subtle. 
Thus, instead of proposing a new concept and having to act rhetorically to put 
it into the lexicon of time, something that already exists is used and its scope 
and content are altered.
The examples we brought in item four of this text, always invoking Vie-
hweg, are illustrative of another movement. More than preservation, these 
are moments when, in fact, innovation appears. Not by chance, if the reader 
is attentive. Viehweg’s three argumentative movements explore, precisely, 
the great historical ruptures that constitute modernity and its fundamental 
aspects: the Enlightenment, the creation of modern science, the industrial 
revolution. As he points out, Jhering was not alone in his concern with devel-
opment, a key concept for his historical time, and his intervention was fun-
damental in recreating a legal dogma capable of responding to the challenges 
posed by industrialization.
Gustav Hugo was looking for an expression that would allow him to dia-
logue with the philosophy of his time, especially with Kant, and at the same 
time express the moment that legal knowledge was going through, that is, its 
need to offer elements of criticism to positive law, at the same time that an 
interest in history was growing. Seen as one of the founder members of the 
Historical School in Germany, his three questions about law as well as the in-
troduction of the expression philosophy of law can be seen as important steps 
in building a separation between the functions of legal knowledge that guided 
the development of the science of German law in the following centuries.
Viehweg recovers several authors to show the changes in the model of ar-
gumentation used in modernity, and they all are part of this same scenario, 
preparing what will come, especially the discussions that will help to present 
legal knowledge as scientific, in the wake of the modern model of science that 
will impose itself in the 19th century to all fields of knowledge.
To explore more deeply these moments when innovation appears, or when 
we simply operate with usual concepts endowed with another semantic con-
tent, is work for the continuity of our research. The insight combining Kosel-
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leck’s work with that of Viehweg has guided us fruitfully so far. We hope that 
this will continue in other texts and in further academic dialogues12.
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Latent innovations in a legal system and civil law categories
Francesco Gambino 
1. Radical and latent innovations in a legal system; 2. The legal language in con-
ceptual, cultural and juridical innovations. Language as a thought-forming or-
gan; 3. Confining the semantic space of reference; 4. Principles, general provi-
sions, new forms of reasoning; 5. Structure of a legal system and the balance of 
powers; 6. Authentic innovations and individual cognitive horizons
 
1. Radical and latent innovations in a legal system
Among the themes arising from a reflection on innovation and transition 
in a legal system, one in particular stands out: the most problematic, which 
could be defined as the theme of the “passages” constituting what is “novel” 
in the legal world. The law assumes many faces;1 as many faces as the legal 
phenomenon can assume according to different conceptions. Therefore, in 
agreeing on giving transition an “ascriptive” function, as a way in which in-
novation can manifest itself,2 it is nonetheless essential to mark a general dis-
tinction. For the purposes of this paper, in a legal system (or, if you wish, in 
a legal order),3 it is necessary to differentiate patent and radical innovations 
from the surreptitious or latent innovations.
The first – the radical innovations – boil down to the historical facts that 
1  Simply consider the debate that took place in the early decades of the 1900s on the 
confusion between the different tasks assigned to legal science and to legal practitioners 
(in particular from the perspective of wilfully exercising a function) that produced the re-
sult whereby the former became “the featherbed of practice”. Merkl (1987) 122.
2  See in this volume the chapter by Massimo Meccarelli.
3  In this preliminary reconstruction, let us leave aside the question of what can be 
defined as ideal and what is real and effective in an order, namely the difference between a 
set of norms and the powers that produce and enforce them, turning the law into “organi-
zation, structure, the very stand taken by society”. Romano (1962) 27. The lesson delivered 
by Santi Romano, who reported the crisis of the hierarchy of sources and refused legal pos-
itivism. Grossi (2006; 2011) 49. In this context, we can read the essays by Gunther Teub-
ner (2005). More recently, a number of contributions on Teubner’s thoughts by scholars 





gave rise to new institutions and new regulatory frameworks that are opera-
tional, binding and effective. The others – the latent innovations which also 
project new contents within given semantic formations –4 arise from those 
who take on the task of interpreting a given system (legal practitioners, legal 
theory, caselaw) and from the way they narrate the law, with a view to meet-
ing the expectations and the prospected expectations of a community. Here, 
the difficulty – as will be outlined below – lies in understanding and recognis-
ing the authenticity of innovation as it arises from the meaning, dimension 
and stability of the phenomenon that breaks with the past.
To give an idea of radical innovation – and its incidence upon language 
and culture – we can recall a few historical events. 
By way of example, let us think of the period in the mid-19th century in 
which Italy was getting ready to take the road of political, legislative, eco-
nomic and administrative unification in the name of continuity with the ex-
periences of the past.5 This was the period in which theoretical elaborations 
and legal categories suffered the impact of history. The cultural framework 
enshrining the 1865 Civil Code, which was moulded on the Napoleonic Code 
of 1804, features the economic and social needs of bourgeois ideology:6 the 
individual, subjective rights, the contract, succession mortis causa. The ex-
egetic method, exercised in compliance with the order laid down by the civil 
code, results from the closely-knit intertwining between legal theorizing and 
law-making activities, “gathered together in the unity of the liberal State”.7  
To make another example, reference can be made to the changes brought 
about to the political and legal order through the introduction of a Constitu-
tion.8 In Italy, the Republican Constitution of 1948, by placing itself at the 
apex of the legal order, downgrades the Provisions on the law in general to a 
4  If we trace the reasoning of Koselleck (2010) 51-66, we can clarify the fact that “in-
novating, in this sense, means finding a way of projecting new contents within semantic 
formations that, whether created for the sake of innovation or not, can be adequately mir-
rored in already shared understandings”, as explained in the chapter by Claudia Roesler 
in this volume.
5  The widespread concern of preserving continuity with the past especially in admin-
istration matters is highlighted in the essay by Cassese (2011) 305 ff., whose title quotes 
the words that Camillo Benso di Cavour wrote in a letter of 19-10-1860 (306, nt. 4).
6  Irti (1990) 4.
7  Irti (1990) 5. 
8  The relationship between the law and the Constitution is cited as an example of 
transition and innovation in the contribution by Meccarelli in this volume. 
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lower-ranking legal source. The soundness of the normative method spread 
among scholars and practitioners of law up to that moment was fatally shak-
en. The coming into force of the Constitution marked a new philosophical 
approach – the philosophy of values –9 which opened up to the prevalent 
interests enshrined in the Constitution. The “value-based” points of view sup-
porting the argumentations dictated by socially recognized values10 meet the 
axiological need to control the jurist’s interpretative and constructive efforts. 
We can ultimately backtrack even further in history and recall the aboli-
tion of the nexum with which the debtor was enslaved to the creditor, who 
was “entitled to keep the nexus, i.e. the obligatus, in chains, beat him with 
a cane, and oblige him to work for him”.11 The “terrible effectiveness” of the 
nexum, which was the cause of unruly fights between patrician creditors and 
plebeian debtors, persisted until the passing of the lex Poetelia in 326 BC, 
which abolished the institution. This is the point in history in which the mod-
ern sense of obligation arose:12 the transition from the personal and coercive 
subjugation of the debtor to a relationship of a pecuniary nature. The “obliga-
tion” loses its original connotation and is normalized, if I may use this term. 
The word, stripped of its etymological halo and acquiring a new evolution-
ary phase of meaning, frees itself of the material person of the debtor.   
It is the very first trace of the full objectification process that, with the full 
development of a legal culture, will ultimately end up by anchoring the liabil-
ity arising from the obligation to the debtor’s assets. 
2. The legal language in conceptual, cultural and juridical innovations. 
Language as a thought-forming organ 
In what we here define as innovation, both patent and latent, the common 
ground is laid down by the language.13 It is within the linguistic structure that 
innovations – forms of thought capable of stabilizing and prevailing in solv-
ing legal and social problems – are created and recognized.14 The stabilization 
process – in the presence of an authentic conceptual, cultural or legal inno-
9  To explore this approach, which in Italy will follow other paths of reasoning, see the 
reconstruction made by Irti (2011) 98-100.
10  Mengoni (1996) 85.  
11  Bonfante (1946) 372.
12  Bonfante (1946) 304, 372.
13  See Roesler’s chapter in this volume. 
14  See Roesler’s chapter in this volume. 
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vation – is made possible by the interaction of a given language with our way 
of conceiving and perceiving the world. Because language, as we can read in 
the writings of Humboldt, is “the thought-forming organ” and must exist in 
close connection with the laws of grammar and the laws of thought.15 In my 
opinion, by following this line of thought – developed in the studies of Franz 
Boas and Roman Jakobson – 16 we can affirm that the legal language does not 
function differently from other languages and can also say that it – exactly 
like any other language – is not so much characterized by what it enables 
one to think as much as by what it “habitually obliges given types of informa-
tion to think”.17 In Guy Deutscher’s reconstruction, when a language “obliges 
its speakers to pay attention to certain aspects of the world every time they 
open their mouths or prick up their ears, at the end these linguistic habits can 
translate into mental habits that produce consequences on memory, percep-
tion, associations or even practical skills.”18 In the light of these findings, we 
could say that the stability of an innovation in the world of law is marked by 
the conversion of a linguistic option into a linguistic habit. It is a sense of con-
straint that, in the totality of meanings in which we live, leads to increasing or 
decreasing our possible options.  
The meaning of certain things on our lives and goals manifest themselves 
in a new way. We could even speak of a new form of usability 19 of legal things. 
Thus, for example, with the abolition of the nexum, the concept of obligation 
begins to lose its material connotation and enters a new domain of constitu-
tion and validity,20 generates new rules for use, and launches new theoretical 
processes. With the abolition of the institution of the nexum or, in more re-
cent times, of the arrest for debt (provided for in the civil code of 1865) or of 
15  Wilhelm von Humboldt’s insight on the theme of the influence of language on the 
mind is cited in the writings of Deutscher (2016) 151-158.     
16  See the Boas-Jakobson principle as recalled in the words of Deutscher (2016) 173-
179.   
17  Deutscher (2016) 175. 
18  Deutscher (2016) 175. 
19  Gianni Vattimo (2000) 23, dwells on the German term Zuhandenheit, used by 
Martin Heidegger (1971) 88-92 in the context of the “worldhood” of the world, in which the 
usability of the meaning of things in connection to our lives “is their way of giving them-
selves a more original meaning, the way in which they first come up in our experience”. 
20  See the reference made to the studies conducted by Georges Canguilhem on “trans-
formations” and on the “shifting” of concepts, Foucault (1999) 7.
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the “stone of shame” used in a little town in Sicily up to the 1920s,21 debt is 
necessarily destined to assume a less afflictive and menacing meaning, psy-
chologically remote from being synonymous to social guilt and shame.
Both in radical and latent innovations, words, concepts, and their varia-
tions in meaning, penetrate the legal system, modifying its features.22 While 
in radical innovations, the construction of a new symbolic space is achieved 
in the sign of an evident break with the old world,23 in latent innovations, it is 
the hidden measure of the break with the past that indicates the degree of au-
thenticity of the innovation. In my opinion, in the latter there is the decisive 
need – pointed out by Koselleck – to effectively prove their newness and what 
results to only be a new way of appearing of unvaried structures.24 Here, the 
sense of constraint underlying a new mental habit arises from an unspecified 
point of intersection between a certain way of narrating and of interpreting 
the law through the expectations of communities in a given historical period.
3. Confining the semantic space of reference
In the perspective outlined by scholars of the language, reference should 
now be made to the evident tendency in civil law to replace solid and age-old 
categories of the past with new paradigms and conceptual orders. In an ap-
proach that also involves other disciplines, it becomes essential to confine the 
semantic space of reference. This space – against which the system’s latent 
innovations are measured – is occupied by judicial decisions in which the 
selection of the legal judgment criteria, by reflecting on the ways in which 
right or wrong is awarded in the trial, carries the weight of an underlying 
cultural responsibility. We are here referring to the context of wilful acts that, 
by deciding the outcome of a controversy, require control techniques over the 
argumentations used to justify the soundness of the decision. The matter of 
the fact is that civil law, not always necessarily bound to the facts, presents 
the possibility of inventive elements in a situation in which the audience25 is 
21  See in this respect the lectio brevis titled Dalla «pietra del vituperio» al «bail-in» 
delivered by Portale (2016). 
22  Here, we see the return of the idea of the “ascriptive value” of the transition as an 
innovation: “a temporal condition capable of attributing specific regimes and contents to 
the law” as is explained in the chapter by Meccarelli in this volume. 
23  See Foucault (1999) 6-7. 
24  See on this point the chapter by Claudia Roesler in this volume.  
25  In the development of the new rhetoric propounded by Chaïm Perelman (1966) 21, 
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commonly made up by the parties to the trial, the higher-ranking judge and 
the scientific community. 
4. Principles, general provisions, new forms of reasoning
It is now twenty years that in Italy the idea of a “factual” law – already 
present in our studies and in our Courts of justice – has been growing. The 
third party that decides on the case is no longer “the mouth of the law”. He 
or she is reluctant to keep to the letter of the law and, in awarding right or 
wrong, does not hesitate to base his/her decision on constitutional principles, 
general principles, extra-judicial judgment criteria, the new lex mercatoria, 
the law of the European Union and also on foreign legal orders. A rigidly hi-
erarchical system is being challenged by a flexible and heterarchical system, 
more in line with the cultural environment of common law systems. General 
principles and general provisions operate as “flexible things” that, by pene-
trating the judges’ decisions, threaten the primacy of the law, making it in-
constant and uncertain. It is the consequence of an overall conception of the 
law that, reflecting the erosion of the juridical nature of the State, sees the law 
as a phenomenon in perennial movement, in which the balance in the legis-
lator-judge relationship changes, the general provisions become the concep-
tual crux from which a new law evolves, and general principles penetrate the 
norms and overturn their interpretation. In certain approaches, the design 
is to adjust the law to social, economic and natural facts and to adapt legal 
forms to the specificity and urgency of the case at hand. This can be done in 
a variety of ways. From the perspective of the interpretation activities carried 
out within the framework of Italian legal theory and caselaw, notice should 
here be taken of two new phenomena: a) general principles and provisions 
applied against the norms; b) building a legal paradigm on principles. In the 
first case, general provisions and principles prevail over legislative regula-
tion. The second case raises the problem of building a legal paradigm in the 
absence of a norm. 
The following pages will focus attention on the future application of the 
general good faith provision on the basis of the definitions given by Italian 
caselaw.  The decision of a district court states that Art. 1375 of the Civil Code, 
which lays down that “the contract must be executed in good faith”, must be 
the audience is defined as “the group of people that the speaker wants to influence through 
his argumentations“.
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understood as referring to the principle of objective good faith which, as it 
regulates every phase of the contract – from its formation and interpretation 
to its execution – configures a general provision grounded on the duty of sol-
idarity laid down in Art. 2 of the Constitution and functions as a criterion of 
reciprocity, regardless of the existence of contractual or legal obligations to 
this effect.26
Here, the reasoning can unfold in simplified and intuitive terms, more 
open to intercept the application of other disciplines.
To act in good faith in executing an agreement means to honour a general 
duty – which applies to all the parties to any contract – to safeguard (or, if 
you like, to protect) third party interests to the extent that this does not entail 
a significant sacrifice of one’s own interests. The general good faith provision 
is grounded on the idea that contractual agreements are incapable of express-
ing everything. They are necessarily incomplete programmes. The approach 
taken by some legal practitioners in tackling economically relevant contracts 
is to clarify and specify a multitude of required behaviours (stating the defi-
nition of the terms used in the contract in the recitals to analytically indicate 
the content of contractual clauses). The most common approach is to leave 
it up to the interpreter to fill in, so to speak, some of the effects of the con-
tracts by applying the general provision. This is what makes the principle of 
good faith in contracts contentious. Under the legal relationship of a contract 
and lacking the indication of the importance of a given behaviour therein, the 
parties are given ample scope of discretion. If the parties reach an agreement 
on a controversial behaviour in the execution of a contract, then there is no 
issue. If, on the contrary, they come into conflict, it will be up to the judge to 
decide by denouncing, so to speak, the legal existence of the behaviour that, 
deemed relevant from the point of view of the good faith principle, will oblige 
the wrongdoer to reimburse the damage.
Let us imagine a first situation. Is the contracting party obliged to toler-
ate that – for unexpected reasons, extraneous to the will of the parties – the 
goods purchased are delivered to a different address not far from the one in-
dicated in the contract? The law tends towards proportionality and therefore 
the answer here is positive. In this case, by virtue of the good faith principle, 
the creditor is obliged to tolerate a defective performance of contract. Already 
the words “tolerate” and “defective” performance (not “non-performance”) 
26  Court of Appeal of Rome, Section II Ruling N.5300 of 16 December 2010, here in 
summary, in the databank of De Jure. 
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well express the idea underlying the contractual good faith principle of pro-
tecting third party interests to the extent that this does not entail a significant 
sacrifice of one’s own interests.
Different is the case, pursuant to the general good faith provision, of the 
recognised possibility of extinguishing one’s pecuniary obligations with a ca-
shier’s check27 (which, according to an approach taken in caselaw, opens the 
door to the use of alternative means of payment other than cash). This is an 
innovative solution that overlaps the literal wording of Art. 1277, Para.1, of the 
Italian Civil Code which reads as follows: “pecuniary debts are extinguished 
with the legal tender in the State at the time of the payment and for its nom-
inal value”. From the perspective of interpretation, there is the problem of 
understanding if contractual good faith – as the specification of the constitu-
tional principle of social solidarity – is capable of converting the expression 
“legal tender” (meaning money in cash) into a more generic expression (for 
example: “monetary value”) in order to attribute to the debtor the faculty of 
paying with a means other than in cash. Relying on a constitutionally-orient-
ed interpretation of Art. 1277 of the Italian Civil Code, the Court of Cassation, 
in joint session, imposed on the creditor – who is obliged to behave in good 
faith – the obligation to accept means of contractual performance that are 
alternative to the delivery – at home – of money in cash.28 This interpretation 
of Art. 1277 of the Civil Code – according to the Court of Cassation – “goes 
beyond the literal wording and, by grasping its authentic sense, adapts it to 
the changed reality”.29 
This is an approach that – although sensitive to the new and increasingly 
sophisticated money circulating instruments – raises the problem of a new 
form of reasoning or, if you prefer, of a new legal argumentation technique. 
The term of reference in the selection of the criteria for the judgement – cri-
teria ultimately aimed at awarding right or wrong in a trial – is no longer the 
“sense made patent by the specific meaning of the words” used by the legis-
lator, meaning thereby the literal meaning to which the interpreter is bound 
pursuant to Art. 12 of the Provisions on the law in general,30 but rather the 
27  See – on the issue of cashless payments – the ruling of the Court of Cassation, Joint 
Session, N. 26617, 18 December 2007, in Corr. giur., 2008, p. 500 ff., with a note by Di 
Majo. 
28  Court of Cassation, Joint Session, Ruling N. 26617, of 18 December 2007, op. cit. 
29  Court of Cassation, Joint Session, Ruling N. 26617, of 18 December 2007, op. cit.  
30  In the case at hand, the univocal meaning of the words “legal tender” contained in 
Art. 1277 of the Civil Code. 
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fundamental duty of social solidarity enshrined in Art. 2 of the Constitution, 
which is useful to strengthen the argument of contractual good faith in the 
case at hand.
Let us now turn our attention to legal disputes over the abusive nature 
of exercising the faculty of withdrawing from a dealer agreement without 
cause.31 Can the licensor (in this case, automobile manufacturer Renault), 
holding an entitlement attributed to it by a clause – considered to be valid – 
withdraw from the agreement (in the case at hand, with notice) without being 
obliged to compensate the damage caused to the dealers32 thus excluded from 
the contractual relationship? 
According to the Court of Cassation, also in this case, good faith, fair play 
and the “fundamental duty of social solidarity” (Art. 2 of the Constitution) 
are the arguments that disclose the judicial control over the performance be-
haviour of the parties (in this case, the abusive nature of the licensor’s con-
crete exercise of the right of withdrawal).33 
As the Italian legal order lacks a provision on the abuse of a right, Courts 
are recognised the power to control the aims and ways also of a withdrawal 
from contract that was agreed to be free and unconditioned. In the ruling cit-
ed, the Court of Cassation relies on the general good faith provision in judging 
the reasons of the withdrawal, to establish if the formal legal framework was 
used for an end other than the reason for which it was developed and if the 
exercise of a right was actually abusive.  
This conclusion, which raises some perplexity, waters down and down-
grades the argumentative value of some civil law categories, age-old concep-
tual orders, and well-grounded interpretative approaches to legal problems 
(also present in the decision of the Court of Appeal of Rome quashed by the 
Court of Cassation). For the trial judge, the reasons of the automobile man-
ufacturer’s withdrawal are unquestionable or, if you prefer, unpierceable 
because upheld by the concept of validity, the notion of potestative right, 
and the principle of private autonomy.34 To declare a clause (the withdrawal 
31  Court of Cassation ruling No. 20106 of 18 September 2009, in Giust. civ., 2009, I, 
p. 2671.
32  Note should be taken of the investments made by dealers and of other economic 
losses. 
33 See on this point Court of Cassation ruling No. 20106 of 18 September 2009, in 
Giust. civ., 2009, I, p. 2671.
34  In this sense, the Court of Appeal of Rome (No. 136/2005, Sect. XI, of 28-9-2004-
13-1-2005, in the ruling quashed by the Court of Cassation) laid down that “if autonomy 
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clause) valid means evaluating it to be in compliance with the higher-ranking 
norms contained in the Civil Code, marking it as belonging to the legal system 
which, through its rules, approves the content of the clause. In other words, 
the act of withdrawing in conformity with a valid clause, does not fall under 
the protection of the good faith provision.35 In line with a traditional school of 
thought, University courses teach that a potestative right (in the case at hand, 
the right of withdrawal) is the power to produce a change in another person’s 
legal sphere. It is not a right of claim which, in order to be fulfilled, needs the 
cooperation of the debtor, but a potestative right. Exercising this right puts 
the other party is in a position of subjection: he/she cannot avoid being sub-
jected to the effects of the changes in his/her legal sphere. Lastly, reference is 
made to the private autonomy principle which, in a liberal order, also arises 
from the power to freely determine the content of the contract (Art. 1322, 
Para. 1 of the Civil Code).  
These are the arguments relied on by the Court of Appeal of Rome to form 
its legal judgment on the concrete exercise of withdrawal without a cause. 
However, as has been pointed out, the reasoning developed by the Court of 
Cassation takes a different direction. The performance behaviour – in exer-
cising the right of withdrawal – is no longer narrated according to the con-
ceptual order with which jurists were accustomed to govern legal phenomena 
(the category of validity, the notion of potestative right, the principle of au-
tonomy) but is placed in a new perspective in which the terms of reference 
change in formulating a judgment and awarding right or wrong (general good 
faith provision, duty of social solidarity, the specific case).
5. Structure of a legal system and the balance of powers
In the light of this approach we can now draw some conclusions. The scope 
of inquiry into the innovations in a legal system bear the effects of the histor-
ical relevance of particular determinations (a constitution, legal institutions, 
the interpretation of a law, the legal category of a people at a given point in 
time). It does not – or at least not yet – involve the radical question in the phi-
recognised the possibility of withdrawing from the contract, there is no need to control the 
cause of the exercise of power”.
35  Relatively to the problem of the extent of the application of general good faith pro-
visions, reference should be made to my book. See Gambino (2015) 207-239.
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losophy of law: quid ius?36 It does not intend to include what remains beyond 
the space-time conditions of particular determinations.37 It does not – or at 
least not yet – question why law exists in Man; nor does it single out, establish 
or confine conceptual autonomy within the “juridical” activity proper. The 
area of legal innovations or transitions is a field of research that delves into 
the knowledge of what belongs to the law (quid sit iuris) in a given place and 
time. 
In this perspective and in illustrating the sense of latent innovations in a 
legal system, focus has been placed on the new ways of reasoning in certain 
judicial decisions in order to justify a well-grounded solution. It will always 
be possible to uphold the argumentative prevalence now of the law, now of a 
constitutional principle, now of a traditional category and now of the specif-
ic case to be decided. These oscillations often conceal single cultural stands, 
ideological principles, comprehensive conceptions of the law. The underlying 
problem is to establish the place of certainty that harbours the possibility 
of legally measuring our behaviours; which means establishing the rules of 
the game so that individuals may know what to do.38 This symbolic space – 
as revealed with respect to the issues put forth above – is at times disputed 
by the univocal words used by the legislator, at times by the programming 
force of the words with which private individuals commit to future actions 
and express their autonomy from the legal order, and at times by the judicial 
precedent 39 which, as we have seen, is increasingly sensitive to historic occur-
rences, concrete cases and performance behaviours. 
36  In raising this fundamental question (quid ius?), Immanuel Kant (2009), in his 
famous introduction to legal theory, makes it a point from to distinguishing it from the 
question on “knowing and stating what falls under the law (quid sit iuris)”, which means 
“what the laws in a given place and given time say or have said”, warning people to aban-
don “a merely empirical theory that is void of rational principles,” and “searching for the 
sources of such judgments, in order to lay a real foundation for actual positive legislation”.
37  This would only have the purpose of establishing why all that is commonly quali-
fied as the law exists. Cotta (1985) 13-14. 
38  In respect of the different conceptions of the law, it will always be possible to ques-
tion the criteria of legality but not the indeclinable need to be able to predict, control, and 
foretell the legal consequences of our actions. The law, by its very nature, considers and 
plans the future in the prospect of giving a new direction to the actions of Man.  
39  Already in the ‘90s, Luigi Mengoni (1992; 2011) 253, perceived the need, in Italian 




In a democratic system based on communicating vessels, underlying these 
different ways of reasoning thrives the balance of power and conflict between 
the legislative and judicial powers, between the “word” of the legislator, who 
always reasons on general and future things, and the “word” of the judge, 
who represents the place in which the law, by deciding on particular issues, is 
made ex post.40 If, on the one hand, the idea of an ex post law – increasingly 
present in modern judicial systems – of a judicial phenomenon disconnected 
from the political power, and of creative and incalculable judicial decisions, 
in some cases becomes a defence,41 on the other hand, it raises the problem 
of the limits of compatibility between the expanded scope of freedom of a 
power and the survival of a given social system that we confide will continue 
functioning.  
6. Authentic innovations and individual cognitive horizons
Once the paradigms now making their way into the Courts of justice be-
come permanent, repetitive, uniform structures, they will end up involving 
the structural elements of the legal system. It will be the longevity of the ef-
fectiveness of persuasion of new language formations and conceptual orders 
or, if you prefer, of the continuance of the break with the past over time that 
will qualify the innovation as authentic. The problem remains of matching 
a certain way of interpreting the law with the expectations of a society. We 
could say that an unspecified number of individual narrations42 of a histor-
ical, cultural, or legal memory, made at a given point in time, matches the 
40  Cassese (2009) 34, wrote: “today the law is, to a large extent, fruit of the ex post 
research into sets of separate rules deriving from the multiplication of norm-producing 
centres”. 
41  Nowadays, note should be taken of the ambiguity of legislative language, the word-
ing of texts that does not correspond to the intended political action, and the introduction 
of obscure, inaccessible norms difficult to understand. 
42  In commenting European humankind, religious incredulity and the attitude to 
give up philosophy up to scientificity, Husserl (2014) 41-42, wrote: “Man is only capable 
of developing an idea from his own position, from his own cognitive and sentimental hori-
zons, thus forming paths in which to believe, as they constitute his vision of the world, 
provide him with personal evidence of an idea and of a norm of the action guided by what 
is thought and believed to be absolute. This attitude exists in human groups that share the 
same original tendencies which subsequently concretise in a common way of feeling and 
proceeding”.
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sense expected by a community. However, the degree of intensity of those ex-
pectations is impossible to know and to prove. The correspondence between 
individual cognitive horizons – where ideas develop and psychological drives 
and feelings thrive43 and where judgments are formed and facts and laws are 
interpreted – and widespread consensus within a society, even if supported 
by quantitative indexes and statistical data, can only be inferred. After all, the 
process by which the unfolding of certain things over time is represented or 
narrated is not typical of science but of artistic creation.44
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The words of Justice and the long Italian transition (1943-1958)
Antonella Meniconi
Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles 
or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and 
by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which 
is to be seized. (M. Foucault, The Order of Discourse).1
1. Introduction; 2. To speak in a courtroom; 3. Judicial speeches of transition; 4. 
To write judgments in times of change; 5. Conclusion: words matter
1. Introduction
My paper explores how the language of magistrates is one of the keys to 
interpreting the Italian transition to democracy. The period between 1943 
(the fall of Fascism) and 1958 (when the new Superior Council of the Judi-
ciary, the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, was created) was decisive 
for the construction of the new Italian democratic system. In the debate at 
the Constituent Assembly (1946-47) the “democratic” integrity of the judi-
ciary was much discussed. In particular, the credibility of the upper ranks 
was questioned especially by left-wing anti-fascist parties, also in relation to 
the dilatory attitude of the Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) in pro-
claiming the results of the referendum, on the choice between monarchy and 
republic. Those judges, and especially those at the top of the judicial pyramid, 
had been trained and had operated during Fascism thus it was asked: what 
would be their degree of “loyalty” to the new democratic system?
First of all, the purge of the magistrates closest to the regime (as more 
generally happened in the administration for senior officials) was not at all 
incisive; indeed, on the basis of accurate research, historiography has now as-
certained it was limited to a few cases and not always exemplary. During the 
entire period, about four hundred magistrates out of a thousand cases exam-
ined were subjected to purge proceedings, which amounted to bringing about 
ten percent of the entire judiciary to trial before the commissions. However, 




of these only a few dozen were effectively expelled from the judiciary, while 
some preferred to avoid the shame of going to trial by requesting and obtain-
ing a retirement from the judiciary, but then returned, in some cases, to the 
judiciary in subsequent years.2 
Moreover, it was a curious game of parts; those who participated, ratio-
ne officii, in the purging commissions of the various administrations (special 
rules provided for this) were magistrates which created a sort of double role 
difficult to interpret, even though it was to give the judiciary an undoubted 
centrality.3
The issue of democratic integrity was strongly re-proposed because of the 
role that the judiciary itself played concretely in the application of the Togliat-
ti Amnesty of 1946 (launched only a few weeks after the referendum), where 
the Court of Cassation (in particular Section II) was accused of excessive leni-
ency towards those who were accused of collaborationism.
More generally, as far as the application of the sanctions against Fascism 
was concerned, starting from a stricter approach by the Corti d’Assise Straor-
dinarie (Extraordinary Assizes Courts) and the special section of the Court of 
Cassation of Milano near the end of the war, the orientation of the judiciary 
soon tilted in favour of a moderate application of the new sanctions, despite 
the circulars issued by the various Ministers of Justice (Umberto Tupini and 
Palmiro Togliatti) ordering the application of the legislation against Fascism 
“with speed and rigour”. A sort of “resistance” by the judiciary to the pun-
ishment of crimes committed by Fascists marked the transition phase be-
tween the old and new regime. A difficulty, which can even be described as 
“human”, of the high magistrates to distance themselves from the mentality, 
network of relations and extra-legal considerations with which they were im-
bued during the Fascist era, emerged with force.  In this sense the continuity 
between Fascism and the new Republic did not only pass through a continuity 
of rules and regulations, but also of mentality, of culture. Moreover, also the 
power relations within the judiciary and the relationship with politics were 
marked by continuity, even if in a different constitutional system. Ultimately, 
the relationship between justice (State) and citizens, i.e. an authoritarian one, 
changed almost not at all.
Thirteen years after 1948 (the year of the new Constitution), in 1961, a 
2  Meniconi (2017), also for the bibliography.
3  As Massimo Pilotti (see below) president of the purge Commission of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
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young magistrate and future founder of Magistratura democratica (Md), the 
left-wing judiciary’s part (1964), Marco Ramat, would speak of a problem, 
also generational, of the high magistrates, trained during Fascism (if not be-
fore) with constitutional innovations. The young judge emphasized the differ-
ent visions at stake as: 
leaps into the unknown, according to the former, democratic evolution according to 
the latter; let’s adapt the Constitution to the previous laws, says (and tries to do) the for-
mer; let’s adapt the previous laws to the Constitution says (and tries to do) the latter.4 
Furthermore, Alain Bancaud, referring to the French judicial system – 
somewhat similar to the Italian one at that time – highlights that the high 
magistracy “does not stand for immutability. But for social position and fam-
ily origin it is predisposed to stability and the reproduction of the past”. The 
point – according to him – is not so much resistance to innovation, but pru-
dence, circumspection: “in the judicial, and therefore legal habitus, change 
as permanence is in fact written”. As a high French magistrate pointed out 
in a speech at the inauguration of the 1962 judicial year, the language used 
by judges could only suffer from this “circumspection”, from this resistance 
to neologisms, to fashionable formulas, to the point of being tinged with tra-
ditionalism and capable of receiving innovation very slowly (at the pace of a 
lowland infantryman, a “fantassin de plaines”).5
However, also in relation to the recent authoritarian past, at the time of 
the election of the Constituent Assembly and during its proceedings, the issue 
of justice was on the agenda in both the political and legal fields. 
As we know, the principle of autonomy and independence of the judiciary 
was explicitly acknowledged in the Constitution of 1948. It was thus possible 
to achieve a strong guarantee of the “external” independence of the judiciary 
from the other branches of power, on the basis of a model of a non-bureau-
cratic judge freed from the executive and endowed with its own self-govern-
ing body. The principle of the “judge subject only to the law” (art. 101 Const.), 
which Piero Calamandrei, more than anyone else, wanted included in the 
constitutional text, opened the door to the “internal” autonomy of the judi-
ciary, that is, the autonomy of each individual judge in the exercise of juris-
diction and in the application of the law.
However, much remained to be done to bring about this disruptive consti-
4  Ramat (1961) 849-850.
5  Bancaud (1993) 111 ff.
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tutional innovation, inasmuch as two major obstacles persisted: the hierar-
chical constraint in relation to the exercise of jurisdictional power and the im-
plicit conditioning of magistrate’ careers by superiors, in part residual from 
the 1941 judicial law, implemented by the Minister of Justice, Dino Grandi.6
In fact, after the end of the war, shortly before the institutional referendum 
in 1946, all or almost all of the most repressive provisions of the Fascist judi-
cial system of 1941 had already been eliminated, with the so-called Guarentigie 
Law, at the initiative of the Minister of Justice, the secretary of the Communist 
Party Palmiro Togliatti. In particular, the hierarchical relations of dependence 
of the “pubblico ministero” (Public Prosecutor) on the minister were abolished 
at that time and were replaced by supervision, but the hierarchy of the organi-
sation of 1941 was not altered at all. Togliatti and his collaborators decided, in 
that delicate phase of transition, not to question the prerogatives of the high 
judiciary. No overall reform was therefore carried out, but only the “surgical” 
removal of certain parts of the 1941 law, which thus “purified” remained for a 
long time the fundamental text for the Italian judiciary.
The “internal” independence of the judiciary thus remained a chimera for 
many years. The existing structure – with the high judiciary sitting in the seats of 
the Court of Cassation, at the head of the entire judiciary and, above all, respon-
sible for checking constitutional legality – remained unchanged for a long time. 
Thus, the articles of the constitutional text, which called for the establishment 
of the Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court) and Superior Council of the 
Judiciary, were not implemented. The two bodies intended to change the legal 
and institutional framework were not created until 1956 and 1958, respectively.7
In this context the judiciary (especially the high ranks) undoubtedly 
played an important role, although not free from ambiguity and resistance to 
change. Above all, the language used by them is a telltale sign of continuity, 
and sometimes ruptures, in the judicial system.
In fact, the persistence over time of a language that resisted the constitu-
tional innovations of 1948 is evident at least until the end of the 1960s. Only 
in that period of social and institutional changes, a new model of magistrate 
would begin to emerge not without many struggles, a model more aware of the 
constitutional interpretation of the law and less conditioned by legal formalism. 
Within this general framework, the first aspect that I will deal with is the 
language used by the “procuratori generali” (public prosecutors) in public oc-
6  R.d. no. 12 of January 30 1941.
7  For a bibliography see Meniconi (2018b).
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casions, such as the speeches pronounced during the solemn inaugurations of 
the judicial years in the courtrooms of the Corti d’appello (Courts of Appeal) 
and Cassation. The second aspect I focus on is instead less evident and more 
difficult to explore, and it concerns the writing of the judgments, which, even 
if intended for publication, were written instead by judges in the privacy of 
their studies. Here they worked on the basis of precedents, legislation and 
doctrine, but also on the basis of the cultural, political and social values of the 
time that they and their colleagues at the board perceived as such; values that 
were not only reflected in the substance of the decision but are also translat-
ed, consciously or unconsciously, into the use of certain styles and formula-
tions over others. Finally, I will draw some brief conclusions on the difficult 
path of democratic innovation during the long Italian transition.
2. To speak in a courtroom
During the inaugurations of the judicial year a real “theatre” is staged. 
A theatre with costumes (the togas of ermine), decorated armchairs, and a 
well-informed audience (authorities, other magistrates, experts, journalists), 
and where, using a theatrical word, a representation or rather a self-represen-
tation of justice takes place. 
The reference to the theatre is not accidental: the scenic aspect, the place-
ment in space of the main characters, the costumes, the division of parts be-
tween those who “act” and those who “assist” as spectators, is required by 
the very nature of the judicial institution. As Michel Foucault reminds us, 
the judicial institution “solemnises beginnings, surrounds them with a circle 
of attention and silence, and imposes ritualised forms on them, as if to make 
them more easily recognisable from a distance”8. In a courtroom one waits in 
religious silence as if one were in church for the word of the magistrate who 
carries out justice, but also who communicates the “secrets” of the exercise of 
jurisdiction to the public. Foucault describes it as a ritual: 
Ritual defines the qualification which must be possessed by individuals who speak 
(and who must occupy such-and-such a position and formulate such-and-such type of 
statement, in the play of dialogue, of interrogation or recitation); it defines the gestures, 
behaviour, circumstances, and the whole set of signs which must accompany discourse; 
finally, it fixes the supposed or imposed efficacity of the words, their effect on those to 
whom they are addressed, and the limits of their constraining value. Religious, judicial, 
8  Foucault (1981) 2.
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therapeutic, and in large measure also political discourses can scarcely be dissociated from 
this deployment of a ritual which determines both the particular properties and the stipu-
lated roles of the speaking subjects.9
In Italy, under the 1865 law, judicial speeches were originally intended to 
present “an account of the way in which justice was administered throughout 
the jurisdiction of the Court and the tribunal”10 but soon became increasingly 
significant, especially for the solemn place where they took place (the monu-
mental palaces of justice, the courtrooms decorated with flags).11
It is no coincidence that the ritualistic, symbolic, and even religious el-
ement has been highlighted not only by Foucault by also by many scholars 
(such as Antoine Garapon and Michele Luminati) with reference to the very 
nature of the judicial function (which needs its own ritual for its legitima-
cy) and to the figure of the magistrate (the so-called “Priest of Themis”, the 
ancient Greek goddess of law, to quote the title of a book by the magistrate 
Guido Raffaelli appeared in 1948 to “instruct” the new judges).12
But it is mainly the judicial speeches, pronounced on the public occasions 
of the inaugurations, that constitute – in my opinion – a decisive moment in 
the process of building a professional identity. Depending on the period, they 
changed in nature and content (but not in their external form), sometimes 
limiting themselves to reports, other times hinting at interpretations, while 
in some cases rising to real statements in terms of politics of law, or politics 
tout court.13 Since 1959 the Superior Council of the Judiciary has, however, 
by means of some memoranda, made the inaugural speech obligatory, estab-
lishing the subjects who are entitled to speak, the timing and themes of the 
report.14
To begin with, the speeches pronounced in the Liberal era (1861-1922) 
appear in a rather free and personal format and with a certain variety, both in 
the structure adopted and in substance. There was not yet a rigid and defined 
cliché, although of course there were rules.
Among the sample of speeches I have examined from the Liberal period, 
9  Foucault (1981) 62.
10  Art. 150 of the judicial law of 1865 (r.d. no. 2626).
11  Da Passano (1991).
12  Raffaelli (1945).
13  For judicial speeches from the 1990s in the climate of competition between the 
magistrature and politics see Sarzotti (2006) 13 (which quotes Bourdieu, 1986).
14  Sarzotti (2004) 139.
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unsurprisingly references to national unity and the myths of the Risorgimen-
to are prominent, as well as the principle of legality to be kept “always invi-
olate”. For example, in 1877 the ancient motto “Sub lege libertas” appeared 
as an epigraph of the first speech to the newly established Court of Cassation 
of Rome by its Public Prosecutor, Senator Giuseppe De Falco. He appeared 
to take care to justify the pronouncement of the speech itself saying it was 
“vestigia costumanza” (vestige of an ancient Roman custom) born in Rome 
as “any custom useful for civil coexistence” that the first day of the exercise of 
public administration opened with “an oration intended to specify its duties”. 
And the high magistrate followed by recalling the importance of these speech-
es, and above all the importance of the new Court born as “the first truly na-
tional court (…) to complete and guarantee national and legislative unity”.15 
The double combination “national unity and legislative unity” and the hendi-
adys “fulfilment” together with “guarantee” (guarentigia) gave a sense of the 
task that the jurists, and in particular the practical jurists as magistrates, felt 
responsible for themselves in 1877, during Italy’s nation-building.
Following the early 1900s, as has been noted, the problem of adapting the 
law to the new political, social and economic reality quickly became a focus 
of reflection,16 such as happened in the eloquent speech in 1912 by Lodovico 
Mortara, Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation of Rome.17 Here, the 
celebrated jurist took the opportunity to carry out an accurate analysis of the 
situation of the judicial body, expressing his fears of the risks that it would 
become a “particular oligarchy”, if an overall “judicial reform” was not carried 
out. Without entering a discussion on the matter (later in 1919 Mortara was 
able as minister to propose this reform which was however rejected), we can 
observe here the words of the high magistrate-jurist which constituted an ac-
tual manifesto of judicial policy, even in opposition to the approved reforms 
of the Minister of Justice Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (note, for example, the 
expression used by Mortara of “democratic institution” always with regard to 
the judiciary).18
15  De Falco (1877) 6. All the cited judicial speeches of the Courts of cassation and, 
from 1923, the unified Court of cassation are accessible at the websites of the Biblioteca 
centrale giuridica and of the Corte di cassazione <https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/
mg_22_4_4.page>; <http://www.cortedicassazione.it/corte-di cassazione/it/archivio_
storico.page;jsessionid=F79DDE3B2C2469DF323E946B2D4BFBFB.jvm1>.
16  Cazzetta (2013) 19.
17  On the figure of Mortara see: Meccarelli (2012) and Boni (2018).
18  Mortara (1912) 25.
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But it was not only eminent personalities such as Mortara who dared to 
speak out in a context intended, at least formally, for the modest task of pre-
senting judicial statistics.  Indeed, during the First World War and immedi-
ately afterwards, other public prosecutors  showed an awareness of the new 
times and, in relation to them, the new tasks of justice; they became increas-
ingly conscious that the contingent changes imposed by the war on the legal 
system would become permanent.
The patriotic emphasis obviously resonated (such as the list of the fallen of 
the war from the various courts pronounced at the beginning of the speeches) 
or the reference to the “communion of ideals and intentions” between the dif-
ferent Courts.19 But there were also observations and even timely references 
to the necessary transformations of the law, for example, the recognition of 
certain patrimonial rights for women (in fact the abolition of marital authori-
sation dates back to 1919), which aimed at a certain openness, even if often 
accompanied, in the style of the time, by prudent specifications. For example, 
the speech of 1918 which proclaims itself “certainly without feminist propa-
ganda”, and goes on to say:
these lofty womanly virtues in all social gradations, from the royal Majesty to the mod-
est, humble worker of the factories and fields, constitute the best titles of merit for the 
homeland and cannot fail to open the way to the greater demands and realisation of the 
gentle sex’s civil aspirations.20
In short, the speeches full of doctrinal references, read as a whole and even 
in their variations, allow us to understand how the numerous economic and 
social upheavals caused by the war and their impact in the legal field were 
perceived inside the judiciary as well as how they were represented external-
ly. Furthermore, struggling with the swirling transformations in the civil and 
criminal fields, the high ranks of magistracy came to propose a “systematisa-
tion” of the tumultuous war legislation, an unprecedented phenomenon that 
was already creating a new jurisprudence.21
Everything or almost everything changed, however, during the Fascist pe-
riod, when the preambles of the speeches were transformed into an occasion 
of celebration of “Fascist justice”, with precise ritual themes (references to 
the Homeland, to the Duce and to the House of Savoy). Now, the “new” in-
19  De Blasio (1918) 23-24.
20  De Blasio (1918) 18.
21  Meniconi (2018a).
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augural addresses presented a very rigid structure, almost a pre-established 
and, given the occasion, predictable “plot”. The introduction inevitably began 
by greeting the authorities and paying homage to the regime and to the Savoy 
family. Then followed the “greetings and memories of magistrates”, always 
invariably, “outstanding”, especially if deceased or retired, and then to the 
“illustrious lawyers” and other figures who had left the district in the past 
year. Then came the more “ideological” core, linked to the events of Fascism 
and its achievements (the Empire in the years 1935-36, for example) and to 
their implications in the sphere of justice (e.g. the institution of the Judge of 
minors and that of the Labour Tribunals were greeted with great approval). 
The central part of the speech (generally separated from the rest, which was 
a constant element of some importance) was more technical and was usually 
dedicated (as in the past) to the jurisprudence of the judicial offices of the 
district, not only with reference to statistical data, but also observations and 
judgments on trends in civil and criminal justice. This was the part of sub-
stance or content, and was in its own way, the most useful. Then followed the 
figures for judicial affairs of the district.22
If the rhetorical motifs followed one another repeatedly on a predeter-
mined scale, they were nevertheless often (but not always) encased (almost 
“encapsulated”) in the part of the speech intended for them, which was gener-
ally the introduction. It was almost as if the rhetoric should was not supposed 
to invade the space dedicated instead to the more technical aspects, in which 
the language remained more aseptic and “professional”. As was also noted in 
the case of bureaucratic communication between administrations, the per-
meability of the linguistic system was not total during Fascism, instead a sort 
of invisible division seemed to combine style and vocabulary according to the 
topics.  
Moreover the speeches were obviously influenced by the language of the 
time, expressing the “pivotal units of the semantic system” around which Fas-
cist ideology and culture centred with  a series of canonical themes that were 
continually drawn on in public communication, such as vitalism, virility and 
physical strength, war, mysticism and mythology, moralism, greatness and 
defence.23 Frequently a pragmatic homage to the “moralising and pacifying” 
action of Fascism permeated the whole report or was put before the begin-
ning of the individual parts. But sometimes the speech continued in the oppo-
22  Meniconi (2014).
23  Among others: Leso (1978).
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site direction by highlighting the structural changes in crime and not, as the 
regime would have liked, of its disappearance.
At the same time, the speeches of the period were still characterised by 
linguistic expressions that originated not only from Roman Law but generally 
from ancient and traditional classical culture. This was typical of the training 
of the magistrates (and of the jurists in general) who wrote the speeches who 
reached maturity mostly at the end of the nineteenth century. For example, in 
1934 the whole preamble in the speech made by the Deputy Public Prosecutor 
Piredda in Cagliari, together with extensive references to the specificity of his 
native Sardinia and its people, was punctuated with quotes from Dante and 
Virgil.24 And this was not untypical.
On the other hand – as has been noted –25 the degree of adherence to 
Fascism (and its styles) on the part of a public prosecutor could already be in-
ferred from the title of the speech. There was a clear difference between those 
who simply and aseptically entitled their speech Inauguration of the Judicial 
Year (like the Venice Public Prosecutor Carlo Alberto Mandruzzato in 1934-
35), and those who instead evoked Fascist Justice in the “second decade of 
the march on Rome” as did the very Fascist Public Prosecutor Marongiu in 
Ancona that same year.26 Again, in the report by Palermo Public Prosecutor 
Carlo Bartolini in 1934, the central part was soberly entitled Court Jurispru-
dence, avoiding any reference to Fascism, but rather focusing exclusively on 
the decisions taken in 1934.27 
In 1938 the inaugural speeches of the various Courts of Appeal were sup-
pressed, perhaps to avoid that minimum of internal debate and freedom of 
expression that the inaugural rhetoric had nevertheless let seep out in the 
previous period. The only survivor was the report of the Public Prosecutor of 
the Court of Cassation. What was the reason for this radical decision? Perhaps 
the public – and in some way political – nature of the inaugural speeches, in 
which the bare judicial statistics district by district were exposed (albeit me-
diated through rhetoric which dispersed and in some sense hid the meaning), 
was not congenial to Fascism.28 The same judicial statistics could appear in 
24  See Piredda (1934).
25  Focardi (2012) 58.
26  Mandruzzato (1935); Marongiu (1934).
27  Bartolini (1934).
28  In fact, in 1937 there had been the case of a Public Prosecutor of the Court of Ap-
peal, Francesco Saverio Telesio, who had been dismissed from his office in Bologna for 
mentioning the growth of crime in that district. See Archivio centrale dello Stato, Minis-
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themselves “dangerous”, even if they only showed the reality of crime or liti-
gation in implicit contrast with the idea of public order and social coexistence 
propagated by the regime.29
3. Judicial speeches of transition
After the fall of Fascism in Rome in 1943, judicial speeches were progres-
sively reinstated. At this time, their language was one of transition. The first 
inaugural speech was made on 4 January 1945, after the pause caused by the 
Nazi occupation of Rome, in the Aula magna of the Court of Cassation with 
the “traditional solemnity” (as is written in the introduction to the official text 
in italics), but was significantly entitled “Justice and national reconstruction” 
(this same title was also used in 1946). Even though its  author, the new Pub-
lic Prosecutor, Massimo Pilotti,30 recognised that something had changed, if 
only because of the presence, duly noted, of many high-ranking officers of the 
Allied forces in uniform, his emphasis was on “continuity”. The word recurs 
twice in the speech. He asserted to the Supreme Court (and through it to the 
whole judiciary) the merit not only of having refused to take the oath to the il-
legitimate government, but of having “represented the continuity of the State 
and justice” in a moment of deep crisis, almost as if to mark – he emphasised 
with pride – the “solidity of the ethical conscience of our judiciary”. It should 
be stressed, however, that he used the words “democracy” and “democratic” 
(government) three times, referring to the need to repeal the laws of the past 
regime that were incompatible with the new system.31 Pilotti concluded his 
speech with a paragraph on “The citizens, the State, the judges”, underlining 
the value of the respect of human personality and the role of judiciary (“the 
judges are the State”) in defence of the citizens. His whole speech was punctu-
ated with ample quotations in latin from Dante (again!) and the Gospels (“we 
cannot but call ourselves Christians” were also his words, perhaps aware of 
his consonance with Benedetto Croce).32
tero della Giustizia, Ufficio superiore del personale e Affari generali, Ufficio II, Magistrati 
fascicoli personali, IV versamento, b. 55, fasc. 69707.
29  In 1941, the discretionary power was given to the Minister of Justice to allow or 
not the speeches of the public prosecutors (art. 88 r.d. no. 12 of 1941). See Neppi Modona 
(1997) 823.
30  See his biography: Meniconi (2015).
31  Pilotti (1945); Pilotti (1946).
32  Pilotti (1945) 20f.
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In fact, the calming wind of continuity was blowing in that courtroom; 
after all it was also felt in the same professional path of the high magistrate. 
According to Prime Minister De Gasperi, Pilotti was an “internationally re-
nowned jurist” who represented the Italian government in the League of Na-
tions from 1933 to 1937 (at the time of the Fascist conquest of Ethiopia in 
1935 and the subsequent sanctions against Italy), and was, in the words of 
Justice Minister Togliatti, “a person of trust in the regime”. According to oth-
ers, however, the magistrate had not made a career during the regime. What 
was not said at the time of his confirmation as prosecutor by the Parri gov-
ernment (September 1945) was that the high magistrate was a monarchist.33
In the meantime, however, in the inaugural speech of the following year in 
1946, a fearful caution seemed to mark the words of Pilotti, caution especially 
towards the nascent democracy. Therefore, in the context of a “circumspect 
revision” of Fascist legislation, the Court of Cassation had taken on the respon-
sibility of “expressing from the experimental nature of individual cases the 
trends of the new democratic legal conscience”. Ample space was then devoted 
to the political justice of the time, i.e. the activity of the special courts (Alta 
Corte di giustizia, Corti di Assise Straordinarie and the Sezione Speciale della 
Corte di Cassazione di Milano) set up to judge the crimes committed by the Fas-
cists during the Repubblica Sociale Italiana (Italian Social Republic, which was 
the puppet government set up by the Germans after they reinstated Mussolini 
as leader in northern Italy). Finally, after the usual doctrinal and comparative 
excursus (from Corpus Iuris to Machiavelli), the Prosecutor hoped that a par-
liamentary assembly would soon be elected, as a full expression of the will of 
the people and the judiciary would be guaranteed full independence.34
However, it was Pilotti’s subsequent preamble of his speech in January 
1947 that demonstrated that even (and above all) during the time of the tran-
sition the words spoken in the “temple of justice” carried weight throughout 
the country. The speech, entitled Justice and constitutional reform, stood 
out for the almost total and deliberate absence of “textual” references to the 
new Republic (result of the referendum of 2 June 1946) and to the new the 
Head of State Enrico De Nicola, causing one of the first Republican scandals. 
De Nicola, present in the courtroom and in the front row, was deeply and 
visibly irritated. At the beginning, Pilotti’s speech limited itself to a general 
reference to the need to engage in common work (which “was concord”) and 
33  Meniconi (2015).
34  Pilotti (1946).
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
167
to go “forward for the Homeland” as “the Italian people with many lives” were 
accustomed to do. The next part, relating to the institutional referendum on 
the form of a monarchic or republican state, stated only:
The Supreme Court intensified its activities considerably compared to previous years. 
Its work was delicate and extensive, and included the opportunity of carrying out a task of 
verification of the highest manifestation of popular sovereignty.35
That was all. That reticent almost provocative prose and especially the 
vulnus of the absence of homage to the head of state was much discussed in 
the now free press and even at the Constituent Assembly.36 It ended with the 
removal of Pilotti from the Supreme Court and his transfer as President of the 
Water Court, which was presented however as a “promotion”.37
The post-war period did not mark a turning point with respect to tradition 
as far as the inaugural speeches were concerned (apart from the absence of 
some controversial episodes), however some small changes can be noted. The 
first thing that can be noticed is the attention paid now to the Constitution 
(the word is often quoted in 1948 and 1949 speeches) and the new bodies 
of the Republic (the President of the Republic and the Superior Council of 
the Judiciary, above all).38 Another element is the re-proposal of a structure 
which – as we have seen – originated from the past. Thus, at the beginning, 
the greeting to the authorities, the mention of the main political and institu-
tional innovations of the year (e.g. in 1950 and 1951, Italy’s participation in the 
first European Union)39 and the commemoration of the deceased colleagues. 
Then followed the sections dedicated to civil and criminal jurisprudence of 
the Court which generally referred to the necessity to strengthen the role of 
the judiciary. Furthermore, from 1949 the Court of Cassation’s report also 
included data from the various Courts of Appeal, providing a more complete 
picture of the justice situation in Italy, although there were specific speeches 
of the different Courts. The necessity of a judiciary reform began to appear in 
35  Pilotti (1947) 2. Another paragraph was dedicated to the central role of the Court 
of cassation in the forthcoming Constitution.
36  Archivio storico della Presidenza della Repubblica, Fondo Enrico De Nicola, Corte 
di Cassazione. Inaugurazione Anno giudiziario.
37  In 1952, Pilotti was the first President, representing Italy, of the Court of Justice of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) until 1958.
38  Macaluso (1948); Miraulo (1949).
39  Miraulo (1950); Miraulo (1951).
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1950 (and continued to be present) with reference to the increasing number 
of judicial affairs (and the “self-sacrifice” of the magistrates) and the problem 
of a skilled recruitment of young magistrates. In any case, sometimes – as 
in the pre-Fascist period – the preambles were the opportunity for the high 
magistrate to present his own point of view of the justice’s problems, to reiter-
ate that the judiciary was almost a “religious ORDER” (in capital letters) that 
requires “sacrifice” and “absolute dedication”.40
Reading these speeches one can understand the self-representation of the 
Court of Cassation in those years, of a body that saw itself at the centre of the 
State not only as the highest jurisprudential interpreter, but also as a consti-
tutional judge (conferred to it by the Constitution pending the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court). As is well known, already in 1948 the Court of 
Cassation tried to dilute the most disruptive constitutional innovations for 
the existing system. It elaborated, within the Constitution, the famous dis-
tinction between preceptive rules (that is to say, preceptive rules of immedi-
ate application and preceptive rules of deferred application) and program-
matic rules, in which only the former were able to be directly applied, while 
the latter required the subsequent intervention of the legislator. This was not 
all. Through the cautious and technical (almost aseptic) words of the public 
prosecutors the difficulty of adapting, despite the statements of principle, to 
the new democratic order can be understood. A new order in which, for ex-
ample, a licence for the bill posting of political posters was yet necessary be-
cause article 21 of the Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of expression 
of thought to all, was interpreted as a programmatic rule;41 or the measures 
concerning police confinement (legacy of Fascism) were not subject to appeal 
to the Court because they were administrative and non-judicial decisions. In 
this case and in others a strict notion of “personal freedom” seems far from 
article 111 of the Constitution. In general we can perceive a tendency to main-
tain the law from the Fascist period, even if this was expressed according to 
democratic principles.42
40  Eula (1954) 33. The speech is very long indeed (69 pages instead of the usual 30-
32), because from this year statistical data and analytical description of the jurisprudence 
are put apart.
41  Eula (1954) 29. Article 113 of the T.U. on Public Security of 1931 was later declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its first decision in 1956. Another example 
is the art. 53 Cost. on the progressiveness of taxes, which was judged also to be a program-
matic rule. See Manca (1955) 13-14.
42  Manca (1955) 18; Eula (1950).
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In 1952, the inaugural address of the judicial year was pronounced by 
Antonio Azara, the new Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, at the 
time also senator of the Democratic-Christian Party and future minister 
of Justice (1953-1954). Azara had been a member of the National Fascist 
Party from 1932 and he had supported its movement, ideas and doctrines 
with words, writings and action. As a member of the scientific committee 
of the journal “Diritto razzista” (“Racist Law”), in 1945 he was subjected 
to the purge process for “the apology of Fascism”, from which he came out 
unscathed and managed to prove, among other things, that he had served 
“not a party” but his “country”43. In his speech of 1952 the high magistrate 
explained the rulings issued by the Court in matters of the right to strike 
guaranteed by article 40 of the Constitution44. After correctly recognising 
that article 40 was a preceptive and non-programmatic rule, and therefore 
immediately applicable, Azara went on to present other rulings, which had 
placed limits on the right to “political” strike. And then, by way of comment, 
he added:
The Supreme Court observes that the strike, whether or not it is a crime, as a purely 
economic-social act, determines in any case a disruption and an imbalance in the orderly 
development of the relations of associated life; in the worsening of the contrasts between 
the opposing categories (in the case of an economic strike) and between the various social 
classes (in the case of a political strike). There may, then, be widespread discomfort, an 
eventual exaltation provoked by verbal and press propaganda, an easier suggestionability, 
so that, also due to the feeling of greater difficulty of the police bodies in protecting the 
public and private rights of the citizens, fanatical and audacious strikers can draw incen-
tives to commit damages which, in addition to violating the right of others to property, can 
endanger and cause serious injury to the entire community.45 
These strong words, among which the expression “fanatical strikers” stand 
out,  reveal much of the underlying values of the high judiciary of those years, 
but also, obviously, of its instinctive reactions, so to speak, to the political and 
43  Archivio centrale dello Stato, Ministero della Giustizia, Ufficio superiore del per-
sonale e Affari generali, Ufficio II, Magistrati fascicoli personali, IV versamento, b. 193 bis, 
fasc. 70689.
44  Art. 40, “The right to strike is exercised within the framework of the laws that 
govern it”, but see also art. 39 “The trade union organization is free. No other obligation 
may be imposed on trade unions other than their registration at local or central offices, in 
accordance with the provisions of the law”.
45  Azara (1952) 17-19.
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social conflict taking place in the country (it was the time of the occupation of 
the lands in the South; the massacre of Portella della Ginestra had taken place 
on May 1, 1947).46 From the highest bench of the Italian justice apparatus the 
words of Azara sounded like a very clear pro-government position.
In the first twenty years of the Italian Republic, the speeches were (and 
continued to be) moments of exaltation of the vision of the world and of the 
values placed at the base of the judicial decisions, more than a public account 
of the activity carried out by the various organisms, as prescribed by the new 
Superior Council of the Judiciary. It could be affirmed that the “interdict” (in 
the Foucauldian sense) of those years consisted in the absence of referenc-
es (or in the presence of only negative references) to the social and political 
changes that the Italy of reconstruction was facing.
Meanwhile, the structure and terminology used remained practically un-
changed compared with the previous model in their “stylistic lexical stereo-
types”. One cannot be surprised, for example, if in the speech of 1953 the 
words of condolence for the death of Vittorio Emanuele Orlando echoed the 
rhetoric of the early years of the century (the Homeland ecc.);  or if the family 
(with the emphasis placed on the value of “family cohesion” against divorce) 
remained the pivotal unit of the social order represented in those courtrooms; 
or if the concern for modesty, pornography and minors were always present 
in those complicated and contradictory 1950s.47 This was the case in a speech 
of 1954, pronounced by Ernesto Eula,48 Public Prosecutor who would become 
the first President of the Court later that year. He, another magistrate who 
had been closely tied to the Fascist Regime, underlined the importance of 
the “Christian morale” for the “strengthening of the Nation” and the pure 
“italianissimo” love of the Homeland.49 We could say that also in this case 
tradition seemed to win against innovation.
As was highlighted by Antonio Santoni Rugiu and Milly Mostardini in 
their book from 1973, in these speeches the language remained “immobile, 
outside time and historical space” and took care to transmit “principles and 
46  In 1950-51, 62 workers were killed by the police, 3,000 were wounded, more than 
90,000 were arrested and 20,000 were sentenced to a total of 7,598 years in prison. See 
Scarpari (1976) 136; Spriano (1986).
47  Macaluso (1953) 4; Miraulo (1951) 6; Miraulo (1950) 26.
48  Archivio centrale dello Stato, Ministero della Giustizia, Ufficio superiore del per-
sonale e Affari generali, Ufficio II, Magistrati fascicoli personali, IV versamento, b. 497, 
fasc. 81806.
49  Eula (1954) 5.
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values” that were considered “universal, immovable and immutable”. In this 
regard the public prosecutors felt as though they were yet “priests of Justice”, 
while society was – in the 1960s and 1970s – in full ferment.50 Therefore, 
the words pronounced in this “theatre” constitute an important window on 
judicial life, where continuity and ruptures were harshly confronted (at least, 
from the end of the 1960s). From 1969, indeed, “counter-inaugurations” 
were organised to coincide with the official speeches of Public Prosecutors, 
which were defined by the young protesters of the Magistratura democratica 
as “rancid choreographic representations, made of tinsel and pompous dis-
guises”. These demonstrations were also the symbolic expression of an icon-
oclasm – sustained Michele Luminati – which aimed to undermine the myth 
of the magistrate-priest and to put the judiciary in relation with social change, 
not without contradictions.51
 But prior, when the new Constitutional Court was finally established in 
1956, the speeches also reflected the conflict, albeit softened, that was arising 
between the two bodies,52 defined, in the usual classical way, the “Vestal of the 
Law” and the “Vestal of the Constitution”.53 The prosecutors tried to react to 
the loss of the central role of the Court of Cassation in the system and to the 
growing criticism in the only way they could outside the judiciary openly, and 
that is in these speeches.54 The same speeches, that since 1865 had constituted 
the official but also freer way to express the high judiciary’s point of view on 
the world, for a determined historical period became the seat of this extreme 
resistance: the last bulwark of a model of magistracy that was by now fading.
4. To write judgments in times of change 
In his famous Elogio dei giudici scritto da un avvocato Piero Calaman-
drei wrote that the judgments should be composed by the magistrate “with his 
head in his hands gathered and motionless” in his office, sheltered from out-
side influences.55 As is well known, however, these acts are intended, if issued 
by a collegiate body, for discussion in the council chamber (secret discussion, 
50  Santoni Rugiu/Mostardini (1973).
51  Luminati (2002) 307.
52  Manca (1956); Pafundi (1957).
53  Pafundi (1957) 14-15.
54  See also Pafundi (1958); Giglio (1959).
55  Calamandrei (1999) 32.
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in which dissenting opinion is not allowed, contrary to what happens in other 
countries) and then for publication. The judgments should – according to Cal-
amandrei – avoid any extraneous influence (here the jurist was referring above 
all to the Fascist regime that had just fallen), but in reality beyond their specif-
ic object and content they reveal how much the magistrates had welcomed and 
shared (or not) the new democratic values in the years of transition.
Certainly, judgments constitute a very different and more complex source 
compared to judicial speeches destined as they are to affect people’s sub-
jective situations, while the latter are limited to describe the orientations of 
jurisprudence and, if necessary, indicate the limits of judicial policy. Also, 
the form is obviously different with the former intended only for reading, the 
latter enjoying instead a public performance, an orality (although they are 
then corrected and eventually amended for publication). Yet, if we disregard 
the content of these acts and focus on the style, some complementary traits 
emerge; traces of a common judicial language, marked by the era in which it 
was articulated, but also by a permanence in time beyond the political (and 
constitutional) changes that seems undeniable. However, a study on the style 
of judgments would require – as is evident – much greater research than what 
we can and propose here. Hoping that more in-depth and systematic research 
will follow from this work, we will limit ourselves to provide some suggestions 
for further reflection.
In Italy, but not only, in the last twenty years the language of judgments has 
been thoroughly analysed by numerous scholars, jurists, but also recently lin-
guists. Different types of judgments (criminal and civil, of merit and legitimacy) 
have been examined, a corpus of databases have been built with new computer 
tools.56 Recently, conferences promoted by the University of Florence and the 
Accademia della Crusca, as well as by the Scuola Superiore della Magistratura 
(High School of the Judiciary), have focused on the language of judgments.57 
After all, the attention is more than justified if, using Bambi’s acute definition, it 
is true that the trial represents a real “forge of a new vocabulary”,58 or a container 
of a plurality of levels of discourse (of lawyers and judges) in the civil trial59 and, 
56  Mortara Garavelli (2001); Bellucci (2002); Cortellazzo (2003); Ondelli (2006); 
Ondelli (2012); Dell’Anna (2013). From an historical point of view, see Mazzacane (1998).
57  Bambi (2016); since 2004 first the Csm then the High School of the Judiciary have 
organised courses on the language of jurisprudence for magistrates.
58  Bambi (2016) 8.
59  Dell’Anna (2013) 100.
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again, a linguistic “melting pot” (the criminal proceedings).60 It is also worth 
remembering the perhaps most complete definition that belongs to the greatest 
scholar of the Italian language, Tullio De Mauro, according to whom the trial 
is a true “linguistic amalgam”, in whose different phases “all types of texts and 
speeches, all types of linguistic acts and all possible types of (in)comprehension 
are crowded and pressed”. From what De Mauro calls a “crucible without equal” 
he claims the “judge must know how to extract the crystal of the sentence”.61
Before the recent profusion, there were two seminal studies each differ-
ent from the other, that provided the foundation for subsequent in-depth 
work. In 1970 a book edited by a magistrate engaged in the running of 
Magistratura democratica, Federico Governatori, entitled State and citizen 
in court. Political evaluations in the judgments, critically examined the 
interpretative schemes used by the Court of Cassation and several courts 
of merit in some judgments concerning the “political” crimes (e.g. outrage, 
violence, resistance to public officials, vilification of constitutional insti-
tutions, demonstration and seditious gathering).62 The intent was to in-
vestigate the “socio-cultural values expressed in jurisprudence”; the work 
was also part of a wider research including the themes of family ethics, 
labour relations and obscenity: in particular it was an analysis of the polit-
ical-ideological conception of magistrates as it emerged from the 613 judg-
ments analysed.
The subject matter chosen was clearly delicate and sensitive in its own 
right, capable of revealing the complex relationship between the authority 
of the State (not only the judicial apparatus but also the police apparatus, 
among other things) and the individual, in what is called the authority/liberty 
dialectic.63 In short, the researchers who collaborated in the book edited by 
Governatori – magistrates, sociologists, for the most part (the research was 
promoted by the National Center for Prevention and Social Defense of Milan, 
founded in 1948 and very active in the field of sociology of law throughout the 
1960s and 1970s) – analysed the rulings of judges issued against the same 
crimes, in different historical periods: the liberal period (1905-1915), a de-
cade of the Fascist period (1925-1935), and the first twenty years of the Italian 
60  Bellucci (2016) 117.
61  De Mauro (2002) XI.
62  Governatori (1970) 5 ss. and 109f.
63  A theme in the same years at the centre of another book by Giuliano Amato, dedi-
cated to the figure of the public prosecutor: Amato (1967).
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Republic (1949-1963). Although well aware of the limits and difficulty of the 
analysis they hoped that it could be a road to be explored in depth, so that it 
could be demonstrated – these are their words that also reveal the ideal intent 
of those years – “in concrete terms that justice can and must be for man and 
not vice versa”.64
What were the results of this “experimental” work aimed at revealing the 
inspiring “values” of judgments as keys to interpreting the law? It was found 
that the value judgements denoted a continuity in the decisions that went 
beyond the specific historical-political moment (certainly important all the 
same) in which the judgments were pronounced. Indeed, what emerges is a 
degree of the judges’ adherence to the ideology transfused into the current 
legislative system they were called to apply, but also, and most interestingly, 
that it involved all judges. It also concerned the vision of the values to be pro-
tected and defended by the State, which were already present in the current 
legislative system of the period prior to the one under examination. More ex-
plicitly, among the particularly significant interpretative attitudes what stood 
out was an authoritarian and classist vision of the role of the State that did 
not seem restricted to the Fascist era, but extended from the liberal period up 
to the first twenty years of the Italian Republic. However, a strange yet justi-
fied time misalignment also emerged, so that in the first years of Fascism the 
judgments for opinion crimes had been milder, while in the first part of the 
Republican age the punishment of these crimes had become more severe. In 
short, it was not only the political time that mattered, but also the culture of 
the individual magistrates formed in the different eras which evidently influ-
enced their judgments.
What always prevailed, in reality, was the cultural formation of jurists over 
the existing legal systems, therefore, without any doubt, the upper echelons 
of the judiciary in the 1950s were more conservative than those of the 1920s 
and 1930s, which had formed in the liberal culture between the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries (for example, having been taught by a professors such as 
Lodovico Mortara). If this factor – the cultural climate of the judges’ forma-
tive years – is not taken into proper consideration, one cannot understand 
the delay and slowness with which the Italian judiciary, in the first decades of 
the post-war period, would assimilate and implement (in its jurisprudential 
activity) the new constitutional values.65
64  Governatori (1970) 276.
65  Borgna (2017).
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The second early study is the one carried out by Giuseppe Barbagallo and 
Mario Missori, who analysed a sample of the civil jurisprudence of the Courts 
of Cassation from 1870 to 1923 (and, in another study, the decisions of the 
Council of State),66 also based on the important considerations of Gino Gorla 
on the “style of judgments”.67 They defined seven criteria through which to 
read the form of the judgments, among which – we point out – the one re-
lated to “value judgments”, and reached some conclusions that – in extreme 
synthesis – leaned towards the “detached style rule”, that is, the judgments 
examined did not present value judgments, at least in civil matters, “while 
more frequent exceptions are found in criminal matters”.68 But here further 
judgments should be analysed on a sample basis to verify the presence or 
absence of extrajudicial evaluations. Some surveys carried out on criminal 
judgments produced instead by bodies of the so-called transitional justice, 
such as the Extraordinary Assizes Courts of 1945, show how – perhaps un-
surprisingly – “the detached and technical style” gave way to “the political 
passions of the time”, that is, there was no lack of personal or value judg-
ments expressed at the juncture of the war that had just ended.69 Moreover, it 
is also true that – as the antifascist jurist Mario Bracci wrote in 1947 – from 
the orientations of the Court of Cassation in relation to the application of 
the sanctions against Fascism and the subsequent amnesty of 1946 there ap-
peared an “ill-concealed dislike” for the “new” world, which perhaps emerged 
disorderly, but which wanted to revive the country from its ruins. Above all 
the high judiciary seemed almost to practice a sort of “isolation” from the 
turbulent reality, within the well-guarded fortress of law and tradition against 
an alleged revolution.70
From these two analyses, as confirmed by more recent work (here I am 
thinking of that of Maria Vittoria Dell’Anna),71 emerges a tendency, almost 
a permanent character of the sentence, of the so-called “hiding” of the judge 
in the traditional and outdated legal syllogism (in his being the bouche de 
loi, the “mouth of the law”). This was in order to affirm more clearly the 
impartiality of the law and its neutrality with respect to all parties involved 
66  Barbagallo (1998).
67  Barbagallo/Missori (1999). See Gorla (1968a) and Gorla (1968b); and the pages 
that Tullio De Mauro dedicated to legislative Italian language: De Mauro (1963) 424 ss.
68  Barbagallo/Missori (1999).
69  D’Alessandro 53. See also Di Massa (2019).
70  Bracci (1947) 1107.
71  Dell’Anna (2013).
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through the use of the impersonal “the question is unfounded” in itself;72 or 
in the “total” choice of the historical narrative past continuous tense, with 
which the facts of the controversy and the reasons given by the parties are re-
ported, which serves to distance the judge from the questions and exceptions 
of the lawyers, but which flattens the events in an indistinct past, not being 
used, as would be correct, to express an action of duration (e.g. “riteneva 
Tizio, disponeva Caio”).73
The structure of the criminal sentence, as has been noted from an exam-
ination of a corpus of documents, appears to be the product of a historical 
tradition that resists in particular in those of the Court of Cassation, fully 
confirming the self-preserved and self-repeating force of what is considered 
a sign of sociolinguistic prestige within that professional and social commu-
nity.74 Moreover, more generally, an analysis of the “physiognomy of the sen-
tence” (civil) has confirmed the tendency of Italian judges toward linguistic 
conservation. According to Michele Taruffo, this is almost a cultural habitus, 
which often ensures that they do not even identify value judgments that they 
make for the purposes of the formulation of their decisions.75 For example, in 
their rulings, they give little space to facts, referring when necessary to expe-
rience or common sense in order to avoid an analytical evaluation that im-
plies a value judgment. After all, this would be the result – besides an ancient 
tradition of the Rotal Tribunals of 1600 and 1700 (as pointed out by Gorla 
in his studies) – of the “bureaucratization of justice” and of the judge who 
would find his archetype, according to Taruffo, in the Napoleonic reforms. 
The judgment, therefore, as a bureaucratic act, at the level of style, referred 
in an abstract way to the office and not so much to the subject who resolved 
the controversy, becomes “the formal justification of an impersonal decision”. 
The “impersonal” stylus curiae would obviously reverberate in the language, 
which still presents today (beyond the different jurisdictions and attempts 
at reform) a strong uniformity, to the point of moving away from common 
language even when it would be possible (in the part of the narration of the 
facts, for example).
The continuity of this cultural and ideological model of the judgment per-
haps also explains the persistence – even in the phases of constitutional in-
72  Sabato (2016) 80.
73  Cortellazzo (2003) 83.
74  Ondelli (2012) 349-350.
75  Taruffo (1989) 1097.
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novation – of an ideal type of magistrate who is merely a law technician, de-
tached from the political temperament and value judgments, extraneous by 
his nature from social conflicts.76
To verify how much this has corresponded to reality in the Italian tran-
sition is a very difficult task if you want to start from the judgments. On the 
other hand – as mentioned above – in judicial speeches the model of magis-
trates indifferent to political passions and the values of society seemed not be 
predominant, and, on the contrary, their active participation in the innova-
tion-continuity debate would stand out.
To confirm these considerations, the characteristics of the Italian judg-
ment can be synthesised as follows: the summary of the narration of the facts 
presented by the writer in a selective way (the higher the degree of judgment 
the more the facts are intertwined with the law); great importance attributed 
to the jurisprudence, to the related intertextual references and to articles in 
the codes; the compulsoriness (the only imposition of the code) of the ref-
erence to the laws (and therefore other intertextual references); finally, the 
impersonality (it has been said) of a system – as Cortelazzo points out – in 
which judges hide their personal opinion and subordinate it to a collegial vote 
(if the judge is not monocratic). This entails, in Cortelazzo’s words: 
a quantitative and argumentative prevalence of the legal motivation over that relating 
to the facts which are almost exclusively instrumental in the construction of the ruling 
and reflect the dominant concern of the judge in demonstrating that the judgment always 
derives from the consistent application of the laws.77
Of course, here too we need to distinguish between civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, between judgments of merit and legitimacy, and – I would stress 
– between different historical periods. I have in mind some magistrates’ judg-
ments of the 1970s (which at the time were not published in legal journals) 
published in the first issues of “Qualegiustizia”, the magazine of Magistratura 
democratica. Some of them from 1972 were about “Police authority and free-
dom of assembly”, while the police continued to crack down on unauthorised 
marches, despite the decisions of the Constitutional Court, even by force. 
Beyond the merits (i.e. the acquittal of defendants for having promoted the 
assemblies), what is striking is the language used by these magistrates which 
aims to criticise legislation (“the legislative discipline of these social facts is 
76  Taruffo (1989) 1098-1099 and 1103.
77  Cortellazzo (2003) 83.
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often inadequate and inapplicable”) and which, in general, appears to be very 
similar to common language.78
In short, from these young magistrates came not a “pernicious esoteri-
cism” (according to Bellucci’s definition), not an “anti-language”, as stigma-
tised by Italo Calvino in a well-known article for “Il Giorno” in 1965,79 but a 
language that was plain, and comprehensible to all, and moreover was in-
spired by democratic criteria and constitutional values.
5. Conclusion: words matter
Since the 1960s, the judicial world has been clearly divided into two blocks 
(the conservatives and the innovators), and the “words” of the judges’ speech-
es, albeit in a different way to their decisions, have become one of the topics 
of confrontation, even symbolic.
After this “long” transition, with the lost war, the fall of Fascism, the divi-
sion of the country in two, the Resistance, the establishment of the Republic 
and the promulgation of the Constitution, the field of confrontation was un-
doubtedly represented by the application of the Constitution as a disruptive 
innovation in Italy. Once the ideology of the judiciary, organised in a unitary 
way, had been blurred, starting from the 1950s, the model of the bureaucrat 
judge, of the law technician dedicated exclusively to the formal interpretation 
of the law and detached from political and social change, also entered into 
crisis. Whether the model was also in the past a real one or just an ideal type 
can be questioned even in the light of the most recent studies, but it remained 
thus fixed in the ideology of the judiciary for many years.
Therefore, the commitment of the judge regarding the value and mean-
ing to be given to the implementation of constitutional innovations is at 
the centre of this analysis.80 We have tried to understand how much of 
the innovative project elaborated by the constituents in 1948 has been 
filtered in the judgments, in the judicial speeches, therefore in the words 
78  Qualegiustizia 1, (1972) 16 ff.
79  “The main characteristic of the antilanguage is what I would define ‘semantic ter-
ror’, that is, the escape in front of every word that has a meaning in itself, as if ‘flask’, ‘stove’ 
‘coal’ were obscene words, as if ‘go’, ‘find’, ‘know’ indicate foul actions. In the antilanguage 
the meanings are constantly removed, relegated to the bottom of a perspective of words 
that in themselves do not want to say anything or want to say something vague and elu-
sive”. Calvino (1965).
80  Governatori (1970) 112.
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of the judges, until it has become a common, widespread discourse within 
society. 
In reality, the democratic “discourse” struggled to establish itself especial-
ly in the first twenty years of the Republic. Well-established permanence and 
recurring styles were not only verbal tics, but they were expressions of a real 
ideology, almost a narrative, that favoured continuity over innovation in the 
democratic sense. In short, the technical-bureaucratic style in the opinion of 
the rulings (but also in the speeches)  may have excluded a “widespread con-
trol over the exercise of judicial power, entrusting it in reality only to the class 
of jurists”. The nature of the judgment that has been described may have end-
ed up becoming the main instrument for “the occult exercise of power and for 
removing responsibility from the judge”, conditions that, according to some, 
continue today.81 One may wonder if and to what extent the constitutional 
principle of autonomy of the judiciary itself, often recalled and extolled in 
judicial speeches, found application in judicial practice in those early Repub-
lican years. Or again, one may wonder if the same autonomy has remained 
a screen behind which to conceal the close consonance with the power that 
once again characterised the high judiciary. Ultimately, the rise of the cen-
trist governments from 1948 certainly had the effect of “freezing”82 the scope 
of innovation contained in the constitutional norms. But this happened also 
with the active collaboration of an old (and entirely male until 1965) judiciary 
class, which reached the top of its career passing through the rules imposed 
by the Fascist regime, often shared by the magistrates themselves. 
Perhaps it is no coincidence that in a speech in 1957 the prosecutor Pafun-
di began with the “bimillenary lesson of Roman wisdom” namely “Servants 
of the law to be free”, claiming that it was echoed in the precept of Article 101 
of the Constitution: “Judges are subject only to the law”.83 A motto which, on 
closer inspection, had been recalled, albeit not literally (“Sub lege libertas”), 
by Procurator De Falco in 1877.84
81  Taruffo (1989) 1104-1105.
82  Calamandrei spoke of “freezing” of the Constitution: Calamandrei (1955).
83  Pafundi (1958) 3.
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, theories of Law and legal adjudication do not usually in-
clude pragmatic elements in the description they make of their objects. Since 
they are not a product of empirical research, their descriptive and prescrip-
tive intentions normally appear mixed.
Any person, however, lay or trained in Law, would agree upon the fact 
that legal practice is strongly influenced by elements of empirical nature such 
as the structure of the courts (amount of cases, formalism, internal bureau-
cracy), the mindset of the judges (ideology, pre-comprehension, prejudices, 
tempers), the procedural paths, the intellectual submission of the judges to 
rhetorical habits, influences and personal connections with the lawyers and 
parties, social pressure (public opinion), submission to mechanisms of hi-
erarchical control, adequacy to the productivity rules, political connections 
with the other powers, search for social legitimation etc.
Fortunately, it has built the consciousness that these factors need to be stud-
ied, to the extent that they contribute to the definition of the characteristics of 
rhetorical communities in which the Law, as a social practice, is produced and 
reproduced. In many countries, this awareness has its origin in the openness 
to interdisciplinary approaches that have produced the notion of “legal field”1 
as an object of research, which now has priority within Law Schools, especially 
around the movement entitled “empirical research in law”.2
1  It is important to highlight the importance of Pierre Bourdieu’s work, The Force 
of Law: Toward a Sociology of the juridical field, in the conception that Law could be 
thought of as a space for competitive struggles, with relative autonomy in relation to the 
other fields. Bourdieu (1987).




Empirical research in the legal field has increasingly drawn on a set of 
approaches and techniques for the production and analysis of data ranging 
from quantitative to ethnographic perspectives. In this universe of distinct 
epistemological foundations, Rhetoric, as millenary knowledge, provides sol-
id bases for the development of studies focused on the discourses of jurists as 
cobwebs in the production of a reality (the “world” of Law) that is artificial, 
dynamic, conflictive and precarious.3
This chapter aims to analyze the relationship between the rhetoric of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) and the live 
broadcast of the plenary sessions, as an example on how technological inno-
vation can influence the rhetorical patterns of an institution.
The main goal is to analyze how judicial rhetoric and, consequently, the 
Law itself can be conditioned by this technological element and how it con-
tributes to change the audience (albeit ideally) to whom the judicial discourse 
is addressed.
In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, this chapter is organized 
in three parts. In the first, it lays some foundations on how to situate the 
approach in the universe of perspectives that can be considered “rhetorical”, 
with a special focus on the concept of audience and the exposure of an em-
pirical model of analysis of legal discourses. In the second part, it analyses 
the meaning and the effects of live transmissions of the plenary sessions of 
the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. In the third and last part, it seeks to 
show, from data obtained through rhetorical analysis, how the transmissions 
of the sessions condition the speech of the judges and how this technological 
innovation can bring considerable changes to what we understand as the pro-
duction of Law.
2. Which Rhetoric?
Rhetoric comprises a very old set of knowledge. Its origins are customarily 
traced back to Sicily (now Italy) around 485 B.C. with the first manuals ad-
dressed to the people who had to write speeches for the citizens who, in de-
fense of their rights, had to face each other personally before the assemblies.4
In Athens, throughout the 5th century Rhetoric became a topic of debate 
3  Sobota (1992).
4  Breton/Gauthier (2001); Barthes (2001).
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between the Socratic Philosophers and the Sophists.5 The negative and lim-
ited image that it has until the present day was introduced in the History of 
Philosophy mainly by Plato’s texts. In the most striking of them, Plato calls 
Rhetoric “the art of flattery” (Κολακεία), a set of artifices by which the speak-
er convinces the ignorant people, seeming to be wise without being so: “The 
orator need have no knowledge of the truth about things; it is enough for him 
to have discovered a knack of persuading the ignorant that he seems to know 
more than the experts”.6
Aristotle was responsible rescuing (even if partially) the dignity of Rhet-
oric. Conceiving it as an art, Aristotle denies giving it the same status as the 
Philosophy, even though he does not conceive it merely as an “art of flattery” 
(pandering), as his master Plato. In his work Rhetoric, Aristotle describes it 
as “the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to 
any subject whatever.”7 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric had influence not only among Greek thinkers, but also 
among the Romans, such as Cicero (106-43 BC) and Quintillian (35-96), who 
will produced works (De Oratore and Institutione Oratoria, respectively) 
that were the basis for several Rhetoric handbooks, containing the canons of 
the composition of persuasive discourse that are valid until today.
With the end of the Western Roman Empire, the decline of Rhetoric be-
gins. During this long period of hibernation, it became progressively discon-
nected from its argumentative part moving towards literary criticism, with 
priority given to figures of style and the ornamentation of discourses.
In the Middle Ages, Rhetoric is still maintained in education through the 
Trivium, the first part of the Seven Liberal Arts, containing the disciplines re-
lated to the written word (Grammar), speech (Rhetoric) and thought (Logic/
Dialectics).
Rhetoric then arrives in the 20th century, when it experienced a new emer-
gence in the 1950s. This resumption took place mainly through the works of 
Theodor Viehweg (Topics and Law - 1953) and Chaïm Perelman, in a part-
nership with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, in The New Rhetoric: a Treatise on Ar-
gumentation (1958).
The Treaty was one of the most important works of the 20th century for 
the resumption of the tradition that goes back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Its au-
5  McCoy (2008).
6  Plato (2004) 459b.
7  Aristotle (2006) 1355b.
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thors maintain that, unlike Logic, the field of argumentation is that of plau-
sible, of probable. They want to refuse the idea that, in cases where it is not 
possible to reach an absolute truth, we should accept the irrationality of brute 
force, or violence.
Since rhetorical arguments do not include demonstrations of evident 
truths, the reference to an audience, that needs to be persuaded, gains im-
portance. 
This emphasis on the notion of an audience is central to Perelman’s theory 
and will be the subject of the next topic in this chapter.
In turn, Viehweg’s Topics and Law marks the rhetorical turn in Law The-
ory. According to him, our way of reasoning with the Law is the same as that 
of the former jurisconsults. We start with a problem (and not with a ready 
and complete system) and seek a good answer to solve it. In this search for 
answers, we collect starting points to build reasoning that is credible and ac-
ceptable to those involved in the practice.8
Viehweg’s conception caused much discussion in an intellectual environ-
ment still shaped by legal positivism. Such discussions projected two less ma-
jor blocks of theories which, despite their differences, can be considered as 
consequences of Viehweg’s “rhetorical turn”.
One of them, of a more rationalist nature, began to develop in the 1970s 
with the publication of works such as A Theory of Legal Argumentation by 
Robert Alexy and Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory by Neil MacCormick, 
both from 1978. Other authors such as Aulis Aarnio, Aleksander Peczenik 
and, in the Latin context, Manuel Atienza contributed to the formation of 
what was called the Standard Theory of Argumentation.9
These theories have, as background, a concern with the rationality of judi-
cial decisions while seeking to develop ideal parameters that allow defining a 
certain decision as justified. They have had a strong influence, although not 
always with the due deepening, on the decision-making process of part of the 
judges in some Latin American countries.
The other block of theories and authors is the so-called Mainz School 
(Mainzer Schule), formed by disciples and collaborators of Viehweg, in Ger-
many. With a less prescriptive profile, the authors linked to it will seek to 
develop perspectives of decision analysis, but without the strong rationalist 
component of Standard Theories. Here, the tendency is to identify rhetori-
8  Roesler (2018).
9  Atienza (2003) 119; Roesler (2018) 28.
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
189
cal strategies that characterize the legal discourse, without limiting itself to 
arguments and without the concern to propose structures and rules with the 
pretension of universality. This description often exposes the use of common 
places that are often sought outside the formal sources of Law. Along these 
lines, it is possible to mention names such as Ottmar Ballweg, Thomas-Mi-
chael Seibert, Waldemar Schreckenberger and Katharina Gräfin von Schlief-
fen (formerly Katharina Sobota).
From this last block of theories, this chapter seeks to highlight the effect 
that factors considered external (such as technological innovation) have on 
the discourse and decision-making process of judicial bodies. Understanding 
Law means, to a great extent, knowing (and being able to analyze) the rhetor-
ical practice of theoretical jurists and, above all, of practitioners. The perspec-
tive of this chapter is inserted in this last rhetorical tradition.
2.1. The importance of the audience
The entire tradition brings the attention to the importance of the audience 
in the rhetorical situation.
Aristotle, in the Book II of Rhetoric, argued that the manner by which the 
speaker places himself in front of the audience makes a great difference in 
persuasion. This way, by making his qualities clear and demonstrating what 
can be expected from it, makes the listeners adopt a certain state of mind 
before him.10
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasize that the establishment of a 
connection between the speaker and the audience is a condition prior to the 
argumentation, even though, sometimes, the latter is a construction of the 
former. A wrong image of the audience by the orator, resulting of the igno-
rance or of an unforeseen set of circumstances, may have the most unpleasant 
consequences [for the speaker]. In their own words:
In real argumentation, care must be taken to form a concept of the anticipated audi-
ence as close as possible to reality. An inadequate picture of the audience, resulting from 
either ignorance or an unforeseen set of circumstances, can have very unfortunate results. 
Argumentation which an orator considers persuasive may well cause opposition in an au-
dience for which “reasons for” are actually “reasons against.”11 
10  Aristotle (2006) 1377b.
11  Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) 20.
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This emphasis on the importance of the audience for the effectiveness of 
communication and the success of persuasion is perhaps one of the greatest 
contributions of the rhetorical tradition to language studies. It is not, howev-
er, free of difficulties.
The first one concerns the possibility of classifying or even ranking the 
types of audiences.
Aristotle’s classification of discourses according to the different types of 
listeners and the time in which the discourse is delivered is well known: the 
spectator of a discourse in the present (epideictic gender), the judge of a past 
situation (judicial gender) and the judge of a future situation (deliberative 
gender).12 Above all, his classification takes into account the already men-
tioned adequacy of the speech to the audience.
Another well-known classification of the audiences is that made by Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca in universal (ideal concept, formed by “all beings 
gifted with reason”) and particular (concrete audiences, which occur in each 
rhetorical situation situated in time and space). The notion of universal au-
ditorium is what justifies the distinction, assumed by the authors, between 
persuading and convincing. Persuasion is applicable in front of a particular 
audience, while a convincing argument is intended to be valid for all.
The idea of a universal auditorium presupposes an idealized group of 
adults, well informed, educated people not subjected to any type of constraint, 
for whom the coerciveness of rational arguments would be irresistible. This 
idea, even if unrealistic, works as a counterfactual ideal that serves as a pa-
rameter for evaluating the rationality of a given discourse.13
As seen in the previous topic, the concept of Rhetoric adopted in this work 
does not adopt as a central concept the assumption of a universal audience, as 
a measure of rationality of a speech. Not only because it is unreal, but above 
all because it is not necessary, since every concrete community (such as the 
legal community to which the discourses analyzed here are addressed) has its 
own criteria about which discursive actions are acceptable or not, tolerable 
or not. On the contrary, the idea of an audience, embodied, as in Perelman’s 
work, in the discourse of Philosophy (European, white, male), that is able to 
produce “universal rules of correction and rationality” represents a strong 
threat of “epistemicide”.14
12  Aristóteles (2006) 1358b.
13  Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) 26-31.
14  “However, if theory emerges from the conceptualization based on the social/his-
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The second difficulty concerns the way in which the relationship between 
speaker and audience is conceived and used. The role of the audience is used 
by some authors to differentiate between Rhetoric and Dialectics. In a dialec-
tical debate, both speaker and interlocutor would have an active role, while 
in the rhetorical situation, the role of the audience would be predominantly 
passive.15
This accusation, directed towards Rhetoric, of a refusal to dialogue in fa-
vor of the pure and simple attempt to persuade seems to be another of the 
negative senses inherited from the Platonic tradition and should be viewed 
with reserve.
First of all because, as Atienza mentions, even when the orator speaks or 
writes, he/she - if he/she is a good orator - considers the reactions of the au-
dience, whether real or imagined. More than that, if we imagine the daily rhe-
torical processes, we will find that the audience - expanded here to the notion 
of rhetorical community - conditions the very formation of the subject as a 
speaker. It is in this coexistence with concrete rhetorical communities (which 
act and react) that we form ourselves as subjects of discourse.
Secondly, the platonic dialogues do not seem to be a good example of di-
aléguesthai, since they were produced by a single subject who, as Plebe and 
Emanuele point out, “resorted to the [rhetorical] strategy of writing dialogues 
with interlocutors that were convenient to him, always condescending, so 
that the author is both the one who questions and the one who answers”.16 
This remark is important because it will represent a position to be over-
come in the defense of the central thesis of this chapter, that is: that the 
change in the audience, due to the live broadcasting of the plenary sessions of 
the Brazilian Supreme Court is a relevant element in the configuration of the 
rhetorical strategies adopted by the Justices, although they cannot know who, 
in fact, is watching them during the judgment.
Indeed, the audience is what will define the rhetorical strategies that may 
be efficient and what types of arguments can or cannot be convincing. Some-
times, identifying the features of the audience can be a complicated task. It 
torical experiences and sensibilities as well as world views of particular spaces and bodies, 
then social scientific theories or any theory limited to the experience and world view of 
only five countries in the world are, to say the least, provincial. But this provincialism is 
disguised under a discourse about ‘universality’.” Grosfogel (2013) 74.
15  Atienza (2017) 88.
16  Plebe/Emanuele (1992) 16.
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is possible that the speaker intentionally adopts the strategy of changing the 
audience, from a real to a virtual one, broader (for instance: the dead, the 
ancestors, the homeland, the gods, the society, the “good people” etc.) or re-
duced (through restricted or specialized linguistic codes), in order to produce 
feelings of identification or exclusion.17 
In the case of legal discourse,18 the judges and courts have, as address-
ees, very diverse groups (lawyers, parties, public opinion, media etc.) and a 
great challenge consists in determining for which of these audiences is the 
discourse really oriented towards.
Nevertheless, the judges are trained, in the most Constitutional States, to 
adopt a rhetoric oriented to the professionals, for whom strategies of techni-
cality, objectivity, coherence and logical unity are valued.19 Any change in this 
audience may promote, as this research hypothesizes, considerable shifts in 
the way legal discourses are rhetorically produced.
2.2. The Empirical-Rhetorical Analysis of Discourse – ERAD
As mentioned in the introduction, Rhetoric embodies a tradition of knowl-
edge that is solid and fertile enough to offer a variety of research tools for 
discourse analysis, alongside a Philosophy and a set of persuasive strategies.20 
This topic presents, albeit concisely, an instrument of analysis, inspired 
by the work of Sobota, under the name of Empirical-Rhetorical Analysis of 
Discourse - ERAD.21
The model, developed in other works, has as central objective to define the 
rhetorical profile of a legal text, a decision or the practice of a court. It shows 
that the discourses - especially the judicial ones - are rhetorical-strategic, that 
is, they seek to conform, even if this is not their central objective, a given 
general reality, as a symbolic artifact, and another specific one, the legal field, 
with its language and its constraints.22
From a “rhetorical reading” of decisions, rhetorical indicators are pro-
duced which, in turn, are grouped into one of three dimensions: ethos, pathos 
and logos.
17  Perelman/Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) 163-164.
18  Shecaira/Struchiner (2018).
19  Sobota (1990).
20  Adeodato (2010); (2011); Leach (2007); Sobota (1992a); (1996).
21  Reis (2014); (2018).
22  Sobota (1992b).
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Ethos (E) refers to the character of the speaker, when the discourse is de-
livered in a manner that makes the audience believe he/she is reliable. In the 
ERAD, ethos includes, besides the credibility, strategies that seek to ascribe 
authority and legitimacy. Some examples of ethos indicators, common in the 
Brazilian Supreme Court decisions are: personal opinions, authority argu-
ments, digressions to teach etc.
Pathos (P) concerns, in Aristotle, the attempts of persuasion through 
the audience’s passions, since the judgements one emits vary depending on 
whether one experiences feelings of anguish or jubilation, friendship or hos-
tility.23 In the ERAD, pathos includes strategies that explore emotions and 
feelings, as well as the production of images and sensations mainly from 
the use of rhetorical figures. Hyperbolic language, ad terrorem argument 
and personification are some indicators produced from the decisions of the 
court.24 
Finally, the strategies of logos (L) are those that seek to produce an im-
pression of objectivity, rationality, acceptability, coherence and internal logic 
of the discourse, producing the effect of meaning that these characteristics 
are independent of the sender. Normally, references to tradition, universality, 
and neutrality are the means by which the strategies of logos are most effec-
tively presented in legal practice.25 Examples of logos indicators are: codifica-
tion arguments, hermeneutical arguments, quotation of jurisprudence from 
other countries (especially at the Supreme Court and Constitutional Courts) 
etc.
After identifying the occurrences of ethos, pathos and logos, they are quan-
tified, which allows identifying the rhetorical profile of the analyzed decision. 
This empirical data may allow understanding a characteristic of the court’s 
rhetoric at a given moment, or in relation to a specific theme, but it also au-
thorizes the construction of new research hypotheses that seek to identify 
possible causal factors that condition a given profile. 
Applied to a broader set of decisions or extended research over time, the 
results of ERAD may allow us to produce the rhetorical profile of a court, of a 
type of trial (for example, declarations of unconstitutionality in abstract con-
trol) or even of a country’s legal community.26
23  Aristotle (2006) 1356a.
24  Reis (2014).
25  Reis (2018).
26  Reis (2018).
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Based on this methodology, one seeks to observe the effect produced by 
contextual shifts, such as the introduction of technological innovations in the 
rhetorical profile of the Courts and, in this case, of the Brazilian Supreme 
Court.
That will be the subject of the next topic.
3. The live broadcast of the sessions and its effects
Studies have shown the connection between the live broadcast of the ple-
nary sessions and significant shifts on aspects of the decision-making practice 
of the courts. For the analysis of these effects, the studies consider categories 
such as the extension of the opinions, argumentative quality, length of de-
bates, relationship between Justices etc.27
These surveys are part of a tendency to make the acts of the Judiciary visi-
ble. It should be understood as a response to the crises of legitimacy that cul-
minated in reforms that sought to broaden external control and ensure faster 
decisions, supposedly increasing credibility and legal certainty, especially in 
economic relations.28
In this context, the transmissions have started in Brazil with “TV Justiça” 
(TV Justice), in 2002. It was a clear response to the crisis of the Judiciary 
Power, considered the less transparent and democratic. On the court’s digital 
page on the internet, the TV Justiça’s goals are presented as being “ to inform, 
to clarify and expand the access to Justice, aiming at making its acts and de-
cisions transparent.”29 
Since then, the country can watch the live transmissions of the plenary 
sessions, including the debates and the opinions of the Justices with com-
ments made by journalists.
The transmissions of trials on TV, in real time and without editing, are 
an initiative found only in a few countries. The Brazilian Federal Supreme 
Court’s website informed, in 2011, that TV Justiça had been the first in the 
world to adopt this practice. Inspired by its example, other countries, such 
as the United Kingdom and Mexico would have followed the same path.30 
27  Hartmann et al. (2017); Fonte (2013).
28  In Brazil, this Reform of the Judiciary took place in 2004, through the Amend-
ment to Constitution n.º 45.
29  Brasil (2017).
30  Brasil (2011).
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Carter reports that the Supreme Court of Canada began broadcasting 10 years 
before Brazil.31 However, this author reports no other experience outside of 
the English-speaking world, although his article was published 10 years after 
TV Justiça started broadcasting the court sessions in the Brazilian Supreme 
Court.
The existence of the TV Justiça and, mainly, the live transmissions of the 
plenary sessions are far from having unanimous approval.
There are those who focus on the advantages of the channel: it presents 
approaching topics related to the Law in an informal way, making it possi-
ble for the general public to get acquainted with legal professions and the 
Judicial Power, aside from spreading the knowledge on topics which are of 
immediate interest of the population.32 
Some of the biggest supporters of the broadcasts can be found among 
the Justices themselves. One of them expresses the association between the 
broadcasts and values like transparency and publicity: “Public visibility con-
tributes to the transparency, to the social control and, ultimately, to the de-
mocracy.”33 
In the discussion about the American Supreme Court, in the long run, Car-
ter argues that broadcasts can help to promote “...the educational and civic 
participation benefits for the public, plus the strategic and public relations 
benefits for the Court”.34 
Many, however, caution that there are more problems than advantages in 
the live broadcasts. One of them is the fact that the written decisions have be-
come longer, even when unnecessary. An empirical research concluded that 
the average number of pages of the decisions has grown around 58% after 
the creation of TV Justiça, in comparison with the period between 1990 and 
2002. If before its existence, the decisions had an average extension of 18.16 
pages, between 2003 and 2011 this average went up to 28.82.35 The study by 
Hartmann et al. confirms, even though partially, this increase.36
Another disadvantage would be that public exposure could highlight 
divergences, leading to the confrontation and verbal aggressions among 
31  Carter (2012).
32  Freitas (2012).
33  Barroso (2009) 2.
34  Carter (2012).
35  Fonte (2013).
36  Hartmann (2017).
ISAAC REIS
196
Justices, which could lead to undesirable effects: instead of increasing the 
trust, it can leave an impression of lack of emotional control and personal 
disagreement.
One last observation to be emphasized has to do with the fact that the ex-
treme publicity hinders judges to “test arguments” or even of changing their 
opinions, worried about not transmitting an image of insecurity or of some-
one who has been defeated in a debate.37
Keeping this discussion in mind, it seems to make sense the idea that the 
live broadcast of the plenary sessions may have effects over the rhetorical 
practice of the Court, i. e., the set of strategies the Justices use to persuade the 
broad audience which is reconstructed by TV Justiça. This will be the subject 
of the following and last topic.
4. The rhetoric of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF)
Previously limited to the parties involved in the cases or to the specialized 
legal community, the discourses of the Justices of the Supreme Court has 
been targeted to a much broader audience since TV Justiça’s live transmis-
sions began.
This fact has considerable effects on the type of language and on the rhe-
torical tools used by Justices, aside from formal aspects such as the length of 
the opinions and the duration of the debates, as mentioned before.
Previous researches38 showed that the decisions of the Court39 have pre-
sented a profile of high rhetorical intensity, i.e., a large number of occurrenc-
es of rhetorical strategies, and followed certain patterns in terms of indicators 
and dimensions.
Indeed, the analysis of the case ADI 3510, of 2008, which judged the con-
stitutionality of the use, for research and therapeutic purposes, of embryonic 
stem cells, showed a rhetorical profile in which 54% of the occurrences were 
situated in the ethos dimension. 30% of these occurrences of ethos corre-
sponded to a single indicator, which represents the “references to the legiti-
macy and competence of the Court, as well as defense of the legal field.” The 
37  Silva (2013) 582-583.
38  Reis (2013); (2014); Coelho/Ramalho (2013).
39  In Brazil, complete decisions (acórdãos) contain the opinions of all Justices, be-
fore the final decision and its grounds.
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occurrences of pathos and logos was, respectively, 15% and 31%”.40 
Another analyzed decision was that of the case ADI 3999-7, published in 
2008, which disciplined the loss of elective mandates due to party infidelity. 
In this decision, despite the difference in relation to the object, the similarity 
of rhetorical profile emerges as remarkable: 51.86% of ethos, 19.26% of pa-
thos and 28.89% of the logos dimension.41
In different decisions, it was evidenced a defined rhetorical profile, cen-
tered in the use of rhetorical strategies of reinforcement of legitimacy, some-
thing that, at first sight, should be unnecessary, since the Justices argue be-
fore a specialized legal audience.
Other research also identified the use of pathos and ethos strategies by 
STF Justices. It also recognizes the expansion of the original audience beyond 
the parties interested in the decisions:
Judges presumably care about public opinion and the judgment it will make on their 
decisions. Therefore, their argument is addressed to the media, scholars, class associa-
tions, parliament. […] This way, Supreme Court Justices use rhetorical arguments to per-
suade “real judges” of the reasons for their decisions. “Real Judges” […]  are those who in 
public debates […] give their opinion on the most controversial issues.42 
In fact, the question of the legitimacy of constitutional jurisdiction gained 
prominence in Brazil in the first decade of the 2000s due to the Court’s atti-
tude considered “activist”. Not infrequently, its decisions invaded the spheres 
of competence of the democratic legislator.43
In another work,44 the very establishment of TV Justiça was considered 
a strategy of self-legitimation of the Court. To what extent, however, is this 
characterization possible? To the extent that it “popularizes” the knowledge 
of the Law, making people without legal training feel like participants in the 
institutions or even able to interfere in them. The transmissions of the ple-
nary sessions of the STF, with the explanations of a journalist in non-special-
ized language in the breaks, transmit the feeling of belongingness, dilute the 
strangeness and the impression that the Judiciary is a “black box”, communi-
40  Reis (2013).
41  Reis (2014).
42  Coelho/Ramalho (2013) 5641; 5654.
43  Waldron (1999); (2006); Bayón (2000); Vieira (2007).
44  Reis (2013).
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cating the pathos of familiarity.45
It is undeniable that TV Justiça fulfills a role in the democratization of 
information and legal knowledge, clarifying the meaning of institutes and ex-
panding the community’s knowledge of the rights and guarantees inscribed 
in the constitutional text.
Another great advantage of TV Justice is undoubtedly a certain desacral-
ization of the highest court in the country. Instead of the usual stiffness and 
excessively formal language, the Justices often lose their emotional balance, 
insult each other, have laughing moments, show weariness, take an unin-
tended nap in the Plenary, and finally, show common reactions like any hu-
man being, therefore losing the aura of Olympian Gods, without this taking 
away their authority as competent and respected jurists.
But the achievement of this “social capital” depends on a performance that 
is persuasive and therefore needs to make use of other rhetorical strategies 
than that of a logical-dialectic character (logos), as would be expected by an 
audience composed only by professional jurists. In the dialectics of the rela-
tions between the speaker and the audience, the transmissions also end up 
leading to a certain imprisonment of the Justices’ rhetoric to a supposed pub-
lic opinion, as well as the stimulus to a sometimes exaggerated performativity 
in the judgments.
It may not be possible to precisely correlate the transmissions of the ple-
nary sessions and the change in the rhetoric of the Supreme Court towards a 
speech of self-legitimization. Other factors certainly influence this change as 
much or more strongly, and the healthy skepticism of the rhetorical tradition 
tends to suspect monocausal correlations.
However, to ignore it would be to assume that such a considerable change 
of audience, even if (or above all because) it points to an undetermined and 
not immediately known audience, would have no effect at all on the manner 
45  The resistance to the acceptance of broadcasts at the Supreme Court of the United 
States was criticized by McElroy as an inexcusable reinforcement of its aristocratic and sa-
cralized character: “Just as the Oracle at Delphi was for the Greeks, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to most Americans to be a mystical, majestic mouthpiece making pronouncements 
about important social and governmental issues for the benefit of the American public. For 
as long as the Justices continue to prohibit cameras at the Court, however, the American 
public will be guided in its perceptions by the stories that the Court’s rituals and poli-
cies, its images, and architecture tell. Without at least virtual access to the Court’s work, 
the public cannot easily and directly learn about the Court’s democratic story.” McElroy 
(2012) 1898.
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in which, rhetorically, Justices are engaged in public discussions and trials of 
the Supreme Court.
The maintenance or suspension of transmissions is not under discussion 
in this chapter, but, above all, the perception of how elements considered 
external can profoundly alter the way the Judiciary acts in the production of 
Law. Fundamentally, the data and research done so far on the subject con-
tribute to demystify judicial practice and call the attention of jurists (espe-
cially academics) to the way in which the concretization of Law by the courts 
is transposed by empirical elements that formalistic and prescriptive views 
seem to ignore.
5. Conclusion
Usually, when one thinks about technological innovation and its effects 
on judicial activity, one imagines some great invention, robots and artificial 
intelligence deciding cases in times and according to superhuman patterns of 
justice. However, the insertion of already known technologies into new envi-
ronments and processes can produce many times greater consequences that 
significantly alter the way judicial activity is carried out and, above all, the 
way it is conceived both by its practitioners and the general public.
The goal of this paper was to expose how the introduction of an external 
element, considered as a kind of technological innovation, has influenced the 
rhetorical practice of the Brazilian Supreme Court.
The exposition did not include an evaluation of the rhetoric of the Court, 
influenced by TV Justiça. Nor affirmed, unquestionably, that the live trans-
missions could cause similar shifts in other countries. As mentioned, the 
rhetorical perspective adopted here tries to escape the confusion between 
prescription and description in its analysis, in addition to avoiding the temp-
tation of post hoc, propter hoc fallacy.
However, the research has contributed not only to clarify the current rhe-
torical profile of the Brazilian Supreme Court, but will have shown that the-
ories that do not consider the effect of external factors in the legal practice 
produce an excessively idealized Theory of Law.
On the other hand, the consideration of pragmatic aspects of the legal prac-
tice puts the rhetorical perspective as a privileged point of view with regard to 
the characterization of legal communities (as rhetorical communities).
If there is any merit in empirical research of this kind, it is to insert jurists 
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into discussions about their own professional practice in debates that are al-
ready advanced among sociologists, political scientists, linguists and commu-
nication scholars. Being responsible for the production and reproduction of 
the webs of Law, and being daily called to reflect on the pretension of social 
and democratic legitimacy of their work (since Law does not belong to ju-
rists), this seems to be a question worth taking seriously.
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Dealing with Experiences

Constituent power and constitutional change
in Brazil’s transition to democracy (1945-1946)
Raphael Peixoto de Paula Marques
1. Introduction; 2. The crisis of the Estado Novo: political and constitutional re-
configurations; 3. Democratization and constitutional change: The debate over 
the legitimacy of the 1937 Constitution; 4. From constitutional reform to constit-
uent power: the end of the 1937 Constitution?; 5. Concluding remarks
1. Introduction
This paper discusses the debate over constituent power and constitutional 
change during the Brazilian transition to democracy from 1945 to 1946. The 
objective is to examine the passage from an authoritarian regime to a demo-
cratic one and how that transitional time has constructed or redefined certain 
legal content, especially in the constitutional field. The intention of this paper 
is not only to investigate the connection between the democratization process 
and the forms and times of constitutional change, but also to explore to what 
extent this political transition allowed the construction of certain constitu-
tional content that persisted beyond the transition.
Placing this process of political and legal change in historical perspective 
allows us to problematize the transition and helps us to interpret in a more 
complex way the dynamics between rupture and continuity in the field of pol-
itics and law. Looking historically at processes of democratization requires 
that the term transition be considered not only in its common definition. In 
its usual meaning, the term is linked more to change than to continuity. By 
valuing exclusively the moment of transition—a before and an after—the term 
is reduced to a “linear, almost inescapable image of the historical process.”1 A 
democratic transition should not be interpreted in a one-dimensional, teleo-
logical way; on the contrary, it should be seen as something fluid, contingent 
and complex.2
The practice of constituent power is an interesting object of study for dis-
cussing the relations between political transition and constitutional innova-
1  Baldissara (2009) 1.
2  Van Marle (2002) 66-67.
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tion. The constituent moment, as Maurizio Cau states, is a temporal space 
“in which the traditional linear succession of completed temporal structures 
jumps and in which a meta-narrative process strongly projected into the fu-
ture takes shape.”3 This disruptive temporal process makes it possible to go 
beyond descriptive, chronological observation, since it represents an example 
of what Massimo Meccarelli calls attributive time, a “time that affects the 
content that the law incorporates.”4 My objective here is to contrast the tem-
poral dynamics that have emerged between democratization process, constit-
uent power and constitutional change (formal and informal). The thematic 
and temporal frame chosen here will be analyzed via the lens of constitutional 
history, understood as the history of “conflicting interpretations” of a consti-
tution.5
2. The crisis of the Estado Novo: political and constitutional reconfigurations
Estado Novo is the term created by Getúlio Vargas to describe the dic-
tatorship established in November 1937. Until his deposition at the end of 
October 1945, Vargas ruled without a parliament, employing emergency mea-
sures and repressive criminal legislation. During that period, Vargas took on 
the title of “father of the poor,” due to the social bonds he established with 
workers by using a political discourse that exalted labor legislation. The am-
biguity of the Estado Novo, as well as its plurality of meanings and temporal-
ities, makes its historical interpretation a complex and difficult task, even in 
the constitutional field.6
The regime began with a coup d’état and a new constitution. Its ideolog-
ical assumptions were made explicit by Vargas in his “Proclamation to the 
Brazilian people,” a manifesto read on the radio on the same day of the coup.7 
For Vargas, the “democracy of political parties” should end, because it “sub-
verts the hierarchy, threatens country unity and endangers the existence of 
the Nation, radicalizes the conflicts and ignites the torch of civil discord.” 
Direct voting would be, in Vargas’s words, a decoy, a “mask that conceals the 
3  Cau (2018) 149.
4  Meccarelli (2018) 18.
5  Jouanjan (2014).
6  On the “Estado Novo,” see Carone (1988); D’Araújo (2000); Gomes (2005; 2010; 
2019); Martinho (2006); Capelato (2019). On the “Vargas Era,” see Bercovici (2009).
7  Vargas (1938) 19-32.
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conspiracy of private economic forces.” The previous constitution, based on 
classical forms of liberalism and the representative system, was “outdated in 
relation to the spirit of the time”; it was destined for “a reality that no longer 
existed.”8
This ideological justification was probably written by Francisco Campos, 
Minister of Justice and author of the Constitution put into effect on Novem-
ber 10, 1937.9 In Campos’s interpretation, the nation was living a time of tran-
sition, in which “the spiritual forms of the past, with which we continue to 
dress the image of the world, reveal themselves to be inadequate, obsolete or 
non-conforming.”10
This political belief influenced his writing of the 1937 Constitution. The 
new constitutional text was a clear exemplar of the illiberal constitutionalism 
of the interwar period.11 Indeed, as the 1937 constitutional preamble clearly 
stated, the aim of the new regime was to put an end to the disorder generated 
by political parties and to the “communist infiltration.”12 In an interview giv-
en to newspapers in November 1937, Francisco Campos explained the consti-
tutional guidelines of the new political regime. For him, the new Constitution 
was “profoundly democratic”: the “incorporation of the masses into the polit-
ical horizon” modified intensely the essence of political institutions. Thus, the 
democratic character of the new constitution, in the words of Campos, would 
lie in its “concrete dimensions”—in the expression of the identity between the 
will of the people and that of the President of the Republic.13
Additionally, and still in accordance with Campos’s thinking, the acceler-
ation of political time had changed the functions of government and refor-
mulated the division of powers, giving the executive a new role. Since the law 
had lost its “exclusively political character” and assumed a “technical con-
tent,” the legislative branch was now incapable of dealing with the world’s 
8  Vargas (1938) 20-23.
9  On Francisco Campos and his constitutional ideas, see Santos (2007); Seelaender 
(2010); Seelaender (2013); Pinto (2019); Bueno (2019).
10  Campos (2001) 13.
11  On the category of “Brazilian illiberal constitutionalism,” see Santos (2007). For 
the European context, see Caenegem (1995) 293-346; Pisarello (2011) 121-457; Stolleis 
(2018).
12  Diário Oficial da União, Constituição dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, seção I, 
10/11/1937.
13  Campos (1938) 14-15.
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new challenges.14 According to the logic of a “strong state,” the dimensions of 
public and private were reconfigured. The state’s duty to provide “goods and 
services” would be at the core of the new declaration of rights, a provision that 
would therefore demand that the state have “control of all social activities—
the economy, politics, education.”15
The 1937 Constitution was rooted in a complex mechanism that enabled 
Vargas to govern in a discretionary and centralized manner until 1945. It came 
into effect with state of emergency that had been declared, and during this 
conditional period, the judiciary could not regulate the actions of the govern-
ment.16 In addition, the functioning of the parliament was dependent on ap-
proval by plebiscite, to be held at the president’s convenience any time during 
his tenure (which would end in 1943). As long as the country’s population did 
not ratify the text of the new constitution, the legislative bodies would remain 
dissolved. In his book Brazil under Vargas (1942), Karl Loewenstein called 
this constitutional device a “double constitution” and a “ghost constitution,” 
which means a constitution that does not limit political power.17
To comprehend the Estado Novo fully, however, we must look beyond its 
authoritarian structures. It is also important to consider how the Vargas dic-
tatorship gained support and legitimacy within society—that is, how its “so-
cial construction” occurred.18 As historiography on the period points out, the 
Estado Novo cannot be interpreted in a homogeneous way.19
In a first phase of the Estado Novo period, a “demobilizing authoritarian-
ism” prevailed that was based on coercion and carried out via censorship and 
repression.20 Brazil’s entry into World War II alongside the Allies in 1942 took 
14  Campos (1938) 9-14.
15  Campos (1938) 15-16.
16  On the 1937 Constitution see Cerqueira (1997) 63-94; Bonavides/Andrade (2008) 
335-352; Santos (2009); Abreu (2016). On the analysis by the constitutional doctrine of 
the period, see Berford (1944); Almeida (1940); Castro (1941); Lins (1938); Pontes de Mi-
randa (1938).
17  Loewenstein (1942) 46. The historical observation of the “perversion of the con-
stitution by modern autocracies” allowed Loewenstein (1979) 213-222 to formulate his 
ontological classification of constitutions: normative, nominal and semantic. In such a 
classification, the 1937 Constitution would be a kind of semantic constitution.
18  On the “social construction of authoritarian regimes”, see Rollemberg/Quadrat 
(2010).
19  D’Araújo (2000); Gomes (2005; 2010; 2019); Martinho (2006); Capelato (2019).
20  Gomes (2005); Capelato (2019).
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the regime into a new phase in terms of the relationship between government 
and society. According to Ângela de Castro Gomes, the governmental project 
of transitioning to democracy was mediated by the construction of a political 
pact between the state and the people-workers, which was based on a sym-
bolic dimension (the creation of a discourse that appealed to the figure of the 
“great president Vargas” as responsible for social legislation) and on an orga-
nizational dimension (an institutional mechanism that intended to integrate 
corporate unionism into the political party system). Such aspects constituted 
what was designated as Trabalhismo.21
The shift in the political context opened a new horizon of expectations, 
creating the conditions for criticism of the 1937 authoritarian project.22 The 
declaration of war in 1942 against totalitarian regimes, though it did not 
imply Brazilian democratization, nevertheless created favorable conditions 
for the rise of political opposition by revealing the discursive contradictions 
of the dictatorship. Criticism of the regime’s authoritarianism was not only 
carried out by a liberal-conservative elite, but also by popular protest move-
ments (including students, workers, communists).23
From that moment on, the authorities began to think about the most ap-
propriate way to change the political system. Preparing for the transition to 
liberal democracy became a point of concern on the Estado Novo’s agenda, 
as the idea of authoritarian democracy was becoming unsustainable.24 In 
the government’s view, however, dispensing with the authoritarian regime 
should not necessarily mean losing political power. Thus, it was fundamental 
“to generate new ideas about its political continuity in a democratic order.”25
The prospect of the end of the World War II had intensified discussions 
about the democratization process, especially about the legal aspects of the 
forthcoming elections for president and parliament and the creation of new 
political parties. The debate over the transition to democracy also included 
the so-called constitutional question. From the government’s point of view, 
the process of democratization should be initiated through the realization 
of the plebiscite anticipated by the 1937 Constitution. That option, however, 
would require some modifications, since the plebiscite had not taken place 
21  Gomes (2019) 197; Gomes (2005) 237-294.
22  Gomes (2005) 186; Almeida Júnior (2009) 275.
23  Calil (2013); Ferreira (1998); Vannucchi (2019).
24  Gomes (2019) 195.
25  Gomes (2005) 186.
RAPHAEL PEIXOTO DE PAULA MARQUES
210
during the period originally established in the constitutional text (i.e., the end 
of the presidential term in 1943), due to the declaration of the state of war.26
The alternative proposed by the government was revealed in February 
1945. The transition to democracy would be initiated with the implementa-
tion of a constitutional reform that would adapt the 1937 Constitution for the 
new international situation and provide for presidential and parliamentary 
elections. For Vargas, the return of the elections implied the creation of a 
political party that would essentially translate the social legacy of the Esta-
do Novo. Using these strategies, the government intended to take charge of 
the transitional process, carrying out its ideological reconfiguration and con-
trolling any debate with its critics.
3. Democratization and constitutional change: The debate over the legiti-
macy of the 1937 Constitution
The change in political regime was not the result of the military coup that 
overthrew the President in October 1945 but an initiative of the Vargas Gov-
ernment itself. The general discussion about democracy vs. dictatorship was 
replaced at the beginning of 1945 by a clash between the various projects re-
lated to the country’s democratization and (re)constitutionalization. In this 
scenario, the constitutional discussion was rooted on three major debates: 
(a) constitutional change (reform of the 1937 Constitution or a new consti-
tution); (b) direct elections for president of the Republic and parliament; (c) 
amnesty for exiles and political prisoners.
The first step toward democratic politics was a reform to the constitutional 
made in March 1945, known as Lei Constitucional nº 9 [Constitutional Law 
no. 9].27 A set of justifications guided this change to the constitutional, which 
26  According to art. 171 of the 1937 Constitution, during a state of war, the president 
of the Republic could suspend the constitution. Decree n. 10.358, of August 31, 1942, de-
clared a state of war throughout the country and suspended Article 175, which established 
the presidential term.
27  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 09, seção I, 01/03/1945. The legal 
figure of Lei Constitucional enacted by Vargas was widely used during the Estado Novo, 
although there was no such provision in the 1937 Constitution. The Lei Constitucional 
was equivalent to a constitutional amendment and was adopted based on a broad inter-
pretation of Article 180 of the Constitution: “Until the national parliament is convened, 
the President of the Republic will have the power to issue decree-laws on all matters of 
legislative competence of the Union”.
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clearly demonstrated the regime’s new ideological rhetoric. The preamble of 
the Lei Constitucional n. 9 stated that “in view of serious world events” and 
“public opinion trends,” the conditions had been created for the represen-
tative bodies referred to in the 1937 Constitution to begin functioning.28 It 
was said that only direct elections would provide the “necessary degree of 
authority” to the executive and legislative powers, which would be “the total 
and unequivocal expression of popular sovereignty.”29
Initially, the government did not intend to convoke a national constituent 
assembly. The proposed elections would only serve to provide the parliament 
with “special powers” to approve a constitutional amendment, if one was 
found to be necessary.30 The objective was only to “correct, perfect, improve 
the institutions and adapt them to the new times” without, however, replac-
ing the 1937 Constitution.31 The abolition of the state of war was not a priority 
either.32
This constitutional amendment was strongly criticized. Two documents 
are of interest for us to understand subsequent developments, especially the 
debate over constituent power and democratic legitimacy. The first document 
is an interview given by the former Minister of Justice and author of the 1937 
Constitution, Francisco Campos.33 According to Campos, the “political per-
ception of the world” had changed. For him, it was necessary to know whether 
the Vargas constitutional reform was sufficiently adapted for this new zeit-
geist. The answer was clearly no. Moreover, there was a “de facto government 
situation” because the 1937 Constitution was no longer valid: it was “a docu-
ment of purely historical value.”34
The basis for Campos’s conclusion was the non-execution of the plebiscite. 
Thus, the constitutional reform put forth by government would be unconsti-
tutional because, in Campos’s words, “it is a new constitution edited as an 
28  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 09, seção I, 01/03/1945, p. 3313.
29  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 09, seção I, 01/03/1945, p. 3313.
30  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 09, seção I, 01/03/1945, p. 3313.
31  Revista Forense, Exposição de Motivos apresentada pelos ministros de Estado ao 
sr. Presidente da República, junho de 1945, 190.
32  Revista Forense, Exposição de Motivos apresentada pelos ministros de Estado ao 
sr. Presidente da República, junho de 1945, 187.
33  Diário Carioca, Entrevista de Francisco Campos, 03/03/1945; Correio da Manhã, 
Entrevista de Francisco Campos, 03/03/1945). The interview is also published in Porto 
(2001) 39-52.
34  Diário Carioca, Entrevista de Francisco Campos, 03/03/1945.
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abusive exercise of constituent power.” For Campos, the only solution would 
be to remove the president from power and appoint an assembly with the 
authority to make “fundamental constitutional decisions.”35
The other document of interest is a legal opinion prepared by Law School 
of Rio de Janeiro.36 The professors who wrote the opinion portrayed the mo-
ment as an “instant of transition and crisis” created by the end of war and 
the illegitimacy of the government. Articulating the concepts of constituent 
power and democracy in a very innovative way, the professors argued that the 
Constitution of the Estado Novo was illegitimate, since it came out of a coup 
d’état that usurped popular sovereignty. The constitution was simply a “de 
facto norm.” The professors argued that because the constitution was based 
on a “permanent constituent power,” any reform decreed by the president 
would correspond to “a complementary coup d’état.”37
Regarding the Lei Constitucional n. 9, the professors argued that it was 
unconstitutional. From a legal perspective, the 1937 Constitution did not au-
thorize constitutional amendments put forth by the president.38 In addition, 
Vargas’s constitutional reform would not have fulfilled any “democratizing 
objective.” It did not restore the separation of powers nor did it promote the 
“transition of the country from an authoritarian to a democratic regime.”39 
The professors concluded that was necessary: (i) to remove Vargas and to 
appoint the president of the Supreme Court (STF) to the presidency; (ii) to 
hold direct elections; and (iii) to elect an assembly that would draft a new 
constitution.40
In the following months, the thesis of the “de facto government” and the 
35  Francisco Campos continues: “We cannot, militarily victorious in war, adopt rea-
sons that put us, from the ideological point of view, in the field of the defeated” (Diário 
Carioca, Entrevista de Francisco Campos, 03/03/1945).
36  Correio da Manhã, Parecer dos professores da Faculdade Nacional de Direito, 
03/03/1945. The text is also published in Porto (2001) 53-62.
37  Correio da Manhã, Parecer dos professores da Faculdade Nacional de Direito, 
03/03/1945.
38  Correio da Manhã, Parecer dos professores da Faculdade Nacional de Direito, 
03/03/1945. This argument was anticipated by jurist and politician João Mangabeira 
(Correio da Manhã, Entrevista de João Mangabeira, 02/03/1945).
39  Correio da Manhã, Parecer dos professores da Faculdade Nacional de Direito, 
03/03/1945.
40  Correio da Manhã, Parecer dos professores da Faculdade Nacional de Direito, 
03/03/1945.
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attendant argument for convening a constituent assembly was adopted by 
a significant part of the opposition, such as those in the Law School of the 
University of São Paulo,41 the Instituto de Advogados do Brasil (IAB) [Insti-
tute of Brazilian Lawyers]42 and the new political party União Democrática 
Nacional (UDN) [National Democratic Union].43 These arguments gained 
further popularity after a press interview given by UDN candidate Brigadier 
Eduardo Gomes. In his statements, he argued that the 1934 Constitution had 
never been repealed. Gomes also defended new elections, with the removal of 
Vargas and the transfer of power to the president of the STF, thus creating the 
slogan “all power to the judiciary.”44 
The constitutional debate described above changed after July 1945. The 
reason for its change in character was the growing popular support obtained 
by Vargas through the so-called Queremismo movement.45 The initial sup-
port for Vargas was represented by the expression “we want Getúlio”; later, 
the slogan became “constituent with Getúlio”. This popular movement had 
the backing of the communists46 and was based on the symbolic and organiza-
41  “The 1937 Constitution and the new leis constitucionais, which modified it, im-
posed by a de facto government and without popular ratification, are not a Constitution” 
(Correio da Manhã, Manifestação da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo, 
10/03/1945).
42  “For the crisis of legality and trust to which the head of government has led the Na-
tion, the only remedy lies in the immediate organization of a new provisional government 
which, basing its powers on the 1934 Constitution, will restore public and private freedoms 
and make the necessary arrangements for the election of a Congress, with full powers for 
its revision, or otherwise of a Constituent Assembly” (Correio da Manhã, Parecer do Insti-
tuto dos Advogados Brasileiros, 13/03/1945).
43  Correio da Manhã, Entrevista do brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, 17/04/1945. On the 
União Democrática Nacional, see Benevides (1981).
44  Benevides (1981) 25; Correio da Manhã, Entrevista do brigadeiro Eduardo 
Gomes, 17/04/1945. For Eduardo Gomes, the judiciary was the only constitutional power 
with any legitimacy after the 1937 coup. In defending the reinstatement of the 1934 Con-
stitution, Gomes also defended the enforcement of the line of succession envisioned in that 
former constitutional text (art. 52, § 8).
45  On Queremismo, see Gomes (2005) 238-288; Netto (1996); Ferreira (1998); Fer-
reira (2010); Macedo (2014); Queler (2016).
46  After the amnesty, the communists began to support Vargas based on a “national 
pact against Nazi-fascism”. Ferreira (1998); Netto (1996). Although the communists did 
not advocate for Vargas to continue in power, they understood that the establishment of a 
democracy could only succeed through a Constituent Assembly freely elected by the Bra-
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tional dimensions of Trabalhismo. The idea of fighting to maintain social and 
labor rights was at the heart of this movement. It was imperative that Var-
gas have a presence in the government while the constituent assembly was 
functioning, both for the guarantee and the expansion of labor rights.47 Thus, 
for the Queremismo social mobilization, the preferred order of proceedings 
for the transition was different: first, the immediate installation of a national 
constituent assembly, with Vargas in power and then later, the holding of 
elections in which the president could be a candidate.
The opposition began to interpret the defense of a “Constituent with 
Getúlio” as a “mere expedient of continuism”.48 In the opinion of the UDN, 
the suspension of elections and the defense of an immediate constituent as-
sembly represented a “coup in disguise.”49 The constitutional discussion was 
thus reoriented. The UDN and the military began defending the legitimacy of 
Vargas’s constitutional reform and the decision to hold, rather than suspend, 
elections. Furthermore, the opposition had crafted an argument that the par-
liament’s “special powers of reform” could be interpreted as the “constituent 
power” necessary for drafting a new constitution. This interpretation was ul-
timately carried out in a very unusual manner: with a judicial resolution.
4. From constitutional reform to constituent power: the end of the 1937 
Constitution?
The dispute over the future parliament’s constituent powers was decided 
by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [Electoral Justice Tribunal]50 in October 
1945. The Court’s understanding was not an innovation, but rather a recog-
nition of something that had been discussed previously.51 In fact, the judicial 
zilian people. Prestes (2006). For the Communist Party, presidential elections should be 
held only after the ratification of a new constitution, in order to avoid the simple replace-
ment of one de facto government by another that was equally armed with the vast and 
arbitrary powers of the 1937 Constitution. Prestes (2006).
47  Ferreira (2010) 35.
48  Diário Carioca, O mais é golpe, 02/10/1945.
49  Diário Carioca, Golpe de morte contra o golpe da “constituinte”, 28/09/1945.
50  The Electoral Justice Tribunal was created by Getúlio Vargas in 1932. It was abol-
ished by the Constitution in 1937 and re-established in 1945 by Decreto-Lei n. 7.586. On 
the creation of the Electoral Justice, see Zulini (2019).
51  The argument that the future parliament would also have constituent powers can 
be identified in a legal opinion elaborated by the Sindicato dos Advogados do Rio de Ja-
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ruling was a response to an inquiry brought by the Brazilian Bar Association 
(OAB). In that context, the association was effectively President Vargas’s op-
ponent.52
The debate in the court reflected the dispute that was also taking place 
in the political arena. There was no unanimity on the court.53 In his dissent-
ing opinion, the judge Edgard Costa concluded the subject was not related 
to election law, but to constitutional law, which would exclude the court’s 
legal competence.54 In a broader sense, the Prosecutor-General, Hahnemann 
Guimarães, argued that the case did not involve the mere “interpretation of 
legislative texts” but would represent a “solution to a political problem”.55
The majority opinion was written by Judge Sampaio Dória, a professor at 
the São Paulo Law School with political connections with the regime’s crit-
ics.56 For Dória, the Lei Constitucional n. 09 had granted constituent powers 
to parliament, although not expressly. The new parliament would therefore 
be a specific type of constituent, a “constituent congress”. According to Dória, 
unlike an “absolute constituent assembly”, a congress with constituent pow-
ers would have the task of judging an existing constitution and—if it did not 
approve the existing constitution—of drafting a new constitution. With both 
constituent types, however, there was a common element: the exercise of sov-
neiro in May 1945. According to that document, any parliament could “institute a new 
political order and reform the existing one”, because “the exercise of constituent power by 
the people does not need a determined form or an express declaration” (Correio da Manhã, 
O Sindicato de Advogados atribui poder constituinte ao futuro parlamento, independen-
temente de convocação expressa, 12/05/1945). The legal opinion was written by lawyer 
Alberto Rego Lins.
52  Vannucchi (2019).
53  The composition of the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral was stablished by the Decre-
to-Lei n. 7.586. The members were as follows: José Linhares (president of the Supreme 
Court), Sampaio Dória (professor of law), Waldemar Falcão (a Supreme Court judge), Ed-
gard Costa (a state court judge), Lafayete de Andrada (a state court judge). The judges of 
the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral were appointed by the president of the Supreme Court.
54  Diário Carioca, Além de funções ordinárias, o parlamento terá funções constitu-
intes, 04/10/1945. Judge Edgard Costa and Electoral Prosecutor Hahnemann Guimarães 
did not agree with the majority.
55  Correio da Manhã, A réplica do professor Sampaio Dória ao parecer do procura-
dor-geral do Tribunal Superior, 03/10/1945.
56  During the Estado Novo, Sampaio Dória was punished with compulsory retire-
ment for criticizing the Vargas government. For a short biography of Sampaio Dória, see 
Paula/Lattman-Weltman (eds.) (2010).
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ereignty.57 Based on the opinion of Judge Sampaio Dória, the Court conclud-
ed the following: “the national parliament, which will be elected on December 
2, 1945, will have unlimited constituent powers in addition to its ordinary 
functions.”58
This unlimited constitutional sovereignty would not have a long life. After 
the military coup that removed Vargas from power, the new president, José 
Linhares,59 decreed several new leis constitucionais. The issue of the parlia-
ment’s constituent powers was addressed in two of them, notably to ratify the 
earlier decision of Tribunal Superior Eleitoral decision and to “protect” the 
results of the presidential elections.60
First, Lei Constitucional n. 13 established that the new parliament should 
meet sixty days after the elections as a “Constituent Assembly” to draft with 
“unlimited powers” a new constitution.61 The new parliament would no longer 
have “unlimited sovereignty” to decide to ratify the 1937 Constitution instead of 
drafting a new constitution. Second, Lei Constitucional n. 15 established that the 
elections results “should be respected” by the constituent assembly. In addition, 
the constitutional amendment authorized the elected president to legislate until 
the new constitution was enacted. 62 This legal rule allowed the next president, 
General Gaspar Dutra, to legislate on “sensitive” matters, creating legal content 
that remained after (and against) the 1946 Democratic Constitution.
Moreover, the judicial and presidential recognition of the constituent pow-
ers of the parliament did not lead to the immediate repeal of the 1937 Con-
stitution. The authoritarian constitutional order continued to be reaffirmed 
on several occasions before the enactment of the 1946 Constitution. Although 
President José Linhares revoked the state of war and the National Security 
Court,63 one of his first decisions was to uphold the 1937 Constitution, even 
57  Correio da Manhã, Contra a convocação de uma constituinte, 28/09/1945.
58  Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, Resolução n. 215, 02/10/1945.
59  José Linhares was the president of the Supreme Court and the Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral. He was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Getúlio Vargas in Decem-
ber 1937. For a short biography of José Linhares, see Dias (2010).
60  The rules of procedure for the initial meetings of the constituent assembly were 
also created by President José Linhares (Diário Oficial da União, Decreto-Lei n. 8.708, 
seção I, 18/01/1946, p. 836).
61  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 13, seção I, 13/11/1945, p. 17409.
62  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 13, seção I, 13/11/1945, p. 17409.
63  Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 14, seção I, 24/11/1945, p. 17837; 
Diário Oficial da União, Lei Constitucional n. 16, seção I, 30/11/1945, p. 18069.
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
217
though there was already a draft of a temporary constitution prepared by his 
Minister of Justice (Professor Sampaio Dória).64 This decision was intended 
to “avoid legal complications,” since the Supreme Court had already ruled as 
lawful the acts of Vargas’s government.65
But it was during the initial proceedings of the Constituent Assembly that 
the debate over the permanency of the 1937 Constitution proved most intense. 
The core of the discussion concerned the extent of its constituent powers, i.e. 
whether the Constituent Assembly could also issue provisional constitutional 
acts. The objective of some constituents was to repeal the 1937 Constitution, 
thereby limiting the legislative power of the elected President of the Repub-
lic.66 That legal dispute, as we can see, concerned the validity President José 
Linhares’s of Lei Constitutional n. 15.
In the end, the argument defended by President Dutra’s party (PSD) pre-
vailed: the Constituent Assembly could not issue temporary constitutional 
rules.67 Consequently, the 1937 Constitution and its authoritarian structure 
remained in force until September 1946, when a new constitution was enact-
ed for the country.
5. Concluding remarks
The transitional process to democracy that took place in Brazil from 1945 
to 1946 was marked by an intense debate about the forms and times of consti-
tutional change. This discussion cannot be adequately covered without a look 
at the political and social context of the era. In this regard, it is not possible to 
understand the process of democratization in Brazil without pointing to the 
broader legal and cultural changes represented by new social legislation and 
to the symbolic dimensions constructed under the Estado Novo.
The mass mobilization in favor of “constituent with Getúlio Vargas” and, 
later, the forced removal of Vargas in October 1945 had a considerable impact 
on the direction of the democratization process. Those events made possi-
ble the abolition of part of the oppressive structure and the consolidation of 
64  The draft was published in the journal “Archivo Judiciário” in 1946 (Archivo Judi-
ciário, Projeto da Constituição, volume LXXVII, 1946).
65  Dias (2010).
66  Bonavides/Andrade (2008) 376. These constituents were from political parties 
(Communist Party and União Democrática Nacional) opposed to the elected president.
67  Bonavides/Andrade (2008) 387.
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a parliament invested with constituent powers. However, they also led to a 
general reaction of conservative liberals and military personnel against work-
ers and communists, which involved not only immediate political persecution 
and repression, but also paved the way for maintaining or creating author-
itarian interpretations and legal arrangements that profoundly marked the 
period after the transition. 
We can indicate some representative aspects of both situations mentioned 
above, taking as a guiding point the debate over the constitution. The first is-
sue worthy of discussion is the constitutional changes generated by the tran-
sitional period. Those changes began with the government’s choice to carry 
out a limited constitutional reform that only enabled new elections, without 
including the creation of a new constitution. That choice brought the expan-
sive dispute over the validity of the 1937 Constitution to the fore, which then 
persisted through the entire political transition, from the beginning of the 
democratization process to the installation of the Constituent Assembly.
However, despite the cries from critics of the Estado Novo, the 1937 Con-
stitution was reaffirmed by the opposition in at least two moments. When the 
Queremista position was being debated, it was necessary for the opposition 
to validate Vargas’s constitutional reform as a strategy for ensuring that elec-
tions would be held. And then, after the deposition of Vargas, when Presi-
dent José Linhares performed an extensive constitutional reform, he used the 
leis constitucionais—the same legal instrument that the UDN had previously 
criticized. Thus, the effort, headed by Linhares, to dismantle the oppressive 
structures of the Estado Novo nevertheless involved the affirmation of the le-
gitimacy of the authoritarian constitution of that period. Therefore, there was 
no temporal synchronization between the political and constitutional break.
Ultimately, the most important innovation during this period was the en-
actment of a democratic constitution in 1946. The way in which the constitu-
ent assembly was convened is quite unusual, since it resulted neither from a 
revolution nor from a formal, traditional decree, but rather from an Electoral 
Court’s decision recognizing the “unlimited constituent power” of the new 
parliament. This judicial ruling can be explained by its manifest political aim: 
to block a popular movement that believed it was more important to draft a 
constitution than to vote for a new political leader.
The second point worth noting is the construction of certain authoritarian 
legal content that became persisted, despite a democratic constitutional inno-
vation. Such content produced effects beyond the transitional period, as illus-
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
219
trated by some key examples.  Although President Linhares revoked central 
elements of the dictatorship, he left intact the national security criminal laws 
and the Political Police, an expression of clear continuity with the previous 
authoritarian regime.
Another case is more explicit in its ascriptive dimension: the legal compe-
tence granted to the newly elected president to exercise “all the powers of the 
ordinary legislature” until the new constitution has been promulgated. This 
provision allowed the former Minister of War, General Gaspar Dutra (who 
was elected president in 1945), to not only legally regulate the most recent pe-
riod of transition, but also to anticipate the normative production of certain 
politically “sensitive” matters and “protect” them from and against the new 
constitutional text. That was the case with labor strikes, for example, which 
were recognized as a right by the 1946 Constitution,68 but which continued to 
be interpreted in a restrictive manner based on Decreto-Lei nº. 9.070, pub-
lished before the new Constitution by President Dutra.69
Therefore, although the constituent process of 1945 to 1946 was charac-
terized, to some extent, as a break with the previous regime, inaugurating 
new democratic practices and establishing a new relationship with individual 
and social rights, many of authoritarian structures and semantics remained 
in place. However, we cannot exclude the democratic nature of the experience 
that started in 1946 and the importance of the new constitution for that his-
torical context.
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Transition to democracy and the Brazilian presidential system post-1946:
the relationship between institutional design and political instability
Claudia Paiva Carvalho
1. Introduction: transitioning to democracy and adapting the presidential sys-
tem; 2. The dispute between the presidential and the parliamentary systems; 3. 
Political crisis, presidential system, and institutional reform; 4. Final remarks: 
presidential system in transition
1. Introduction: transitioning to democracy and adapting the presidential 
system
The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 restored representative democracy af-
ter eight years of dictatorship. During the “New State” regime (Estado Novo, 
1937-1945), there were no elections, and Parliament was kept closed. Presi-
dent-dictator Getúlio Vargas concentrated legislative powers and appointed 
interveners to govern states. Restoring democracy required changes in the 
system of government. At the time, there was a consensus that presidential 
power should be contained in order to avoid the abuses and arbitrary mea-
sures practiced by the previous regime. But there was disagreement on how 
this should be done.
During the constituent process that took place from February to Septem-
ber 1946, some representatives supported the parliamentary campaign led by 
deputy Raul Pilla. Pilla was the main sponsor of parliamentary reform as a 
means to improve democracy in Brazil. But he did not succeed in approving 
the parliamentary system in the constitutional frame of 1946. The presiden-
tial system prevailed, although under a significantly different set of rules. 
Most constituents believed that the presidential system better suited 
the Brazilian political tradition and would better serve the need for State 
intervention. As the State’s action spread to areas of economic policy and 
social assistance, the importance of a strong Executive branch became more 
prominent. At the same time, in a Cold War scenario, a strong State was also 
defended to face the so-called communist threat. The constitution framers 
understood that the presidential system would be better qualified to enable 




volved designing an Executive branch that would be both limited and pow-
erful. 
To prevent abuse, the Constitution would establish constitutional limits 
on presidential power, especially by reinforcing the mechanisms of Legisla-
tive control. The multi-party system and proportional representation should 
balance the president’s power, since the government would depend on con-
gressional support to conduct its agenda. The mediation of national parties 
and the functioning of the electoral system, where secrecy of the ballot was 
guaranteed, would also decrease the president’s personal influence in the 
choice of congressmen and state governors. Finally, the president would be 
subject to congressional investigation and oversight and, ultimately, to im-
peachment in the case of serious misconduct.
Despite the adjustments, the presidential system was a key factor in the 
political instability of Brazilian democracy after 1946. Three major political 
crises took place in 1954, 1955, and 1961, all of them involving conflicts be-
tween the Executive and the Legislative, as well as attempts to remove pres-
idents from power or to prevent them from taking office. The three political 
crises were solved through political interference of the Armed Forces, though 
the military did not remain in power, but returned the government to civil-
ians. In 1964, however, one last crisis – also featured by strong disputes be-
tween president and Congress – would collapse democracy and install a mil-
itary dictatorship that would last 21 years. 
There seems to be no doubt that political crises challenged the presidential 
system. But one must ask whether the dysfunctions of the presidential system 
are to be blamed for the political instability. A growing number of congress-
men thought so and endorsed consecutive attempts along the 1950s to amend 
the Constitution in order to adopt the parliamentary system. Nonetheless, all 
attempts failed up to President Jânio Quadros’ resignation in August 1961, 
which was followed by an impasse created by the attempted military veto on 
the inauguration of Vice President João Goulart (Jango). As a compromise 
solution to ensure that João Goulart took office, but under limited powers, 
Congress approved a hasty implementation of a parliamentary system. The 
parliamentary experience was both unstable and ineffective. After successive 
cabinets fell from power, a plebiscite held in January 1963 approved the re-
turn of the presidential system by a large majority.
Given this scenario, the present research investigates how the presiden-
tial system responded to Brazil’s transition into democracy post-1945. Based 
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on a document analysis methodology, the main purpose is to analyze how 
the debate on system of government became central to the constitutional and 
democratic order, as well as to explain the relations between the presidential 
system and the political crises of the period.
The text is divided in two parts. The first topic analyzes the presidential 
system in the Constitution of 1946 and the first attempt to adopt a parlia-
mentary system, considering the political context, the legislative debates, and 
the expected or frustrated outcomes. The second part investigates the rela-
tionship between the political crises of 1954 and 1955 and the perspectives of 
changing the system of government, based on a diagnosis of presidentialism 
as a source of political instability.
2. The dispute between the presidential and the parliamentary systems
The debate about system of government is of central importance for Bra-
zilian constitutionalism post-1946. Such centrality can be demonstrated by 
the consecutive attempts to adopt the parliamentary system. As mentioned 
earlier, the dispute over the political system that would better serve Brazil-
ian democracy started in the Constituent of 1946. It was certainly a relevant 
topic for the transition into democracy and one that persisted on the agenda 
throughout the period, until the 1964 coup d’état.
On March 12 1946, during the constituent debates, the “Parliamentary 
Manifesto”, written by José Maria dos Santos and signed by more than 60 
congressmen, was launched. According to the text, the “New State” dictator-
ship had not been “but the logical and necessary conclusion of the forty-eight 
years of personal government” that had prevailed over Brazil’s republican 
history. Only by abandoning the personification of power inherent to the 
presidential system would it be possible to build a truly democratic regime.
Deputy Raul Pilla proposed an amendment to the draft Constitution pro-
viding for the adoption of a parliamentary system. The justification stated 
that the presidential system did not ensure an adequate relationship between 
the executive and legislative branches: either one of the powers annulled the 
other or they lived in constant conflict. The lack of integration impaired the 
government’s ability to act efficiently and to conduct the public policies nec-
essary to face national problems.
The presidential system also failed to guarantee mechanisms for holding 
the president accountable, argued Pilla. The fact that the government did not 
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depend on the confidence of the Legislative would favor the concentration of 
powers and the despotism of the president. In addition, impeachment would 
be an ineffective and useless mechanism to combat presidential abuses, as 
demonstrated by this instrument’s historic lack of enforcement.
In the context of the Constituent Assembly, left-wing sectors also support-
ed the parliamentary amendment based on their criticism of the authoritar-
ian uses of presidential powers and their belief on the possibility of social 
change via the parliamentary system. Therefore, communist and socialist 
representatives stood up for a parliamentary system equipped with a strong 
Legislative branch as a means of democratic transformation of society.
The Constituent Assembly did not approve the parliamentary change. In 
practical terms, the presidential system’s victory was largely due to the dom-
inant presence of the governing party that wished to preserve the President’s 
powers. But those in favor of maintaining a presidential system also needed to 
justify such choice. One of the main arguments referred to an alleged Brazilian 
culture and political tradition of praising authority and strong central power. 
In addition, the debates also highlighted the prospects for the presidential 
government under the new grounds set by the Constitution of 1946. 
A series of mechanisms created to improve representative democracy 
would serve to limit the president’s powers and control abuses. Proportion-
al representation would strengthen nationally-based parties and guarantee a 
plural parliamentary composition as a counterweight to presidential action. 
The possibility of congressmen participating in the government and the Con-
gress’ prerogative to call for Ministers of State to provide clarifications would 
also improve the relationship between the powers and the control over the 
Executive’s acts. The constituents described this model as an “eclectic” or 
“temperate” type of presidential system, including elements that were typical 
of the parliamentary system, as deputy Rafael Circunriá argued:
Eclectic presidentialism, with fair and convenient concessions to parliamentarism: at-
tendance at the Chamber of Ministers of State; accountability for the acts the ministers 
subscribe to, with the President of the Republic; possibility of deputies and senators exer-
cising the ministerial function without losing their mandate.1
The 1946 Constitution came into force in September 1946. In 1948, the 
preface to the second edition of the “Parliamentary Manifesto” already indi-
cated articulations within the Congress for a constitutional reform to aban-
1  Anais Constituinte (1946) 83.
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don the presidential system. The movement was led by Raul Pilla who, at 
the end of 1949, had gathered enough signatures to submit the proposal for 
constitutional amendment n. 4, aimed at implementing a parliamentary sys-
tem. The attempt to promote a constitutional change in such a short notice 
demonstrates how the institutional design adopted by the 1946 Constitution 
remained a conflictive aspect of the political transition. Over time, proposals 
for parliamentary amendments would be reinforced by successive political 
crises that challenged the presidential system.
During the constitutional amendment procedure, an important debate in-
volved two congressmen: Raul Pilla and Afonso Arinos.2 Raul Pilla was the 
proponent of the parliamentary amendment, and Afonso Arinos the rappor-
teur of the Special Commission constituted to evaluate the text. While Pilla 
was an enthusiastic supporter of the change in the system of government, Ari-
nos strongly defended the maintenance of the presidential system at the time. 
The difference of opinions engendered a rich debate that became a mandato-
ry reference for studies on system of government, as well as a central episode 
of the Brazilian constitutional experience after 1946.
Raul Pilla was a trained physician and had been involved in politics for 
many years. His party, the Liberating Party (Partido Libertador), had its sup-
port base rooted in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. Both Pilla and his 
party had the defense of the parliamentary system as their main political plat-
form. Arinos, in his turn, belonged to the National Democratic Union (União 
Democrática Nacional), the main opposition party to Getúlio Vargas and to 
the political groups linked to his name. Arinos belonged to a traditional polit-
ical family and was a jurist also dedicated to an academic career.
The two parties shared similar ideas about political, social, and economic 
policies. As a rule, both held more conservative positions, defending indi-
vidual freedoms and opposing the agenda of strong State intervention. They 
also shared the criticism of what was identified as populist and demagogic 
politics, mainly related to the figure of Vargas. But when it came to the de-
bate over systems of government, unlike the Liberating Party, the National 
Democratic Union did not establish a unique and binding position for many 
years, leaving it up to each member to vote for or against the parliamentary 
amendment. As rapporteur for the Special Commission created to analyze the 
proposal, Afonso Arinos was strongly against it.
A few years later, Arinos would change his position and support the adop-
2  Pilla’s and Arinos’ opinions are gathered in: Franco/Pilla (1958).
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tion of the parliamentary system in Brazil. This change of mind, shared by 
several other jurists and politicians, will be analyzed later. But in 1949, in 
his opinion to the Special Commission, Arinos stated that the parliamentary 
system violated the independence between powers since it promoted “almost 
a complete merger of the executive and legislative branches.”3 Moreover, by 
giving primacy to the Legislative branch, the parliamentary system would 
hardly be compatible with the concept of the supremacy of the Constitution 
and with judicial review:
Presidentialism, the legal system par excellence, places the Constitution legally above 
the laws and it is up to a body of jurists to resolve conflicts between one and the other. Par-
liamentarism, a political regime par excellence, hardly accepts constitutional supremacy 
in the face of political power, and logically removes the question from the legal realm.4
Arinos considered that the parliamentary system prioritized political free-
dom and its defense by the Parliament, while the presidential system favored 
legal freedom and its defense by the Judiciary.5 And because the parliamen-
tary system would repel Constitution as a supreme law, it would also be ir-
reconcilable with federation, which depended on the superior norm of the 
Constitution to regulate the division of powers between the federal entities.
In response, Pilla argued that the parliamentary government was not 
based on the Parliament’s sovereignty, typical of conventional or assembly 
governments, but rather allowed for a better integration between political 
branches. Instead of subordination, the parliamentary system would favor 
a coordinated relationship between the Executive and the Legislative. The 
possibility of dissolving the Chamber would guarantee a balance of powers by 
preventing the Legislative branch from abusing its prerogative to overthrow 
governments over the loss of parliamentary support.6
Another aspect highlighted by Pilla was the presidential system’s inability 
to resolve conflicts between Executive and Legislative branches through the 
mechanisms provided by law.7 In a situation of escalating crisis, the system 
of checks and balances would fail, and the response would generally involve 
the use of extra-constitutional measures. As a result, the presidential system 
3  Franco/Pilla (1958) 26.
4  Franco/Pilla (1958) 71.
5  Franco/Pilla (1958) 73.
6  Franco/Pilla (1958) 73.
7  Franco/Pilla (1958) 73.
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would threaten democratic stability and would often lead to breaches of the 
constitutional regime.
The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of each system of gov-
ernment is not new in political science. Many considerations have already 
been made about each system’s ability to guarantee stability of democratic 
regimes, to enhance democracy, and to strengthen the decision-making ca-
pacity of political powers.8 In the present research, our goal is not to consid-
er a theoretical debate on whether or how institutional choices matter and 
which system works best.9 Rather, the purpose is to understand why it was an 
important debate in the context of Brazil’s political transition post-1945 and 
how it impacted on constitutional theory and practice during that time.
Support for the parliamentary system significantly grew over time, includ-
ing the conversion of former staunch supporters of the presidential system. 
Such discontent with the presidential system in Brazil during the 1950s is 
related to the fear of the authoritarian past, but also to the political crises and 
the opposition’s political strategies. Therefore, it is important to understand 
what motivated players to change their positions over time. It is also relevant 
to note that, despite its growing popularity, all attempts to implement a par-
liamentary system were frustrated until its improvised adoption during the 
political crisis in 1961, which can hardly be considered a victory of parliamen-
tary supporters.
In an analysis of the statements made in the Chamber of Deputies defend-
ing the parliamentary system between 1946 and 1961, Eunice Esteves identi-
fies seven main arguments:10
i) Balance of powers: cooperation between the Executive and the Legisla-
tive, avoiding the “dictatorship” of the presidential system;
ii) Government responsibility: prime minister is approved by parliament 
and is kept accountable;
iii) Building political leaders: the prominent role of parliament in the gov-
ernment contributes to the preparation of statesmen;
iv) Strengthening of parties: cabinet system obliges parties to develop co-
herent and unified programs;
v) Administrative stability: the fall of the cabinet does not stop the admin-
istrative machine, kept separate from the government;
8  Linz (1991).
9  Cintra (2004).
10  Esteves (1984).
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vi) Smooth succession: cabinet changes do not generate crises, but occur 
under normal conditions and with national approval;
vii) Natural adaptation: through parliament, public opinion has greater 
influence over the government, which responds better to the nation’s prob-
lems and needs.
Esteves also notes which arguments were used the most at each mo-
ment. In the debate over the first parliamentary amendment, in the context 
of Vargas’ election and the first years of his government, arguments related 
to smooth succession and government accountability prevailed. The concern 
with presidential succession was connected to the conflicts and political in-
stability surrounding Vargas’ election in 1950. At the same time, concerns 
with the president’s authoritarian background and reactions to corruption 
scandals contributed to criticisms regarding the lack of accountability in the 
presidential system.
It is worth noting that an attempt to begin impeachment proceedings 
against Vargas’ Minister of Finance, Horácio Lafer, occurred in parallel with 
the debates on reforming the political system. The deputies’ frustration with 
the lack of accountability of the president and his assistants strengthened the 
parliamentary discourse.
The debate over the first parliamentary amendment, from 1949, was 
interrupted in 1950 after Arinos’ and Pilla’s votes in the Special Commis-
sion. The procedure was only resumed in 1952, when a new Commission 
was formed and approved Pilla’s vote in favor of the parliamentary system. 
At that time, dissatisfaction with the presidential system corresponded to 
dissatisfaction with Vargas’ election and government. Getúlio Vargas had 
been elected in 1950 under strong protests that criticized his authoritarian 
past, but also feared his connections with the working class. For many op-
ponents, Vargas’ victory at the polls had only been possible thanks to the 
presidential system, which allowed for the popular choice of the president, 
and thus made room for the alleged pernicious influence of demagogic and 
populist practices.
During Vargas’ administration, criticism of the presidential system was 
also encouraged by opposition sectors that sought to undermine presidential 
power. Opponents accused Vargas of disregarding the role of the legislative 
branch and of making direct appeals to the people as a source of legitimacy to 
government policies. They also criticized the excessive powers that the pres-
ident held in his hands, both to control the legislative agenda by approving 
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measures of interest to the government, and to issue wide reaching decrees 
independently from Congress.11
One of the leaders of the opposition to Vargas and well-known jurist, dep-
uty Aliomar Baleeiro argued that the presidential experience changed his 
mind about the political system. He had defended the presidential system 
in the Constituent Assembly, but became a supporter of the parliamentary 
reform in Brazil. “I was a presidentialist and, unwillingly, insulting my legal 
education, I became a parliamentarian, due to the disenchantment of the re-
gime in which we have lived until today.”12
It becomes clear that criticism of the presidential system was mixed up 
with opposition to Vargas’ administration. In other words, support for parlia-
mentary system was in part a political strategy for those who had not accepted 
Vargas’ return to power in the first place. Such political use of parliamentary 
discourse was not new. The defense of parliamentary system had long been 
identified as an expedient reaction to momentary crises or as an opposition 
attitude towards the government. That was also Afonso Arinos’ understand-
ing in 1949, as he claimed that parliamentary amendment was driven by the 
opposition’s interest in approving an institutional change that would weaken 
the president’s power.13
Nonetheless, despite the growing anti-presidential attitude among groups 
opposed to Vargas, the parliamentary amendment was rejected by the majori-
ty of congressmen in a vote that took place in June 1953. Even a party that sup-
ported the parliamentary system in its program voted against the amendment. 
The negative result can only be explained by taking into account the electoral 
ambitions of parties and politicians already thinking of candidacies for the 
1955 presidential succession. Deputies officially justified their vote against the 
amendment on the grounds that it would be inconvenient or inopportune, due 
to the impact on institutional stability. But the prospect of coming to power 
certainly sparked interest in maintaining the presidential system.14
As Paixão e Barbosa pointed out in an analysis of the debate over the sys-
tem of government in the 1950s: 
11  D’Araújo (1992); Dulci (1986). 
12  Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, 12 Jun. 1953, 5348-9.
13  Franco/Pilla (1958).
14  This is the case of the Social Progressist Party (Partido Social Progressista), which 
defended the parliamentary system in its political program, but voted against the amend-
ment. The interest in maintaining the presidential system was related to the interest of its 
leader, Ademar de Barros, to run for president in the 1955 elections.
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It is clear that many defenders of the parliamentary system were ideologically commit-
ted to their cause, but the promotion of an alternative system of government also followed 
the motivations of more specifically political-electoral and partisan nature.15
As noted, shaping the system of government had been a major concern in 
the transition to democracy. Shortly afterwards, ideas for changing the insti-
tutional mechanism emerged and led to an important constitutional debate. 
Not only that, support for the parliamentary system grew over the period in 
close connection with the political crises featured by conflicts between the 
powers.
3. Political crisis, presidential system, and institutional reform
After the first parliamentary amendment failed, it would not be long be-
fore the idea of changing the system of government was brought back into 
public and legislative debate. It reappeared shortly after the final crisis of Var-
gas’ government, which ended in August 1954 with the president’s suicide, in 
the context of strong pressures for his resignation and attempts to remove 
him from power, including threats of military intervention. 
For some time, the government had been facing difficulties. The oppo-
sition and a significant part of the press accused Vargas of corruption and 
anti-democratic measures. The crisis escalated in early August, when one of 
Vargas’ main political opponents, the politician and journalist Carlos Lacer-
da, was the target of an attack that resulted in the death of a member of his 
personal security, Air Force officer Major Rubens Vaz. The revelation that 
a member of Vargas’ personal guard took part in the attack and the suspi-
cions of the president’s direct involvement exacerbated tensions between the 
Armed Forces and the president. Amid threats of military action and pressure 
for his removal and resignation, Vargas decided to take his own life. Such dra-
matic act put an end to his government, but not to his influence on national 
politics.
The tragic end of Vargas’ presidency intensified the debates about the 
functioning of the institutions and the political system. According to Hermes 
Lima, an important jurist and former deputy member of the Socialist Par-
ty (Partido Socialista Brasileiro), the crisis demonstrated the failure of the 
presidential system: 
15  Paixão/Barbosa (2013).
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I believe that the tragic fall of President Vargas has challenged, once again, the viabil-
ity of the Brazilian presidential regime. The presidential system organizes the Executive 
in such a rigidly one-person format that any structural change poses fatal dangers to its 
functioning.16
The author highlighted the main points of criticism of the presidential sys-
tem: tendency towards a personal government, lack of collaboration between 
the executive and legislative branches, and the absence of effective controls 
over the president. The presidential system was also responsible for creating 
conflicts and crises without offering a way out. As a result, politicians would 
call upon the Armed Forces to intervene in political processes. “The Army was 
raised to the category of interpreter of the natural law of Brazilian presiden-
tial system,” said Lima.17
In January 1955, Afonso Arinos would write that, due to the expansion 
of State interference in the economy, “Brazilian presidential patriarchalism” 
became stronger. However, although the president was strong in economic 
policies, he was weak in governance, which depended on the unstable support 
from Congress, caused by party fragmentation. The combination of “political 
strength” and “legislative weakness” of the president would define Vargas’ 
administration and lead to its final crisis.18
When Vargas’ government came to an end, another parliamentary amend-
ment offered by deputy Raul Pilla in May 1954 was in progress. After the esca-
lating conflicts that led to the government’s fall, the amendment was pushed 
forward under what seemed to be a strong consensus that the adoption of the 
parliamentary system would be the adequate response to the political and 
institutional crisis. Deputy Coelho de Souza summarized this shared belief: 
“Right after the 24th of August we heard in every corner that the adoption of 
Deputy Raul Pila’s amendment, which, with a clear vision and eminent polit-
ical clairvoyance, foresaw the whole crisis in which we now plunge, would be 
the solution.”19
The expectation of successfully approving the amendment did not come 
true. The rapporteur of the Special Commission had already given an opinion 
contrary to the amendment, which was voted and approved by the Commis-
sion in November 1954. The legislative debate was concentrated during the 
16  Lima (1954) 53.
17  Lima (1954) 67.
18  Melo Franco (1955).
19  Diário do Congresso Nacional, 15 Dec. 1954, 8607.
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months of December 1954, May and June 1955. However, support for the 
reform declined over time, and in September the amendment was rejected 
for lack of quorum.
Although the amendment did not get to be approved, the legislative de-
bate reinforced the relationship between the political crisis of 1954 and the 
failures of the presidential system. By blaming the presidential system for 
the crisis, deputies dismissed Congress from responsibility and emphasized a 
moderating, patriotic, and unbiased intervention by the Armed Forces. 
For instance, Deputy Coelho de Souza described the presidential system as 
a balancing game between the Executive branch and the Armed Forces. “For 
these forces, the Congress does not count – or it counts very secondarily,” he 
added. According to this view, the Legislative branch would not have played 
a relevant role in the final crisis that ended Vargas’ government. The Armed 
Forces, on the other hand, would have acted as saviors by solving the conflicts 
and restoring normality with no intention of taking power, but ensuring the 
prompt return to the civilian command. 
The idea that the Armed Forces moderated political crises became well-
known and quite influential in explaining Brazilian democracy from 1946 to 
1964. That was actually an idea supported by many members of the politi-
cal elites. For instance, in a conference before the General Staff of the Army, 
in 1949, Brazilian sociologist and politician Gilberto Freyre argued that the 
Armed Forces were designed and prepared to arbitrate major national con-
flicts.20 An important jurist, Themístocles Cavalcanti, favored a similar ap-
proach. According to him, the role of the military structure in Brazilian poli-
tics would be more relevant the less consistent and developed was the social 
structure. The lack of political elites capable of leading the country with re-
sponsibility also left room for the military to act at certain times to “correct 
the anomalies found in the normal mechanism of the political system.”21
Some congressmen incorporated the same thought to explain the 1954 cri-
sis. According to Deputy Castilho Cabral: “The Armed Forces had to intervene 
for the presidential balance to be reestablished in Brazil.” Deputy Luiz Garcia 
stated that it was not correct to say that the Armed Forces were called upon 
to intervene on political disputes; they only acted when compelled by the cir-
cumstances and because of the dysfunction of the presidential regime:
20  Freyre (1949).
21  Cavalcanti (1961).
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But, Deputies, the Armed Forces were never called upon to solve certain crises in the 
country. They have come to act as an imperative of the moment. It is political circum-
stances – because of political crises – that have been determining their interference in the 
country’s public life. The flaw is neither in the formation of the Armed Classes, nor in those 
who direct politics, but in the regime, which sometimes does not allow for a constitutional 
way out, a legal way out of a crisis.22
This interpretation disregarded the decisive role Congress played in the 
destabilization process and in the final crisis of Vargas’ government. It also 
simplified the relations between the Congress and president Vargas, as if they 
were based on a complete supremacy of the Executive, secured by the Armed 
Forces. It is important to understand why this image did not match reality. 
Firstly, Congress was not a minor player in the Vargas administration. It 
is true that Vargas maintained dubious relations with parties and with Con-
gress, and often sought to legitimize his policies through direct appeals to 
the people. But Vargas also faced limits imposed by the Congress and sought 
its collaboration to succeed in governing. As for the president’s influence on 
the legislative agenda, the Constitution itself guaranteed a great amount of 
powers to the Chief of the Executive specifically to allow for his participation 
in the legislative process. As already mentioned, a strong Executive was the 
institutional design supporting an intervening State. Besides, considering the 
performance of other presidents in the same period, it cannot be argued that 
Vargas exerted a disproportional influence over Congress. 
Even more striking is the role that the Congress and some parties played 
in the process of destabilizing the government. A few months before the fi-
nal crisis, opposition attempted to impeach Vargas based on irregularities on 
government expenses and on alleged communist plans and connections. The 
impeachment failed, but anti-Vargas forces continued a campaign of strong 
attacks and defamation against the government and the president.
During the month of August, Vargas’ opponents tried several strategies 
to remove him from office by extralegal means. They tried to force the presi-
dent’s resignation on the grounds that he had lost the authority and legitima-
cy to occupy the position. They also sought to justify a military intervention 
to remove Vargas and expressly called on the Armed Forces to take action, 
which included efforts to circumvent existing legalist resistance within the 
military. By August 12th, deputy Aliomar Baleeiro stated that the only reason 
why Vargas was still in power was because “people responsible for the Armed 
22  Diário do Congresso Nacional (1955) 2771 (Speech of Dec. 13 1954).
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Forces of the country feel a sort of embarrassment in offering a solution that 
violates the Constitution.” According to him, the country was under a severe 
political disturbance
because we fear touching the Constitution. I praise this concern for our supreme law. 
But we need to know that the country’s life cannot be damaged by the myth of a separation 
of powers or by theoretical principles that do not match our needs.23
Many other deputies were engaged in convincing the military to remove 
Vargas and in offering legal arguments to justify disobeying the Constitution. 
Therefore, it is by no means reasonable to say that Congress or the parties had 
a minor part in the course of events.
Secondly, it is also not possible to understand that the Armed Forces in-
tervened as simple arbitrators of the political crisis. The military acted as key 
stakeholders and as active participants in political processes throughout the 
period from 1946 to 1964. The fact that they did not officially hold power does 
not take away the constant influence that they maintained over politics. In 
the case of Vargas, who had been overthrown by the military in 1945 and who 
was elected in 1950 through military endorsement, relations with the Armed 
Forces were a central component of government stability.
The political crisis of 1954 may have represented a test of the presidential 
system’s functioning and its ability to resolve conflicts. However, there was a 
clear attempt to make institutional design responsible for the crisis in order 
to, at the same time, make institutions and agents who triggered the crisis 
unaccountable. The fact that the adoption of a parliamentary system did not 
move forward is symptomatic. 
However, another political crisis would again challenge the presidential 
system and reinvigorate political and legislative movements in favor of chang-
ing the system of government. The political crisis’ critical point took place 
in November 1955, when two presidents were removed from office. Those 
events were a result of a series of conflicts that happened along the year and 
orbited around the October presidential elections.
Succession was largely pointed out as one of the serious flaws of the pres-
idential system.24 Raul Pilla highlighted the “notorious and well-proven fact 
that each presidential election generally corresponds to a serious crisis that 
23  Getúlio é um espectro que já não mais governa, “Tribuna da Imprensa”, Aug. 13 
1954.
24  Trigueiro (1976) 384.
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endangers the democratic institutions themselves.” The coincidence between 
succession and crisis was a characteristic of the presidential system in Latin 
America:
The presidential system was called an astronomical political system, for strictly sub-
mitting political events to the calendar: with equal reason, in Latin America at least, it 
could be called cataclysmic, since each succession is characterized by deep agitations, if 
not by a coup d’etat or a revolution.25 
After Vargas’ suicide, Vice President Café Filho took over the government 
with a conciliation speech. However, the 1955 presidential campaign was 
troubled by attempts to change the electoral rules, to cancel the election itself, 
and to challenge the candidacy of Juscelino Kubitschek (JK) and his running 
mate João Goulart, both of them associated with the figure of Vargas and 
therefore strongly fought by his opponents.
Those who opposed the elections claimed the existence of fraud and cor-
ruption that supposedly tainted the results of the polls. They also challenged 
the JK-João Goulart candidacy specifically, mainly due to relations with the 
communist party, which had been declared illegal by the electoral justice. The 
most radical anti-Vargas sectors gave speeches in favor of military interven-
tion and the establishment of an exception regime that should correct the 
flaws in the democratic process and prepare the country for true democracy.26 
The use of military force to solve the succession problem was defended by 
Alves Rodrigues, who argued: “This is not a coup – pure and simple – in the 
subversive sense, in the sense of ‘quarterly’.” According to him, “What every-
one wants is that the law of force imposes the force of law.”27
The announced victory of JK and Jango amplified the threats to prevent 
the elected candidates from taking office. In this context, in early November, 
President Café Filho took a temporary leave from office due to a health prob-
lem, and successor Carlos Luz took over. Under the suspicion that Carlos Luz 
was articulated with sectors favorable to a coup, the so-called preventive coup 
or countercoup was organized. A military movement led by General Henrique 
25  Franco/Pilla (1958) 370.
26  See the newspaper articles published by Lacerda: Em cima da hora, “Tribuna da 
Imprensa”, 5 Jul. 1955; Tudo legal, “Tribuna da Imprensa”, 1 Aug. 1955; Antes ou depois, 
“Tribuna da Imprensa”, 11 Aug. 1955; Proposta concreta para resolver a crise, “Tribuna da 
Imprensa”; 18 Aug. 1955.
27  Alves Filho (1955) 11-13.
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Teixeira Lott removed Carlos Luz from office. Troops and tanks cordoned off 
the area of the government palace, and the president and his close advisers 
took refuge in a warship with the initial intention of resisting.
The military movement publicly justified itself as a preventive action aim-
ing to ensure respect for the popular vote and election results and to guaran-
tee that the elected candidates took office. Carlos Luz’ removal was endorsed 
by the Congress, which approved a declaration of inability against the presi-
dent, later extended to president Café Filho when he tried to return to office. 
Café Filho appealed to the Federal Supreme Court to claim the right to end 
his term as president. Yet, one day after the appeal, the government declared 
a state of siege that prevented the Court from considering the case.
The 1955 crisis involved a dispute over the constitutional and legal or-
der.28 On the one hand, those who supported the removal of two presidents 
from office claimed the need to prevent a coup and guarantee the rules of the 
democratic game that demanded respect for the election results. On the other 
hand, those who had questioned the election results and called for military 
intervention would stand as guarantors of the legal order against the removal 
of presidents outside legal means.
Much like 1954, the political crisis in 1955 was not resolved by the means 
provided by the Constitution. Conflicts between the Legislative and Executive 
branches caused political and institutional instability. But the 1955 crisis also 
challenged an important aspect of the presidential system, which is the tran-
sition of power. The holding of presidential elections with increasing social 
participation and with instruments to guarantee the vote against coercion was 
something new and significant for Brazilian democracy. Certainly, the electoral 
processes were not free from fraud and corruption, but the attempts to inval-
idate the elections were related to another feature of the presidential system 
that bothered part of the political elites: the popular choice of the president.
It is also important to note that, despite the use of military force to remove 
the presidents from office, the solution to the crisis included the direct and 
relevant collaboration of the Legislative branch. Congress approved the dec-
laration of inability of the two presidents, as well the state of siege request-
ed by the government. The legislators that endorsed such drastic measures 
made great efforts to demonstrate that they were supported by law and by the 
Constitution. This institutional and legal endorsement is relevant to under-
stand the crisis and its effects.
28  Carloni (2012).
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Juscelino Kubitschek took office under the state of siege decreed and se-
cured by military support centered on the figure of General Lott, who became 
an influential Minister of War. As a government that was born out of a polit-
ical crisis, the idea of institutional reform was present from the start. In fact, 
the government discussed a broad constitutional reform that would promote 
a series of changes, including the electoral process, the relationship between 
powers, and legislative making process.29 Changing the system of government 
was also among the topics of discussion. 
A new parliamentary amendment was offered by Raul Pilla in April 1956 
and was under Congress’ analysis nearly through the entire Juscelino’s ad-
ministration. A significant number of parliamentarians signed the amend-
ment, including the support from leaders of majority, minority, and oppo-
sition. However, the favorable trend towards the approval of the reform was 
reversed in a few days. The pivot of this setback was the Minister of War. In 
an interview on a national radio station, on April 18, general Teixeira Lott de-
clared himself against the amendment. He said: “Personally, I am not in favor 
of parliamentarism. I think that, under the current conditions, Brazil would 
not support a change in the system of government.”30
Press channels and opposition accused Lott’s statement as undue intru-
sion into legislative work and as a military pressure, if not a military veto, to 
the amendment. The general’s statement against the change sent a clear mes-
sage for the Congress’ governing coalition to block approval of the amend-
ment. Lott would later explain that the amendment could be used to weaken 
JK’s government, as a tool for questioning presidential powers and pressing 
for new elections. In addition, although he denied it, General Lott had his 
own electoral ambitions, which were made clear when he decided to run for 
president in the 1960 elections. For someone with possible intentions to be-
come president, it was convenient to maintain the presidential system.
As Cristiano Paixão and Leonardo Barbosa point out, this episode is little 
known, despite its relevance to understand an important character such as 
Lott.31 Books generally describe Lott as an army official strictly committed 
to the rule of law and detached from party disputes. His interference in the 
legislative debate on the parliamentary reform reveals a political move and a 
29  Reforma Constitucional (1956), “Revista de Direito Administrativo”, 46.
30  Lott confirma: vetou a emenda parlamentarista, “Tribuna da Imprensa”, Apr. 18 
1956.
31  Paixão/Barbosa (2013) 56.
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calculated strategy that do not match the neutral and unbiased profile com-
monly attributed to him.
Despite the parliamentary amendment’s new defeat, the negative evalua-
tion of presidentialism was growing. An important figure would come to sup-
port the adoption of the parliamentary system: Afonso Arinos. As seen pre-
viously, Arinos had been a strong supporter of the presidential system in the 
early years of the 1946 regime. In 1957, Arinos declared his change of opinion 
based on what he understood as a failure of the presidential experience in 
Brazil.32 The diagnosis would be based on his own testimony: 
I saw, from within, in one of its most critical moments, the process of profound malad-
justment of the Brazilian presidential machine. Reflecting on it, in the light of the events 
that I experienced directly, or followed closely, I came to the conclusion that such malad-
justment has an impact outside the strictly institutional field and affects the entire com-
plex national reality, leaving its structure unstable and hampering its development.33
According to Arinos, the failure of the Brazilian presidential system was 
due to the lack of development of three main pillars: the Constitution, the 
political parties, and the Supreme Court. Firstly, Brazilian constitutional cul-
ture was attached to abstract and unstable concepts and to practices of con-
stantly changing Constitutions, with no commitment to any of them. Second, 
political parties were weak and unable to neutralize the predominant military 
influence in political processes. Finally, the Supreme Court had failed its mis-
sion to act as an arbiter of legality. Instead, the Tribunal would be defined by 
a combination of weakness, omission, and conformism.34 
Arinos’ analysis demonstrates how political crises influenced the percep-
tion of the Brazilian presidential system as a regime that did not work and 
caused democratic instability. There is no doubt that the crises were a driving 
force behind the attempts to establish parliamentarism.35 However, the fact 
that all the attempts up to 1961 failed casts light on the political, partisan, and 
electoral strategies that motivated supporting – and withdrawing support – 
for parliamentary amendments.36 At the same time, dissatisfaction with the 
presidential system also reveals difficulties in dealing with typical elements 
32  Franco (1957).
33  Franco (1958) 2.
34  Franco (1958) 5-6.
35  Esteves (1984).
36  Paixão/Barbosa (2013).
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
243
of democracy, such as popular participation in politics and the resolution of 
political and social conflicts.
Finally, Arinos suggests that the presidential system failed because the 
1946 Constitution itself would have failed. The conclusion does not seem to 
do justice to the constitutional experience of 1946 – it would be reductionist 
to assume that the institutions and mechanisms designed by the Constitution 
simply did not work. As other studies have already shown, even with difficul-
ties in institutionalizing itself, the party system after 1946 grew stronger over 
time, responding to changes and political disputes.37 The Brazilian Congress 
also emerged as one of the strongest in Latin America in the post-war period. 
Both Congress and the parties played a decisive role in the context of political 
crises, including articulation with the military.
In this sense, what was considered a crisis in the presidential system can 
also be understood as part of an adjustment process. Relations between the 
Executive and the Legislative, for example, reflected the Congress’s signifi-
cant gain in autonomy and the president’s challenge to balance popular le-
gitimacy and the need for government coalition. At the same time, tensions 
between presidentialism and democracy would not be resolved by changing 
the system of government, which was made clear by the turbulent parliamen-
tary experience of 1961-1963.
4. Final remarks: presidential system in transition
The post-1945 transition to democracy in Brazil was strongly linked to the 
debate over the system of government. The authoritarian experience of the 
“New State” (1937-1945), as well as the abuse of exceptional measures in the 
First Republic, were largely considered to be the result of the presidential sys-
tem’s excesses, that provided the president with almost uncontrollable pow-
ers. For some, democracy would require abandoning the presidential system. 
For others, it would be enough to adapt the presidential system with the nec-
essary checks and balances in order to avoid abuse.
Presidentialism was preserved after all, but it was kept under attack 
throughout the democratic period of 1945-1964. The political crises that 
shook the regime reinforced criticism towards the presidential system and 
support for the parliamentary system as the most appropriate for maintain-
ing democratic stability. In this context, frustrations regarding the political 
37  Souza (1990).
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system’s functioning were often interpreted as a continuation of the unsuc-
cessful presidential experience in Brazil. In other words, according to this 
view, after 1945 the same “imperial” presidentialism with authoritarian ten-
dencies and with no effective controls that shaped Brazilian history insofar 
predominated.
The present study demonstrates, however, that it is not possible to speak 
of a mere and pure continuity in the practice of the presidential system. The 
institutions operated under a different context, with new rules related to the 
electoral process, the party system, and political participation, as well as new 
ways of controlling and limiting the presidential power, mainly through the 
Legislative branch. The presidential system itself was in transition. This does 
not mean that the institutional model had no problems, difficulties, or con-
tradictions. But the political and legal history of the relationship between the 
Executive and the Legislative is more complex than a diagnosis of a flawed 
institutional design.
Political crises were also indications of a presidential system in transition. 
On the one hand, they demonstrate the resistance to the democratic process 
and the difficulties in resolving conflicts between the powers within the legal 
rules and framework. They also prove the willingness to break the law based 
on a justification of necessity or on the idea that the Constitution could not be 
a suicide pact. The extralegal solutions to the crises were carried out through 
interventions by the Armed Forces, which proves the central role played by 
the military. At the same time, the episodes reveal the Congress’ protagonist 
position in leading the crises and in legitimizing the measures adopted. As a 
consequence, it becomes clear that authoritarian threats cannot be under-
stood solely as a concentration of powers in the hands of the Chief Executive. 
In fact, the Legislative branch also actively participated in the process of es-
tablishing and legitimizing the post-1964 dictatorship in Brazil.
As for the parliamentary system’s defense, it can be seen that it was strongly 
connected to political and electoral strategies, especially from opposition par-
ties. Although they also aimed at improving the institutional design adopted 
by the 1946 Constitution, parliamentary amendments were influenced by the 
electoral calendar and the political crises. When it was finally implemented in 
1961, the parliamentary system was an improvised response to a new political 
crisis used as an expedient to reduce the powers of President João Goulart, as 
he took office after the resignation of Jânio Quadros.
Finally, the analysis of the relationship between the government system 
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and political instability in the context of the transition to democracy in Brazil 
after 1945 sheds light on reflections of the present time. The scenario of po-
litical instability in Latin America and the constant episodes of presidential 
removal have been the subject of several important studies.38 Investigating 
how conflicts between powers were resolved in the past and how institution-
al mechanisms worked in response to crises helps to better understand this 
scenario and further developments. After all, institutions do matter, but they 
interact with certain contexts, disputes, and strategies that are peculiar in 
times of political crisis and transition.
References
Alves Filho, F. Rodrigues (1955), Democracia corrompida ou golpe de Estado?, 
São Paulo, GEA
Carloni, Karla (2012), Forças Armadas e democracia no Brasil – o 11 de Novem-
bro de 1955, Rio de Janeiro, Garamond
Cavalcanti, Themístocles (1961), Formas de governo – uma revisão do problema, 
in: Revista de Direito Público e Ciência Política, 5, 1, January/April 1961
Cintra, Antônio Octávio (2004). Presidencialismo e parlamentarismo: são im-
portantes as instituições?, in: Sistema político brasileiro: uma introdução, São 
Paulo, Fundação Unesp.
D’Araújo, Maria Celina Soares (1992), O segundo governo Vargas 1951-1954: de-
mocracia, partidos e crise política, Second Edition, Rio de Janeiro, Ática
Dulci, Otávio Soares (1986), A UDN e o anti-populismo no Brasil, Belo Horizonte, 
UFMG
Esteves, Eunice Maria de Souza (1984), O pensamento parlamentar e o parla-
mentarismo no Brasil (1946-1961), Brasília, Fundação Nacional Pró-Memória
Franco, Afonso Arinos de Melo (1957), Minha evolução para o parlamentarismo, 
in: Revista de Ciência Política, 27, 2, Rio de Janeiro, 1-10
Franco, Afonso Arinos de Melo, Raul Pila (1958), Presidencialismo ou parlamen-
tarismo? Rio de Janeiro, Olympio
Freyre, Gilberto (1949), Nação e exército: conferência proferida na Escola do Es-
tado-Maior do Exército, Rio de Janeiro, Livraria José Olympio
Hochstetler, Kathryn (2007), Repensando o presidencialismo: contestações e 
quedas de presidentes na América do Sul, in: Lua Nova: Revista de Cultura e 
Política, 72
Lima, Hermes (1954), Lições da crise, Rio de Janeiro, José Olímpio
38  See, e.g., Valenzuela (2004); Pérez-Liñán (2007); Hochstetler (2007).
CLAUDIA PAIVA CARVALHO
246
Linz, Juan (1991). Presidencialismo ou parlamentarismo: faz alguma diferença?, 
in: Lamounier, Bolívar, A opção parlamentarista, São Paulo, Sumaré
Linz, Juan J (1990), The Perils of Presidentialism, in: Journal of Democracy, 1
Linz, Juan J., Arturo Valenzuela (eds.) (1994), The Failure of Presidential De-
mocracy, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press
Melo Franco, Afonso Arinos (1955), Os partidos políticos nacionais, in: Revista 
Forense, 157, 52
Paixão, Cristiano, Barbosa, Leonardo Augusto de Andrade (2013), Crise Política 
e Sistemas de Governo: origens da “Solução Parlamentarista” para a Crise Po-
lítico-Constitucional de 1961, in: Universitas JUS, 24, 3, 47-61
Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal (2007), Presidential Impeachment and the New Political In-
stability in Latin America, New York, Cambridge University Press
Souza, Maria do Carmo Campello (1990), Estado e partidos políticos no Brasil 
(1930-1964), Third Edition, São Paulo, Alfa-Omega
Trigueiro, Oswaldo (1976), O novo presidencialismo, in: As tendências atuais do 
direito público, Rio de Janeiro, Forense
Valenzuela, Arturo (2004), Latin American presidencies interrupted, in: Journal 
of Democracy, 15, 4
The physical body through the juridical lens:
an issue of law of innovation and of innovation in law (XIX-XX cent.)
Elisabetta Fusar Poli
1. Coordinates and spaces; 1.1. Languages and contents; 1.2. The “body” as a “ju-
ridical place” in trans-formation; 1.3. Where is the body? Natural law and general 
principles of law; 2. Some examples between the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies in Italian legal experience; 2.1. Active and passive body in crimes “against 
morality”; 2.1.2. Abduction and “forced body”; 2.1.3. Public scandal and private 
offences; 2.2. Represented and imagined body; 2.3. “Collective body”: health care 
and protection; 3. An in-progress conclusion: cues for further analysis
1. Coordinates and spaces
1.1. Languages and contents
Taking “innovation” and “transition” as coordinates, I am ready to place 
myself in a hyperbolic space, where to transfer themes that are, in some ex-
tent, “familiar” to the legal historian, but need to be re-shaped into new de-
scriptive and interpretative geometries.
I will therefore use these given coordinates in a descriptive sense, but also 
as hermeneutic categories, and then my first concern will be to provide clari-
fications on the meaning of these two words / realities / concepts, in as far as 
they are addressed here.
These are outwardly monolithic terms, from a general semantic profile, 
which find a seemingly unproblematic translation within legal frame, where 
they appear to be external categories. However, “innovation” and “transition” 
present themselves, at a closer look, with multiple and problematic levels of 
depth and facets, and seem to be able to connect with each other and tune in 
to the legal sphere, revealing unprecedented tracks and paths of study and 
analysis. 
Reflecting on the concept of “transition”,1 it appears immediately (and not 
exclusively) to be placed within a temporal-semantic field, and seems to place 
1  Precious ideas and references in Meccarelli (2018) in particular 19-21. On transition, 





itself in dialogue with that of “historical contingency”; it is also compatible – 
indeed, necessarily connected, in my opinion – with that of “evolution” in its 
most recent and prudent re-interpretations, which, in fact, combine the idea 
of a process, free from finalisms, with that of transformation by way of adap-
tation and exaptation.
In particular, “transition” identifies a process that takes place over time, 
with respect to which the dies a quo and the dies ad quem are relevant. It 
is a process that goes from a “before” to an “after”, drawing a time frame 
and tracing perspectives that the historian identifies and delineates by mak-
ing reconstructive choices, on the basis of moments and phenomena that are 
themselves transitory (I can imagine, in legal history, laws expressly ruling 
a transitional period, bodies or procedures introduced to regulate the tran-
sition from one regime to another, from one system of law to another, etc.), 
and which at the same time suggest the transition as a heuristic key. We could 
say that “transition”, as an instrument of explanation and scientific investi-
gation, has an ontological status (it is outlined in the “external” data) and at 
the same time epistemological (as a conceptual instrument that performs, in 
fact, a heuristic action).
In short: “transition” is not only what in the context declares itself as such, 
but also what the historian identifies as such in the context, taking as its refer-
ence a “before” and an “after”, which are relevant in the light of the observed 
space-time reality and from its protagonists’ point of view. This, obviously on 
the basis of the assumption that law is context-sensitive and that a legal his-
torian is above all an “observer” of the context and its main players.2
2  In particular, those who study legal history “ocupa la posición dada por la confluen-
cia entre dos puntos de vista que conllevan estrategias cognitivas y discursivas diferentes. 
Un punto de vista posterior respecto de lo acontecido, que va del presente al pasado (mira-
mos desde después) y tiende a construir genealogías, privilegiando por tanto la diacronía 
(del pasado al presente). Un punto de vista externo, que va de fuera hacia dentro (miramos 
desde fuera) y tiende a construir ‘mundos’, espacios de sentido, marcos de significado, priv-
ilegiando por tanto la sincronía (el pasado o el presente). […] Pero el historiador es la suma 
de ambos: el sujeto que, a efectos cognitivos, adopta un punto de vista posterior y externo 
respecto de lo acontecido; una abstracción, si se quiere, que usamos para designar el punto 
donde confluyen ambas perspectivas y examinar las condiciones epistemológicas que de-
terminan a quien ocupa esta posición”. Garriga (2020) 8-9. I may add, on this subject, the 
reflections of Halpérin (2017). Considerations on these issues, also with regard to the latest 
paths of legal historiography, are in Hespanha (2019): “[t]he boundary between law and 
other normative discourses and practices became totally porous and context dependent” 16.
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As for the issues outlined here, “transitional” is the same time-span con-
sidered, from a general history profile and with particular regard to the so-
cio-cultural context of the historical phase that goes from the second half of 
the nineteenth century, particularly from its last two decades, to the inter-
war period. A fifty-year timeframe, that in Europe marks the long moment of 
transition throughout modernity and to modernity.
And modernity is a key concept 3 for us, beyond conventional periodiza-
tion and historiographical debates on it. 
Reading through the self-narration of ’800/’900 actors, “modernity” is 
period in which, for the first time, innovation, the other coordinate here 
taken as our reference, becomes a distinctive sign, the one that marks the 
abrupt acceleration and trans-formation that we could say global, not only 
European, as much as the affirmation of a new anthropology, which is rooted 
in the hard sciences (there are many studies that highlight the link between 
new anthropology and theories of physics - relativity and quantum - with the 
decomposition and complexification of individual identity).4 It is a period in 
which machine starts replacing men, men are mechanized by their artificial 
extensions and mechanicism invades thought, linked to the faith in prog-
ress.5
“Modernity”, in the perception of those times, lies exactly in the clear di-
viding line between known past and the tension towards the new, a future 
3  For reflection on the concept of modernity, pregnant with meanings, I refer to Rosa 
(2015) 23-24, and his stressing on “speed” and especially “acceleration”; with reference 
to this last crucial idea, he points out that, since XVIII century a “processo accelerato di 
trasformazione della società”, in a wide cultural sense, can be detected, that is a “trasfor-
mazione dei modelli di rapporto sociale, delle forme della prassi e della sostanza della co-
noscenza (rilevante per la prassi)”. That is, there are acceleration processes within society 
and other processes that are accelerations of the society itself. For Rosa, 28, who takes as 
reference measures of changement “family” and “work”, as “istituzioni che organizzano i 
processi di produzione e riproduzione”, affected by technological acceleration, “classical 
modernity” is the period that goes from 1850 to 1970. 
4  The same “distruzione della nozione di tempo nella fisica fondamentale» is the «re-
alizzazione dell’ubiquità dell’impermanenza”: Rovelli (2017) 87; there are other “scientific 
traumas” that modernity contemplates, from non-Euclidean geometry to Darwinism. For 
a broad picture, Geymonat (1971) remains essential. For interesting hints on the relation-
ship between “machine theory” and anthropology, technique, technology and identity of 
human beeings in modern age, I refer to the essays in Russo (2007).
5  But the acceleration of modernity brings the perception of insecurity and fear with 
it: on these boundaries see Scuccimarra (2019) 21 and ff. 
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that is still not well identified, but certain and better. And innovation is a 
typical phenomenon of modernity, highlighted by economic,6 social and cul-
tural history, which in scientific, technical and technological development has 
found its most immediate and typical expression.7 
As a matter of fact, going back to language, and looking at the lemma “in-
novation” in the linguistic use and lexicography of the ‘800-’900, we identify 
clues on the significant historical path of the term,8 which put a more abstract 
semantic-conceptual field, beside innovation meant in the traditional field of 
science and technology. Indeed, it is a path that refers also to innovation as 
change, transformation and evolution, defined in opposition to the idea of 
“conservation” and “tradition”: the term “innovation” gains the wider mea-
ning, witnessed by the texts, of “introduction of new ideas, or systems in the 
political, legal, religious, artistic, scientific, economic or technical sphere”.9
If the growing diffusion of the use of the term is immediately associated 
6  It is known that from Joseph Schumpeter onwards, or since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, innovation is a crucial element in the micro- and macroeconomic re-
flection. 
7  I think of the beautiful encyclopedic item edited in 1989 by Luigi Luca Cavalli Sforza, 
anthropologist and geneticist, and recently re-edited with a final essay by Telmo Pievani, 
where innovation is an implicit element of cultural evolution: Cavalli Sforza (2019) and, 
on these issues, Fusar Poli (2020). On the nexus between culture and law in its different 
perspectives (law as culture, law in culture, culture in law etc.) there are numerous insights 
in scientific literature: I mention Cotterrell (2004) 3, as a clearly explanatory text concern-
ing this complex subject matter, in its various forms and declinations, among which the 
“comparative” one, as well as the perspective of a “law’s domination of culture”, draw a 
specific attention of the legal historian.
8  It is rather interesting to investigate the term “innovation” from a lexicographical 
profile (rooted in Italian linguistic tradition). “Innovating”, referring to multiple semantic 
fields, ranging from abstract to technical, takes on an increasingly broad and dynamic 
shared meaning, that of “transforming by introducing new systems or methods”, while the 
noun “innovation” becomes synonymous with change and evolution. In the most recent 
and accurate lexicography, to innovate means “to change, modify, vary, change by adopt-
ing or introducing new elements or methods; make something new; make new, modernize, 
modernize” and again, “profoundly transform a political, juridical, economic, religious, 
cultural situation; introduce new regulations, new institutions; reform”. The quotes are 
taken from Cardinali (1846) 76; Tommaseo/Bellini (1861) 1548-1549 but see also the pre-
cious edition (from XVII to XX cent.) of the Vocabolario of the Accademia della Crusca, 
now also available online at http://www.lessicografia.it/ricerca.jsp. 
9  The definition is translated from Battaglia (1995) 43-45.
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with a growing concrete relevance of the “innovative phenomenon”10 in the 
economic and scientific-technological field, only in very recent times innova-
tion seems to have gained its significance for legal studies, especially in reac-
tion and response to the impact of technical and scientific innovation on the 
sphere of law. However, if the non-rhapsodic and accepted use of the lemma 
in the legal field dates back to very recent times and typically concerns the 
area of “Research and Development”, this model has historical roots right at 
the end of the nineteenth century, and reconnects to industrial property and 
patent law,11 historically representing the effective legal content of innovation. 
Precisely this specific area of law offers an example of the relevance of 
innovation not only as a phenomenal datum that precedes law and which is 
conformed by law, but also as a process that concerns the law itself, internal 
to it and expressive of transformations that invest the norm, legal science, 
interpretation, discursive models, etc.
Innovation therefore becomes a versatile phenomenal and conceptual/in-
strumental tank (as a heuristic medium), concrete and abstract at the same 
time, which, in my view, implies the idea of a process – a tension in novum 
that is neither necessarily aware nor intentional – without value connotation 
as such, that implies a substantial course of time in order to be observed as 
significant, or impacting on context and not merely ephemeral. Therefore it 
is an ontologically historical phenomenon, which incorporates the transition, 
the passage from/to, and its – only apparent – negation, i.e. permanence. 
Transition and permanence: almost two tracks that implicate each other, 
which justify each other.
From these introductory lines, a wide range of intersectional questions 
and topics emerges: I will try to address some of them, within the given 
guide-coordinates. 
10  Looking at the growing and varied literature on the subject, mainly traceable 
through the last thirty years, and centered on the economic relevance of scientific-tech-
nological development, I mention, as significant also of an (albeit heterogeneous) auton-
omous area of scientific interest, Fagerberg et al. (eds.) (2005), particularly at 349-379, 
where the multiplicity of innovative models and their dynamics throughout history is 
highlighted.
11  Fusar Poli (2012): as for “research and development”, with reference to the emerg-
ing of a tight connection between research, inventions and production, also from a labour 
law point of view, see 117-129 and 226 and ff.; see also Fusar Poli (2015) on “scientific 
property” and the impact of hard sciences on innovation, in connection with the world-
wide need of legal protection for scientist work. 
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1.2. The “body” as a “juridical place” in trans-formation
Given my premises, I will take into consideration “innovation” as a process 
of change towards new internal structures in legal knowledge (methodolog-
ical, interpretation, linguistic, even epistemological innovation), focusing 
on a specific investigation area, that, according to me, intensely reflects the 
transitional phase of modernization, challenging legal actors and their instru-
ments. My aim is testing the coherence, or better, the sincronicity between 
endo-legal innovation in a moment of transition and their context, especially 
through the mediation of the jurisprudential output of the Italian courts, that 
translate the dynamic process of change and transformation of reality into 
static juridical shapes or, viceversa, adapt legal innovations to a slowly-react-
ing reality. 
Within this frame, the topic of my analysis is the “body”, real and symbol-
ic center of change and also a “legal place”,12 at the same time material and 
immaterial, a subject and an object, self-perceived by the subject of law and 
extra-perceived (or recognized) by lawyers, legal scholarship, judges, legisla-
tor. The vastness of this topic is immediately clear, and leads to potentially 
unlimited thematic gradations and perspectives, referable to the entire spec-
trum of the juridical, from the remote past to futuristic scenarios, from the 
positive datum to speculation, from norms to their interpretation. 
I therefore consider it useful to propose only some reflections – which may 
appear rhapsodic, but are rather meant to be evocative – around themes of 
extra-, trans- and endo-juridical innovation that contemplate the body as an 
12  Among the Italian jurists who have dealt with the theme of the relationship be-
tween body and law, Stefano Rodotà stands out with his numerous and intense studies, 
also developing the theme of new technologies impacting on body perception and legal 
relevance: I will just mention Rodotà (1994) and the Trattato di biodiritto directed by him 
together with Paolo Zatti, with particular reference to its second volume of Canestrari et 
al. (eds.) (2011), that collects interesting contributions where the attention to historical 
profiles is not lacking. Also, on the relationship between body, individual and person, I 
can mention Baud (2003). As for Italian legal history literature, the body issue seems to be 
mainly an implicit cultural background or a non-exclusive nor direct subject of analysis, 
especially in criminal law frame: many fruitful cues, especially about ‘right on one’s own 
body’ can be gathered from Testuzza (2013) and Testuzza (2016) but given that an exhaus-
tive picture of papers and book thematically involving ‘body’ can not be outlined, specific 
references will be given time to time. Lastly, I have found illuminating Agamben (2014), 
where ‘body’, ‘property’ and ‘use’ are put in relationship through dense pages that suggest 
fascinating perspectives for historical investigation. 
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object of law in two main senses: (1) in its immediate physical dimension – the 
body as a non-available good and mainly, for the considered period, the body 
as an active or passive subject of crime, in the kaleidoscope of criminological, 
anthropological and sociological theories developed since the second half of 
the nineteenth century; (2) from the (mediate) profile of its representation, 
both (i) concrete, as an image - we can think of visual art, photography, cin-
ema, therefore the rights and obligations arising from the new techniques of 
reproduction and diffusion of the image, and from the new needs of exploita-
tion, but also of protection of the image – both (ii) as a vehicle/symbol of 
individual rights with collective relief (for example the body as object of care, 
with the first hints of “right to health” through the theme of drug law).
It is a body in transformation, which means that it goes through a phase 
of transition towards a new definition, also juridical (from a double profile: 
descriptive and prescriptive), to which the innovation on a broadly under-
stood side contributes substantially. In all cases, these are perceptions and 
representations – immediate and mediate – of the body (and the “mind”, lo-
cated in the brain, is a part of it)13 that also change, owing to new sciences 
and techniques, more and more refined, exactly in the considered decades, 
thus imposing a challenging dialogue between legal interpretation and dif-
ferent scientific knowledges, with their methods and technical languages. In 
this way, that is, by facing new problematic issues, for which the traditional-
ly applied models, the known tools, the usual strategies and argumentative 
techniques are inadequate, incomplete or forced, the juridical discourse (and 
the physiognomy of the jurist) is innovated from the depths.
1.3. Where is the body? Natural law and general principles of law
In order to present a last introductory note, I will leave the ground to the 
distinguished Italian philosopher and jurist Giorgio Del Vecchio (1879-1970), 
in the form of a long quotation from a text I have repeatedly encountered, in 
recent times, following different study paths; a text that reflects “transition” 
in the sense of which I intend to speak, also addressing issues that touch the 
theme of “body” and its presence/absence in Italian legal system. 
The avant-garde gaze of Del Vecchio,14 while analysing the possibility of 
13  The inclusion is clear if only we think of criminal positivism theories and the model 
of anthropological determinism from which it draws inspiration: see Musumeci (2015).
14  Del Vecchio has a deep influence also on great Latin American jurists and philos-
ophers including Brazilian ones, such as Miguel Reale. On the connections between Del 
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innovating the legal system through its principles, when lacking norms, is 
also focused on the “body” and on the new shades of the relationship between 
freedom and law when connected to the body, in the light of social and cultur-
al changes, as well as economic ones, that affect the very start of the twentieth 
century.
In the lecture on the “general principles of law”, the opening address read 
for the course of Philosophy of Law in the Royal University of Rome, on De-
cember 13rd 1920, while stressing on freedom as “expression of the absolute 
value of the human personality”, he makes examples of situations in which 
“it’s perfectly admitted that effective limitations to personal arbitrium oc-
cur, not expressed in law, and yet legally valid, because grounded on those 
general principles to which the law itself refers”. Among the mentioned ex-
amples, Del Vecchio points out the “right over one’s own body”: 
The notion of the right on one’s own body, for example, is completely obscure in our 
legislation, this right is recognized and protected only indirectly, by means of the general 
public order guarantees, of the criminal laws concerning ‘crimes against the person’, and 
by the civil law only as far as it imposes compensation for damages as a consequence of 
any culpable act. The inadequacy of such a generic and indirect recognition, in a scientific 
perspective and considering the needs of definition of concrete cases, is made clear by the 
fact that many still deny the existence of a right on their own body, and that among them 
who admit it, there are vivid disagreements about the nature and consequences of the 
recognition of this right.15
These words exactly evoke a moment of transition in Italian scholarship, 
but also in the Supreme and minor courts, leaving behind consolidated posi-
tions, and moving towards new ones in absence of express legal provisions, 
notably in the field of civil law.16
Vecchio and Latin-American thought, see the notes of Rivera Llano (2017) e Leucadito 
(2017). 
15  For the text of the lecture, here translated into an English version, see Del Vecchio 
(1921), but also its reproduction in Rivista Italiana per le Scienze Giuridiche, VIII (2017) 
15-63 (43 in particular), preceded by the interesting notations by Bruno Romano (3-14). 
On the disruptive (for Italian legal scholarship of the time) thought of Del Vecchio, see also 
Sciumè (2002) 220 and ff. 
16  The acts of disposition on parts of the body are the first normative expression of 
rights on the body, which finds a normative discipline starting from art. 5 of the Italian Civil 
Code dated 1942, which translates into law previous jurisprudential and doctrinal orienta-
tions. Note that, originally, an art. 6 entitled “Rights to one’s own body”, has been drafted, 
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Not surprisingly, Del Vecchio writes about the “body” and its legal re-defi-
nition, through the mirror of “general principles of law” of the Italian legal 
system, that are a conservative and innovative instrument (handled by judg-
es, really a key factor for us) at the same time, therefore able to ride the transi-
tion. And exactly on case law and on Italian law courts interpretative paths we 
are now turning our glance, to observe the “law in action” through its actors, 
and to detect (or not) the sincronicity between change in reality and innova-
tion in the juridical (not only normative) dimension. 
Our attention will be focused on criminal law, a crucial field, where the 
body seems to be impacted from multiple sides, as a material and physical 
entity (the “crimes against the person” mentioned by Del Vecchio, give it sig-
nificance), but also in the light of its “social perception” and public represen-
tation.  
2. Some examples between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Ital-
ian legal experience
2.1. Active and passive body in crimes “against morality”
2.1.1. Abduction and “forced body”
Given the premises above, our field of investigation and analysis is iden-
tified by the decisions of the Court of Cassazione of the Kingdom of Italy, be-
tween “Zanardelli Code” (1889) and “Rocco Code” (1930),17 concerning crimes 
that imply the “social representation” or projection of the body. The two codes 
are reference points identifing a specific legal transition, that goes from a “lib-
providing that the only two limits for acts of disposition of the body when phisically dam-
aging, are law and moral; indeed, in Pandolfelli/Scarpello/Stella Richter/Dallari (1939) 58, 
we find that “L’art. 6 del progetto non s’ispira al rigore di quei principi, per i quali dovreb-
bero ritenersi prive di effetto tutte le disposizioni che toccano l’integrità del proprio corpo, 
in base a quelle preoccupazioni aprioristiche per le quali si afferma che il corpo non può 
essere oggetto di alcun diritto di cui la persona è titolare, essendo esso stesso un elemento 
essenziale della personalità. Il progetto muove, invece, dalla considerazione che esistono, 
anche nel campo del diritto privato, numerosi contratti in cui la persona dispone del pro-
prio corpo più o meno direttamente o indirettamente (contratto di baliatico, di locazione 
d’opere, contratti di circo, ecc.). si è pertanto ritenuta adeguata una norma che dichiari tali 
disposizioni permesse quando non siano contrarie alla legge o alla morale”.
17  On Zanardelli and Rocco Codes, see the essays and the sources collected in Vinci-
guerra (1999) and Vinciguerra (2010). On the court of Cassazione, my main references are 
Abbamonte (2003), Meccarelli (2005), Mastroberti (2014).
ELISABETTA FUSAR POLI
256
eral” criminal code to the “fascist era” code, stimulating a closer look at the 
balance between tradition (as justice protects the given system) and innova-
tion of interpretative solutions, especially when dealing with extra-juridical 
data and phenomena deeply rooted into the cultural and social background. 
It is a topic I have recently investigated, through an extensive and inten-
sive exam of the case law, especially devoting my attention on cases where 
criminal offences acted against persons and violating bodies are punished for 
their intrinsic and mediate vulnus to society and its widely shared values. 
We are talking about crimes originally (by 1889 Code) considered “against 
good customs and the order of families”, and that Italian Criminal Code of 
1930, according to a different systematic choice, has splitted into the cate-
gory of “crimes against public morality” and “crimes against the family”.18 
The law provisions concerning these criminal offences, that have a predomi-
nantly sexual connotation, reflect a precise vision of “person” in society (with 
its internal order and given rules), a vision that, first of all, is shared by the 
legislator, and also solicits law-appliers and law-interpreters to a complex 
trans-duction from a system of values to a system of rules and vice versa. 
A logical operation that reveals – precisely through the legal discourse 
developed in the judgments – how much and through which argumentative 
paths this social vision finds concrete affirmation in the frame of justice.
Looking closely at the sources regarding the types of crime considered 
here, we can observe how the new sciences, firstly social and medical ones, 
have, on the one hand, impacted on the tools of knowledge and decision-mak-
ing process of the judge, necessarily also conditioning the language, more 
and more accurate and “technical”;19 on the other hand, they have fueled her-
18  As for legal doctrine on the specific crimes, see Calogero (1890), Precone (1892), 
Mortara (1890-1899), Tuozzi (1902), Manzini (1934), Grispigni (1939). 
19  With regard to the connections between law and new sciences, especially from the 
criminological and medico-legal profiles (particularly connected to the development of the 
“Positive School” and to the “experimental” method), I mention Speciale (2012), Musu-
meci (2015) and with reference to the Positive School, in particular on the topics hereof, 
Musumeci (2012), Colao (2012), Miletti (2012). The new relevance assumed by the crim-
inological and, more generally, psycho-anthropological studies, variously absorbed by a 
large part of the legal doctrine, is also evident in the argumentation of the decisions taken 
by the courts. Especially from the 10s of the ‘900, the relevance of the subjective state of 
the offender, or the “criminal” or emotional nature of the accused, seems to become crucial 
and is outlined by means of technical (psychiatric, physiological, byological) languages 
borrowed by social and medical sciences.
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meneutical slow changes affecting the balancing of principles, interests and 
rights. And the balance seems to be also weighting tradition (what needs to be 
kept effective) and innovation (what needs a new shape, content or solution) 
in a permanent dialogue between these two (apparent) opposites.   
If it is true that judges tend to be attentive to the respect of the literal 
data and of the legislator’s voluntas, thus confirming their role as guardians 
of values, both in full liberal age and in the years of the fascist regime, it is 
equally true that the law-maker’s choices, particularly those concerning the 
considered crimes, leave ample margins, stimulating a more intense inter-
pretative effort, for which also the axiological choices assume importance. 
In fact, through the “body” – which physically undergoes the criminal action 
– also enters the “moral”20 and, by this way, the passive subject of the crime, 
typically female and of minor age, often does not coincide with the subject 
properly offended and does not hold the primarily injured legal asset. 
From a certain point of view, the body that undergoes the violent or per-
verse action of the offender is a sort of medium, an instrument through which 
rights belonging to a sort of collective domain are injured: criminal behavior 
passes through the individual physical body, but the good actually injured is 
another, it’s immaterial and it’s held by the social community.
During the considered years, in the judge’s weighting, “sexual freedom”21 
and the concept of autonomy and self-determination of human beings over 
their own bodies is very far from making its appearance; the very first “rudi-
mental” ideas of integrity and inviolability of the physical body do not signifi-
cantly enter into a relationship of comparison with the need to repress the un-
lawful conduct that puts the social canons and order (as it is positivized into the 
legal frame) at risk. And the body is the indirect protagonist, also through the 
words of judicial decisions: it is the image and the instrument of those canons 
and of the moral qualities in which they are concretized.
In this regard, from the point of view of the historical investigation, the 
case of the “ratto”22 (that is the case of abduction with sexual aims) appears 
20  On the liberal period morality, see also Rizzo (2004).
21  As Testuzza (2013) 282 clarifies, sexuality is the first manifestation of corporeality 
to become the object of specific consideration by the jurist, typically in connection with 
the context of marriage where sexuality should “functionally” be expressed, very far from 
ideas of bodily integrity or freedom.
22  Arts. 340 e 341 of Zanardelli Code and 522-524 in Rocco Code. For an interesting 
analysis concerning this crime and the short-distance dialogue between Cassazione and 
lower courts on different interpretations, see Cazzetta (1999) 361 and ff.  
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to be particularly significant of a transition, which leads to identifying in the 
subject directly offended (physically forced, suffering physical or moral vio-
lence), and no longer in the family – violated in its unity personified by the 
father-symbol – the actual (as the moral and social) victim of the crime. 
The conduct of those who, with violence, threat or deceit (but also with 
consent of the minor-age victim) subtracts or holds with them a person, both 
to force her to contract marriage in case of a woman, or for the purpose of 
lust, presents a dense and articulated case study. The violent or “consensual” 
abduction (punished by both the Codes) is typically against the female minor, 
but places the theme of the violation of the patria potestas in primary evi-
dence, prevailing with respect to the right of freedom of the subject to which 
the corporal abductous conduct is immediately directed. The victim of the 
crime is, in fact, the family 23 – even, more widely, the social order, as evi-
denced by the fact that a ‘reparative marriage’ extinguishes the crime – not 
the person who is violated.
In the 1920s the interpretation begins to consolidate, and the “ratto” ap-
pears as an offense that primarily affects “the right to individual freedom of 
the person abducted” and only in consequence that of the family,24 from that 
descending the extension of the protection of the effective passive subject 
(even if minor and orphan without tutors, or in case of consent of the parental 
authority) through the argumentation of some innovative decisions. 
A decision given in 1926 on the subject of consensual “ratto”, through a 
23  In this sense, as for case law from the most relevant specialized law reviews, which 
are my main source of decisions, I can mention Cass. Pen, 19 December 1890, Ric. Mira-
bella, Pres. De Cesare, in Monitore dei Tribunali, 32 (1891) 89, significant of the premi-
nent family honour. In XX cent. a new interpretation is making its way: see, for instance 
Cass. Pen., 23 March 1914, Ric. Cavallone, Pres. Blancuzzi, in Giustizia Penale, 19 (1914) 
723-725, where, in a case of consensual “ratto” the judge highlight an harm, both of the 
order of the families (and the legal objectivity is represented by the lesion of the rights of 
the patria potestas), and of certain rights of the raped, who is the “true passive subject 
of the crime”, therefore entitled to complaint “even without the assistance of those who 
integrate its legal capacity” (in the same sense Cass. Pen., 17 July 1903, Ric. Lo Giudice, 
Pres. Petrella, in Monitore dei Tribunali, 45 (1904) 258. The relevance of social and family 
values lies also in the provision that exclude the punishment (Zanardelli Code: art. 352) or 
criminal relevance of the conduct of the offender (Rocco Code: art. 544), in case of subse-
quent marriage with his victim.
24  See, for example, Cass. Pen., 25 January 1922, Ric. Tucci, Pres. Nonis, in Giustizia 
Penale, 27 (1922) 927-930.
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synthetic reconstruction of the jurisprudence and case law developed and with 
an argumentation focused on identifying the injured right, rejecting legalistic 
formalism, states that: “while not disputing that the objectivity of the consen-
sual crime is based on the violation of family rights, it simultaneously admits 
a direct injury also to the rights of the minor, who is the passive subject of the 
offence; and therefore she too is materially and morally affected and offended 
by the crime itself, also for the possible injury of her personal freedom”.25 
Almost unexpectedly, considering the patriarchal ideology of the period, 
but at the same time predictably, in the light of the slow path that the case 
law has traced in the previous decades, even under the validity of the Italian 
Criminal Code of 1930, which places the crime of “ratto” partially among the 
crimes “against the family” – and which also assigns a fundamental social 
role to the family cell, according to fascist organicist view of social collectivity 
– the interpretation of the judge is oriented towards recognizing the very per-
sonal rights of the subject primarily offended. We are on the threshold of the 
recognition of fundamental rights and this gradual process flows like a karst 
river even in times that would seem to follow a contrary direction. 
We can think we are talking about innovations that gradually stabilize and 
consolidate,26 despite of the historical period and of the formal legal choices.
2.1.2. Public scandal and private offences
In some situations, the judge’s interpretation seems strongly stereotyped 
and appears to be taking an inverse direction with respect to the idea of (even 
slow) emancipation we could expect, taking into consideration the cultural 
and social climate. Attitudes and postures that are deeply rooted in tradition 
could be hard to remove, or could even find new vitality, if not new politi-
cal-ideological nourishment. Resistances and viscosity, despite of moderniza-
tion (we could even think of different speeds within the texture of reality), are 
mirrored or even fostered by judicial decisions  
25  Cass. Pen. 15 March 1926, Ric. Carandola, Pres. Dobelli, in Giustizia Penale, 31 
(1926) 598-599.
26  We can underline the emergence of a “strutturale ambiguità della leva giudiziaria: 
ora docile strumento repressivo, ora potente macchina di costruzione del consenso; spesso 
asservita al regime ma anche dotata di insospettabili logiche proprie, non del tutto addo-
mesticabili»: justice appears to fulfill a «funzione conformativa e performativa: da un 




In this regard, it seems to me particularly significant of the connection 
between the body, the sphere of what we now define as “sexual freedom”, and 
public morality, the relevance of the “scandal”, that is the disturbance to the 
common moral sense, which can be determined by the perception (with the 
eyes or through the narration) of a part of the body or of sexually connoted 
behaviors. As well as a large number of decisions in which the element of the 
“scandal”, the “commotion of public opinion”, is a constitutive element of the 
crime, we can also count many cases in which it plays the role of a decisive 
circumstance for the purposes of the trial. If adultery, or incest, are punished 
only in the event of a public scandal, there is also the “indecent exposure” 
offence, a sort of residual case, for which the impact of the conduct on an 
indistinct “public” assumes decisive importance.27 
In every situation, the objectivity of the “scandal” turns out in different 
and mutable interpretative shades, clearly representing the difficulties in 
giving substance to that “common moral sense” whose injury is relevant for 
legal purposes. The qualification of the scandal that emerges from motiva-
tions is mainly the result of this argument: the scandal causes an “injury 
to the rights of society”28 and therefore the behavior, which would other-
wise fall within the sphere of private actions, becomes harmful to a collective 
right, hence deserving to be repressed. Public relevance, visibility and the 
effect of social disturbance are a constant in the logical arguments of the de-
cisions in the considered decades, but ‘scandal’ is a word that through legal 
interpretation is filled with meaning, varying as the value system (and social 
context) changes.
The trial itself, in case of crimes against morality, causes scandal and “of-
fense propagation”: everything refers to the public relevance of the crimes 
considered and the offense inflicted by them. The fact that the element of 
public impact is decisive, also from an argumentative point of view, can be 
seen from many profiles, including the procedural one: prosecution ex officio 
rather than lawsuit (and the remissibility of it) provided for by the legislator 
is a normative index, from an argumentative profile, of a greater impact of the 
crime on collective morality. The aim is “not to attract the great light of justice 
27  In the twentieth century, also in connection with the spread of the press, a rather 
articulated case study emerges (sometimes colorful), which focuses on sexuality and the 
female body exposed in images, described in literary works, depicted in works of art.
28  C. App. Milano, 1 December 1896, App. Altigieri, Pres. Geloso Peralta, in Monitore 
dei Tribunali, 38 (1897) 535-536.
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[...] over the travails of intimate life”, if not strictly necessary in relation to the 
gravity of the offence injuring the collective morality.29
The approach to body, sexuality and moral issues seem to lie on a continu-
ous path, from liberal to fascist period. We can figure out a line,30 from liberal 
individualism to fascist collectivism, traceable on the basis of a persisting ten-
sion to social control through cultural and ideological strategies of commu-
nication as well. A common paternalistic model encouraged or impelled by 
the State as a compacting and strengthening (exploitable) value is carried on, 
notwithstanding a different collective sentiment. 
This is an asyncronicity reflected by case law: a sort of conservative resis-
tance to innovation and change (according to the institutional and political 
foreground31 and rejecting the social and cultural background), with a few 
sparks of exception. Sparks that shed light on different future scenarios. 
2.2. Represented and imagined body
Trying to widen the gaze towards a concept of “mediated” body, but this 
time in an effective and technical sense, that is in connection with the wide 
spreading images by means of new instruments and methods of reproduction 
and communication boosted by technological innovation, emerges the pos-
sibility of investigating the links between law and body from a perspective 
that is undoubtedly unknown to the jurist until the first half of the nineteenth 
century.
Between the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth century, there is a remarkable development of legal initiatives 
aimed at regulating rights on “intellectual works” (copyright and patent law 
are involved) both in the domestic and international legal framework.32 These 
29  This is stated in Cass. Pen., 17 July 1922, Pres. Nonis, in Giustizia Penale, 27 (1922) 
1015-1017. See also Rizzo (2003). 
30  See Cazzetta (1999), especially from p. 185, where, among others, the feminine 
consent issue lifts the veil over the deceptive and rhetorical ‘secularization’ of criminal law 
in the liberal age; in this way a continuity, from liberal period and the fascist one loses its 
hyperbolic guise. 
31  It is well known the distrust of the regime for the judiciary, or rather, for those 
individual personalities who, from within, threaten the image of granitic compactness and 
common adhesion to the imposed values: see, among others, Abbamonte (2011) 902 and 
Meniconi (2015). 
32  As for intellectual property, see Fusar Poli (2014).
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“new rights” of the authors and inventors may conflict with or impact on oth-
er emerging rights: those “of personality” whose conceptual shaping is in 
progress by European (German and French in particular) legal scholarship. 
We can appreciate that the “right on one’s own image”, begins to be taken into 
serious consideration at the start of XX cent. by civil law and commercial law 
scholars; then, it’s also faced and reflected in the case law, revealing a growing 
friction surface between law principles.33 
Also in this case, a further reference to Del Vecchio’s lecture can lead us to 
the heart of the matter.
Among the examples of possible recourse to the general principles of law, 
in order to fill regulatory gaps and balance intersubjective conflicts between 
their respective freedoms, Del Vecchio mentions the “right to image”:
No provision of law in our system prohibits, for example, a painter or a photographer 
from portraying the image of anyone, and also from disclosing it; nor could such a prohi-
bition derive from other legal provisions by analogy. If the aforementioned criterion were 
true, for which in all cases not covered by law the legal solution would consist in excluding 
any limitation, the said activity should therefore be judged included without limit in the 
sphere of individual law. But the more general and true principle, which embraces, not 
only negatively, the essence of the human personality, that principle which is implicit in 
our legal system, requires a deeper and, we would like to say, more substantial examina-
tion of the abovementioned relationship. The artist’s will to portray and disseminate the 
image of others has to be balanced with the will of whom the disclosure of his/her appear-
ance may not like. 
The conflict finds a solution, according to Del Vecchio, “going back to the 
general principle of respect for the human personality, and placing in rela-
tion with it that particular expression of the personality which consists in one 
33  For a careful examination of the European doctrine on the subject, I refer to Piola 
Caselli (1904), reported in comment to a decision of the Court of Appeal of Turin of 3 
March 1903: in relation to a controversy dealing with the photographic reproduction of a 
female body, he addresses the issue of the conflict between copyright and “right on one’s 
own image” (as for Piola Caselli himself, he seems not to consider the specific right as 
falling within the scope of the “rights of personality”). I also refer, as a doctrinal point of 
reference, to Kohler (1903), as well as, also for evidences of the recurrence in Italian case 
law, Ricca Barberis (1903); Ferrara (1903) (who goes back to the theme in 1942, with a 
valuable and organic essay); Dusi (1906) and, for the first avant-garde hints of attention, 
Amar (1872) 365 ff. Legal scholarship at the beginning of the twentieth century swings 
between imagine as a substantial part of the body, and imagine as an autonomous juridical 
quid, and also shifts from the existence of an absolute right to a complete denial of it.
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own’s physiognomy”. Hence the juridical figure of the “right over one’s own 
image”, “presupposes a foundation of reason in our law, beyond the express 
terms of the law”.34 
If legal scholarship reflecting on principles of civil law shows interest and 
wide opening to these atypical matters, as well as a fruitful flexibility, also 
through the reception of European theories and models, the same compliance 
with the frantic changes of reality cannot be detected passing to the side of 
criminal law.
The “body image” issues addressed by case law often mix up civil and 
criminal matters and reveal interesting examples of “resistance” that con-
firm the remarks of the previous paragraph, involving crimes against “public 
morality” focused on sexuality and on the female body displayed in images 
or represented (or described or suggested) in intellectual works. Here it is, 
precisely, the image of the body that assumes direct relevance and there is a 
close relationship between the concerns of the judges, even more rigorous in 
outlining the contours of the cases, and the changed cultural climate that is 
the “official” backdrop to the judgments considered. 
See for instance the “indecent exposure” crimes: they become more and 
more frequently detected in cases of representation of the body, in connection 
with a certain “morality” taken as a reference. If the international case of the 
Entartete Kunst shows us in a spectacularly evident way this connection in its 
most “pathological” form, Cassazione decisions are not less significant when 
recognizing the body as vehicle of moral principles, thus revealing, through 
argumentation, the changing of the reference value system especially during 
fascist period.35 The connection body-image-morality is in any case clear and 
again seems to disconnect the legal and judiciary frame from the effective 
social one, according to an “imposed morality”. 
34  The translated sentences are taken from Rivista Italiana per le Scienze Giuridiche, 
8 (2017) 42-43.
35  The Cassazione is called to express itself on the subject of “indecent exposure” in 
relation to literary works and figurative art more and more frequently between the years 
‘20 and ’30 of XX cent.: “art must tend to purify the environment, it must soften, not dirty, 
the costume” (Cass. Pen., 7 June 1926, Riccardo Mariani and Mattavelli, Pres. Bianchi, in 
Giustizia Penale, 31 (1926) 478- 482; in the same sense Cass. Pen., 13 May 1931, President 
Carrara, in Giustizia Penale, 37 (1932) 239-241 and Cass. Pen., 30 aprile 1934, Ric. Donivi, 
Pres. Saltelli, in Giustizia Penale, 39 (1934) 1132-1334). 
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2.3. “Collective body”: health care and protection
Lastly, in order to conclude the series of examples, it is worth mentioning 
the subject of the body as a vehicle/symbol of individual rights with a col-
lective projection: health as a pattern of relations, that implies a connection 
between individual bodies and the “social body” in its collective sense.
In this field, the theme of drug regulation and its “patentability” is a signif-
icant example in our perspective, both in the sense that it involves the exter-
nal datum of innovation – in a period in which scientific and industrial devel-
opment undergoes a phase of profound transformation, in which interests of 
the chemical industry, relaunched by the war events, are particularly pressing 
– and also from an internal perspective, with regard to the emergence of new 
interests worthy of legal protection and with reference to the balancing of 
these interests with those individual, or in any case particular, to the exploita-
tion of the product of intellectual work.36
Starting from the first attention of the jurists, the issue arouses strong 
contrasts and even ideological conflicts, in particular revealing the close 
connection between the level of economic development and the provision 
of patent protection. This last relationship becomes tangible when the pat-
ent model is exported, being the object of a regulatory “transplant” outside 
the European borders (see the law of the Latin American colonies, but also 
the Far East ones), and the exclusion of the patenting of drugs becomes a 
reason of differentiation from the law of the “mother country”. And here 
there is a transitional theme that has also a spatial dimension, inherent in 
the transplant.37 
But going back to the specific Italian experience, we notice that, in the 
most significant moments of the parliamentary debate related to the Pied-
montese draft law concerning the rights on industrial inventions and discov-
eries 38 (finally entered into force in 1855 and then extended to Lombardy and 
all Italian provinces), a substantial modification of the original draft involves 
the exclusion of patentability for “inventions or discoveries concerning phar-
36  Fusar Poli (2013) 159-160, 202, 218.
37  On the theme, Augusti (2016) offers a clear analysis of literature, and suggest a 
stimulating exploitation of the heuristic category in historical approach.
38  It is the Law 12 March 1855, n. 782, also known as Law 30 October 1859, n. 3731, 
that is the provision that extends to the first of the territories acquired to the future King-
dom of Italy, the Piedmont patent law.
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maceutical preparations or medicaments of any kind”.39 But the normative 
exclusion is weakened by jurisprudence and case law: the exceptional nature 
of the exclusion, with respect to the “natural” right deriving from the inven-
tion, does not allow an extensive interpretation of the law, and the patent-
ability at least of the ‘procedure to obtain drugs’ is gradually admitted.40 A 
surreptitious change, we may say.
The main problem of the drug issue is closely linked to the new industrial 
economy and new research structures, which also require attention to the 
needs of economic incentive for research and discovery/invention actors 
and activities. At the base of the prohibition, still, there is a highly idealistic 
vision of medical research, while, in reality, biochemical research is part 
of the production cycle. In a few words: on one side, we have the scientist, 
being an employee of the investing company, hence a cost for it; on the oth-
er side, there’s a rudimental “right to health”, guaranteed also through the 
wide accessibility of pharmaceutical drugs, a right that seem to overbalance 
industrial needs.
Patentability being excluded, also the path of “scientific property” is re-
sidually followed.41 In the draft agreement drawn up by Francesco Ruffini in 
1923 for the League of Nations, aimed at ensuring protection and remunera-
tion for scientific activity, we find an extension of the possibility of protecting 
drugs (the “medicaments”), implicitly circumventing the ban on patenting in 
various European countries, including Italy. The “scientific property” fails its 
aim, wrecked in international contrapositions, and slowly disappear from in-
ternational tables, but leaves important traces: Italian legislator, while deal-
ing with the reform of industrial property law enacted in 1934, revitalizes the 
issue and, substantially accepting the requests made by the pharmaceutical 
associations, deletes the old (and badly tolerated) exclusion of patentability.42 
The law innovation is merely ephemeral, because it never becomes effective, 
39  Embracing the positions of the prevailing French doctrine: see in particular Re-
nouard (1865) 308 ff. 
40  As for the history of drug patentability, see in particular Mazzolà (1951) and Ro-
tondi (1952), as well as Barone (1978), this last one commenting the decision of the Con-
stitutional Court mentioned afore in text.
41  Fusar Poli (2015).
42  I’m referring to the Royal Decree 13 September 1934, n. 1602 which, however un-
implemented, marks a fundamental moment in the history of the legal discipline. Com-
menting on the exclusion of drugs from patentability, the prohibition is linked to «errors 
of appreciation or prejudices» (Laboccetta (1931) 19).
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and a subsequent decree in 1939 restores again the status quo ante, also trig-
gering questions of constitutional legitimacy. 
It is an ambiguous and complex story that does not end up with the crys-
tallization of the principles (including that of health) in the republican con-
stitutional chart: the prohibition on patenting falls only with the D.P.R. June 
22, 1979, n. 338, implementing the well-known pronunciation of the Italian 
Constitutional Court n. 20, dated 20 March 1978, whose motivation is partic-
ularly attentive to the historical steps.43 In particular, the Court detects an in-
ner conflict between the Government draft law 44 and the parliamentary Com-
mission one, concerning the ratio of the disputed law provision welcomed by 
the Piedmontese legislator and then by the Italian one. 
The main reasons of the (“outdated” according to the Court) legal provi-
sion were originally based on the opportunity of “prevent charlatans, apothe-
caries and ‘secretists’ from taking advantage of patent rights to sell products 
that are not useful for health”; on the concern about an increase of the price of 
drugs caused by the patent; on the idea that the discoverer - inventor - philan-
thropist, who dispenses to all men the fruit of his research, is not entitled to 
any form of economic remuneration, except for prizes in case of “reported 
benefits”. Unconvincing reasons, as can be seen, that have clashed head-on 
with the principles of the Italian constitutional chart, in particular that of 
equality (art. 3) and also with the Republic’s duty to “promote scientific and 
technical research”.
Is this case a case of “positive” innovation carried out through case law? 
Can we consider the long period of the exclusion of patentability, eluded by 
courts’ decisions, a transitional one, contrary to the real and prevailing atti-
tude, and caused by the accidental prevailing of a minor voice in the legisla-
tive debate, as sources seem to demonstrate? The “pharma” issue should need 
an even more thorough examination.
3. An in-progress conclusion: cues for further analysis
I can now try to shortly highlight those that seem to me to be some of the 
significant points revealed by the themes and examples I have chosen within 
the perspective of “innovation and transition in law”. 
43  See the precious comment on the case, by Pardolesi (1978).
44  The main author of the Government draft, Antonio Scialoja, opposes the prohibi-
tion, but the orientation prevailing in Parliament results in the exclusion of patentability: 
see Fusar Poli (2012) 44.
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I could not say that the following considerations are shaped as a real con-
clusion; I would rather say that they represent the partial results of an inves-
tigation that lends itself to be integrated and expanded. An exploitation of 
the same perspective could be imagined, outspreading the studied examples 
(I think in particular of the theme of body in relation to “collective health”, 
to the “state of exception” and the emergency legislation), or even deeply ex-
ploring the multiple facets of the two coordinates taken into consideration.
On this last point, I find stimulating, for the heuristic potential it offers, 
the hypothesis of deepening the spaces of overlap between “transition” and 
“innovation”, bringing them into an interdisciplinary context that seems nec-
essary to me to fully hold this view. I tried to highlight some aspect of this 
intersectional complexity in my analysis and the first insight reveals challeng-
ing answers to my opening questions.
For instance, through the cases discussed as examples, we see that inno-
vation appears, both from an “external”, scientific-technological profile, and 
from an “endo-legal” approach, the last one revealing an often unpredictable 
process of gradual, non-traumatic change, which may concern language, nor-
mative content, legal models or institutions, argumentation, etc.. Exploring 
this second, “internal” key, it is not worth asking which, between innovation 
or transition, is the logic or chronological prius, but rather highlighting that 
innovation consists in a (sometimes really slow and imperceptible) transi-
tion, as a dynamic process that is based on (and conceptually implies) tradi-
tion and continuity and tends to permanence. 
It can be said that in this process, law-appliers and law-interpreters (main-
ly jurisprudence and case law) played – plays? – a fundamental role, from 
two main sides: (i) by means of argumentation and by affirming principles 
of law that impacts on law interpretation and, (ii) giving inputs on the law-
maker itself. It is above all by looking at case law playing the role of mediator 
between positive law and reality, that we can grasp how ‘external’ innovation 
and changes can be translated into the shapes of law and, at the same time, 
how the juridical dimension itself experiences changes in a sort of adaptation 
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From telegraph to telephone: an exemplary transitional space
in the legal discipline of technical innovations (1877-1903)
Francesca Martello
1. The hint of transition in the legal world: the telephone, an exemplary case with 
uncertain contours; 2. The intuitive similarity between telegraph and telephone: 
considering analogy, fragmentation and incompatibility; 3. The precarious bal-
ance between academic and jurisprudential solutions and legislative attempts; 4. 
Tradition, fixed points and identity of each transitional space 
1. The hint of transition in the legal world: the telephone, an exemplary 
case with uncertain contours 
On the theme of the interweaving of law and technical innovation, there 
are numerous spaces of transition that usually emerge, chronologically speak-
ing, between the significant diffusion of invention and the promulgation of an 
ad hoc legislative discipline capable of regulating, if not all of them, at least 
the most relevant and new legal profiles opened up by the novelty introduced. 
It becomes interesting therefore to analyze what happens in this framework 
and which contingent legal strategies are adopted to face new forms of rela-
tionships generated by the apparatus responsible. This investigation is not 
intended to be a mere survey of provisional solutions, but an attempt to re-
construct the most salient features of an exemplary transient period which, 
at least in an inductive way, allow us to grasp and define the contours of tran-
sience as an autonomous object of study.
Beside the awareness of progress,1 there emerges explicitly from most of the 
essays and monographs on technical innovations, the perception of the  transi-
tory nature of the  legal situation at that time. More voices manifest the realiza-
tion that, in the face of a “sun of progress”2 that is seen to constantly “change and 
1  For the different elaborations on the concept of “progress” see Testoni (1976); Sasso 
(1980); Sasso (1984); Papa (1985). The latter’s conception is used by Giuseppe Speciale 
to distinguish between an Enlightenment conception, where progress is not a necessary 
character of human history but depends on man’s ability, and a historical conception ac-
cording to which progress is a necessary and absolute character of human evolution. Spe-
ciale (2001). For sources see Miceli (1911).




evolve”3 into an “unceasing movement that transforms, and transforming ev-
erything improves (...), wraps around everything, penetrates everything”,4 “the 
science of law and law itself are not stationary but should be the constant mir-
ror of the moral and economic conditions of a people”.5 So the flow of progress 
reverberates in the progress of law. However, this passage is never linear and 
immediate: one perceives the surprise in the words of Camerano who idealizes 
photography as a wind that “penetrates suddenly, knowing no obstacles, not 
stopping in front of barriers”.6 At the same time, they are openings determined 
by sociological development which, as the “basis of inorganic, organic and so-
cial evolution”7 is ineluctable, even if in the period between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries it experienced a singular peak marked by “cluster innova-
tions”.8 Then, most of the innovations, at the dawn of their introduction, fol-
lowed an “uncertain and changing technical trend” without developing “except 
rather poorly”.9 This was true for the telegraph and the telephone,10 but also for 
“the appearance of railway tracks, and cars  that were greeted with hostility”.11 
In practice, it opens up, “transition periods”12 in which “science, and, even more 
so, positive law do not reflect very faithfully the needs of society (…), nor are 
they in perfect harmony with them”.13 The work of the legislator is, therefore, 
figurative as a path in constant perfectibility in which each step “highlights pre-
viously unknown or unsanctioned rules of law or promulgates new rules (...) 
replacing the force of the law with the arbitrariness of legislation”.14 
3  Cogliolo (1891).
4  Chironi (1882).
5  Giampietro (1918).
6  Camerano (1902).
7  Chironi (1886).
8  Ciriacono (2000). 
9  Nitti (1897).
10 Nitti (1897). 
11  This discourse cannot be generalized to all technical innovations: “(…) dovunque i 
palloni, gli aeroplani e i dirigibili sono stati accolti sempre festosamente, anzi con entusia-
smo, mentre la comparsa delle strade ferrate, dei telegrafi, dei telefoni e degli automobili 
fu in altri tempi accolta ostilmente”. Meili (1910).  
12  Giampietro (1918). 
13  Giampietro (1918).
14  Norsa (1883). Of the same tenor Foligno: “Sennonché, mentre quando la nuova in-
venzione è all’inizio, bastano generalmente o si fanno bastare le norme giuridiche esistenti 
[…], più tardi, quando questa è perfezionata e specialmente messa alla portata di tutti, 
si sente la necessità di nuove apposite regole che ne determinino il funzionamento che 
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The collection of characteristics incidentally attributed by 19th and 20th 
century jurists to  transitional phenomenon, outlines some essential traits 
suitable for a first focus on this abstract object of study namely its unpre-
dictability is one with its inevitability, which align it very closely to anoth-
er theme of becoming, namely, the crisis;15 the uncertainty and instability 
that characterize its evolutionary process but also a certain circumscription, 
to use mathematical jargon, of its boundaries and finally, the disconnection 
between transitional solutions and the needs of reality. Essential characteris-
tics, fleetingly perceptible but nevertheless grasped by jurists in every breach 
in the legal system opened by technical innovations. 
For a more in-depth analysis of these aspects and their peculiarities, the 
choice, for various reasons, falls on the transitional space generated by the 
diffusion of the telephone. The advent of telephone communication is, first 
of all, an exemplary case, deeply representative of the sudden legal vacuum 
that a novelty can generate. Several contributions to legal doctrine16 intro-
duce the issues related to telephony starting precisely from the “problems 
and complaints”17 raised by an unregulated use of the device, with reference 
to the first services for  public use, the installation of telegraph poles and ca-
bles on  private property, public safety and episodes of interference between 
several telephone lines and between the latter and telegraph lines. However, 
the first responses to these events were isolated, contingent and above all 
inconclusive, denoting the confusion and difficulty in identifying a single and 
coherent legal framework. Cesare Norsa’s18 words make us fully  understand 
limitino i rapporti pubblici e privati da essa nascenti, che ne stabiliscano particolarmente 
le funzioni”. Foligno (1912-1916). Of the same tenor also Rivalta when reviewing Rava: 
“Mentre però l’invenzione di così utile strumento per le comunicazioni faceva dunque im-
mensi progressi, non progrediva del pari il lavoro del legislatore” Rivalta (1900). 
15  See Canullo (2017).
16  Norsa (1883); Cavalieri/Persico (1908); Rava (1900).
17  Norsa (1883).
18  Cesare Norsa, was a lawyer expert in international law, representative of the Mil-
anese Lawyers’ Association, as well as a member of various associations that led him to 
have numerous contacts with foreign law and legal literature. In particular, he was a corre-
spondent member of the Royal Lombard Institute of Science and Letters, a correspondent 
member of the Veneto University, the Academy of Legislation in Madrid, the Society of 
Comparative Legislation in Paris, the Institute of International Law in Brussels and, final-
ly, of the Associations for the Reform and Codification of the Law of the People of London. 
Tacchi (2002); Liva (1991). Cf. also the subheading on the front cover Norsa (1883).
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that originally the matter was affected by such serious “legal weakness”19 that 
the relative law could be considered “absolutely inconsistent”.20 
This specific problem goes hand in hand with a very particular circum-
stance: the telephone, unlike other inventions such as electricity or the car, was 
part of an innovative juridical path partly already opened by the telegraph,21 
another fairly new and apparently similar instrument to the telephone. This 
marked the open transition from telephone communication with legislative 
and interpretative strategies based on the comparison/conflict with a pre-ex-
isting regulatory framework, even if it was lacklustre in itself. 
To all this is added the transversality of the numerous critical issues 
generated by the telephone: the simple establishment of simultaneous com-
munication at a distance had enormous repercussions in all legal branches, 
both in substantive and procedural law. In order to have a sufficiently pre-
cise picture of the many legal issues arising from the telephone, it is use-
ful to consult the index of one of the thematic monographs elaborated on 
the subject, written with the precise aim22 of enclosing in a single place all 
the legal problems relating to a specific invention.23 Taking as reference the 
work of the lawyers Cavalieri and Persico24 for its analyticity and practicality, 
among the various problems are: the nature of the contracts stipulated by 
telephone, whether between those absent or those present, the discipline of 
the electric-telephone conduits relative to the easements of support, the type 
of management with which to provide the service, if in a state monopoly, 
concessionaire or private, the judicial authority responsible for telephone 
disputes, the identification of crimes perpetrated by telephone, the violation 
19  Norsa (1883).
20  Norsa (1883).
21  A juridical theoretical space configured in particular from Serafini (1862).
22  Regarding the telephone, the most important in ascending chronological order 
are: Norsa (1883); Rava (1900); Forti (1902); Di Marzo (1903); Brunelli/Longo (1906); 
Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
23  This is a new form of legal monograph, no longer focused on this or that 
legal institution, but dedicated to a single technical innovation that would deal with 
all the legislative material, doctrinal problems and sometimes the jurisprudential 
pronouncements related to it, across the legal system. Among the first Serafini (1862). 
There are several examples in Italian legal literature: Benvenuti (1884); Pipia (1900). 
German legal literature: Bar (1892); Meili (1908). In Spanish legal literature: Ortuño 
(1920); Garcia Rodrigo (1927).
24  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
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of the secrecy of telephone correspondence and insult and defamation com-
mitted by telephone.
The delimitation is an ontological and intuitive connotation typical of 
every transition: as far as technical innovations are concerned, the point of 
origin is identifiable when “law”, including legislation, legal theory and juris-
prudence, takes an interest in the issues and new legal relationships gener-
ated by novelty. There is nothing like a great invention, “it brings with it the 
creation of new social relationships” and, given that “every social relationship 
in civilian populations must be governed by a legal precept”,25 the arrival of 
an innovation identifies the initial moment of a legal transition in its first im-
pact on the legal system. On the other hand, recognizing the conclusion of a 
transitional space of innovation is more complex. In the light of the premises 
made up to now, this should take place with the return to the ordinary situa-
tion prior to the transition. This occurs when the legal landscape is reunited 
with the new economic, social, technical and factual reality generated by the 
invention, in other words, with the full and complete adaptation of “law” to 
the new situation, hence its consequent loss of the very character of novelty, 
at least on the legal level.
The complexity of recognizing the inventor of the telephone,26 corresponds 
to the difficulty of precisely tracing the initial moment of the transition peri-
od, begun by this new form of communication in Italy. Although it is easy to 
identify it from a factual point of view in the first telephone line installed in 
Milan on 30 December 1877, from a legal point of view one can only rely on27 
the most important legal journals and monographs to realize that telephony 
had begun to capture the world of law with the first Italian judgments – few in 
truth – and the first works of legal doctrine on the subject in the early 1880s, 
as confirmed by the legal encyclopaedia entry dedicated to the telephone: “In 
Italy only in 1880 was there the need to regulate the relationships arising 
from the telephone business”.28
Before this moment there is a trace of the theme only in a ‘Study on the 
Telephone’ competition announced by the Royal Academy,29 in public opin-
25  Foligno (1912-1916).
26  Cavalieri/Persico (1908). See too: Foligno (1912-1916).
27  Among others: Arca (1900); Armissoglio (1889); Bianchi (1888); Bianchi (1892); 
Cammeo (1887); Farlatti (1902); Galassi (1905); Nitti (1897); Pipia (1900).
28  Foligno (1912-1916).
29  We refer to the competition published in 1878 by the Regio Istituto Lombardo, 
Class of Mathematical and Natural Sciences, on the subject “Study on the telephone”, the 
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ion30 and in weak attempts to legislate. In fact, on November 27, 1880 the 
Minister of Public Works Baccarini in concert with the Ministers of the In-
terior (Agostino Depretis) and of Justice (Tommaso Villa) presented to the 
Chamber of Deputies a bill on the telegraph service that should have been 
extended also to the telephone,  given the few rules contained therein. In ad-
dition to the insufficiency and superficiality of this attempt at extension, the 
draft was presented two years later, on April 25, 1882, by the member of Par-
liament  Parenzo, but never approved.31 
Ideally the starting point of this legal transition could be said to be in Oc-
tober 1882 with the publication in Il Giornale delle leggi,32 of an article by 
Francesco Carlo Gabba,33 which seems to be the first academic publication on 
the telephone, since “no one else bothered”.34 Proof of this is, first of all, the 
periodical Monitore dei Tribunali which, contrary to its usual policies,35 re-
published the well-known article only nine days later,36 for its originality and 
correctness. The novelty of the article can also be seen from the answers of the 
jurists37 recalled to the debate38 by the conclusions formulated by Gabba: the 
prize of the Cagnola Foundation. Norsa gives us an account of it, which also specifies that 
there was only one participant. Norsa (1883). 
30  They are quoted by Norsa (1883).
31  Foligno (1912-1916).
32  Gabba (1882a). 
33  On Gabba see Beneduce (1998). 
34  Beneduce (1998) 515.
35 The editorial staff of the Monitore (made up of the compilers Dr. Giovanni Porro, 
owner and manager and the lawyer Amilcare Della Carlina) wanted to specify that in the 
past it had hardly ever given space to articles already published in other magazines and 
that this exception was justified by the novelty and correctness of the ideas reported by 
Gabba. Beneduce (1998) 513.
36  Gabba (1882b).
37  Not only Ercole Vidari, but also the members of the editorial staff of Giornale delle 
Leggi (Avv. Bernardo Cassini, Editor-in-Chief, Avv. Gaetano Queirolo, Vice-Director) and 
of Il Monitore dei Tribunali who expressly supported Gabba’s thesis. See the following 
note. 
38  The reconstruction of the debate launched by Gabba’s article from the pages of 
Giornale delle Leggi and Il Monitore dei Tribunali is not part of the theme of this es-
say. However, it deserves a mention: in response to Gabba’s thesis on the nature of the 
telephone contract between those present, Ercole Vidari had an article published in the 
same magazine Giornale delle Leggi, in which, countering his colleague with interesting 
arguments, he came to the opposite conclusion, namely the nature of the telephone con-
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management of the Giornale delle Leggi in the persons of the lawyers Cassini 
and Queirolo, wanted to underline the “brand new and very interesting”39 
character of the subject. Ercole Vidari40 made it clear, in a note to his reply 
article,41 that although “very important, mind you, from a theoretical point 
of view: however, as far as practice is concerned, the telephone has so far 
only served to put in communication bosses and salespeople, factories and 
branches or warehouses, etc. Concluding contracts is not yet needed”.42 
Yet shortly afterwards, Gabba and Vidari’s academic articles proved to be 
of great use for later literature on the telephone, also providing the two main 
starting points from which to elaborate a correct theory, especially from a 
methodological point of view, guided by analogy. In fact, it is curious that the 
very first voices of debate that were added to Gabba and Vidari, with a few ex-
ceptions such as Bolaffio and Norsa, tried to range themselves  on one side or 
the other, essentially reiterating the arguments of the two reference authors. 
There was Majorana, who in his monograph,43 as noted by his reviewers,44 
“diligently examines and takes sides in favor of Vidari’s opinion”;45 but also 
Ottolenghi 46 and Gatto, whose opinion was assimilated to that of Majorana.47 
tract between those absent. The reply to Vidari did not take long to arrive both from the 
editorial staff of Il Monitore dei Tribunali (Editor of Il Monitore dei Tribunali, Ancora sul 
punto se il contratto stipulato per telefono sia a considerarsi far assenti o fra presenti, 
Il Monitore dei Tribunali, Anno XXIII, n. 43, 28 ottobre 1882, 1017-1018) which, albeit 
implicitly, from the editorial staff of Il Giornale delle Leggi, which reproposed the article 
signed by the Editor-in-Chief of Il Giornale delle Leggi (editorial staff of Il Giornale delle 
Leggi, Ancora sul punto se il contratto stipulato per telefono sia a considerarsi fra assenti 
o fra presenti, Giornale delle Leggi, Anno 13, n. 45, 9 novembre 1882, 553-554, both in 
support of Gabba’s thesis. The really interesting point is the “personification” of the direc-
tions of the two periodicals in the expression of their opinion. 
39  Editorial staff of Il Giornale delle Leggi 553.
40  On Vidari see Monti (2011). 
41  Vidari (1882).
42  Vidari (1882) 529.
43  Reviews refers to: Majorana (1883). However Majorana printed a new edition of 
his book in 1912: Majorana (1912). 
44 Anonymous (1884); Delogu (1884); Anonymous (1883).
45  Anonymous (1883) 150. 
46  Ottolenghi (1883).
47  Anonymous (1884). 
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2. The intuitive similarity between telegraph and telephone: considering 
analogy, fragmentation and incompatibility
Within this framework of transition, thus begun, acute jurisprudence in-
terpretation48 identified an initial period characterized by the “application to 
telephone communications of the rules and laws governing telegraphic com-
munications”.49 As anticipated, the legislator – the proposer, first of all, had 
recourse to the extension of the telegraph regulations to the telephone.50 But 
the appreciation of the analogy was also the first methodological option al-
though not necessarily decisive, for the legal theory. Gabba and Vidari them-
selves, although they agreed on the need to “study the facts in their intimate 
essence”51 because “rights have a close connection with our physical way of 
being”,52 compare the two innovations several times, placing the contract 
concluded by telephone, first in the category of contracts between those pres-
ent, then  in the category of contracts between those absent. On the one hand, 
Gabba highlighted the differences in the functioning between the two devices, 
and in particular the absence of interpositions between the telephone sub-
scribers. This inevitably cancels the gap between the proposal and the accep-
tance, eliminating the distances at least in time. For his part, Vidari used the 
same argument against his colleague, arguing that if “two people (…) commu-
nicated with each other directly by means of a telegraph”, there would be a 
simultaneity comparable to a moment of silence in telephone communication 
and therefore, it could be said that this constituted a telegraphic contract be-
tween them.53 Hence the senselessness in Vidari’s thought of establishing the 
48  Foligno (1912-1916) 595.
49  Foligno (1912-1916) 596.
50  See footnote 32. 
51  Gabba (1882b). 
52  Vidari (1882).
53  As anticipated in this heated debate, the direction of Il Monitore dei Tribunali 
(The Monitor of the Courts) was also included, which, in issue 40, Year 1882, published 
a commentary in support of Gabba’s positions and deeply critical of Vidari’s reasoning. 
It is not known what actually motivated the Editor to intervene directly and actively in 
the debate, it is enough to know that the Directorate itself asserts that their intention was 
“non lasciare senza un cenno questo lavoro dell’egregio prof. Vidari [in quanto] dal canto 
suo tiene, in ispecie nel campo del diritto commerciale , un posto troppo alto , perché le 
sue obbiezioni se tali possono dirsi , ci sembrassero da trascurare”. See also Giornale delle 
Leggi, 13/40 353-354.
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diversity of legal framework, regardless of the concrete manifestations of the 
two instruments. 
In essence, a period of transition opened up during which the legal issues 
related to the telephone were continuously tested in the light of the strategies 
of the analogia legis54 and the general principles55 or analogia iuris,56 fitting 
into that late nineteenth-century trend of recovery and rethinking of these 
interpretative canons prepared by the legislator. Mechanisms that went from 
being mere exegetical references, appropriate for the convergence between 
the will of the legislator and the activity of the interpreter, to becoming a ploy 
for allowing legal theory and jurisprudence to “complete the law to /reveal 
what is latent in it, or rather what is potentially hidden in it”.57
In the light of this, the intuitive similarity between the telephone and the 
telegraph led to the conception that the former was nothing more than a dif-
ferent form of communication at a distance, belonging to the same genre 
as the latter and therefore to be “considered as such”.58 Even a current of 
thought59 based on an unspecified “scientific point of view”, annulled any dif-
ferentiation, believing that telephony was nothing more than a branch of the 
telegraphic phenomenon. 
Among these analog applications, the one relating to the management of 
telephone communications as a government monopoly, pending its own spe-
cific bill, stands out for its importance. The law on public works of 20 March 
1865, had subjected the telegraph service to a public monopoly, although this 
was not absolute, since no sanctions had been provided for acts of private 
competition. On the contrary, “in the process of experimentation and pend-
54 Benoit (2005); Guastini (1976); Naletto (1991); Palchy (1974); Petronio (2010). 
55  See Sciumé (2013).
56 On the origin of the distinction between analogy legis and analogy iuris: Errera 
(2010); Pene Vidari (1977).
57  This refers to Mortara’s words: “Non importa se, chiamato a determinare la norma 
regolatrice di un particolare rapporto, il giudice ne dichiarerà una effettivamente diver-
sa da quella che il legislatore aveva per esso destinata”. Mortara (1905). See Meccarelli 
(2005). 
58  Parere della R. Avvocatura erariale (1884).
59  This is the point of view of  Marchiori: “La telefonia non potrebbe considerarsi al-
trimenti che come un ramo della telegrafia, sia dal punto di vista scientifico, che da quello 
dell’applicazione”. Atti del parlamento italiano. Camera dei deputati (1890). 
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ing a legislative provision”60 in other words, “precariously”,61 telephone com-
munications had been regulated by Royal Decree no. 1335 of 1 April 1888 
(amended by Royal Decree no. 2110 of 21 February 1884), which allowed 
private telephony operations under a three-year, renewable, not necessarily 
exclusive, concession from the Ministry of Public Works, against payment of 
a fee.
However,62 a number of contributions of an academic63 and other nature 
reflected on the appropriateness of this differentiation. Among others, Fran-
cesco Nitti, in an objective evaluation of the theme,64 wrote that “the affini-
ties between one and the other are so great, their origin and purpose are so 
identical, that it is a serious mistake to consider them differently”.65 In fact, 
the common features of the two services, such as the establishment of remote 
communication, the operation through electricity, the need for a network of 
cables to be installed in urban areas, entailed the same needs and function-
al repercussions. As for the post office and the telegraph, the general utility 
of the telephone could not be seriously challenged: it responded, like other 
forms of communication, to the “need for universality of citizens”66 under-
stood not as generality but as the “whole State”.67 Hence the need to prevent 
an industrial exercise harmful to consumers.68 On the one hand, the private 
exercise of telephony did not guarantee a regular, continuous and uniform 
service, especially in those places where entrepreneurs could make less profit. 
On the other hand, in the most profitable areas, a sole telephone company, 
as an arbitra assoluta 69, would have raised tariffs dramatically in order to 
obtain maximum profits, which, against the plurality of private industries, 
60  Foligno (1912-1916).
61  Norsa (1883).
62  Norsa (1883); Arca (1900); Basile (1900); Rava (1900); Brunelli (1908). It should 
be noted that despite the law of 1892, the issue continued to be the subject of lively debate 
even afterwards, concerning the differentiation between the management regime of urban 
and interurban lines and the phenomenon of municipalisation.
63  Nitti (1890-1891).
64  It is Nitti himself who makes it clear that his is an objective doctrinal evaluation, 
unrelated to any political connotation. Nitti (1890-1891).
65  Nitti (1890-1891) 113.
66  Norsa (1883).  
67  Norsa (1883). 
68  Nitti (1890-1891).
69  Nitti (1890-1891).
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would have created inconvenience and damage to the urban context.70 In sup-
port of these prospects, the jurists Arca,71 Nitti72 and Norsa73 pointed to the 
experience gained with the telegraph in other countries because “given the es-
sential affinities (...) it is logical that one now encounters the same difficulties 
encountered and overcome by the other”.74 Particular emphasis is given to the 
case of England where the State, noticing the considerable telegraphic devel-
opment and the problems generated by private management, was forced to 
redeem the communication systems for “hundreds of millions of pounds”.75 
Attention was also extended to the development of the new communica-
tion tool: the increased connection and speed given by the telephone, her-
alded in the early 1890s its future extension even to the detriment of the 
telegraph itself. Therefore, in keeping with these intentions, it was necessary 
to evaluate which management system would most favour the progress of 
telegraphic communication in order to apply it, by similarity, also to the tele-
phone, at least while waiting for legislation specifically dedicated to it. In this 
light, it appeared that only the state authority could satisfy the  direct com-
munication needs of “every corner of Italy”, as it was  able to compensate for 
any losses with the development of technology and the economic progress of 
the country.
Naturally, alongside these arguments, others were proposed in support of 
the public monopoly, at times linked to public safety which was threatened by 
the intertwining of several electric cables, at others to the economic loss to the 
State from the prevalence of the telephone over the telegraph and, again, to 
the need for telephone and telegraph networks to be connected to each other. 
However, we will skip a deep analysis of these aspects so as not to distract 
attention from the issue that is of interest here, i.e. the profiles of analogy 
between the two instruments of communication, grasped by legal science and 
70  Norsa recalls in particular an episode that occurred in Milan in December 1882: 
“per la neve caduta in qualche giorno del mese di dicembre 1882, i fili telefonici si ruppero 
improvvisamente, e ne nacquero pericoli gravi di disgrazie per le persone percorrenti lun-
go le vie della nostra città. Inoltre se come avvenuto per Milano viene accordata a più di un 
concessionario la facoltà si stabilire ed esercitare il telefono in una medesima città molti 
inconvenienti sorgono dall’esercizio simultaneo” Norsa (1883).
71  Arca (1900).
72  Nitti (1890-1891).
73  Norsa (1883). 
74  Nitti (1890-1891).
75  Nitti (1890-1891). On this interesting point see also: E.d.V (1898). 
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based on the hypothesis of an initial and transitory extension of the existing 
rules to the new apparatus. The “close analogy with the telegraph service”76 
was also used in other issues such as the legal qualification of telephone oper-
ators as clerical and non-workers and the public authorization for the attach-
ment of telephone wires.77 
Extensive interpretation, both in the form of the analogia legis and in the 
form of the analogia iuris, presupposes that there is already a rule or princi-
ple regulating the analogous or similar case in the legal system. However, the 
framework of the dialectic between telegraph-telephone was also enriched by 
issues with respect to which the analogical perspective remained at a design 
stage without rising to the legislative level: this is the case of the installation 
of apparatus, supports and telephone wires in defiance of the absoluteness 
of private property. While in other countries – Norsa gives the example of 
Louisiana and Belgium78 – he law had already imposed on the owners the 
obligation to tolerate the affixing of telegraph wires, in Italy, according to the 
jurist, there had been a general acquiescence towards telegraph systems (“a 
test of tolerance” or “a willing obedience to the orders of the Public Authority” 
or yet again “having reflected little or not at all on the severity of the burden 
imposed”),79 almost a “universal consensus of the population”,80 which had 
prevented the Italian legislator from introducing a specific provision to this 
effect. With the advent of the telephone, episodes of opposition became so 
frequent81 that the parliamentary committee was induced to extend public 
servitude to the telephone as well, inserted for the first time, but only for the 
telegraph, in the bill of 27 November 1880, Art.4.82 This particular episode 
opens the way to a more careful reflection on the features characterized by 
76  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
77  However, here the analogy was admitted only in the Italian areas to which the 
Piemontese law on telegraphs of 23 June 1853 regulating the matter had been extended. 
For the other areas, since the analogy could not operate in the absence of a law on the 
similar case of the telegraph, one had to refer to Artt. 1 and 8 of the law on public works. 
Parere della R. Avvocatura erariale (1884). 
78  Norsa (1883). 
79  Norsa (1883) 98-99. 
80  Norsa (1883) 98-99.
81  Report of the Ministry of Public Works accompanying the bill of 27 November 
1880, no. 138 and the Report of the Parliamentary Commission of the same bill produced 
on 25 April 1882 no. 138 cited by Norsa (1883). 
82  The bill was never enacted. Foligno (1912-1916).
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the use of the analogical strategy applied to the telephone issue: in any case, 
it was a question of punctuality of application forced to confront two aspects. 
The first one is the fragmentation of the legal rules on the telegraph and 
their consequent insufficiency for a phenomenon as extensive as the tele-
phone. The Italian telegraphic legislation of the late nineteenth century, 
which at least initially could have filled some urgent and specific gaps, was 
scarce and poor, and was not able to extend to all the problems generated by 
the telephone. Leaving aside the two international conventions of Paris in 
1865 and Petersburg in 1876, the measures adopted on telegraphic matters by 
the pre-unification states – in particular the Piedmont law no.1563 of 1853 –, 
although incomplete “as they were sure to be in the early days”,83 were never 
extended to the whole Kingdom,84 with the exception of those relating to the 
special economic relations underlying the provision of the service. Even in 
1883, the need for a unitary law regulating all the new legal relations gener-
ated by the telegraph, both private and public, was only satisfied with “here 
and there imperfect regulations, or very succinct articles of law”, “isolated 
seeds of legislation”.85 So the legal vacuum was left to be filled by a custom-
ary right based on the public utility of the service, public common sense and 
the prudence of the Administration. This was the result not only of frequent 
governmental instability, which had in fact halted several bills,86 but also of a 
well-considered choice, in imitation of other European States which wanted 
to wait in order to gather as much data as possible from experience, before 
providing a stable legal framework for the new instrument, as they were not 
able to foresee the future evolution of communication techniques.87 There-
fore, the state-of-the-art Italian legislation on telegraphic matters, lacking a 
83  Norsa (1883).
84  Sabato (1912-1916).
85  Norsa (1883). 
86  One thinks of the bill presented by the Minister of the Interior on 22 June 1878, 
which was intended to “provvedere alla guarentigia, alla libertà e al segreto nella corris-
pondenza telegrafica privata”, whose legislative process was interrupted by the dissolution 
of the House in 1880. One thinks again of the already mentioned project of 27 November 
1880, no. 138 presented by the Minister of Public Works, in agreement with the Minister 
of the Interior and Justice, which was also not properly complete and in any case stopped 
by the dissolution of the Chamber. Foligno (1912-1916).
87  Report of the Ministry of Public Works accompanying the bill of 27 November 
1880, no. 138 and the Report of the Parliamentary Commission of the same bill produced 
on 25 April 1882 no. 138 cited by Norsa (1883).  
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general and organic framework able to satisfy all needs and including only 
“partial, grainy, insufficient rules”,88 was not suitable to lending itself to gen-
eral analogue extensions, either interpretively or a fortiori, with an explicit 
legislative extension. On this last point, therefore, the legal theory recognized 
the fruitlessness of referring to  foreign examples, such as that of England 
and Belgium, where, at least initially, the analogical extension was – or had 
already been involuntarily 89 – prescribed by law. 
Alongside the fragmentation, there was also the incompatibility, in some 
ways, between the legal framework of the telegraph and the specific peculiar-
ities of the telephone and the relative legal issues. Vidari, Gabba, Norsa were 
in fact well aware of the profound differences between the two instruments 
and of the forcing that took place in aligning them.90 There are several aspects 
that confirm this profile. The functional connection established by the law on 
public works of 1865 between the transmission of telegraphic dispatches and 
railway law was considered an example. In order to guarantee the safety and 
regularity of the railways, the concessionaire was obliged to install offices and 
telegraph apparatus with which the State could interfere at any time for the 
transmission of its official dispatches. According to Norsa, these provisions 
could not “logically extend, in their entirety to  phones, as their application to 
them is neither necessary nor obvious”.91 More fitting is the factual circum-
stance that telegraph personnel could  and had to, according to the Inter-
national Telegraphic Convention of 21 July 1868, halt dispatches that were 
dangerous for public safety. On the contrary, direct communication between 
telephones prevented any extensive application of this regulation, requiring 
instead other measures of prevention and protection. Along the same lines 
were also envisaged provisions made to deal with hypothetical criminal of-
fences. Most of these measures were, still at the planning stage and related 
to the illegitimate actions of the employee who took possession, opened, re-
vealed, suppressed or altered the contents of a telegram, or had maliciously 
delayed its transmission or delivery. At most, as Norsa observed, since these 
are criminal provisions, therefore insubstantial in their extensive92 interpre-
88  Norsa (1883).
89  In the English case, the telegraph legislation: Norsa (1883).
90  Gabba (1882a); Vidari (1882).  
91  Norsa (1883).
92  “(…) poiché delle leggi penali non è lecito fare una interpretazione estensiva”. Nor-
sa (1883) 107.
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tation, the hypotheses regarding the criminal activity of the suppression of a 
telegram or the arbitrary alteration of a machine in order to seize the commu-
nication could be legally extended to the telephone. In addition, in telephone 
communication, there are factual peculiarities unknown to the telegraph, 
such as the already mentioned absence of a temporal distance in the meeting 
between proposal and acceptance and the need for tariffs that are adequate 
both to the development of the new apparatus and to limiting its prevarica-
tion over the telegraph, to the detriment of state finances.93 
In the light of this picture, the concluding proposals made by the first legal 
literature dedicated to the telephone are well understood. Norsa, more than 
anybody else, explicitly favours an investigation of all the regulations con-
cerning telegraphic matters in order to proceed “with a subtle eye” to examine 
“to what extent they coincide and where instead modified or appropriate new 
provisions are needed”.94 In fact, it was his opinion that the “sensitive and im-
portant points of contact” should induce the legislator to issue a “cumulative 
law” containing “common general principles” alongside “provisions, rules 
and determinations appropriate for both systems”.95 
Gabba and Vidari, even though they settled for opposite positions, ignored 
the legal panorama offered by poor telegraphic legislation, in the deep con-
viction that the new phenomena of the telephone should be analyzed and 
disciplined “for what they really are, without trying to adapt them to their 
own opinions”. However, it was precisely on the different conception of the 
functioning of the telephone and the different interpretation of the concept 
of presence that the contrast between their opinions was based. Finally, Nitti 
who, enriching his legal reasoning with a series of confutations of all the op-
tions against the public monopoly, seen by some as dangerous collectivism, 
closed his article hoping that these unfounded “concerns” would not further 
slow down the parliamentary work because “acknowledging the principle of 
the exercise of the state, assuming that between the government monopoly 
and the company monopoly, that of the state is preferable (...) it seems to me 
little prudent to indefinitely postpone the resolution of such an important 
issue”.96
93  On this point see also De Viti De Marco (1890). 
94  Norsa (1883). 
95  Norsa (1883).
96  Nitti (1890-1891).
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3. The precarious balance between academic and jurisprudential solutions 
and legislative attempts
After the pioneering voices and the consequent contributions alternately 
deployed towards one or other theory, the increasing diffusion of the tele-
phone, together with the profiles of fragmentation and incompatibility with 
the telegraph, made the empty legal spaces “in their essence and structure”97 
more and more evident. Hence both for the completely unregulated new and 
remaining issues, there was no other option but to urgently ask the legisla-
tor for a unitary framework, dedicated mainly, if not exclusively, to the tele-
phone.98 In this area, the process of conciliation of the legal system with reality 
gave way to a second type of approach, characterized by a substantial balance 
established between the thrusts of the legal theory towards an original ad hoc 
law, meagre jurisprudence and, in addition, background parliamentary work 
that tried to satisfy legislative expectations. 
The literature of this period has authoritative voices and covers various le-
gal issues, the most important of which relate to the conclusion of the contract 
by telephone and the management of the telephone service. On contractual 
matters, Bolaffio99 and Bianchi’s100 points of view are valuable as they finally 
express neutrality and detachment regarding the first trilateral debate (Gab-
ba-Vidari-Monitore dei Tribunali). Bolaffio, dealing with contractual perfec-
tion in relation to Art. 36 of the new Code of Commerce,101 applied his deduc-
tions to the telephone, recalling in several points of his discourse the relevant 
profiles of difference from the telegraph. Moving away from the excessive ac-
ademicism with which, in his opinion, the issue had been addressed, the fu-
ture successor of Vivante, proposed  focusing on the most convenient solution 
in terms of legal practice: it was true, as claimed by Gabba, that the telephone, 
unlike telegraphic communication, allowed the simultaneity of statements, 
but this did not help to identify the moment of perfection and therefore, the 
97  Giannini (1908).
98 For a reconstruction of the numerous bills elaborated on questions of the telephone 
from the Baccarini project to the first Italian law exclusively dedicated to the telephone 
(law of 12 April 1892.95) see Foligno (1912-1916); Giannini (1908).
99  On Leone Bolaffio see Cicconetti (1969).
100 On Ferdinando Saverio Bianchi see Mosca (1968). 
101 Bolaffio, in particular, after summing up the trilateral debate, states that he has 
reflected “a lungo sulle ragioni addotte da quelli che ci precedettero nella trattazione 
dell’argomento”. Bolaffio (1882). 
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applicable law, the legal customs, the competent court, even in case of trans-
mission errors. What is most interesting, is the hope, in the conclusion of the 
article, that his work “if good, even if only partially, will be useful (…). If bad 
(...) not to worry, time is there to administer quick and relentless justice”. 
Bianchi,102 having, like his colleague “proceeded with an elimination work” of 
the various theses, presented an original reconstruction, introducing the new 
category of “contratti conclusi per relazione immediate”, that is “such that 
there exists simultaneity between the declaration of one and the perception 
or knowledge of it by the other”.103 As clearly pointed out by the lawyer Camil-
lo Cavagnari 104 a reviewer from the Monitore dei Tribunali, the difficulty of 
moving away from pre-existing concepts and the pretension of proposing an 
innovative solution, led Bianchi to conclude “for convenience of language”105 
that the contract by telephone was in any case to be considered equivalent to 
that stipulated between absent persons. 
On the subject of telephone service management, De Viti De Marco,106 al-
though an economist, fed the legal debate in the pages of the Giornale degli 
economisti by arguing for the opportunity of a pluralistic management of te-
lephony, unless one wanted to give in to those trends of collectivization that 
would increase the costs borne by the State and at the same time decrease the 
quality of those complex services, in need of numerous operators and expen-
sive means, such as those related to communication. 
For its part, the case law on telephony, at least until the first decade of 
the twentieth century is very limited107 and has few pronouncements mostly 
related to the tariff regime and the “affixing of telephone lines and devices”. 
With respect to this last issue, the judges, in the absence of a complete law on 
the matter, strove to grant protection by recognizing judicial actions to own-
ers harassed by the passage of wires.108
On the other hand, the intense parliamentary work only led to the draft-
ing of several bills, none of which was approved until 1892. They range from 
the first Baccarini project of 2 March 1882, to a list that includes, among the 
102  Bianchi (1888). 
103  Relevant sentences of Bianchi’s work reported by Cavagnari (1888). 
104  Cavagnari (1888).
105  Cavagnari (1888).
106 De Viti De Marco (1890), also quoted by Arca (1900). 
107  Consiglio di Stato, IV Sezione (1899); Corte di Cassazione di Roma a Sezioni Uni-
te (1901).
108  Corte di Appello di Genova (1904).  
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most important and above all ambitious, the Lacava and Saracco projects. 
None of these was ever approved either for lack of funds or because of the nu-
merous government crises.109 However, it should be pointed out that, at this 
early stage, there were some very timely interventions specifically dedicated 
to the telephone, mostly marked by necessity and temporariness. In partic-
ular, there were “some regulations [adopted] with individual ministerial de-
crees”110 such as, for example, Decree No. 1335 of 1 April 1883 on the approval 
of specifications for telephone operating concessions for public and private 
use, later amended by Decree No. 2110 of 21 February 1884.
Among the three forces, the opinions of consultative bodies interposed as 
a useful pivot for achieving a summary and temporary stability. Among these, 
the opinion of the Avvocatura Erariale was very direct and limited itself to 
stating that “where the Sardinian law of 1853 does not prevail (…) Articles 1 
and 8 of the law on public works relating to the attributions of the Ministry of 
Public Law apply”.111
More precisely, on the other hand, the Council of State which, when ques-
tioned by Minister Baccarini himself on the subject of a public telephone ser-
vice, specified that it would be up to the State, throughout the Kingdom, to 
have the monopoly of telegraphs and, consequently, also that of telephones 
“which are nothing more than the application of the same principle for the 
use of correspondence and for the transmission of thoughts and words“.112 
The Supreme Council focused its line of argument on the regulatory foun-
dations provided by the laws of March 20, 1865 – which among the public 
works, also included “maintenance and operation of telegraphs”–, August 18, 
1870 and by the Piedmontese law of 1853, which although not extended to all 
provinces, was considered sufficient for an analogical extension to the tele-
phone.
Finally, on April 30, 1891, Minister Branca presented a project relating 
only to the management of the telephone service, “rather than [to] the devel-
opment of telephony”113 and privatisation. In fact, the project aimed at recog-
nizing the telephone service more as a private industry than as a need marked 
109  Foligno (1912-1916).
110  Foligno (1912-1916) 599.
111  Parre della R. Avvocatura erariale (1884).
112  The ruling of the judgment is reported by Foligno (1912-1916).
113  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
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by “necessity and universality”.114 However, “the very provisions of the project 
and certain sentences of the report betrayed a different concept”,115 which fi-
nally led to a state monopoly and telephone operation through strictly regu-
lated concessions, to be entrusted only to private industry for a well-defined 
period – initially 25 years. The approval of this project with the promulgation 
of Law No. 184 of 7 April 1892, apparently put an end to the uncertainty, at 
least with regard to the regulation contained therein. The legislation regulat-
ed the public and private use of telephone lines only by means of a govern-
ment concession; it admitted the existence of peculiar support easements for 
the electrical wires of the telephone, dwelling also on the tariffs and the pos-
sibility of lodging administrative appeals against the decisions of the Prefect 
on the matter.116 Certainly, the lawof 1892 and the relative regulation of 1894, 
did not dampen the academic ferment: the legislative framework , far from 
being complete, left blank spaces but also a stratification of regulations, not 
easily referable to order. For this reason years followed, about a decade or so, 
in which legal theory and jurisprudence strove to widen the legislative mesh, 
this time not in relation to a previous regulation and not with an analogical 
method. 
The jurists continued to oppose each other, even on previously unthought 
of aspects that experience had produced. Among these was the interesting 
question of ingiuria telefonica which, while for some117 seemed certainly 
subsumed in Article 395 of the Zanardelli Code, for others needed a partic-
ular hermeneutical effort: the element of “presence”, understood as “real 
and effective”.118 In addition to being essential for the configuration of the 
case referred to in the second paragraph of the above mentioned provision, 
it contributed to justifying the increase in the penalty prescribed therein, the 
offence expressed as a person denotes, in fact, a more serious animus iniuri-
andi.119 
When this and similar cases arose, it was fundamental to identify the place 
of jurisdiction which the jurists120 tended to identify as where the recipient’s 
114  Norsa (1883). 
115  Foligno (1912-1916).
116  For the text of the law: Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
117  Galassi (1905). 
118  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
119  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
120  Facchinetti (1902). It should be noted that Facchinetti was King’s Deputy Prose-
cutor at the Court of Florence when he published this article. 
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telephone was located, as the place where the insult, the defamation, the ac-
ceptance came to the knowledge, to the ear of the other party. In order not 
to consider the procedural aspects connected with the telephone evidence.121 
Moreover, only in the early twentieth century, was the telephone issue 
beginning to come to terms with the new phenomenon of municipalisation, 
that is, the trend, which spread in several Western countries to “exalt and 
expand the city’s function”122 in order to consider economic, legal and social 
problems in relation to the municipal context. From this point of view, we can 
understand the writings of Arca,123 Bresadola124 and Basile,125 who expressed 
themselves favourably towards the “decentralising”126 policies that “do not al-
ready have as their aim a decrease in the social activity of the state, but only 
a more harmonious direction of it”.127 Among the protagonists of this debate, 
Luigi Rava128 stands out, in particular, with a monograph,129 included in the 
Primo trattato completo di diritto amministrativo by Orlando, in which he 
proposed a more structured solution – dependent on the urban or interurban 
nature of the telephone lines – but, in any case, still regressive as regards the 
previous legislative settlement relating to telephone management. 
In the field of jurisprudence, the pronouncements on telephony were en-
riched in number and themes, contributing to completing the jagged legisla-
tive panorama with rigorous definitions, compositions of apparent regulatory 
antinomies and resolutions of further issues arising from the use of telephone 
systems. The Council of State outlined the field of application of telephony, 
understanding “telephone communication”130 as “not a conversation in the 
121  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
122  Bliss et al. (eds) (1908). 
123  Arca (1900).
124  Bresadola (1901). 
125  Basile (1900).
126  Arca (1900).
127  Arca (1900).
128  On Luigi Rava see Meniconi (2016); D’Agostini (2013). 
129  Rava (1901). 
130  “Per ‘conversazione telefonica’ si intende non una conversazione nel significato 
comune della parola , ma ogni comunicazione per mezzo del telefono, e quindi anche quel-
la che ha per obbietto la trasmissione del contenuto di un telegramma”. Consiglio di Stato 
(1905). But also “La comunicazione telefonica si deve intendere stabilita quando sia in 
condizione di agibilità e si possa senz’altro parlare: il semplice filo non dà comunicazione 
telefonica”. Pretura di Orvieto (1907).
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common meaning of the word, but any communication by telephone, and 
therefore also that which has the object of transmitting the content of a tele-
gram”. Jurisprudence also reconstructed the juridical nature of the peculiar 
supporting easement introduced by the law of April 7, 1892: neither predial 
servitude nor right of use in the restricted meaning of the Civil Code,131 but “a 
public servitude governed by special law”.132 In numerous rulings  the judges 
reconciled the recent legislation on telephone matters with the previous law, 
such as the railway,133 commercial134 and labour law.135 The judges’ attention 
was focused on new cases, the result of the experience and development of te-
lephony: ranging from the limits of the responsibility of telephone companies 
towards subscribers in case of interruption of service, especially if due to force 
majeure 136, to the conditions for establishing a plurality of concessions,137 and 
the problem of the competition between telephone lines and power lines.138
The knowledge of this legal doctrine and jurisprudence is crucial for con-
firming the characteristics of the transition. Not only do they show that after 
1892 the legal system was far from conforming to the needs of the real, but 
they also show that the transition periods are not immune to new vicissitudes 
that complicate the transition process, leading to the rethinking of statutes 
until then considered undisputable. In the literature reported, the problem 
of telephone offences had not appeared before the widespread and informal 
use of this instrument; likewise the profiles of the state management of the 
service seemed incontrovertible until they were confronted with municipali-
sation. This is to say that the transition is not a linear, but a bumpy one, made 
up of only apparent slowdowns, complications and stability, susceptible to 
131  Tribunale Civile di Roma (1906).
132  Corte di Cassazione di Palermo (1907).
133  Tribunale di Firenze (1906). 
134 “L’esercizio telefonico può essere assunto anche da società cooperative senza ve-
nir meno al principio di mutualità”. Corte di Appello di Milano (1906). 
135  “La legge sul lavoro delle donne e dei fanciulli è applicabile anche alle telefoni-
ste”,Cassazione di Roma (1905) in footnote. But also in Pretura di Treviso (1905). 
136  Corte di Cassazione di Torino (1903). But also Pretura di Torino (1902); Tribuna-
le Civile di Firenze (1906). But contrary: “Non sono dovuti danni per la caduta dei pali se 
l’Amministrazione non mancò di diligenza in vigilando”. Tribunale di Venezia 17 dicembre 
1904 e Corte di Appello di Venezia, 26 ottobre 1905, in Cavalieri/Persico (1908). 
137 Corte di Appello di Roma (1901) e Consiglio di Stato (1900). But also the Court of 
Cassation of Rome 18 December 1902, Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
138  Corte di Appello di Lucca (1903).
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the external influences of other transitional spaces. In fact, the words of Ra-
va’s reviewer are extremely apt: “only it was a difficult thing to resolve every 
question in such a mutable and continually progressing matter. Who in fact 
could have taken into account all the transformations and all the improve-
ments that telephony is capable of”139 and, one adds, society?
It can be understood, therefore, how the latest trend of this ideal transi-
tional path, as also identified by the legal theory, is afferent to the “Italian leg-
islative movement”140 that “at this point could not stop”141 because the prob-
lems previously linked to fragmentation had now turned into a lacunosity 
directly proportional to the incessant spread of the new machinery.142 We can 
mention some new bills such as the one by Nasi of 1889 for the construction 
of new urban lines and that of Di San Giuliano, to prescribe the direct state 
assumption of almost all the existing telephone lines, reducing the concession 
to a mere possibility the project by Pascolato aimed at the reorganization of 
all services.143 Despite the ease with which they fell through, these projects 
highlight the continuous and urgent need both to fill the gaps – newly emerg-
ing and formed around the law of 1892 – and to give “better organization”144 
as well as to encourage the development of an increasingly complex and 
structured communication network. In an attempt to satisfy these intentions, 
no better instrument than a single text could be envisaged. In particular, the 
proposal put forward by the Honorable Galimberti on June 14, 1902 was suc-
cessful. It suggested authorizing the Royal Government to collect and reorga-
nize in a single text the provisions of the above mentioned law as well as the 
previous ones and was approved by the Chamber of Deputies with Law no. 32 
of February 15, 1903. The Government implemented the delegation with the 
decree of 3 May 1903 no.196, considered by the scholars “the most important 
telephone law”.145 
The use of a single text does not represent the culmination of the continu-
139  Rivalta (1900).
140  Foligno (1912-1916).
141  Foligno (1912-1916).
142  The numbers reported by Rava are very interesting: in 1899, seven years after the 
1892 law was passed, there were only two dealer companies (La “Generale” and “L’Alta Ita-
lia”) with 11 and 9 networks respectively. In not even a decade the networks had practically 
doubled. Rava (1900). Dati confermati da Foligno (1912-1916).
143  Foligno (1912-1916).
144  Foligno (1912-1916).
145  Foligno (1912-1916).
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ous legislative movement regarding the telephone. Suffice it to say that it did 
not cover all the legal issues related to the telephone and that, moreover, it 
was the subject of numerous subsequent amendments – such as, among oth-
ers, Law No. 506 of 15 July 1907, which made the trend towards the exercise 
of the State prevail in a definitive manner. Its survey reconnaissance nature, 
inferred from the provision of delegation – “The government is authorized 
to coordinate and collect in a single text (…)”146 – made this single text only 
a fixed point, ordered, systematic, but never definitive. On closer inspection, 
the legislative movement on the subject of the telephone, together with the 
related debates on theory and case law continued to follow the factual de-
velopment of the new means of communication through the intensification 
of long-distance lines; the telephone connections between Italy and abroad, 
hence the first international telephone conventions;147 transoceanic commu-
nications – with all that derived from them in terms of underwater lines;148 
the adaptation of the telephone to wartime – “Modern warfare is essentially 
scientific and electricity is one of the most effective collaborators”.149 In short, 
a continuous work of additions, modifications and reinterpretations that goes 
beyond the periodization on which this contribution is based. For this reason 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize a moment of perfect reunification 
between the juridical order and telephony: the continuous development of 
the latter and the contexts of its use prevented the former from taking defin-
itive positions. 
In spite of this, the adoption of the single text by decree of 3 May 1903 
no.196, represents, a good point to place, if not the conclusion, at least a pause 
in the transitional path initiated by the telephone as not only was it considered 
the most important and basic legislation on the telephone but “although mod-
ified by successive laws, it is still [in 1912] in force and constantly applied”.150 
In the light of the above premises, the identification of this as a stage, if not 
conclusive, then at least the arrival of the transition is something to be contex-
tualized both positively and negatively. On the positive side, the choice to affix 
this term is justified by the particular nature and function of a single text: it is in 
146  Legislatura XXI- 2° Sessione, Discussioni, Tornata del 31 gennaio 1903, Atti Par-
lamentari della Camera dei Deputati 5081.
147  Orlando (1914). 
148  From the affirmations of Cavalieri and Persico we can guess that in 1908 trans-
oceanic communications were still a mere hypothesis. Cavalieri/Persico (1908).




fact a legal instrument of its own for defining, coordinating and systematizing a 
subject that is considered to be, at least at that moment, summarily complete. 
In reality, and on the negative side, the legislator of 1903 did not foresee ei-
ther how much more the need for a telephone network extended to the whole 
Nation and beyond would grow, nor the relative and continuous insufficien-
cy of financing, nor the dissatisfaction of the employees of the concessionary 
Companies regarding their juridical and economic status, nor, finally, the First 
World War and the consequent strategic value of the telephone. 
4. Tradition, fixed points and identity of each transitional space 
The analysis of the case of the telephone, allows us to detect the most sa-
lient aspects of the phenomenon of legal transition falling within technical 
development. The first juridical interests in the new instruments generated, 
or rather, noted, a situation which Norsa accurately defined as “weakness” 
or “legal inconsistency”.151 Therefore, it was not so much a matter of gaps or 
voids, but rather of an insufficient and unsuitable juridical structure, detached 
from factual reality, and yet fundamental in  elaborating the first answers to 
the new questions. This initial basic toolbox originated from pre-existing law 
for several reasons. First of all, because of the urgency with which solutions 
were needed, especially in jurisdictions where recourse was made to legisla-
tion that was already well established, such as that on the telegraph or the 
aqueduct, in relation to their “affinity of form and substance”152 with electrical 
and telephone pipelines. This impelling need for answers sometimes went 
beyond the scope of the debate of 1882 on the value of concluding contracts 
by telephone. To this is added, in contrast to the trend, a prudent predispo-
sition: as Norsa and Foligno pointed out, and as can be seen from the parlia-
mentary debates on the various bills presented on telephone issues, there is 
every intention to wait and  accumulate as much experience as possible, at 
least until the definitive settlement of the telephone system. In fact, among 
jurists, the new telephone models such as the Reis or the lanyard153 model are 
a warning , since they could change the way in which the word is transmitted 
and therefore distort any new law drawn up on previous and outdated mod-
els. However, what drives most towards the recovery of the previous right are 
151  Foligno (1912-1916).
152  Corte di Appello di Roma (1898). 
153  Norsa (1883). 
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what Carnelutti, in an article dedicated to electricity , calls “the eyeglasses of 
theories, formulas and tradition” that “often have so much influence on us 
that we isolate ourselves completely”.154 The same risk is clearly felt by Gabba 
and Vidari with regard to telephone matters: for the former it is necessary to 
“study the facts in their intimate essence”155 because, using the words of the 
latter “rights have a close connection with our physical way of being”.156 And 
yet, as we have seen, they both tried to relate the telephone to  the legislation 
already elaborated for the telegraph.
The works of reform and refinement that took place after the single text 
of 1903, connected with municipalisation, transoceanic lines157 and the war, 
partly question the possibility of placing the concept of legal transition in the 
world of technical progress. In fact, we could not speak of transition if, after 
the advent of an innovation, the reunification between the juridical world and 
the real world seems to be an asymptotic graph, insusceptible to reunification. 
Indeed, if we accept the thesis that considered the telephone as a mere branch 
of the telegraph and the telegraph, in its turn, as a form of communication at 
a distance comparable to postal correspondence, it is no longer even possible 
to identify exactly the initial moment of transition. Therefore , in that straight 
but jagged line of the progress of law in relation to technology, it is essential 
to consider fixed points which, although not definitive, delimit a transitional 
space as an object of analysis. These fixed points, as can be seen from the 
single text of 1903, do not participate in the unstable, uncertain and tempo-
rary nature of the law, but are originally designed to last and  be preserved. 
This differs from the first regulations on telephone issues that were laid down 
“provisionally” for some “particular points”158 or from the analogical applica-
tions related to the telegraph, which although intuitively correct, remained a 
mere “adjunct”.159 It should be noted, however, that on the subject of progress 
there seem to be some examples of definitive elaborations reached following 
heated theoretical debates and jurisprudential disputes, as in the case of the 
legal nature of electricity, still today explicitly qualified as a movable asset by 
Art. 814 of the Civil Code. 
154  Carnelutti (1913).
155  Gabba (1882b).  
156  Vidari (1882).
157  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
158  Foligno (1912-1916).
159  Foligno (1912-1916).
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It follows that reflection on the transitions brought about by technical 
progress can only be generalised within certain limits because every process 
of change has its own particular characteristics. These give it identity and also 
influence its course. In the case of the telephone, the transition period opened 
by its diffusion favoured another phenomenon of (re)transitional openness 
that has probably never been completely defined: through a reverse flow 
compared to the one previously described, the legal framework promulgated 
on the telephone was, curiously, extended by law or by extensive interpreta-
tion, to some controversial issues inherent in  the telegraph, which became 
rarer and more exceptional, dragging them into a “journey backwards”.160 
This is the case of the State ‘s responsibility for the damage caused to users 
on the occasion of the service which, although it had been excluded by the 
telegraph regulations, was reintroduced, after a long debate, in the 1903 sin-
gle text on the telephone and expressly extended ex Art. 32 to the telegraph 
service.161 Also as regards government concessions for telephone operation, 
where the report on the Pascolano bill suggested “extending also to teleg-
raphy the faculty that the government has to give telephone concessions for 
private use”;162 and on the matter of the servitude of telegraphic lines.163 In 
practice, the legislative elaborations on the telephone became a real “oppor-
tunity to fill the gap and for the regulations on this matter [the telegraph] 
to acquire the authority and effectiveness that so far it had not had”.164 This 
peculiar change of direction of analogical strategies, determined both by the 
undoubted and unchanged similarity between telephone and telegraph, and 
by the irresolution of fragmentation in telegraphic legislation, seems to con-
tradict one of the main characteristics that, intuitively, are attributed to tran-
sitional phenomena. It is not only a question of paths made up of attempted 
legislative interventions, unstable doctrinal proposals and contingent juris-
prudential decisions, drawn unidirectionally from an initial legal situation to 
a final one, which tend to be static until the next period of change. Sometimes 
the opening of transitional spaces represents an opportunity, an ideal oppor-
tunity to review the entire legal system with new eyes, attentive to weaknesses 
160  Giannini (1908). 
161  Giannini (1908) XI.
162  Atti Parlamentari Senato, Legislazione XXI, 1° sessione 1900, Disegni di legge e 
relazionali n. 24, 74, nota 6, 2. Cit. also in Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
163  Cavalieri/Persico (1908) 136.
164  Cavalieri/Persico (1908).
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and shortcomings, envisaging new and stronger tools for its innovation and 
progress. 
References
Anonimo (1884), Cenni bibliografici, Delle convenzioni fra persone lontane, Per 
l’avv. Gaetano Majorana, in: Rolandino gazzetta del notariato, IV-9, 5, Cata-
nia, 1883, 80
Anonimo (1884), Recensione a Majorana avv. Gaetano, Delle convenzioni fra 
persone lontane, in: Rivista di giurisprudenza», Vol. unico, Catania, 1883, 
149-150
Anonimo (1916), La Telefonia e la Telegrafia nella guerra Europea, in: Bollettino 
del Ministero delle Poste e dei Telegrafi, 16, Parte I, 301-303
Arcà, Francesco. (1900), La municipalizzazione del servizio telefonico urbano, in: 
Foro delle Puglie, 154-162
Armissoglio, Francesco (1889), Gli impianti elettrici per illuminazione e traspor-
to di forza motrice, Torino; F.lli Bocca
Atti del parlamento italiano (1890), Camera dei deputati , sessione 1889-1890, 4 
della 16° legislatura, Vol. 4, Tip. Della Camera dei deputati, 4883
Atti Parlamentari Senato (1900), Legislazione XXI, 1° sessione, Disegni di legge e 
relazionali n. 24, 74, nota 6, 2 
Bar (1892), Das Gesetz über das Telegraphenwesen des Deutschen Reiches, Ber-
lin, Internationale Verlags-Anstalt
Basile, Cesare (1900), L’unicità della concessione per il servizio telefonico urbano 
in uno stesso Comune, in: Foro Italiano, III, 17-21 
Beneduce, Pasquale (1998), Gabba, Carlo Francesco, in: Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani, 50, <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/carlo-francesco-gab-
ba_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/> 
Benoit, Frydman (2005), Le sens de lois: historie de l’interpretation et la raison 
juridique, Bruxelles, LGDJ
Benvenuti, Giovanni Battista (1884), I tramways. Note giuridiche, Firenze ,Tip. 
Pellas
Bianchi, Ferdinando (1888), I contratti conclusi per telefono, Siena, Enrico Tor-
rini Editore
Bianchi, Ferdinando, I contratti per corrispondenza e l’art. 36 del nuovo Codice 
di Commercio, in: Archivio Giuridico, XXIX, 511-513
Bliss, William, Rudolph Binder, Edward Page Gaston (edit by)(1908), Munici-




Bolaffio, Leone, (1882) L’art. 36 del nuovo Codice di Commercio e i contratti per 
telefono, in: Archivio Giuridico, XXIX, 505-520
Bresadola, Pompeo (1901), La municipalizzazione del servizio telefonico urbano, 
in: L’elettricità, 6
Brunelli, Italo (1908), Istruzioni pratiche di servizio sulla telefonia, Roma, Tip. 
Dell’Unione Cooperativa
Brunelli, Italo, Emanuele Longo (1906), Trattato di telefonia, Roma, Tipografia 
Scotti
Camerano, Carlo (1902), Dottrina, critica e legislazione. Se la legge sui diritti 
d’autore possa applicarsi alla fotografia, in: Il consulente commerciale e tri-
butario, XIX, 10, 145
Cammeo Federico (1887), L’Illuminazione a gas e a luce elettrica, Milano, Soc. 
editrice libraria
Canullo, Carla (2017), Ma cos’è questa crisi?, in: Meccarelli, Massimo (ed.), Rea-
ding the crisis. Legal, Philosophical and Literary Perspectives, Madrid, Carlo 
III University of Madrid, Editorial Dykinson, 99-115
Carnelutti, Francesco (1913), Studi sulle energie come oggetto di rapporti giuridi-
ci, in: Rivista del diritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle obbligazioni, 
I, 354-382
Cassazione di Roma (1905), 4 novembre, in: Foro Italiano, II, 87
Cavagnari, Camillo (1888), I contratti conclusi per telefono, del prof. Ferdinando 
Bianchi, Siena, in: Monitore dei Tribunali, XXIX, 32, 11 agosto 1888, 659
Cavalieri, Gastone, Giovanni Persico (1908), Il telefono nelle leggi nella dottrina 
e nella giurisprudenza, Roma, G.Scotti
Chironi Gian Pietro (1882), Il darwinismo nel diritto. Discorso pronunziato per la 
commemorazione di C. Darwin tenuta nella R. Università di Siena il 2 maggio 
1882, Siena, Tip. Sordo-Muti di L. Lazzeri
Chironi Gian Pietro (1886), Sociologia e diritto civile: prolusione al corso di di-
ritto civile nella regia Università di Torino detta il 25 novembre 1885, Torino, 
Fratelli Bocca, 6
Cicconetti, Stefano M. (1969), Bolaffio, Leone, in: Dizionario Biografico degli Ita-
liani, 11, < http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/leone-bolaffio_%28Diziona-
rio-Biografico%29/>
Ciriacono, Salvatore (2000), La rivoluzione industriale. Dalla proto industrializ-
zazione alla produzione flessibile, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 64
Cogliolo Pietro (1891), Filosofia del diritto privato, Firenze, Barbera Editore, 142-
143
Cogliolo Pietro (1917), Il progresso del diritto privato nell’ultimo cinquantennio, 
in: Scritti vari di diritto privato, I, Torino, Unione Tipografica Torinese, 13
Consiglio di Stato (1899) 15 dicembre 1899, in: Foro italiano, Vol. unico, 1900, 17
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
301
Consiglio di Stato (1899), IV Sezione, 15 dicembre 1899, in: Il Foro Italiano, XXV, 
Parte Terza, Third part 1899, 17-28
Consiglio di Stato (1905) 23 giugno, Soc. Gen. It. Telef e Min. P. e T., in: Foro 
italiano, Sez. III, 164
Corte di Appello di Genova (1904) 17 October 1894- Catto c. Soc. Telef. Ligure, in: 
Giurisprudenza Italiana, I, Sezione 2, 750 
Corte di Appello di Lucca (1903) 31 dicembre 1902, in: Foro italiano, Vol. unico, 
Sez. I, 632
Corte di Appello di Milano (1906) 31 gennaio 1906, in: Rivista del contenzioso del 
Ministero delle Poste e dei Telegrafi, 111-112
Corte di Appello di Roma (1898) , 28 febbraio 1898, in: Foro Italiano, XXIII, 1358
Corte di Appello di Roma (1901) 28 dicembre 1901, in: Foro italiano, Vol. unico, 
Sez. I, 727-729
Corte di Appello di Venezia (1905), 26 ottobre 1905, in: Cavalieri G., G. Persico, Il 
telefono nelle leggi nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza, Roma, G.Scotti,196
Corte di Cassazione di Palermo (1907), 31 dicembre 1906- Soc. Telef. C Ardizzo-
ne, in: Foror Siciliano, 38
Corte di Cassazione di Roma (1901) a Sezioni Unite, 13 dicembre 1900, in: Reper-
torio generale annuale di giurisprudenza, 191
Corte di Cassazione di Roma (1902), 18 dicembre 1902, in: Cavalieri G., G. Persi-
co, Il telefono nelle leggi nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza, Roma, G.Scotti, 
192
Corte di Cassazione di Torino (1903), 28 agosto 1903, in: Foro Italiano, Vol. unico 
1903, Sez. I, 1408
D’Agostini D. (2013), Rava, Luigi, in: Birocchi I., et al. Dizionario Biografico dei 
giuristi italiani ( XII-XX secolo), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1660 ff
De Viti De Marco, Antonio (1890), L’industria dei telefoni e l’esercizio di Sta-
to, in: Giornale degli Economisti, settembre 1890, pp.279-306 (cf.- Biblioteca 
Nazionale Centrale di Roma, Biblioteca Digitale, <http://digitale.bnc.roma.
sbn.it/tecadigitale/giornale/TO00185044/1890/unico/00000269>)
Delogu, Pietro (1883), Recensione a Majorana avv. Gaetano, Delle convenzioni 
fra persone lontane, Tip. Galatola, Catania, in: Il Filangieri, Vol. unico, IX, 
1884, 47-48
Di Marzo, Donato (1903), Del servizio telefonico, Roma, Bertero e C.
Direzione del Monitore dei Tribunali, Ancora sul punto se il contratto stipulato 
per telefono sia a considerarsi fra absenti o fra presenti, in: Giornale delle 
Leggi, 13, 40, 353-354
E.d.V. (1898), La questione dei telefoni in Inghilterra, in: Il Giornale degli Econo-
misti, Serie seconda, 17, 9, ottobre 1898, 351-361
Errera, Andrea (2010), Tra analogia legis e analogia iuris: Bologna contro Or-
FRANCESCA MARTELLO
302
léans, in: Storti, Claudia (ed.), Il ragionamento analogico. Convegno Como, 
17-18 novembre 2006, Napoli, Jovene Editore, 133-182
Facchinetti, Giuseppe (1902), La questione di competenza nel reato d’ingiuria 
telefonica, in: Giustizia Penale, VIII, 273-276
Farlatti, Federico (1902), L’ingiuria telefonica, in: Giustizia Penale, Vol. unico, 
73-77
Foligno A. (1912-1916), Telefono, in: Digesto Italiano, XXIII, Part I, 590
Forti, Ugo (1902 ), La questione telefonica in Italia. La questione interurbana e gli 
interessi meridionali, Napoli, Società Anonima Cooperativa Tipografica
Gabba, Carlo Francesco (1882a), Il telefono e la giurisprudenza, in: Il Giornale 
delle leggi, 13, 40, 5 Ottobre 1882, 513-515
Gabba, Carlo Francesco (1882b), Il telefono e la giurisprudenza, in: Il Monitore 
dei Tribunali, XXIII, 41, 14 ottobre 1882, 969-973
Galassi, Mario (1905) , Ingiurie per telefono, in: Rivista Penale, Supplemento 
XIII, 257
Garcia Rodrigo, Carlos Maria (1927), Legislaciòn eléctrica. Recompilaciòn de to-
das las disposiciones legales dictadas sobre la materia, Gongora
Giampietro, Pasquale (1918), Studi e questioni di diritto postale, Torino, Unione 
Tipografica Torinese, 1918
Giannini, Torquato Carlo (1908), Prefazione, in: Cavalieri G., Persico G.(1908), 
Il telefono nelle leggi nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza, Roma, G.Scotti, II
Guastini, Riccardo (1976), Completezza ed analogia. Studi sulla teoria generale 
italiana del diritto del primo Novecento, in: Materiali per una storia della cul-
tura giuridica, 6, 511-591
Legislatura XXI (1903), 2° Sessione, Discussioni, Tornata del 31 gennaio 1903, 
in: Atti Parlamentari della Camera dei Deputati, 5081
Liva, Alberto (1991), Le professioni liberali e i loro collegi: gli avvocati, in: Mozza-
relli, Cesare, Rosanna Pavoni, (eds.), Milano fin de siècle e il caso Bagatti-Val-
secchi. Memoria e progetto per la metropoli italiana, Milano, Guerini, 322-323
Majorana, Gaetano (1912), Delle convenzioni fra persone lontane, Palermo, O. 
Fiorenza 
Majorana, Gaetano (1883), Delle convenzioni fra persone lontane, Tip. Galatola, 
Catania 
Meccarelli, Massimo (2005), Le Corti di Cassazione nell’Italia Unita. Profili siste-
maticie costituzionali della giurisdizione in una prospettiva comparata (1865-
1923), Milano, Giuffré Editore, 204-206
Meili, Friedrich (1908), Das Luftschiff im internen Recht und Völkerrecht, Zu-
rich, Füssli 
Meili, Friedrich (1910), I problemi giuridici dell’aviazione, in: Rivista delle comu-
nicazioni, Vol. unico, 118
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
303
Meniconi, Antonella (2016), Rava, Luigi, in: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 
86, <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/luigi-rava_%28Dizionario-Biogra-
fico%29/>
Miceli, Vincenzo (1911), Il concetto sociologico del progresso, in: Rivista Italiana 
di Sociologia
Monti, Annamaria (2011), Angelo Sraffa. Un “antiteorico del diritto”, Milano, 
Egea
Mortara, Lodovico (1905), Commentario del Codice e delle leggi di procedura 
civile, Milano, Vallardi, terza edizione, I, 62, 73
Mosca, Gaetano (1968), Bianchi, Francesco Saverio, in: Dizionario Biografico de-
gli Italiani, 10, <http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/francesco-saverio-bian-
chi_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/> 
Naletto, Giuseppina (1991), Analogia ed equità nel diritto del lavoro: profili sto-
rici, Padova, CEDAM
Nitti, Francesco Saverio (1890-1891), I telefoni e l’esercizio di Stato, in: Rassegna 
di Scienze Sociali e Politiche, VIII, II, 103-115
Norsa, Cesare (1883), Il telefono e la legge. Memoria del. S.C. avv. Letta nelle 
adunanze 29 marzo, 31 maggio e 14 giugno 1883 del R. Istituto Lombardo di 
scienze e lettere, Milano, Tip. Bernardoni di C. Rebeschini e C., 82
Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele (1914), Primo trattato completo di diritto ammini-
strativo italiano, Milano, Società Editrice Libraria, Vol 7, 345-367
Ortuño, Emilio (1920), El problema ferroviario. Algunas consideraciones acerca 
del nuoevo règime para la explòtacion de los ferrocarrilles, Madrid, Septiem-
bre MCMXX
Ottolenghi, Emanuele (1883), Il codice di commercio del Regno d’Italia: illustra-
to coi lavori legislativi, colla dottrina e colla giurisprudenza, Vol.I, Torino, Ca-
milla e Bertolero
Plachy, Adolfo (1974), La teoria dell’interpretazione: genesi e storia dell’erme-
neutica, Milano, Giuffrè Editore 
Papa, Emilio Raffaele (ed.) (1985), Il positivismo e la cultura italiana, Milano, 
Franco Angeli, 227-240
Parere della R. Avvocatura erariale (1884), estratto dalla Relazione sul servizio 
pel 1883, Notizie Varie, in: Monitore dei Tribunali, XXV, 1191 
Pene Vidari, Gian Savino (1977), Nota sull’”analogia iuris”. L’art. 15 del tit. prel. 
Cc. Albertino e la sua formazione, in: Rivista di Storia del diritto italiano , L, 
342-355
Petronio, Ugo (2010), L’analogia tra induzione e interpretazione prima e dopo i 
codici giusnaturalistici, in: Storti, Claudia (ed.), Il ragionamento analogico, 
Convegno Como, 17-18 novembre 2006, Napoli, Jovene Editore, 183-294
Pipia, Umberto (1900), L’elettricità nel diritto, Milano, Ulrico Hoepli
FRANCESCA MARTELLO
304
Pretura di Orvieto (1907), 1 luglio 1907- Montini, in: Rivista del Contenzioso del 
Ministero delle Poste e dei Telegrafi, Vol. unico, 189
Pretura di Torino (1902), 14 novembre 1902, in: Giurisprudenza di Torino, Vol. 
unico, 1493
Pretura di Treviso (1905), 3 agosto 1905, in: Giustizia Penale, Vol. unico, 115
Rava, Luigi (1900), Il telefono nella legislazione italiana, Bologna, Zanichelli
Rava, Luigi (1901), Il telefono in Italia, Roma, Direzione della Nuova Antologia
Rivalta, Valentino (1900), Recensione di Luigi Rava, Il telefono nella legislazio-
ne italiana, in: Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali, 22, fasc. 85, gennaio 
1900, 115
Sabato R. (1912-1916), Telegrafo, Digesto Italiano, XXIII, Parte I, 634
Sasso, Gennaro (1980), Progresso, in: Enciclopedia del Novecento, V, Roma, 
632-638
Sasso, Gennaro (1984), Tramonto di un mito. L’idea di “progresso” tra Ottocento 
e Novecento, Bologna, Il Mulino
Sciumé, Alberto (2013), I principî generali del diritto nell’ordine giuridico con-
temporaneo (1837-1942), Torino, Giappichelli
Serafini, Francesco (1862), Il telegrafo in relazione alla giurisprudenza civile e 
commerciale, Pavia, Tip. Fusi
Speciale, Giuseppe (2001), Antologia Giuridica. Laboratori e rifondazioni di fine 
Ottocento, Milan, Giuffrè Editore, 1-9
Storti, Claudia (ed.) (2010), Il ragionamento analogico, Napoli, Jovene Editore, 
183-294
Tacchi, Francesca (2002), Gli avvocati italiani dall’Unità alla Repubblica, Bolo-
gna, Il Mulino, 35 e 53
Testoni, Saffo (1976), Progresso, in: Bobbio, Norberto, Nicola Matteucci (ed.), 
Dizionario di politica, Torino, 794-799
Tribunale Civile di Firenze (1906), 22 luglio 1905, in: Rivista del contenzioso del 
Ministero delle Poste e dei Telegrafi, Vol. unico, 3
Tribunale Civile di Roma (1906), 1 maggio 1905, Casali Del Drago c. Soc. Gen. 
It. Telef., in: Rivista del Contenzioso del Ministero delle Poste e dei Telegrafi, 
Vol. unico, 71-73
Tribunale di Firenze (1906), 25 luglio 1906, Soc. Telefonica Alta Italia c. Ferrovie 
Meridionali, in: Cassazione di Firenze, Vol. unico, 858
Tribunale di Venezia (1908), 17 dicembre 1904, in: Cavalieri G., G. Persico, Il 
telefono nelle leggi nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza, Roma, G.Scotti, 196
Vidari, Ercole (1882), I contratti per telefono, in: Giornale delle Leggi, 13, 42, 19 
ottobre 1882, 529-550
In the middle of nowhere.
The never-ending transition of Italian private companies
(società a responsabilità limitata - SRL)
Alessio Bartolacelli
1. Introduction; 2. Streamlines in reforms of Business Law from 1942 to 2004. 
The birth and growth of SRL; 3. The long-lasting season of the amendments to 
the s.r.l. rules (2008-2019); 3.1. The confirmation period (2008-2012); 3.2. The 
counter-reformation (2012-ongoing?); 3.2.1. The Innovative Start-ups; 3.2.2. 
Innovative SMEs; 3.2.3. The general extension of specific rules; 3.2.4. The final 
step: delegated management again; 4. Some possible final remarks
1. Introduction
Business Law is one of the fields in legal studies where innovations are 
usually most frequent and important. Actually, we can assume that Business 
Law has two basic purposes. On the one hand, it aims at regulating business 
activities; this means that business regulations are continuously chasing real-
ity, trying to provide legal responses to the innovative situations developed in 
economic practice, but, at the same time, being aware of the fact that reality is 
always moving farther away, gaining a lead, like in Zeno’s paradox of Achilles 
and the tortoise. On the other hand, particularly under the most proactive 
and wise legislatures, Business Law is responsible for promoting new entre-
preneurial attitudes and tools, serving as a vehicle of innovation for society 
as a whole.
This means that Business Law, as regards the specific case, has either a 
rearguard (response) or a forefront (impulse) approach to the actual business 
environment. Such a situation is not necessarily dependant on the specific 
system of rules laid down in a given order: in the same legal environment 
– which can be either a national or a supranational one – the two attitudes 
might coexist. In the same legal environment, the rearguard attitude can be 
present with reference to some situations, while a forefront promotion ap-
proach is adopted for others .




sitional phenomena. They nevertheless differ: very often, the rearguard at-
titude is not fully adequate to provide an answer to the question “where are 
we going to?”, while the forefront one naturally should be forged having a 
rather clear idea of the final target of the process. This clear idea is not always 
present, as we are going to see, and this creates somewhat of a short-circuit in 
legislative interventions, with schizophrenic sudden changes with little or no 
clear ultimate purpose.
In this chapter, I deal with a specific example from Italian Business Law, 
i.e. the case of the Italian private company, the società a responsabilità lim-
itata. In fact, its course has been meaningfully marked by several conflicting 
legislative interventions during the last decade. This superabundance of in-
terventions has contributed to changing the very basic profiles of this compa-
ny form, whose nature and position in the system of Italian Company Law is 
currently a matter of harsh debate among legal scholars.
2. Streamlines in reforms of Business Law from 1942 to 2004. The birth 
and growth of SRL
From 1865 until 1942, the realm of Italian Business Law had as its primary 
legislative source a specific Commercial Code. The first Commercial Code of 
unified Italy was issued in 1865, and replaced just seventeen years later by the 
Codice di commercio issued in 1882. The remaining part of Private Law had 
the Italian Civil Code issued in 18651 as its main source.
The separation between the Civil and the Commercial Code is naturally 
relevant in order to understand the attitude of the Italian lawmaker regarding 
the relationship between Civil and Business Law. Business Law was intended 
to be a realm separated from general Private Law because of the economic 
nature of business.2 It is not by chance that the application of the Codice di 
commercio was intended to occur with reference to all the acts of business 
(atti di commercio), and to contracts where even just one of the parties was a 
businessman (commerciante). In this system, where a single type of contract 
could have rules in both the Civil and Commercial Code, the provisions laid 
down in the Commercial Code prevailed over the possibly conflicting rules 
present in the Civil Code. The system was thus designed in order to expand 
the application of Commercial rules over the “common” civil ones, and this 
1  Galgano (2010) 221 ff.; Spada (2009) 15 ff.
2  Spada (2009) 18-19.
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expansion followed the commercial nature of the acts carried out by a sub-
ject.3
The unification of the Civil and Commercial Codes in 1942 solved the pos-
sible conflicts of rules, de facto sanctioning the priority of Commercial rules 
over general private ones. Even if one might be tempted to think that the 
repeal of the Commercial Code and the inclusion of the commercial subject 
in the Fifth Book of the 1942 Civil Code was to be intended as a “defeat” for 
Commercial Law, which was “losing” its proper Code, the correct reading of 
the unification is another. From a functional point of view, there has been a 
substantial transfusion of many of the solutions present in the late Commer-
cial Code into the new Civil Code: many commentators and scholars have 
spoken of the “commercialisation of Private Law”.4 A corollary to this move-
ment towards commercialisation was the identification of a new cornerstone 
of the application of commercial law: the passage from the act of commerce, 
to the person in charge of commerce, i.e. the entrepreneur (imprenditore). It 
has been clearly pointed out that, from a practical point of view, there were 
not huge differences between the old commerciante (businessman) and the 
new imprenditore.5 In any case, the fact that from 1942 on, the entire Com-
mercial Law system has as its pivot not an act, but a person (either natural or 
legal, as in companies) clearly contributed to an increased certainty regarding 
the area of application of Commercial Law in the entire Italian legal system. 
A legal system that became much more thoroughly “commercialised” because 
of the adoption of commercial principles in the new Private Law regulation 
set down in the Civil Code issued in 1942.6
In the area of Company Law, the Civil Code issued in 1942 marked the cre-
ation of a “new” company form, the società a responsabilità limitata (herein-
after just s.r.l.), that was meant to signal the need for a specific legal tool for 
the development of small enterprises. By means of the s.r.l. the lawmaker was 
3  Spada (2009) 25 ff. For a more comprehensive panorama, see also: Buonocore 
(2006) 15 ss, spec. 22 ff.; Libertini (2006), Delle Monache (2012), and the debate between 
Libertini (2015), Montalenti (2015), and Maugeri (2015). A new and recent debate on the 
so-called “ricommercializzazione” of Italian Business Law is also interesting: Angelici 
(2019), Portale (2019), Spada (2019), Libertini (2019), and the German-related remarks 
by Kindler (2019).
4  Buonocore (2006) 22 ff.
5  Spada (2009) 27-28.
6  For a comprehensive analysis of this transition from the Commercial Codes of the 
19th century, to the new Civil Code, see Teti (2018).
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granting the members of this company the benefit of limited liability, without 
imposing on them the stricter legal obligations taken from the rules set down 
for the (bigger) Società anonima, whose name was changed in 1942, becom-
ing Società per azioni (s.p.a., Joint stock company).7
This general panorama was not affected by major legal amendments until 
2003/04. In 2003, a general reform of company law was passed,8 with the 
purpose of modernising the Italian company environment. This reform did 
not modify any of the general Business Law principles, but designed a new 
allocation of competences for the company forms known by Italian Law. In-
deed, the 2003/04 reform on the one hand, contributed to reinforcing the 
role of the s.p.a. as the reference model of the firm for bigger businesses. On 
the other hand, conversely, it enhanced the freedom for the members of an 
s.r.l., so that they were enabled to create a “custom tailored” company, with 
the specific features the members desired, and no strict legal ties.9
This attitude was clearly aligned with the 1942 scheme: s.p.a. for bigger en-
terprises; s.r.l. for smaller ones. Nevertheless, the reform in 2003/04 was not 
constrained just to that. It also recognised the momentous social role of the 
s.r.l. in the Italian economy, taking note that the s.r.l. was – and is – at large 
the most common company form in Italy, due to the overwhelming predomi-
nance of SMEs over bigger businesses in the economic life of the country.10 In 
so doing, this normative technique aimed at expanding the possibilities for a 
broader customisation of the company, leaving limited room for mandatory 
7  A very valuable reconstruction of the legal precursors of the model abroad, and of 
the projects for the new code can be found in Rivolta (1982) 26 ff. The most complete work 
on the s.r.l. is certainly Zanarone (2010), where there are also historical and systematic 
remarks on p. 3 ff.
8  Legislative Decree January 17th, 2003, no. 5, amending the Civil Code with reference 
to the companies and cooperative societies, entered into force on January 1st, 2004 (hence 
the reference, in the text to the 2003/4 reform).
9  See the Relazione to the Legislative Decree 6/2003, which in the part devoted to 
the s.r.l. states: “Essa si caratterizza invece come una società personale la quale perciò, 
pur godendo del beneficio della responsabilità limitata (che del resto, dopo la generale 
ammissibilità della società unipersonale a responsabilità limitata, non può più ritenersi 
necessariamente presupporre una rigida struttura organizzativa di tipo corporativo), può 
essere sottratta alle rigidità di disciplina richieste per la società per azioni”. The Relazione 
is available in Rivista delle società, 2003, p. 112 ff. (the part cited is on p. 147).
10  According to data retrievable from database AIDA, there are currently more than 
1.24 million active s.r.l.s in Italy; just for a quick comparison, the figure for s.p.a.s is 27,048. 
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legal provisions. The fundamental idea was to remove from the s.r.l. the tag 
of “ s.p.a.’s younger (and smaller) sister”, which was very common until 2003, 
and was due to the massive cross-referencing in the realm of private compa-
nies of rules primarily laid down for joint stock companies.11 The s.r.l. system 
that the 2003 reform designed was less influenced by the rules established 
for the Società per azioni, and originated a genuinely autonomous company 
form, with very few formal links with joint stock companies.
Moreover, the new s.r.l. also had a promotional function. Although a com-
pany, and due to this needing a starting share capital in order that its members 
could benefit from limited liability, according to the general doctrine/theory 
of legal persons in Italian Law, the minimum amount of money needed for 
the constitution was – and is – much lower than the minimum capital – or 
legal capital – required for establishing a Società per azioni.12 With a view 
to this circumstance, the s.r.l. was intended to be the most likely candidate 
for being the “natural” entry-level company form, for entrepreneurs aiming at 
developing a business benefiting from limited liability. Of course, they had the 
opportunity to run their business either as sole entrepreneurs, or by means of 
a partnership; these solutions, nevertheless, had both pros and cons, the cons 
being the unlimited liability for the entity’s obligations, and the pros being the 
extreme flexibility that is the hallmark of partnerships and sole enterprises.
Until 2003/04, the members’ choice between adopting a partnership or 
an s.r.l. as a business model had to take into consideration that getting the 
benefit of limited liability could mean giving up designing the company in full 
accordance with their entrepreneurial ideas. Conversely, the unlimited liabil-
ity characteristic of partnerships was the price to pay for full customisation. 
The reform in 2003/04 removed this obstacle, by expanding the room for 
members’ autonomy also in the s.r.l.13
11  See, for instance, the former (before 2003) Arts. 2486 and 2487 Civil Code, cross 
referencing for the application in the s.r.l. most of the rules laid down for the s.p.a.
12  Starting from the year 2003/04, EUR 10,000 instead of EUR 120,000 (but only 
50,000, since 2014: see infra). Furthermore, besides the rules on minimum capital, the 
norms applicable to contributions allowed members, in most cases, to pay-in only one 
fourth of the subscribed contribution as of a company’s constitution. This means that, 
when establishing an s.r.l. with two or more members, whose contributions are cash, the 
amount of contributions to be immediately paid-in did not exceed 2,500 EUR. This entire 
issue has been revolutionised by the reforms in 2012/13 that we are going to analyse in the 
forthcoming paragraphs.
13  For instance, in the field of company governance, allowing the use of the models 
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From a systematic point of view, the new role for the s.r.l. was to be the 
link between the partnerships, and the s.p.a. There is, however, one more 
issue to deal with in order to make the panorama as clear as possible. When 
we mention members’ enhanced autonomy in the s.r.l., we must not imply 
that such autonomy is necessarily intended to create a company that could be 
seen as “a partnership with members having limited liability”.14 This situation 
covers just a portion of the entire range. On the opposite side, in fact, we must 
consider that the members could use their autonomy also in order to recreate 
an s.r.l. with features very similar to those present in the s.p.a., but with much 
lower capital requirements. A bird’s eye view of the s.r.l., therefore, would 
not reveal a monolithic organisational form; it would rather show a flexible 
tool, where the hallmark was, typically, its own intrinsic flexibility.15 As such 
flexibility was intended to be used by the company’s members, this led to con-
sidering the s.r.l. as the company form where the importance of the members 
as a person – in juxtaposition with the members’ contributions as the key 
organisational feature – was more developed and crucial.16
This being said, understanding the key features of the s.r.l. when com-
pared with the s.p.a. is nevertheless not immediate. Their ultimate purposes 
are intended to be different, and this is mirrored in the lower amount of capi-
tal required for establishing an s.r.l.; however, nothing prevents the members 
of the s.r.l. from deciding to raise the company’s share capital not just higher 
than the minimum capital required for the establishment of an s.p.a., but 
even much higher. A lower minimum capital requirement for the s.r.l. than 
for the s.p.a. is thus directly linked with the ultimate purpose of the former, 
i.e. to serve as the vehicle for the acquisition of limited liability (also) for run-
ning small and medium sized enterprises. However, this has almost nothing 
to do with the key differences between the models, which is itself a paramount 
issue in a system based on the principle of typicality like that of Italy.17
The hallmarks of an s.r.l., when compared with an s.p.a., were traditional-
ly intended to be two, present since 1942, plus one, in some ways reinforced 
in 2003/04:
established for partnerships (see: Art. 2475 Civil Code), or as far as contributions are con-
cerned, with the possibility of work or service contributions, under certain conditions (Art. 
2465 Civil Code).
14  See again the Relazione mentioned above, footnote 9.
15  Zanarone (2003) 84-90.
16  Relazione, footnote 9, 148.
17  Cf. Art. 2249 Civil Code.
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a. In the s.r.l., the membership interests representing the participation of 
each member in the company (quote) cannot be, properly speaking, stocks 
(azioni), which are the hallmark of the s.p.a.;18
b. In the s.r.l., the membership interests owned by the members cannot be 
publicly traded, for instance in a primary or a secondary exchange market;19
c. In the s.r.l., one or more members are entitled to be in charge of the 
management of the company, along and together with the directors, while in 
the s.p.a. the company’s management can only be enacted by the directors, 
with no competence regarding this for the shareholders.20
While features a. and b. have been present in the rules of the s.r.l. since 
1942, principle c. has been strongly affirmed in particular by the 2003/04 
reform.
Points a. and b. have some common background. When we consider that 
membership interests cannot be stocks, this means that the company’s cap-
ital can be divided not into a pre-arranged number of shares, each one with 
the same par value, and incorporating the same rights and duties – at least 
where the shares belong to the same class or category – but only in the num-
ber of the company’s members. In a share-based system, each shareholder 
can own a certain amount of stocks, or shares; in a non share-based system, 
like the s.r.l., each member owns just one membership interest, whose actu-
al value normally depends on the member’s contribution. This means that, 
while all the stocks of an s.p.a. (or, more correctly, all the stocks belonging 
to the same class, in an s.p.a.) are necessarily equal in rights and “weight”, 
the membership interests of an s.r.l. are normally different. The prohibition 
to create stocks in the s.r.l. is to be read not just in a formal way – it is not 
possible to call “stock” a membership interest – but not even substantially – it 
is not possible to create “classes” of membership interests having necessarily 
the same par value and incorporating the same rights and duties.
This, naturally, has a direct influence on the (legally mandatory) prohibi-
tion to trade publicly an s.r.l.’s membership interests. The public trading, in 
particular when it comes to stock exchanges, requires the exchanged goods to 
be fungible; if they are not, the market is not in the condition to form the price 
for the good. Naturally, as membership interests cannot be incorporated in 
18  Art. 2468, paragraph 1, Civil Code.
19  Art. 2468, paragraph 1, Civil Code.
20  Art. 2479, paragraph 1, Civil Code (and Art. 2380bis Civil Code for s.p.a.). For the 
deviations from this principle in the s.r.l. see below, paragraph 3.2.4.
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shares, they cannot be considered fungible, and therefore cannot be traded on 
a market. Furthermore, the very nature of the s.r.l., with the central position 
of the member as a person, makes this company form an organisation where 
the fiduciary relations among the members are of the utmost importance. The 
consequence of this is that the number of members is usually rather low. This 
prevents membership interests from being listed in a public market system, 
with no guarantee on the personal peculiarities of the buyer, nor on his/her 
reliability towards the remaining members. Also for these reasons, the s.r.l. 
– along with its equivalent “sisters” in Europe and elsewhere –21 is usually 
classified as a private company.
The private character of this company form is relevant also when it comes 
to point c. In fact, if we consider a company with few members, we naturally 
understand that the separation between the ownership (members) and the 
control (directors) is far less pronounced than in public companies. Empir-
ically speaking, also in those cases where directors are not members them-
selves,22 it is fairly usual for members to carry out management activities as 
well. The rules laid down in the s.r.l. establish a legal framework for such a 
situation, also by extending directors’ liability to the acting members, in the 
case where their behaviour prejudices the company.23
The situation after the Company Law reform in 2003/04 was that in spite 
of belonging to the same family (the “companies”), s.r.l. and s.p.a. had differ-
ent purposes and thus different key features. However, everything was about 
to change, from 2010 on.
3. The long-lasting season of the amendments to the s.r.l. rules (2008-2019)
3.1. The confirmation period (2008-2012)
The regulatory situation of the s.r.l. was not fated to find peace after the 
2003/04 reform. In spite of having clear goals and ultimate aims for Italian 
private companies, from the very early years after the reform the Italian law-
maker found topics whose amendment could somehow reinforce the under-
21  This with meaningful exceptions in the Netherlands (where the local BV is at large 
modelled after the NV; references in Wooldridge (2009) 369), and (now for) Belgium, 
where with the 2019 Reform, the private character of the “old” SPRL was de facto denied. 
References in Bartolacelli (2019) 199 ff.
22  The default rule laid down in Art. 2475, paragraph 1, Civil Code, is that members 
only are entitled to be directors, if the articles do not state otherwise.
23  Art. 2476 Civil Code.
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lying idea of the s.r.l. as an entry-level model, making its establishment and 
management easier.
The first relevant operation in the field dates back to 2008;24 it basically 
deals with the repeal of the obligation for the s.r.l. to keep a specific book 
where the name of company members had to be recorded (libro soci): ev-
ery transmission of membership interests was effective against the company 
from the moment of the deposit of the deed in the public Register (Registro 
delle imprese).25 Naturally, this amendment implies the company directors 
have fewer duties to fulfil; namely, they were delivered from the keeping of 
the internal register. Without taking any position regarding the actual effec-
tiveness of the new norm, we can nevertheless assume that the policy behind 
its introduction is, again, to broaden the differences between the s.r.l. and 
s.p.a., where the book is still present and mandatorily required.26
Actually, with reference to the transfer of s.r.l membership interests, a fur-
ther innovative legislative measure had been taken a few months before the 
repeal of the libro soci. Again in June 2008, a governmental decree laid down 
a “deregulating provision” regarding the requirements for the deed of transfer 
of an s.r.l.’s membership interest. The new rule made the intervention of a 
public notary in the transfer of the membership interest no longer necessary. 
It is now sufficient to undersign the deed of transfer by means of an electronic 
signature, with the eventual deposit to the Registro delle imprese to be per-
formed by an enabled intermediary – which basically means a certified profes-
sional accountant.27 This amendment makes the transfer of membership in-
terests easier, and cheaper, considering the averagely high notary fees in Italy.
The role of the public notary in the Law regulating the s.r.l. is one of the 
key issues also for the second amendment that belongs to the “confirmation” 
trend, whose systematic impact has been far stronger than the repeal of the 
members’ record book. 
Starting from 2012, but still ongoing in 2013, the rules regarding the min-
imum capital requirement for establishing an s.r.l. were changed radically. 
The minimum capital currently required for the constitution of a società a 
24  Governmental Decree November 29th, 2008, no. 185, converted into Law no. 2, 
January 28th, 2009.
25  Art. 2470, paragraph 1, Civil Code.
26  Art. 2421.
27  Governmental Decree June 25th, 2008, no. 112, converted into Law, no. 133, Art. 
36, paragraph 1bis, August 6th, 2008.
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responsabilità limitata according to the regulation passed in 2012 (just) for a 
new company sub-version – the simplified s.r.l. – and in 2013 for every s.r.l., 
was reduced from EUR 10,000 to EUR 1.28 Of course, this trend once again fa-
cilitates the establishment of a new s.r.l.; the underlying reasons for a further 
measure are multi-faceted.
On the one hand, if we consider the time of this amendment, it is clear that 
it came in the long wave of the global economic crisis that started in 2008. As 
one of the major effects of this crisis was the impossibility of maintaining the 
previous levels of employability, one of the solutions was to promote self-em-
ployment, by turning a former employee into an entrepreneur. In order to 
make this scheme more realistic, the establishment of a new company needed 
to be cheaper. This is why the lawmaker decided to modify the minimum 
capital requirement, taking it to almost zero: as (starting) capital is perceived 
as a cost, slashing this “cost” was to be seen in a certain sense as a “gift” to 
promote entrepreneurship.
This attitude alone does not have a direct impact on the above-mentioned 
issue of the intervention of public notaries in the process of the establishment of 
a company under Italian Law. As a general rule, in fact, whenever a company is 
established in Italy, regardless of its form – i.e.: the rule is the same for an s.p.a., 
s.r.l., and Società in accomandita per azioni,29 – a public notary must draw up 
the deed of incorporation.30 Even without taking position on the enhanced reli-
ability of the deeds for third parties triggered by a system where a public servant 
certifies the deed, this naturally involves an additional cost for the company. Be-
sides the capital and administrative costs to be paid to the public administration 
for stamps, taxes and filing activities, establishing a new company also requires 
paying the public notary’s fee for the drawing up of the deed. According to data 
provided by the EU Commission, the cost is not exactly negligible.31
28  The whole, complex history of this legal amendment can be read in Bartolacelli 
(2016) 665-673.
29  A sort of limited partnership by shares, which is however a company under the 
Italian company law system.
30  The due legal form (cf. Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017, relating to cer-
tain aspects of company law, Art. 10) for the establishment is, for all these company forms, 
the atto pubblico, i.e. a deed drawn up by the notary : cf. Art. 2328, paragraph 2, Civil Code 
for s.p.a., cross-referenced in Art. 2454 Civil code for s.a.p.a., and Art.2463, paragraph 2, 
Civil Code for s.r.l.
31  An interesting comparative overview of the notarial fees throughout Europe is 
available in the “Commission Staff Working Document - Impact Assessment”, Accom-
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
315
The meaningful reduction of the capital requirement, therefore means that 
the cost of establishing a new s.r.l. has been lowered, but not as yet zeroed. 
Precisely because of that, an additional legislative intervention32 in early 2012 
provided for a low-cost establishment of a new s.r.l., when the founding mem-
bers were – originally33 – people under 35 years-old. This special regime of 
establishment gave rise to a new “sub-version” of the s.r.l., named after the 
Società a responsabilità limitata semplificata – a simplified s.r.l., or s.r.l.s. 
– where the deed of incorporation is to be drawn up “in accordance” with ex-
tremely basic model articles prepared by the Ministries of Justice and Eco-
nomic Development. In this case, too, the deed must be formally drawn up by 
a public notary;34 however, as notaries must use the model articles, and they 
only have to assess the identity of the founding members and the lawfulness 
of the social object clause, they are not entitled to ask for a fee for this activity. 
In other words, when an s.r.l.s. is established, no fee is to be paid to the public 
notary for the deed of incorporation, and the starting capital can even be set at 
just EUR 1. The “price” for this facilitation in establishing the company is the 
fact that the s.r.l. will be necessarily governed by means of articles that are too 
basic to be effective and useful to the actual activity of the company.35
The situation created by the establishment of the s.r.l.s. and the reduction 
of minimum capital requirements for the ordinary s.r.l. is, in my opinion, the 
highest point achieved by s.r.l. regulation with a view to the simplification of 
the model, when compared to the s.p.a. The autonomous nature of the s.r.l. is 
at this point even made extreme: the “price” for the limited liability, i.e.: the 
capital the members have to invest in the company in order to benefit from 
panying the document “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on single-member private limited liability companies” SUP, SWD(2014) 124 final, 
of April 4th, 2014, p. 45.
32  Actually, the legislative innovation here discussed came before the reduction of 
minimum capital for the ordinary s.r.l. As I am trying to explain in the text, and with a 
procedure that has been used very often in recent years, the simplified s.r.l. served as a sort 
of laboratory, or a ballon d’essai, for innovative solutions to eventually export to ordinary 
company forms.
33  While the current version of Art. 2463bis, amended in 2013, no longer requires a 
specific age, simply excluding legal persons from the use of an s.r.l.s.
34  But not in the – revolutionary – first version of the Act, where there was the possibil-
ity of establishing the company by means of a non-notarial deed. This rule was immediately 
repealed as of the conversion of the Decree into Act. See again Bartolacelli (2016) 699.
35  For a critical assessment, see Bartolacelli (2016) 669 ff., 689 ff.
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a limitation in their liability for the obligations born by the company, tends 
now to zero. This naturally is a great help in the establishment of new compa-
nies, but, intuitively, gives almost no consideration to the protection of third 
parties, in particular the company’s creditors.
On the other hand, the “one-euro company” should be considered in a cer-
tain sense as a label fraud: if it is true that one euro is legally sufficient for 
establishing a company, it must nevertheless be remembered that the single 
euro of capital is manifestly insufficient for the s.r.l. to rent an office, or pur-
chase the furniture, or hire personnel. As it is reasonable that the company 
will have to perform at least some of these activities, and that at least in its 
start-up phase there will be no company fund to cover that, the necessary 
money is to be found elsewhere. This means that the money will be provided 
either by the members themselves, or by a financing third party, usually a 
bank, that will do it against a guarantee. However, the new-born company 
has no asset suitable to serve as a guarantee; such an asset has to be searched 
for in the members’ personal patrimony. At the end of the day, the hyper-au-
tonomy of the “new” s.r.l. is resolved by taking the key issue of financing the 
company outside Company Law, and within the scope of the application of 
general Private Law. The new paradox is that we are now facing the privatisa-
tion of financing, i.e. a core issue of Company Law.
Besides this, there is another profile where the new s.r.l.s. in particular 
betray the very nature of the s.r.l., and this concerns the members’ autonomy 
in designing their own company. When we consider a company that, in order 
to be delivered from the obligation of paying the notarial fees, accepts to be 
regulated according to model articles arranged in advance by a public admin-
istration which the members are not entitled to amend, we are not looking at 
a company where the members’ will is central.36 For all of these reasons, the 
36  Even if the aura of myth surrounding the members’ full autonomy in designing 
the company present in the s.r.l. should perhaps be removed. In fact, if it is true that this 
is one of the hallmarks of this company model, and that most of the rules laid down with 
reference to of the s.r.l. are not mandatory but simply establish a default framework where 
the members’ will does not decide otherwise, it must be remembered that such freedom 
is very costly. The act of designing the company, by means of the drawing up of elaborate 
articles, is subject to the considerable cost of the fees to be paid to an expert consultant. 
Should the company decide otherwise, committing the drawing up to a cheaper and less 
skilled consultant, higher costs could eventually arise, due to the uncertainty in the deci-
sions after the legal proceedings needed to solve the internal conflicts deriving from he 
poor articles. Freedom to design the articles, therefore, is certainly a wonderful gift, but 
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panorama here described does not help to define the s.r.l. as a virtuous form 
of company, as it seems to have lost, in many cases, most of its virtues.37
3.2. The counter-reformation (2012-ongoing?) 
3.2.1. The Innovative Start-ups
Later in the same year, 2012 which saw the creation of the s.r.l.s., a new 
Governmental Decree created a further regime, not limited to, but in particu-
lar addressed to the s.r.l.: the Innovative Start-ups.
Again, the purpose of this legislative intervention is to be a means for the 
promotion of new businesses in the form of a company; in this case, how-
ever, the goal is more targeted than in s.r.l.s., or in a low-capital ordinary 
a gift that in most cases needs money to work properly – and perhaps too much money 
for a small company at the dawn of its business. For more comprehensive remarks, see Di 
Cataldo (2011) 297-316.
37  In the words of an important scholar, “Un tipo senza qualità”: Cagnasso (2013).
Even if we argue that, from 2012/13 on, there has been a sort of Counter-Reformation in 
the field of the s.r.l., with a general trend that has led to the società a responsabilità limitata 
closely resembling a società per azioni, also in the following years there have been occasion-
al regulatory amendments intended to further facilitate the establishment of an s.r.l. 
Such facilitations usually reduced the legal obligations an s.r.l. should perform. In the 
wake of this, there is the repeal of the obligation to appoint company auditors when the 
s.r.l.’s share capital exceeded the minimum required for an s.p.a. (Art. 2477, paragraph 2, 
Civil Code, eventually repealed in 2014). This amendment was to some extent required 
by the already mentioned reduction of s.p.a.’s minimum capital from EUR 120,000 to 
50,000. If the original rule were maintained, every s.r.l. with a share capital between EUR 
50,000 and 120,000 would have suddenly had to appoint at least one auditor, and evi-
dently the lawmaker deemed such a consequence less desirable than reducing in a sub-
stantive way the obligation for s.r.l. to have auditors.
A second facilitation, coming from the European Union Law, dates back to August 2015. 
The Legislative Decree 139/2015, in fact, implementing in Italy the Directive 2013/34/EU, 
introduced into the Civil Code the new Art. 2435ter, on balance sheets facilitations for Mi-
cro-Enterprises. Actually, the rule is not addressed explicitly to the s.r.l., as the requirements 
for benefitting from the facilitation are based on the assets resulting in the Balance Sheet 
(under EUR 175,000), net turnover (under EUR 350,000), number of employees (5), and not 
the company form used. This means, on the one hand, that the facilitation is applicable not 
only to the s.r.l., but also to other company (and partnership, and cooperative society) forms, 
if they meet the requirements; and, on the other hand, that reasonably it will not be applicable 
to every s.r.l., as the bigger ones among them will not meet the prescribed requirements.
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s.r.l., as the new company must be somehow “innovative”.38 The primary aim 
of the operation seemed to be, therefore, the promotion of a new culture of 
innovation in Italian enterprises. In retrospect, on the contrary, it seems to 
be looked at as a new ballon d’essai to test on a limited scale solution to be 
eventually extended to a broader range of subjects.
A detailed description of the features of the Italian Innovative Start-ups is 
not important for the purposes of this chapter. What I must highlight is the 
specific regulatory regime temporarily (for a duration of up to five years) ap-
plicable to the companies that have been recognised as Innovative Start-ups. 
First, the promotional rules for the Innovative Start-ups are not limited to the 
s.r.l.; according to the Act, any unlisted company, or even a cooperative soci-
ety, is entitled to be an Innovative Start-up, and therefore only partnerships 
are excluded from the scope of application.39 Naturally, the company must be 
a start-up, i.e. it needs to have been recently established; specifically, the com-
pany must have been constituted up to four years before the application in 
order to be granted the benefits linked to the status of Innovative Start-up.40
As we are looking at cases of newly established companies, the entire back-
ground of the amendments to the rules for the s.r.l. discussed so far is useful 
for understanding that most of the new companies that apply to be registered 
as Innovative Start-ups will be in the form of the “entry level”, and less ex-
pensive, model of company: the s.r.l. Also for this reason, the norm in the Act 
that provides for the “exceptions to general Company Law rules”41 focuses 
primarily on the s.r.l., with very few provisions applicable also to other com-
pany forms and cooperative societies.
Almost all the derogations to general s.r.l. rules considered by the norm 
are, both in empirical and systematic terms, colossal. I am discussing here 
only those that are more closely related to the trend – or counter-trend – I 
am trying to describe in this apparently never-ending transition in s.r.l. rules.
According to the already-mentioned Governmental Decree, the s.r.l.s reg-
38  The notion of “innovation” applicable to this company sub-version is rather broad. 
It can either be in the way the business is carried out e.g.: an innovative production chain 
for a “traditional” final product), or in the actual output of the business (an innovative 
product, regardless of the innovations in its production chain), or, naturally, in both of 
them. Cf. Benazzo (2014), p. 113 ff.
39  Art. 25, paragraph 2, Governmental Decree October 18th, 2012, no. 179, Converted 
into Law no. 221, December 17th, 2012,– hereinafter “Start-up Decree”.
40  Art. 25, paragraph 3, Start-up Decree.
41  Art. 26, Start-up Decree.
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istered as Innovative Start-ups are entitled to have in their articles provisions 
regarding their own membership interests, allowing that such quote (stakes in 
the company) can be categorized. The quote that belong to each category must 
have the same rights, even departing from the rule set down by Art. 2468, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, Italian Civil Code.42 In the special categories (or classes) of 
membership interests just mentioned there is also the possibility of affecting 
the members’ voting rights, even having classes of membership interests com-
pletely deprived of the right to vote, or with a limited voting right.43
Besides that, the membership interests of Innovative Start-ups can be 
publicly bid for on the market,44 even using specific online services the Gov-
ernmental Decree establishes for this purpose, via an equity crowdfunding 
operation.45 The Decree explicitly states that this possibility is a derogation to 
the provision laid down in Art. 2468, paragraph 1, Italian Civil Code.46
If we consider that the rules mentioned deal with two of the three topics 
that can be considered the “inner sanctum” of the s.r.l. as a company form 
as distinct from the s.p.a., their relevance is naturally extremely meaningful.
The fact that the membership interests can be grouped into homogeneous 
classes, and that the membership interests belonging to each class have the 
same rights and duties, makes such membership interests substantially very 
similar to the stocks of a public company. It is true that the rule does not 
explicitly require that the membership interests grouped in classes must all 
have the same par value, as happens for the s.p.a. stocks; their similarity with 
the stocks is, however, very strong.
In the same vein, when the Act we are describing amends the Financial 
Markets Code by introducing the rules for a new primary online market for 
the allocation of the membership interests issued by the Innovative Start-ups, 
this clearly clashes with the general theory of the s.r.l., and its very nature as 
a private company.47
42  Art. 26, paragraph 2, Start-up Decree.
43  Art. 26, paragraph 3, Start-up Decree.
44  Art. 26, paragraph 5, Start-up Decree.
45  Art. 30, Start-up Decree.
46  Besides those just mentioned, the Decree on Innovative Start-ups sets down many 
additional derogations to general rules applicable to the s.r.l., for instance in the area of 
financial assistance, delayed terms for capital reduction in case of severe losses, issue of 
hybrid financial instruments, and so on. The exceptions I have described more closely, 
however, are of the utmost importance from the systematic point of view.
47  As is explicitly recognised by the Decree itself, in Art. 26, when it states the depar-
ture from the rules laid down in Art. 2468, paragraph 1, Civil Code.
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In different terms, then, we can say that the exceptions to the general rules 
applicable to the s.r.l. introduced by the Act on Innovative Start-ups substan-
tially take the s.r.l. back to a model similar to that of the s.p.a.. They impact 
on two areas of the rules of the s.r.l. that had not been brought closer to the 
s.p.a. even in the period 1942-2003, when the s.r.l. was known as the “s.p.a.’s 
younger sister”. As none of the amendments referred to are obligations for 
the company members, but just possibilities, they are free either to use, or 
not, the s.r.l. Innovative Start-Up is much more similar to an s.p.a. than an 
s.r.l. before the reform of 2003/04.
Indeed, one could object that these amendments are not to be intended as 
general, as they are applicable only to an extremely limited number of s.r.l.s, 
i.e. those established fairly recently, that have some kind of an innovative 
vocation or hallmark. This was true for a little over two years.48
3.2.2. Innovative SMEs
In fact, in January 2015, the Italian lawmaker, again by means of a Gov-
ernmental Decree, decided to extend a relevant part of the exceptions the 
Innovative Start-ups were granted of to every s.r.l. with innovative character 
classified as an SME, with no need at all for the company to be in its start-up 
phase.49 The applicable definition of an SME was the notion laid down by the 
European Commission in its Recommendation 361/2003.50
The extension of the provision to the Innovative SMEs actually made 
sense. The underlying idea was that they would serve as a sort of “landing 
field” for the Innovative Start-Ups at the end of the start-up period. During 
such time, the Innovative Start-Ups benefit from several advantages, under 
Company, Labour and Tax Law; furthermore, they are allowed to draw up 
their articles adding provisions that are not consistent with the general s.r.l. 
48  But, also during that time, with the need to recognise that, after the end of the 
Start-up period, the provisions in the articles would nevertheless stay valid even if the 
company was not to be considered an Innovative Start-up any longer. 
49  Governmental Decree January 24th, 2015, no. 3, converted into Law no. 33, Art. 4, 
March 24th, 2015.
50  Commission Recommendation of 6th May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (2003/361/EC), Annex, art. 2, paragraph 1: “1. The 
category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises 
which employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding 
EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 43 million”.
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rules laid down in the Civil Code. With a view to a continuative promotion 
of the innovation, not only in the start-up phase, the regulatory intervention 
extended to the Innovative SMEs the application of many articles of the De-
cree on Innovative Start-ups.51 This means, in particular, that the same ex-
ceptions to general rules we observed for the Innovative Start-ups are also 
possible for the Innovative SMEs. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental issue 
to underline: while the exceptions in the Innovative Start-ups were thought to 
last for a time-limited period of up to five years, in the case of the Innovative 
SMEs this advantage is potentially everlasting. If the SME can show that its 
innovative nature persists – and this is to be declared on a yearly basis by the 
company directors52 – then the company continues to benefit from the pro-
motional rules just mentioned. In particular, for the purposes of this chapter, 
the Innovative SMEs, which naturally can be s.r.l., are also entitled to create 
categories or classes of their own membership interests, incorporating dif-
ferent rights for each other, and with the possibility of accessing a primary 
market for the selling of such quote, by means of equity crowdfunding.
If even just these observations show the extreme relevance of the new 
rules for the Innovative SMEs, and the huge fallout for the general system 
caused by companies taking advantage of time-unlimited derogations from 
basic general rules and principles, we must nevertheless add that the Decree 
on Innovative SMEs went far further. In fact, besides the already mentioned 
extension, it also brought in additional amendments to the rules for Innova-
tive Start-ups. 
These amendments are once again hugely relevant also from a theoretical 
and systematic perspective. They deal with the establishment of an innovative 
company, and with the trading (and not just the initial placing) of its shares 
or membership interests. To put it more simply, a new framework applicable 
to virtually every innovative company was created despite there not being a 
legal definition of innovation in this case.
As for the company’s constitution, as an alternative to the “classic” no-
tarial deed of incorporation, the Decree allows Innovative Start-ups to be 
established by using an online form with a digital signature and online mod-
el articles prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development. The same 
possibility is also granted for every amendment to the original articles.53 
51  Art. 4, paragraph 9, Decree 3/2015.
52  Art. 4, paragraph 6, Decree 3/2015.
53  Art. 4, paragraph 10bis, Decree 3/2015.
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The model articles developed for the case discussed here are fortunately 
much more detailed, and in general better, than those prepared for the sim-
plified s.r.l.54
The second deviation is even more ground-breaking from the systematic 
point of view. It is now possible not only to place newly-issued membership 
interests by means of equity crowdfunding on a public market, but also to 
trade them through enabled intermediaries, which operate in the online mar-
ket reserved for Innovative Start-ups and SMEs.55 In this case, not only is the 
ordinary notarial intervention not required but neither is the written form 
of the membership interest transfer. We should nevertheless remember that 
it had been possible to avoid notarial intervention since the Governmental 
Decree 112/2008, that enabled professional accountants to perform such ac-
tivities.56 In this system, which is a voluntary alternative to the usual one, 
the enabled intermediaries are entitled to hold the membership interests in 
their own name, but on behalf of the members, and to keep records of all the 
transactions related to the membership interests. The members are simply 
given certificates, issued by the intermediary, that entitle them to exercise 
their rights in the company.57 Evidently, this new system of membership in-
terest trading dramatically facilitates the transfer of the quote, using the on-
line platform as the place where supply and demand come together, in a way 
very similar to a stock exchange. Again, the point of the compatibility of this 
rule with the general s.r.l. principle that the company’s membership inter-
ests cannot be bid for in the open market remains unsolved, as the answer 
depends on the definition one gives of “bid to the general public” present in 
Art. 2468, ICC.
The model articles needed for the online incorporation, luckily with a more developed 
self-awareness than those available for the simplified s.r.l., were laid down by two Minis-
terial Decrees (Ministry of Economic Development): February 17th, 2016 (on the guidelines 
for the drawing up of the articles), and October 28th, 2016 (the proper model article).
54  As this way of incorporation does not require the notarial form of the deed, this 
raises issues for compatibility with the already cited Art. 10, Directive (EU) 2017/1132. 
Starting from a different case, but basically on the same issue: Licini (2015) 390 ff.
55  Art. 100ter Legislative Decree February 24th, 1998, no. 58 (hereinafter also “t.u.f.” 
or “Financial Markets Code”), paragraph 2bis.
56  Again, a new deviation from the general rule present in the Financial Markets 
Code, Art. 23, paragraph 1, laying down the prescription that all the contracts related to 
investment services must be in written form.
57  Art. 100ter t.u.f., paragraph 2bis, lett. c).
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To sum up, the derogations from the general rules applicable to the s.r.l. 
were first laid down for the Innovative Start-ups, and later extended to the 
Innovative SMEs. This naturally has repercussions in the general regulation 
of the s.r.l.s, but one could think that this is due to the innovative character of 
these companies, and the lawmakers’ clear aim to promote innovation.
3.2.3. The general extension of specific rules
This counter-argument becomes hardly defensible when it comes to the 
second extension of the derogations, decided in April 2017, again by means 
of a Governmental Decree.58 The structure of the legal provision is extremely 
simple; its fallout, epoch-making.
The black letter of the law is, indeed, extremely concise: “In Art. 26, para-
graphs 2, 5 and 6 of the Governmental Decree October 18th, 2012, no. 179, 
converted, with amendments, into Law no. 221,December 17th, 2012, , the 
words ‘Innovative Start-ups’ and ‘Innovative Start-up’, wherever they occur, 
are replaced by ‘SME”. Even if there is not a complete extension to the entire 
realm of the SMEs of all the rules applicable to the Innovative Start-ups (as 
only some paragraphs are referenced, and not all of them), many important 
provisions become nevertheless applicable to the latter.
As for the objective extension of the exceptions to the general rule, it deals 
again with the most relevant issues we have discussed so far. 
Regarding the possibility for the s.r.l. to issue categorized membership 
interests, the quote can be aggregated in homogenous classes, each with its 
proper rights. As the norm does not mention paragraph 3 of Art. 26, d.lgs. 
179/2012, it is questionable whether the s.r.l. SMEs are entitled to issue class-
es of membership interests with partial or even no voting rights. However, 
the answer should be affirmative, due to the wording of paragraph 3: “the 
companies paragraph 2 refers to”.59
As regards market access, the extended scope of the derogation mentioned 
in paragraph 5, d.lgs. 179/2012, now allows all the SMEs established in the 
form of an s.r.l. to use the online platform in order to take advantage of the 
crowdfunding for the initial placement of their membership interests, and for 
the facilitated transfer of the quote by means of enabled intermediaries. 
Furthermore, the deviation is also extended for the permission of financial 
58  Governmental Decree April 24th, 2017, no. 50, converted into Law no. 96, Art. 5, 
June 21st, 2017. 
59  For a very convincing overall panorama, see Cian (2018) and Speranzin (2018).
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assistance to the company’s employees, as derogation to Art. 2474 ICC, that 
forbids in a general way any kind of financial assistance for the s.r.l.
Now, from the objective point of view, there is nothing new in the exten-
sions. The disruptive novelty regards the subjective aspect. In fact, if so far 
we have faced rather subjectively-limited derogations, justified on the basis of 
a supposed policy in favour of innovation, the extension we are now dealing 
with has nothing to do with innovation, as all the exceptions are applicable 
to every s.r.l. SME, regardless of its innovative feature. The point is that the 
lawmakers have made the understanding of what an s.r.l. SME is anything 
but clear.
We had as a reference model the s.r.l. Innovative SMEs, already discussed, 
where the legislation explicitly made reference to the definition of an SME 
provided for by the EU Recommendation 2003/361/EC;60 the d.l. 50/2017, in 
spite of the huge fallout of its Art. 57 on the general system of the s.r.l., does 
not even mention the criteria for a company being held as an SME. We can 
reasonably assume that they are the same as we have some evidence of this, 
not in the d.l. 50/2017,61 but in the Financial Markets Code, which regulates 
SME access to the open market via the online platform. It is easy to remember 
that the possibility for an s.r.l. to use specific online platforms for placing its 
membership interests by means of a crowdfunding operation was first grant-
ed only to Innovative Start-ups. The Decree that introduced the Innovative 
Start-ups consistently modified the Financial Markets code, in order to regu-
late the online platforms;62 the eventual extensions (first to Innovative SMEs, 
and later just to SMEs) simply intervened in the field of financial markets by 
amending those original provisions. This means that in the current version of 
60  Art. 4, paragraph 1, Decree 3/2015. The definition of Recommendation 2003/361/
EC can be found above, footnote 49.
61  Governmental Decree April 24th, 2017, converted into Law no. 96, June 21st, 2017,. 
No definition was present either in the Act for State Financial Stability 232/2016, Art. 1, 
paragraph 70, which was the first but incomplete source for the extension of the regime 
originally intended just for the Innovative Start-ups to all the SMEs in the form of the 
s.r.l., at least in the area of financial markets. Such regulatory intervention, then, had to 
be integrated by the d.l. 50/2017, in order to rectify some applicative mistake brought in 
by Law 232/2016, and this is why, in the interest of a simplification in the exposition and 
due to the temporal proximity of the two different amendments, I did not mention Law 
232/2016 in the text.
62  Namely, Arts 50quinquies and 100ter of the Financial Markets Code, introduced 
by Art. 30, d.l. 179/2012.
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Arts 50quinquies and 100ter t.u.f., where there was originally a reference to 
the Innovative Start-ups, we can now find only a general mention of SMEs. 
The need for a clear definition of SME for the purposes of the access to the 
market was therefore felt also in the field of financial markets law. Art. 1 of 
the Financial Markets Code provides for a definition of the platform, in para-
graph 5novies. Again, the paragraph was introduced by d.l. 179/2012, and 
eventually amended several times; in particular, the Legislative Decree for 
the implementation of EU Directive 2014/65/EU 63 introduced a definition of 
an SME. This definition, which should be held applicable also for the purpose 
of the interpretation of the word SME in the d.l. 179/2012, refers to the no-
tion given by the EU Law, no longer in the Recommendation 2003/361/EC, 
but in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, Art. 2, paragraph 1, lett. f. This definition 
encompasses the one present in the old 2003 Recommendation (“companies, 
which, according to their last annual or consolidated accounts, meet at least 
two of the following three criteria: an average number of employees during 
the financial year of less than 250, a total balance sheet not exceeding EUR 
43 000 000 and an annual net turnover not exceeding EUR 50 000 000”), 
adding a further, alternative, criterion (“small and medium-sized enterprises 
as defined in point (13) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU”). This latter 
notion is “companies that had an average market capitalisation of less than 
EUR 200 000 000 on the basis of end-year quotes for the previous three 
calendar years”.64
Now, evidently the second part of the definition is not (yet?) applicable 
to the s.r.l., as it implies a rather high market capitalisation, while we do not 
have a fully developed market for s.r.l.’s membership interests.65 The first 
part, on the other hand, does not add anything new to what we already knew 
from the Recommendation 2003/361/EC: this will also be the interpretative 
criterion for the d.l. 179/2012.
What does this mean, in actual fact? It means that, finally, the deviations 
from the rules given in the Civil Code are applicable to all the s.r.l. that, ac-
cording to their last accounts, “meet two of the following criteria: an average 
63  Legislative Decree August 3rd, 2017, no. 129, art. 1, paragraph 1, let. dd).
64  It should be noted that, consistently with the disjointed system we are describing, 
the Financial Markets Code, again in Art. 1, paragraph 2, lett. w-quater.1 already has a 
(totally different) definition of an SME, that should not be used for the interpretation of 
the situation referred to here, as it is not compatible with the realm of private companies.
65  We must remember that the definition of SME crosses the different company 
types, and is thus applicable to the s.r.l. as well as to the s.p.a. that fulfils the requirements.
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number of employees during the financial year of less than 250, a total bal-
ance sheet not exceeding EUR 43 000 000 and an annual net turnover not 
exceeding EUR 50 000 000”. This means, as stated by a prominent Italian 
scholar,66 that the definition covers 99.8% of the over one million existing 
Italian s.r.l. This being said, the distinctive feature of the s.r.l. as a company 
that cannot have recourse to the capital market has almost disappeared,67 as is 
confirmed also by the Financial Markets Code itself. In Art. 100ter, paragraph 
1bis, added by the already mentioned d.lgs. 129/2017, there is the following 
statement: “As a derogation to Art. 2468, paragraph 1, ICC, membership in-
terests of SMEs established as s.r.l. can be subject to public bid of financial 
products, also by means of the platform for the raising of capital, as far as this 
Code admits it”.
As is evident, the revolution is almost complete.68 
3.2.4. The final step: delegated management again
There is now only one obstacle for seeing an image of the s.r.l. fully com-
parable with the s.p.a.: the persisting possibility for the member of the s.r.l. to 
manage the company along with the directors, in spite of not being specifical-
ly appointed as a director (and without the use of the category of the so-called 
“shadow director”). If the description I have made so far of the evolution of 
the s.r.l. is clear enough, it should be evident that all the other hallmark fea-
tures of the s.r.l. have already faded away.
The last chapter of this certainly not straightforward and creeping vicissi-
tude is in the new Code of Business Crisis and Insolvency, which replaced the 
Bankruptcy Code in January 2019.69 The Code is the product of a reformation 
66  Giuseppe Zanarone, in his keynote speech during the congress La società a re-
sponsabilità limitata. Un modello “transtipico”, held in Turin, March 21st, 2019.
67  The paradox is that of the 0.2% must be regarded as the “real” s.r.l.: those compa-
nies that are by their size more similar to the s.p.a., that are subject to the general rules of 
the s.r.l.
68  Furthermore, we can add that the State Financial Stability Act for the year 2019 
(Law December 30th, 2018, no. 145, in Art. 1, paragraphs 236 seqq.) extended the use of 
online platforms, intended so far for equity crowdfunding and membership interest trans-
fer, also to debenture financial instruments issued by SMEs, exactly as is possible for the 
s.p.a. in the (traditional) financial market. A few limitations are nonetheless present in Art. 
100ter, paragraph 1ter, Financial Markets Code, which states that only specific profession-
al investors are entitled to undersign debenture instruments issued by SMEs.
69  Legislative Decree January 12th, 2019, no. 14; many amendments to the rules re-
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process in the field of the crisis of the enterprise that began in the early years 
of 2000, and is not over yet. Since 2005, in particular, there have been many 
regulatory interventions each year, step-by-step changing many of the tools 
provided for by the Bankruptcy Law. The new Code, which has been issued 
by means of a Legislative Decree issued by the Government based on a Par-
liamentary Act that set down the basic principles to be followed,70 will enter 
into force only in September 2021. The Legislative Decree 14/2019, besides 
encompassing the Insolvency Code, also contains a few (major) amendments 
to the Civil Code, which – unlike the entire part on insolvency – already en-
tered into force in January 2019. One of them, perhaps the most discussed so 
far, deals specifically with company management.71
Using wording that was already present in the rules applicable to the s.p.a., 
the d.lgs. 14/2019 extended (not just) to the s.r.l. (but to all companies, and 
even to partnerships) the principle that an organisation’s exclusive manage-
ment belongs solely to its directors.72 In this way, the members are excluded, 
at least apparently, from the s.r.l.’s management.
The scope of this last amendment is naturally huge, even if we consider 
it alone; if, on the contrary, we put together this and all the recent modifi-
cations that have been affecting the s.r.l. over the last eight years, it is clear 
that the turnabout is actually radical. The point, however, is: did the Leg-
islative Decree on the establishment of the Insolvency Code have the sub-
stantive power to change such a core theme of the s.r.l. as an autonomous 
ferred to in the text have been proposed so far, and lastly approved by the Government 
on October 18th, 2020 and published on the Italian Official Gazette, as Legislative Decree 
October 26th, 2020, n. 147. According to Art. 40 of such Decree, fortunately, the directors’ 
exclusive management we refer to in the text is now limited to the creation of adequate 
procedures and guidelines for the administrative, organisational and accounting-related 
profiles.
70  Which is, by itself, the sign of another major transition in Italian - and not just 
Italian – Enterprise Law, which no longer sees bankruptcy as a social stigma , but an oc-
casion for a “fresh start”, as pointed out also in EU documents, for instance “Report of 
the expert group: A second chance for entrepreneurs: Prevention of bankruptcy, simpli-
fication of Bankruptcy procedures and support for a fresh start”, January 2011, available 
online: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/10451/attachments/1/translations/
en/renditions/native
71  For different opinions on the issue: Rossi/Di Cataldo (2018), Ibba (2019), 250 ff., 
De Angelis (2019), 14 ff., Calvosa (2019).
72  Arts. 2357, 2475 Civil Code.
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company form? In fact, the Insolvency Code only had the task of dealing with 
insolvent companies and enterprises, also by preventing insolvencies, while 
the rule on directors’ exclusive management power is always applicable to 
companies and partnerships, and not only in the proximity of an insolvency 
situation. Furthermore, even if the Insolvency Code introduced the new rule, 
it did not amend or repeal any of the still existing regulations, which control, 
for instance, the liability of those members who intentionally decided or au-
thorised acts (i.e.: acting as directors in their management capability) that 
caused damage to the company.73
These circumstances, among others, led the literature to adopt, in this first 
year after the issuance of the Insolvency Code, an undecided, or, better, a di-
vided approach. The key division is between those who still think that there 
should be an autonomous place for the s.r.l., and thus believe that the inter-
pretation of the new legislation must be somehow restrictive74; and others who 
hold that, in spite of there not being a formal repeal of all the remaining regu-
lations linked to the amended ones, the s.r.l. is now similar to the s.p.a. also as 
far as managerial liability is concerned. To put it shortly, the Italian scholars 
are discordant on either resisting or surrendering to the new idea of the s.r.l. 
This leads us to some final remarks. Or, better, to some remarks, as we 
have already seen that very few conclusions can be held as final when it comes 
to the Italian s.r.l.
4. Some possible final remarks
The short journey we have made through the vicissitudes of the Italian 
s.r.l. over the last few years have shown rather clearly that we have been fac-
ing an undoubted transition. It is very hard to say whether this transition has 
currently come to an end, or not. Actually, I think it depends very much not 
only on the data relating to legislation, but also on the scholars’ opinion, once 
it has stabilized, and – above all – on the courts’ decisions, once a meaningful 
amount of time has passed to benefit also from jurisprudential interpretation.
If we look just at the legislative data, the panorama is rather clear. The 
general idea is that the s.r.l. is losing all of its distinctive features, apart from 
the persisting possibility of a tailor-made design which benefits also from the 
73  Art. 2476 Civil Code.
74  According to the new wording laid down in D.Lgs. 147/2020, this seems to be the 
winning interpretation.
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partnership rules, if the founding members so decide. The difference from 
the s.p.a., therefore, would simply be an enhanced degree of customisation, 
possible in the s.r.l., and not allowed (or, at least, not so widely) in the s.p.a. 
Besides this, the s.r.l. would not be substantially different from the s.p.a.
This situation is likely to have several outcomes. On the one hand, the first 
general idea would be that there is no need for two different company forms 
in Italian Business Law. If we say that the key legal features of the s.p.a. and 
the s.r.l. are substantially the same,75 there is no reason for maintaining two 
organisational forms: just one company form, perhaps with a modular ap-
proach, would probably be sufficient. This conclusion has to do with a specific 
Company Law policy that, evidently, the Italian lawmaker still has not ad-
opted in a formal and systematic way. Nevertheless, the legislation described 
here shows that this should be understood as the substantial line of conduct.
The second fallout is probably more interesting, and deals with the in-
terpretation of the regulations and company’s articles related to the s.r.l. In 
spite of being an autonomous company form, the corpus of the regulations 
specifically applicable to the società a responsabilità limitata is far small-
er than those laid down for the regulation of the società per azioni.76 This 
means that many of the legal tools known by the s.r.l. are not fully regulated, 
as happens in the case of the s.p.a., and to a greater extent for listed s.p.a. The 
price paid for the freedom of designing the company enjoyed by the founding 
members of an s.r.l. is that the rules emanating from the members’ free will 
must on the one hand comply with the mandatory regulations, and on the 
other hand, when they deviate from a legal default solution, should include a 
reasonably complete set of prescriptions. When this does not happen, which 
is rather frequent in practice, the need for an interpretation becomes urgent; 
and the same happens with the interpretation of the legal norms applicable to 
an s.r.l., when the regulatory framework is not complete.
In these cases, however, the interpretation must take place not consid-
ering just the wording of the legislation, which is often insufficient for find-
ing an adequate solution, but the actual and comprehensive situation of the 
specific company whose rules are being interpreted. This applies even more 
when it comes to the s.r.l., which by virtue of the members’ autonomy is legit-
75  Naturally, besides the minimum capital required for the establishment of a compa-
ny, and the higher degree of customisation proper to the s.r.l.
76  Just with rough figures, a little more than 30 articles for the s.r.l. against more than 
150 for the s.p.a.
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imated – and currently even more than ever – to assume extremely different 
basic attitudes, from para-partnership, to para-public company. A one-size-
fits-all interpretative approach naturally cannot work properly, and finding 
interpretative benchmarks, and criteria for deciding when to use a certain 
benchmark instead of another, is indispensable.
One could be tempted to think that, at the end of the day, even the count-
er-reformation trend we examined above does not substantially change the 
panorama. If it is true that the newer laws allow an s.r.l. to be more similar 
to an s.p.a., this does not mean that it must necessarily be so. This is just an 
option, and not an obligation: when the members decide to use this opportu-
nity, and thus to structure the s.r.l. in a form more similar to the s.p.a., then 
(also from the interpretative point of view) the s.p.a. will become, for that 
actual company, the paradigm for solving the exegetic problems that could 
arise. This is naturally true. The fallout could nevertheless be an unwant-
ed and somehow epidemic expansion of the s.p.a. rules as an interpretative 
benchmark for the s.r.l. also in cases where it is not strictly necessary. This 
scenario would substantially deprive of any relevance the formally still exist-
ing distinction between the s.p.a. and the s.r.l., to the detriment of those s.r.l.s 
that are, in the range of all the possible configurations, closer to partnerships, 
or even to those in the “neutral” middle sector.77
Again on the issue of the interpretation, however, there is also another side 
to the story. We have so far considered the interpretation from the s.p.a. (i.e.: 
using originally s.p.a. principles and rules) to the s.r.l.; a substantial equali-
sation, however, is likely to have outcomes also the other way around, from 
s.r.l. to s.p.a. Indeed, there are some rules present in the s.r.l. corpus that do 
not have an equivalent in the s.p.a., for instance as far as the corporate gov-
ernance models are concerned,78 or again for the treatment of the company’s 
financing by members other than contributions.79
If we really admit such an extended substantial assimilation between the 
s.r.l. and the s.p.a., we should also admit some kind of an osmosis as far as 
the formal rules are involved, irrespective of an explicit reference to the use 
of the s.p.a. or s.r.l. rules when specific regulation is missing respectively in 
s.r.l. or in s.p.a. 
77  On this issue, see again Cian (2019).
78  Art. 2475 Civil Code allows the s.r.l. the use of the governance systems specific to 
partnerships (Art. 2357 s. Civil Code), which is not (explicitly?) admitted for the s.p.a.
79  See Art. 2467 Civil Code.
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Personally, I am not sure at all that this is a desirable solution, because, 
again, this would go against the idea of an s.r.l. as the main organisation form 
for “real” SMEs, and micro-enterprises, where the use of the rules established 
for the s.p.a. could be extremely resource-consumptive. Naturally, not all of 
the above mentioned risks can be avoided just by means of interpretative 
choices; the attitude of the legislator for making the s.r.l.’s legal environment 
closer to that of the s.p.a. is undeniable, and must be taken into full consid-
eration when dealing with the “new” s.r.l. This is also the case if we can try to 
weaken – in my opinion, correctly – the last disruptive fallout coming from 
the Insolvency Code: the previous amendments we discussed are not subject 
to an equally reductive interpretation, and they do not deal only with national 
Italian Law. Actually, even if private company law has traditionally been out 
of the main scope of application of the harmonisation process put in place by 
the European Union in the field of Company Law, leaving private companies 
to a substantial regulatory competition among the Member States,80 we have 
already seen that the general provision on the access of SMEs – and thus, of 
private companies – to capital markets comes from an EU legal instrument.81 
This European Union attitude, evidently, on the one hand, cannot take into 
consideration all of the peculiarities specific to private companies in every 
Member State – and thus disregards, for instance, the prohibition to access 
capital markets set down by Art. 2468, paragraph 1, ICC – and in the flexible 
terms of a Directive tries to establish a not-too-problematic common legal 
framework regarding the goals, leaving the States relative freedom with ref-
erence to the actual means. On the other hand, it indicates that the ultimate 
distinction that the European lawmaker is drawing is not based on the formal 
type according to which the companies are formed, but on the substantive 
data relating to their dimension, i.e. a distinction between large enterprises, 
and SMEs. Such a situation seems to be followed, at least partially, also by 
the Italian Law: the approximation of the s.r.l. and s.p.a. rules means that 
the basic rules laid down for the s.p.a. are generally applicable also to the 
s.r.l., de facto creating just one company macro-type. Furthermore, the spe-
cific rules set down for larger companies, generically identifiable as open and 
listed companies, create a new specific class of companies, which, as we have 
80  Bartolacelli (2017).
81  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and the Council, on markets 
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU 
(so-called MiFID 2 Directive).
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already seen, do not necessarily belong just to the realm of the s.p.a. In con-
clusion, we are facing a complete paradigm shift.
The scenario we have just depicted, however, allows for a couple of further 
more general remarks on another transition we are currently facing – also, 
but not only – in Italian Company Law.
On the one hand, it is rather clear that we are currently passing through a 
time of dangerous superficiality in the drafting of regulatory texts. The bigger 
risk – or certainty? – is that this has to do more with a conceptual indecision 
than with technically poor skills in legal drafting. Too often, it is not fully clear 
what the single Acts are actually meant to regulate, in their scope of applica-
tion, or even in the very rules they are supposed to set down. In an extremely 
short time, an Act can be subject to several reiterated amendments, which 
substantially modify the original settings, as is evident, for instance, if we 
look at the vicissitudes of the simplified s.r.l.82
The effect of this on the technical means of legislation should be evident to 
the shrewder readers: the vast majority of the amendments made in the field 
of Company Law during the last years have been brought in by means of a 
Governmental Decree (decreto legge). The decreto legge is by its very nature 
an exceptional measure allowed under the Italian Constitution to grant the 
central Government the opportunity to regulate a specific issue with no need 
for a prior passage through Parliament. This permits the Government to issue 
ad hoc rules that are needed in situations of emergency, and Parliament has 
the right to ratify these emergency rules within 60 days. Now, it is evident 
that none of the rules described above has an emergency nature. On the con-
trary, all of them are long-lasting modifications, whose raison d’être did not 
lie in occasional circumstances, but in a – hopefully conscious – change of 
paradigm. 
On the other hand, as a Governmental Decree is usually issued in a very 
short time, there is not always the opportunity for the government to use its 
best discernment in drafting the legislation. This supplementary request for 
wisdom is de facto transferred to the Parliament, while converting, within 
60 days, the Decree into a proper Act. The system works properly if there is 
not an abuse in the use of the Governmental Decree; otherwise, Parliament 
gets clogged up with Decree conversions and their short deadlines prevents it 
82  And not to mention that, during the years 2012/13 only, a further low-cost sub-ver-
sion of the s.r.l., the società a reponsabilità limitata a capitale ridotto, appeared as an 
alternative to the simplified s.r.l. See, for further details, Bartolacelli (2016), pp. 670-673.
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from paying the due attention to the examination of each one of them.83 This 
is exactly what commonly happens with Company Law-related Governmen-
tal Decrees: the formal conversion into an Act normally simply confirms the 
original text, or even adds further rules to it, without repealing anything.84 
The final consequence is that an in-depth investigation into the measures 
contained in a Governmental Decree is rather rare, with the obvious fallout 
on the general quality of the legislative action.
Again, the above mentioned situation leads us to the final issue I would 
like to underline: the relevance of the sources, and of their stability. Classi-
cally speaking, the system of the main sources in Italian Company Law is not 
particularly difficult to understand: the main provisions for all the partner-
ships and companies lie in the Civil Code. The additional rules for listed com-
panies are in a specific Financial Markets Code (Testo Unico dell’Intermedi-
azione Finanziaria), and special rules for some peculiar sectors (Insurances, 
Banks…) have their specific Acts and Codes. In general, we can say that it is a 
sort of irradiation system: the Civil Code is the sun, and its rays expand to the 
sectorial specific rules.
Even without considering other very relevant consequences,85 we must 
here call to mind that in 2017, the most numerically relevant regulatory mod-
ification to the law governing the s.r.l., which affected the 99.8% of Italian 
private companies, took place by means of a Governmental Decree that did 
not even change a paragraph in the Civil Code. The d.l. 50/2017, and its Con-
version Act, simply extended to virtually every s.r.l. some of the substantial 
rules applicable (originally, only) to the Innovative Start-ups; and these latter 
rules, in turn, were laid down by means of another Governmental Decree, 
derogating, but not amending the Civil Code provisions.
The paradoxical situation we now witness is a company form, the s.r.l., 
whose regulation – according to the general system – should be almost en-
tirely present in the Civil Code, that has derogations to the general rules pro-
vided for by a Governmental Decree, and applicable to the almost entirety 
of the concerned companies, applicable by virtue of another Governmental 
83  See also, in this book, the chapter by Gianni Di Cosimo.
84  Also because the Governmental Decree by its very nature enters into force imme-
diately after being issued. This means that an eventual Conversion Act by Parliament that 
repeals a part of the content of the Decree, or even does not convert it within the deadline, 
causes an actual prejudice to the people who validly relied on the rules present in the De-
cree and in force since its issue.
85  Speranzin (2019).
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Decree. The hierarchy of the sources of the s.r.l. is evidently upside down, 
and this goes to the detriment of the people possibly interested in founding 
an s.r.l., who are not in the position of being personally aware of the full ap-
plicable regulatory framework.
On the other hand, it seems that the trust in the certainty and the stability 
of the regulations and the legislative systems is not among the priorities of the 
Italian lawmaker. We will see in the near future if the legislative amendments 
that really revolutionized the face of the s.r.l., apart from creating a chaotic 
situation from the interpretative point of view, at least succeeded in providing 
a further development in the use of this legal tool.
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The evolution of the form of government in Italy
Giovanni Di Cosimo
1. Parliamentary government; 2. Two phases; 3. Weak rationalization; 4. Parliament and 
Government;  5. Parties in transformation; 6. Alternation in Government; 7. Strengthen-
ing the Government; 8. Two scenarios
1. Parliamentary government
The Constituent Assembly opted for a form of parliamentary government. 
A decisive argument put forward during the discussion in favour of the par-
liamentary system was the concern over an excessive concentration of pow-
er. The wish not to repeat the experience of the fascist regime as well as the 
veil of ignorance regarding the result of the political elections that were to 
be held on 18th April, 1948 led the political forces to prefer a parliamentary 
government in which the executive and legislative branches were bound by 
a relationship of trust as this was thought to best safeguard the losers.1 The 
adoption of the symmetric bicameral system that assigns the same powers to 
the two chambers can also be ascribed to this line of reasoning.
Similar concerns conditioned the choice of electoral regulations and led to 
the adoption of the proportional system which faithfully reflects the balance 
of power between the parties decided by the electorate, unlike the majoritar-
ian systems that reward the political forces that emerge as  winners at the 
polls. Even the decision to introduce a new level of decentralized government, 
halfway between the State and the local administrative bodies (communes 
and provinces) can be seen as associated with the diffidence felt towards the 
concentration of power. In fact, the legislative function was distributed upon 
the centre-periphery axis, albeit in a rather unequal way.
In short, the Constituent Assembly steered towards institutional solu-
tions that focused on the balanced distribution of power regarding the form 
of government (parliamentary), the form of state (regional) and the electoral 
law (proportional representation).2 As we shall see, this orientation seems, 
1  Paladin (2004) 61. 
2  The principal concern of the Constituent Assembly was “to guarantee a balance in 




at least partly and in various ways, to have been abandoned in the course of 
time. The evolution of the form of government has taken a different direction 
given that the equilibrium between Parliament and Government has shifted 
in favour of the latter.
2. Two phases
In over seventy years, many events have shaken the republican institu-
tions. Consider, just to cite some episodes, the resignation in 1964 of Pres-
ident Segni who was seriously ill; of the Lockheed trial in 1977 against two 
ministers found guilty of corruption by the Constitutional Court; of the for-
mation of the Andreotti IV Cabinet in 1978, that saw the communist party 
have a parliamentary majority for the first time, an event which coincided 
with the kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the terrorist organization The Red Bri-
gades. Moro was a Christian Democrat politician who had worked to promote 
the extension of the government coalition to include a part of the left. Con-
sider also the parliamentary speech of the ex Prime Minister Craxi in 1992 in 
which he admitted that the funding of the parties was for the most part illegal. 
More generally, there was a succession of different political phases ranging 
from the initial centrism to centre left to the so-called five-party coalition.
Yet, in this whole period there were no important changes in the internal 
balance of the parliamentary form of government. The political orientation, 
in other words, the big political decisions made at national level, continued to 
be taken within the circuit between the Parliament and the Government, with 
the former in the predominant role. In fact, it largely endorsed the will of the 
parties who were the undisputed protagonists of republican life.
With the 1993 referendum things changed significantly as it spelled the 
end of proportional representation, one of the cornerstones on which rested 
the equilibrium of the form of government in place until then. A mixed sys-
tem was then introduced that aimed to entrust the electorate with not only the 
selection of members of parliament3 but also with the choice of government. 
From then on the political panorama changed profoundly so that the old par-
ties were replaced by new political groups; at this point even the ideological 
divisions had much less importance and were no longer centred around the 
conflict between the soviet block and western countries.
was considered the cause of the dysfunctions and crisis of the liberal pre-fascist regime”. 
Ghisalberti (2010) 422.
3  Cassese (2014) 82.
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Of course, even in this phase, moments of institutional tension are evident 
(for example, the 2011 government crisis when the President of the Republic 
faced with the plummeting confidence in the financial markets in the country 
appointed a technocrat who was not a member of the parties; or the re-elec-
tion of the President in 2013 for the first time in the history of the Republic 
waiving the customary rule that aims at avoiding excessive length of the pres-
idential mandate; or again, the laborious formation of the Government after 
the March 2018 elections, marked by the conflict over the nomination of the 
Treasury Minister and by the subsequent request to impeach the President 
put forward by the head of the relative majority party and then speedily with-
drawn). But what is new after 1993 is that the internal equilibrium of the form 
of parliamentary government changed and a process of evolution in the form 
of government was set in motion.
3. Weak rationalization
The root of it all is the brief duration of the governments, the government 
instability. Strictly speaking, this had been a problem even before but was 
only seen as serious in the second phase, when the negative conditioning it 
exerted on decision-making became even stronger.4 Political parties there-
fore implemented institutional measures to tackle it and achieve so-called 
governability. And it is these institutional measures themselves that altered 
the initial balance.
Let us take a closer look at this point. According to the current analysis, 
one of the reasons given to explain the government instability is the terseness 
of the constitutional rules relating to the form of government (actually anoth-
er still more important cause is the political instability which however cannot 
be tackled with institutional measures because it depends on causes that are 
endogenous to the party system, causes that can be ascribed to the nature of 
political culture). When the Constituent Assembly following Perassi’s agenda 
approved on 5th September, 1946, stated it was in favour of the parliamentary 
system, it suggested introducing “suitable constitutional provisions to safe-
guard the need for stability of government action and to prevent the degen-
eration of parliamentarianism.” However the final constitutional text gives a 
restrictive interpretation of the mechanisms of stabilization; it outlines a low 
4  However it is also true that the length of the government does not automatically 
assure the efficiency of its action: see Sartori (2017) 520.
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rationalized parliamentary government, basically limiting itself to envisaging 
the role of the President of the Republic as that of guarantor and political 
arbiter while to the Constitutional Court it assigned the task of guaranteeing 
the supremacy of the constitution.
It is actually these attempts to find a solution to the weak rationalization 
that have set in motion the evolutionary process of the form of government. 
In short, the evolution of the form of government is connected with a series 
of concepts that link the weak rationalization to the terseness of the consti-
tutional text held responsible for government instability. Viewed in reverse 
order, starting from government instability, it is possible to trace back to the 
supposed cause which is the terseness of the constitutional text, and therefore 
to the need to increase the rationalization of the  parliamentary government 
through measures, that, and this is the point that interests us, have the effect 
of alternating the equilibria of the form of government.
Over the years since the establishment of the Republic, several institutional 
measures have been tried in order to stabilize the form of government follow-
ing the guidance of the Perassi agenda: the path of electoral reform (starting 
from 1953 when the “swindle law” was approved, whose majoritarian effects 
never actually came into force);  restructuring the parties, and constitutional 
reform.5 What these three paths have in common is that they brought about 
evolutionary and modifying effects to the form of government. It should be 
pointed out that over time other evolutionary effects stemmed from the rela-
tions between consitutional bodies. This was a factor that emerged from the 
practice and which is evident in the standpoint of the rationalization itself.6
In conclusion, in order to understand how the form of government has 
evolved, it is necessary to bear in mind all these factors. In so doing, we see 
that the combination of the institutional measures put in place to overcome 
the weak rationalization of the form of government (the constitutional and 
electoral reforms, as well as the restructuring of the parties) and the practice 
which also tends towards that goal, produce three important developments: 
the first relating to the relationship between the Legislature and the Execu-
tive; the second to the role of the parties; the third to the government coali-
tions.
5  Elia (2008) 7 ff. 
6  On the concept of constitutional amendments see Bartole (2019) 335 ff. 
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4. Parliament and Government
On several occasions over the years the legislator has focused attention on the 
relationship between the Legislature and the Executive. Political parties have 
pushed for both constitutional and electoral reforms. However some reforms 
have not even seen the light of day while others have been of short duration.
As early as the 1980s, the opportunity to reform the republican Constitu-
tion began to be discussed. From different quarters amendments were called 
for in support of the need to consolidate the executive. However, the work of 
the bicameral commissions set up for the purpose came to nought. The con-
stitutional rules relating to the relationship between Parliament, Government 
and the President of the Republic remained unaltered.
On two occasions Parliament definitively approved important con-
stitutional reforms. The first time in the Autumn of 2005 the centre-right 
launched a reform that concentrated power in the hands of the Prime Min-
ister, outlining a system that has been defined as “absolute premiership”.7 
However the following year the reform was rejected by popular referendum. 
The success of the reform of electoral law, approved at the same time as the 
constitutional reform, was more short-lived. In 2014 the Constitutional Court 
found it unconstitutional on account of the majority bonus which “causes an 
excessive split between the composition of the political representative body, 
which is at the hub of of the representative democracy system and the form 
of parliamentary government foreseen by the Constitution, and the will of the 
citizens expressed through the vote, which is the principal instrument of the 
manifestation of popular sovreignty.” (sent.1/2014).
Eleven years on and it was the turn of the centre-left majority to put for-
ward a constitutional reform which, among other things, impacted on the 
balance of the form of government, in the sense that it strengthened the Gov-
ernment and Prime Minister, although in a different and less disruptive way 
compared with the preceding attempt.8 Yet the reform was rejected in the De-
cember 2016 referendum, suffering the same fate as that of the centre-right.
At the same time, the centre-left launched a new electoral law formulated 
within the same reform project, just as the centre-right had done. The goal 
of combining the constitutional amendment and electoral change was to 
strengthen the Government. Just like the preceding one, this law was also 
7  Elia (2005). 
8  Cheli (2016) 2 f.; Pace (2016).
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quashed by the Constitutional Court, which observed that the goal of achiev-
ing government stability excessively compromised the representative nature 
of the parliamentary assembly contravening the principle of the balance of 
power, given that “in a form of parliamentary government, each electoral sys-
tem, even though if must foster the formation of a stable government, can 
only primarily be intended to assure the constitutional value of representa-
tion” (sent. 35/2017).
Recently the developments in the form of government could be condi-
tioned by the reduction in the number of parliamentarians approved in the 
current legislature. The immediate effect of this constitutional change risks 
further weakening Parliament, with the consequent impact on the equilibri-
um of the government.9
As already stated, all these reforms aim to re-enforce the Executive with-
out really succeeding. It is important to note that the goal is achieved anyway 
due to some changes in the relationship between Parliament and Govern-
ment that have slipped into the established practices, that is, as a result of 
unwritten rules, the behaviour of the constitutional bodies, and mainly of the 
Government itself. I will recap briefly.10 The first is the progressive predom-
inance of government legislation over parliamentary law: a quantative and 
qualitative supremacy since the most important political decisions are ad-
opted through the regulatory laws of the Government, in particular the legis-
lative decree. The second is the emergence of the Executive as the  principal 
interlocutor of European institutions which is having an increasing impact on 
the internal legal system. The third is the growing power of the executive in 
the organization of the public administration. The fourth is the ever increas-
ing abuse by the Government of certain institutions of parliamentary life, in 
particular the confidence vote combined with the use of major amendments. 
The latter is the progressive imposition of the will of the Government in de-
fining the content of the budgets put before Parliament.11
5. Parties in transformation
Another important development involves the parties which have been 
transformed over time with the result that even their role in the functioning 
9  See Ciaurro (2019) 113 f.; Algostino (2019).
10  For a more detailed analysis cf. Di Cosimo (2014) 34 ff.
11  Cf. Di Cosimo (2019 a)  207 ff.
INNOVATION AND TRANSITION IN LAW
343
of the parliamentary government has changed.12 In recent times, the transfor-
mation has followed two principal paths.13
The first is summarized by the expression personal parties.14 From the begin-
ning of the Republic the parties were places in which to make decisions concern-
ing power that were intended to be then trasferred to the institutional circuit. 
However the twentieth century mass-based parties were also places of collective 
reflection aimed at giving a well-debated foundation to those decisions. Where-
as the current parties have almost completely lost this planning function and 
seem to be mainly electoral machines at the service of their leader, so that the 
political policies express primarily his/her will and that of his/her acolytes.
The second path of transformation concerns the digital parties.15 Forms of 
political communication have changed as a result of the internet and informa-
tion technologies. Supporters’ loyalty is progressively won through social me-
dia and it is above all the leader who puts him/herself in a direct relationship 
with the followers. Furthermore, the use of the internet alters the organization 
of the parties. Fundamental functions like the selection of candidates for elec-
tions are now carried out using digital platforms to which members have ac-
cess. The 5 Star Movement has been a pioneer in this since it chose its political 
leader in September 2017 using its Rousseau platform. It then confirmed him 
in the role after the disastrous defeat in the European Elections of May 2019, 
and a few months later rejected his political line on regional elections.
Hence both paths of transformation, summarized under the labels person-
al party and digital party are competing to boost the role of their leaders, the 
heads of the party, giving rise to the second important development in parlia-
mentary government. Other ideas based on the concept of direct democracy 
and political disintermediation which are taking hold in the political cultural 
arena 16 are leading to the same result. These are ideas that downgrade Par-
liament to a mere conduit of political communication and which consider of 
paramount importance the digital channel where tools like the above-men-
tioned platform operate.17
Above all, if the first two important developments in the form of govern-
12  On the transformation of the parties see Cossiri (2018); De Fiores (2018); R. Cal-
vano (2017); Scuto (2017).
13  See Di Cosimo (2019 b). 
14  Calise (2010); Musella (2019).
15  See Gerbaudo (2019).
16  See Bassanini (2019) 45 ff.
17  Morrone (2018) 11.
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ment are considered together, it is evident that a process of concentration of 
power in favour of the Government and the party leaders is underway and 
that this reaches its apex when the head of the Government is at the same 
time a party leader as occurred with Berlusconi and Renzi. 
6. Alternation in Government
The third important development concerns the freeing up of the “blocked 
democracy”, namely the situation where the government was continuously 
led by the Christian Democrats and their allies because of the conventio ad 
excludendum which was then dropped at the end of the Seventies.18 Finally 
with the 1994 elections the bipolar approach was established and the alter-
nation of the political forces in government. The coalitions of centre-right 
and centre-left competed for the government headed by leaders nominated 
as Prime Minister. All this came about due to the new electoral regulations 
that led to the abandoning of proportional representation.19 Obviously the 
decision to structure the political system in two alternative poles played an 
important role.
Nevertheless in 2011 as touched on above, at the height of the grave eco-
nomic-financial crisis, the mechanism jammed making it necessary to form a 
technical government under the economist Monti. Two years later, the return 
of the political governments did not go hand-in-hand with the re-establish-
ment of the alternation between the coalitions. The success in the polls of 
the 5 Star Movement led to the restructuring of the political system based on 
three political orientations. The situation was repeated in the 2018 elections 
partly as a result of a new electoral law approved the preceding year which 
arouses fears that the period of alternation between too opposing poles is 
over, replaced by alliances that are made after the vote. 
7. Strengthening of the Government
In the history of Italy’s institutions continuity and discontinuity co-exist. 
If, on the one hand, in the seventy years of the Republic the constitution-
18  The conventio ad excludendum is “an agreement, that lays down that one or more 
parties are considered outside the area disposable for parliamentary support of a Cabinet 
(…) this agreement ad excludendum becomes an actual rule of the game, binding for all 
constitutional players”: Elia (2009) 204.
19  Pasquino (2017) 5 f. 
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al rule concerning the parliamentary government has remained unaltered, 
on the other, its characteristics have been modified by the changes brought 
in through practice. The constitutional rules have remained the same since 
1948, but the structure of the form of government is markedly different. The 
changes have had debatable effects such as, principally, the greater concen-
tration of power, owing to the consolidation of the Executive branch with re-
spect to that of the Legislative and to the transformation of the parties. At this 
point, a contraposition exists between the constitutional rules that place Par-
liament at the centre of the system, and the practice that grants a preeminent 
role to the Government and Prime Minister. However, it should be pointed 
out that the first Conti Government was an exception because the leadership 
was in the hands of the two deputy prime ministers rather than the Premier. 
This practice, which strengthens, the Executive is the demonstration of the 
way in which the evolution of the form of government is heading in the oppo-
site direction to that indicated by the Constituent Assembly. Conditioned by 
the “dictator complex”, it was concerned about the balanced distribution of 
power among the constitutional bodies. And it is of significance that the turn-
ing point did not come about as a result of structural reforms, that is, of delib-
erate plans to modify the institutional rules, but as a consequence of practice.
It should also be pointed out that the strengthening of the Government 
took place despite the fact that in the 2006 and 2016 referendums the elec-
torate demonstrated that it did not want this outcome. This was possible be-
cause, on the one hand, the Constitution grants the electorate the power to 
halt the initiatives of the constitutional legislator, but on the other, it is also 
true that some of the causes of government strengthening are outside the re-
mit of the volition of the electorate. For example, relations with the European 
Union, the abuse of Government regulatory tools and the action of the Gov-
ernment in Parliament. 
Lastly, it is significant that the strengthening of the government has para-
doxically not led to the goal of greater government stability which has fueled 
the entire evolutionary process.
8. Two scenarios
In conclusion, the question which arises concerns the importance of the 
evolutionary process. Has a new form of government been put in place that 
increases the powers of the Executive and, in particular, those who lead it or 
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is the process still ongoing, and therefore this a transitionary period the out-
come of which is unknown?
The interpretation that a new form of government has replaced the old im-
plies that  parliamentary government has already been shelved, when in fact 
the constitutional rules continue to contemplate it. The grave consequence of 
this, therefore, is the negation of the prescriptive value of the Constitution  re-
garding an essential aspect of the legal system of the Republic. In reality, it 
appears that this disruptive scenario has not yet occurred. The flexible na-
ture of parliamentary government is specifically against it given its capacity 
to adapt itself to the changing political institutional scene partly as a result 
of the criticality of the constitutional rule concerning the reciprocal relations 
between the political bodies.20 At the end of the day, even the solution found 
to the government crisis in August 2019 shows that Parliament can still play a 
decisive role. It returned to centre stage in a crucial moment of the functioning 
of the parliamentary government whereas it played a lesser role in the aspects 
mentioned above.  Parliamentary government operates as long as the three 
political bodies - Parliament, Government and the President of the Republic 
- exercise the competences that the Constitution bestows on them. Or rather, 
this is the situation until one of them usurps the competences of the other, 
which appears not to have happened yet, despite the undoubted abuse that 
has taken place (for example, as regards the issuing of interlocutory decrees.)
The interpretation which most fittingly describes the current state of af-
fairs is that we are experiencing a different version of parliamentary govern-
ment which changes and is modified along the way, exploiting the margins 
of flexibility allowed by the parliamentary system.  It is a version that does 
not mean the abandonment of the parliamentary model chosen by the Con-
stitution. This interpretation acknowledges that there could be evolution in 
the future, signs of which however appear doubtful. Given that until now the 
impetus for changing the established practices has not been strong enough to 
cause the abandonment of parliamentary government, further developments 
could, equally, definitively cause its breakdown or, on the contrary, mitigate 
the conflict with the constitutional plan. The will of the electorate will be fun-
damental even though it can only be directly expressed in the terrain of insti-
tutional reforms since voters do not possess the effective tools to intervene in 
the practice. The behaviour of the parties will also be decisive as they could 
reverse the deformative processes.
20  Regarding the flexibility of the Constitution, see Fioravanti (2008).
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Finally, an important task is awaiting the Constitutional Court. In the 
spotlight is the case concerning the 2019 budget law, when the Government 
imposed an approval time that precluded parliamentary debate. However, 
the Constitutional Court did not penalize this serious infringement of parlia-
mentary prerogatives, limiting itself to issuing a warning for the future.21 A 
year on and the situation was repeated during the approval of the 2020 bud-
get, when the new majority reduced the parliamentary preogatives in much 
the same way. This raises fears that we are facing the nth slippage in terms 
of practice, a further de facto transformation in an important matter like the 
approval of the budget. But this would mean questioning the meaning of the 
evolutionary process, it would no longer be taken for granted that it led to a 
different version of the parliamentary system. The repetition of episodes like 
these involving the reduction of Parliamentary prerogatives seriously risks 
actually causing the definitive abandonment of parliamentary government.
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